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DEMOCRACY 

AND  THE 

EASTERN  QUESTION 


DEMOCRACY 

AND  THE 

EASTERN  QUESTION 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  FAR  EAST  AS  DEMON- 
STRATED BY  THE  GREAT  WAR,  AND  ITS  RE- 
LATION TO  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


BY 

THOMAS  F.  MILLARD 

Author  of  "Our  Eastern  Question,"  "The  New 

Fab  East,"  "America  and  the  Far 

Eastern  Question,"  etc. 


«e««ev*M» 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1919 


flit*/ 

Copyright,  1919,  by 
The  Centuby  Co. 


Published,  May,  1919 


DS 

mil* 

CONTENTS  cop^- 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I  The  Issue 3 

The  problem  as  posed  in  the  East — The  issue  the  same  as  in  Europe 
— Militarism  versus  democracy — Hopes  of  the  democratic  peoples  of 
Asia — Causes  of  war  in  the  far  East — Dr.  Charles  Eliot's  report — Dan- 
gerous tendencies — Protagonists  of  the  new  order — Viscount  Grey  on  a 
league  of  nations — Relation  of  the  Eastern  question  to  a  league — 
The  opposing  theory — Marquis  Okuma  on  diplomacy — Craft  and  secrecy 
its  requisites — Okuina  and  Bernhardi — Japan  and  the  question  of  alli- 
ances— Japan  and  the  spoils  of  war — Dr.  Nitobe's  opinions — The  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance — Its  relation  to  a  league  of  nations — Proposed  by 
Germanv — Reasons  for  the  alliance  analyzed — Alliances  and  the  causes 
of  war— The  war  cloud  in  the  far  East — Need  for  measures  to  prevent 
war — The    problem    and    the    United    States — Essence    of    the    problem. 

II  The  Real  Character  op  Japan 16 

Creation  of  modern  Japan — Myth  and  fable — The  parallel  with  mod- 
ern Germany — The  cult  of  emperor  divinity — Invention  of  a  new  religion 
— Japan's  historical  background — Bushido  a  recent  fabrication — Divine 
origin  of  the  Japanese  nation — The  military  autocracy — A  replica  of 
Prussianism — Why  Japan  has  mystified  the  West — Japanese  language  a 
screen — Evolution  of  Japanese  view  of  the  West — Foreign  patronage  now 
resented — Exclusion  of  "dangerous  thoughts"  from  Japan — American 
Constitution  in  that  category — A  striking  incident — Dilemma  of  Chris- 
tianity in  Japan — Trying  to  reconcile  it  with  emperor  divinity — Japan's 
constitutional  forms — Throne  not  responsible  to  people — All  rights  rest 
in  throne — Japan  and  democracy — Liberal  ideas  not  tolerated — A  theo- 
cratic state — The  Government  and  industry — Japan's  efficiency — State 
of  administration  in  Japan — Government  of  Japan's  dependencies — For- 
mosa and  Korea — A  Korean  appeal — Status  of  foreigners  in  Japan — The 
so-called  liberal  elements — Downfall  of  the  bureaucracy  predicted — 
Japan's  foreign  propaganda — Some  illustrations — Japan  after  the  war — 
Attitude  toward  league  of  nations — Question  of  armaments — Time  re- 
quired for  reform. 

III  Japan's  Policy  in  the  Great  War 48 

A  devious  course — A  policy  of  opportunism — How  it  was  circum- 
scribed— Japan's  rating  of  other  nations — "Powers"  and  lesser  nations 
— America  not  a  "power" — Why  Japan  entered  the  war — Not  so  obli- 
gated by  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance — No  quarrel  with  or  hostility  to 
Germany — Japan's  forehandedness  in  declaring  war — Her  motives  an- 
alyzed— Periods  of  Japan's  war  policy — Its  various  motivations — Gov- 
erned by  expediency  and  opportunity — Lessons  of  the  war — Making 
Japan's  army  and  navy  obsolete — How  foreigners  in  the  East  view  Japan 
— Destruction  of  former  international  standards — The  anti-British  agi- 
tation in  Japan — Control  of  publicity  by  the  Government — Secret  diplo- 
macy in  wartime — The  secret  treaty  with  Russia — Putting  pressure  on 
her  allies — Using  the  German  entente  possibility — Oblique  methods — 
The  veto  of  events — Entrance  of  America  in  the  war — The  Russian  rev- 
olution— A  German  Russo-Japanese  entente — Count  Terauchi's  views— - 
Baron  Goto's  opinions — Pro-German  sentiment  in  Japan — Japan's  posi- 
tion at  the  peace  conference — What  she  really  wants — Fear  of  political 
and  moral  isolation — The  question  of  Kiao-chou. 


vi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

IV  China  and  the  War 84 

Sentiments  of  Chinese  about  the  war — Apprehension  of  Japan — Ef- 
forts to  preserve  China's  neutrality  and  territorial  integrity — The  first 
proposal — Outline    of    the    situation — China's    rights    ana    wishes    disre- 

Sarded — Japan's  ultimatum  to  Germany — China's  sovereignty  ignored — 
■reat  Britain's  attitude — Position  of  the  United  States — Japan's  over- 
running of  Shantung — The  next  move — Japan's  twenty  one  demands — 
Her  oblique  course — The  "Agreement"  forced  upon  China — China's  pro- 
test— Statement  by  the  United  States — Dilemma  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment— China's  first  offer  to  join  the  Allies — Its  discouraging  reception 
— China's  second  offer  to  join  the  Allies — Conditions  of  this  offer — Plan 
blocked  by  Japan — Irritation  of  Japanese  press — Japan's  attitude  de- 
fined. 

V  China  and  the  War — (Continued) 102 

China's  position  in  1916 — Chinese  sentiment  about  the  war — No  tan- 
gible reason  to  fear  Germany — Real  fear  of  Japan — Suspicion  of  the 
Allies — The  United  States  takes  a  hand — Influence  of  America  at  Peking 
— Invitation  to  China  to  sever  relations  with  Germany — Diplomatic 
situation  caused  by  this  proposal — How  the  powers  stood — The  atti- 
tude of  Japan — Sounded  by  Russia — Some  secret  correspondence — 
What  Japan  wanted — British  and  French  influence — Japan's  oblique 
course — China's  internal  situation — The  United  States  advises  China — 
Questions  raised  by  this  action — Irritation  of  Japan — Misrepresenting 
the  issue — Japan-American  relations — Meaning  of  Root-Takahira  agree- 
ment— Japan's  anti-American  propaganda  in  China — Some  examples — 
The  analogy  of  Korea — The  Chinese  point  of  view — Shifting  of  Japanese 
attitude — Advantages  to  China  in  declaring  war — Effort  to  detach  China 
from  America — China  declares  war — Her  action  analyzed — New  turn  to 
event*. 

VI  China  and  the  War — (Continued) 136 

Shift  of  Japan's  diplomatic  strategy — Efforts  to  establish  special  po- 
sition in  respect  to  China — Analysis  of  the  paramountcy  and  special 
position  doctrine — Purpose  of  the  Ishii  mission  to  America — China  dis- 
turbed by  factional  strife — The  abortive  monarchy  revival — Return  to 
power  of  Tuan  Chi  jui — Financed  by  Japan — The  loan  question — Obsta- 
cles to  American  loans — The  banking  group  method — Dangers  of  the  old 
system — Japan's  violation  of  the  group  agreement — China's  desire  to 
participate  in  the  war — Effort  to  obtain  funds  from  America — Opposi- 
tion of  Japan  to  China's  participation — Reasons  for  this  opposition — 
Japan  verm*  the  Western  powers — A  delicate  question — Japan  s  plan  to 
control  China's  military  organization — Some  confidential  despatches; — 
The  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement — What  it  meant — Motives  of  the  parties 
to  it — Was  Japan  flirting  with  Germany  ? — Text  of  the  agreement. 

VII  China  and  the  War — (Concluded)       ....  154 

The  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement — Its  premature  publication  by  Japan — 
Uneasiness  caused  by  it — My  letter  to  Mr.  Lansing — Dangers  of  the  in- 
cident— Might  alienate  both  China  and  Japan — Had  China  been  traded 
off? — Was  the  agreement  a  bribe  to  Japan? — Need  to  counteract  first 
impressions — Japan  violates  the  "gentlemen's  agreement" — Agreement 
given  publicity  at  Peking — Reason's  for  Japan's  procedure— A  difference 
of  translations — What  does  "special  interests"  mean? — The  American 
version — China  repudiates  the  agreement — Cryptic  character  of  the  in- 
strument— Its  effects  in  the  far  East — Japanese  propaganda  and  the 
agreement — Criticisms  of  a  Chinese — The  doctrine  of  territorial  pro- 
pinquity— Its  dangers — What  was  the  American  Government's  object? 
— Further  analysis  of  the  agreement — Its  legal  aspects — Which  is  the 
correct  interpretation  ? — American  interpretation  probably  the  best — 
International  psychology  of  the  agreement — Possible  motives  of  the 
United  States — Putting  world  pressure  on  Japan — Japan's  opportunity. 


CONTENTS  vii 

CHAPTEB  PAQB 

VIII    The  Corruption  op  a  Nation 174 

Increase  of  Japan's  influence  in  China — The  revised  Japanese  policy — 
Its  motives  and  methods — China's  wish  to  participate  in  the  war — How 
it  was  defeated — American  loan  refused — Effects  of  this  refusal — Cor- 
ruption of  Chinese  officials — Getting  control  of  the  Government — The 
War  Participation  Board — The  military  agreement — Advent  of  Nishi- 
hara — The  orgy  of  loans — Japan's  two-faced  policy — Attitude  of  other 
powers— The  rake's  progress — Sowing  seeds  of  internal  dissension — 
Japan  in  Shantung — Establishment  of  civil  administration  there — Pro- 
tests of  the  Chinese  inhabitants — The  question  analysed — Japan's  objects 
revealed — Forced  sale  of  Chinese  lands — Fraudulent  seizure  of  mines — 
Survey  of  Japanese  "penetration"  of  Tsinan-fu — Brothels  and  drug-shops 
— Where  the  money  came  from — Refastening  the  opium  trade  on  China — 
Japan's  illicit  trade  in  morphia — How  the  trade  is  conducted — Explana- 
tions  of  the  Japanese  Government — Exploiting  the  Chinese  bandits. 


IX    China  and  Economic  Imperialism 221 

Definition  of  economic  imperialism — Its  relation  to  international  af- 
fairs— Its  working  method — War-causing  elements  of  the  system — Its 
application  to  China — Beginning  of  foreign  trade  with  China — Develop- 
ment of  strategical  phases — The  "sphere  of  influence"  idea — Dangerous 
phases — Prevision  of  John  Hay — The  Hay  Doctrine — Its  outward  ac- 
ceptance by  the  powers — Private  agreements  based  on  the  "sphere" 
thesis — Recrudescence  of  the  "sphere  of  influence"  practice — Due  to 
Japan's  policy — War  provided  Japan's  opportunity — Japan's  fear  of 
American  influence — A  flank  movement — The  Shibusawa  plan — The  "co- 
operation" idea — Its  real  purpose  exposed — How  it  was  contrary  to 
traditional  American  policy — How  it  was  invidious  to  China — China's 
situation — Dangers    inherent   with    the    cooperation    plan. 


X    China  and  Economic  Imperialism — (Concluded)   .  238 

Blindness  of  Americans  to  certain  conditions — Applying  lessons  of  the 
Great  War — Relation  of  militarism  to  economic  imperialism — Some  as- 
pects of  American  trade  in  China — Effects  of  the  "hyphen"  in  foreign 
trade — Fallacy  of  the  Shibusawa  plan — A  remarkable  letter — Why  Amer- 
icans in  China  are  anti -Japan — Japan  and  China  contrasted — First  and 
later  impressions — Coordination  of  Japanese  political  and  commercial 
methods — A  strong  arraignment  of  Japan — Her  recent  course  in  China 
indicted — How  the  Chinese  are  impressed — Sreming  inconsistency  of 
Allied  professions  and  policy — Implication  of  America's  weakness — 
Japan's  anti-Allied  propaganda — The  coming  reaction — Japan's  unpopu- 
larity with  the  Chinese — How  it  may  affect  post-war  business — Japan's 
capital  in  China  is  force — The  moral  issue — Effects  of  the  cooperation 
idea  on  American  trade  in  China — Its  military  aspect. 


XI    The  Open-Door  Policy 256 

Definition  of  the  open  door — Talk  with  Viscount  Motono — China, 
Japan  and  America — Monroe  Doctrine  and  Hay  Doctrine  compared — 
Their  principles  identical — The  Japanese  Monroe  Doctrine  for  China 
— False  analogies — Causes  for  failure  of  the  Hay  Doctrine — Nullified  by 
private  agreements — Japan  and  the  open  door — Manchuria  a  test  casa 
— Japan's  discriminations  there — Spy  and  police  systems — Making  it' 
unpleasant  for  other  foreigners — Influence  over  Chinese  officials — Reac- 
tions from  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement — Japanese  interpretation  ac- 
cepted— Special  antagonism  to  Americans — Incidents  showing  Japanese 
contempt  for  Europeans — Case  of  British  woman  missionary — Japan 
exercising  sovereign  authority — Summary  of  methods  handicapping 
American  trade  in  Manchuria  and  Shantung — The  mail  and  shipping 
matters — Views   of  American   organizations. 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAOl 

XII  The  Siberian  Question 283 

Siberia  and  the  Eastern  question — Their  close  relation — Developments 
after  Russia's  collapse — Japan  and  intervention — The  attitude  of  Rus- 
sians— The  propaganda  for  intervention — Japan's  sounding  of  the  Allies 
— Attitude  of  France — Great  Britain's  attitude — Japan  and  Germany 
— Danger  of  a  combination — The  interests  of  China — The  menace  to 
China — Japan's  proposal  to  intervene  exclusively — Motives  of  Great 
Britain  and  France — Effort  to  obtain  America's  assent — A  flood  of 
propaganda — America's  interest  analyzed — Importance  of  protecting 
democratic  peoples — Territorial  proximity — The  old  diplomacy  at  work 
— Suspicion  of  Japan — Rejection  of  the  one  nation  plan — Change  of 
Japan's   attitude — Conversion   from  asset  to  liability. 

XIII  The  Siberian  Question — (Concluded)     .     .     .  297 

Effects  of  the  Russian  Revolution — Its  extension  to  the  East — The 
position  of  Siberia — How  it  differed  from  Russia  in  Europe — China's 
close  relation  to  the  question — The  Chinese  Eastern  Railway — Disorders 
in  Manchuria — Political  elements  analyzed — Different  motives — Japan's 
selfish  policy — The  German  influence — Various  Russian  factions — Col- 
lapse of  Russian  authority  in  Manchuria — China  forced  to  act — Japan's 
fear  of  America — A  secret  diplomatic  note — Japan,  Russia,  and  Ger- 
many— Japan  seeking  for  advantage — Proposals  to  Russian  groups — 
Backing  different  factions — Secret  anti  American  propaganda — Some 
examples  of  this — The  American  intervention  plan — Japan  and  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway — Obstruction  of  the  Allies — Rushing  Japanese 
troops  into  Manchuria — Usurpation  of  China's  prerogatives — The  Man- 
chuli  incident — Attitude  of  Japanese  toward  other  allies — Incident  at 
Changchun — The   armistice   and   after. 

XIV  The   Solution 325 

Effects  in  China  of  the  collapse  of  Germany — The  internal  situation 
— Composition  of  the  Government — Japan  forcing  her  schemes — The 
armistice — Weakening  of  Japanese  influence  at  Peking — Some  causes 
of  this — Injection  of  American  ideals — President  Wilson's  prin- 
ciples— Their  application  to  China — Work  of  American  propaganda — 
Japan's  plan  to  represent  China  at  the  peace  conference — The  scheme 
blocked — Uneasiness  of  Chinese — The  Southern  point  of  view — Further 
effort  by  Japan  to  intimidate  China — Effort  to  prevent  the  publication 
of  secret  treaties — Outcome  of  that  matter — Further  advice  of  the  Al- 
lied powers  to  China — Trying  to  end  the  civil  strife — The  conference  at 
Shanghai — What  shall  be  done  for  China  ? — The  case  of  China  sum- 
marized— Responsibility  of  America — The  problem  analyzed — Question 
of  extra  territoriality — A  plan  for  its  gradual  abolition — This  plan  con- 
sidered— The  railway  question — The  question  of  loans  and  finance — 
New  declaration  of  the  American  Government — Will  China  take  the 
cure? — China's  appeal  to  civilization. 


APPENDICES 

The  Hay  Doctrine — Notes  and  Treaties  Between  the 
Powers  Affirming  the  Commercial  Principle  of 
the  "Open  Door"  and  Declaring  Their  Intention 
to  Respect  the  Independence  and  Territorial  In- 
tegrity of  China,  and  Separate  Agreements 
Among  the  Powers  Concerning,  and  Defining 
Their  Respective  "Spheres  of  Interest"  and 
"Special  Positions"  in  China 361 


CONTENTS  ix 

PAGE 

B  Japan's  Diplomatic  Demands  on  China  in  1905,  with 
the  Original  Secret  Twenty-One  Articles,  the 
Eleven  Articles  Presented  to  the  Powers  Incor- 
rectly Representing-  Japan's  Demands,  the  Re- 
vised Demands,  the  Chinese  Government's  Official 
Statement  of  the  Negotiations,  and  the  Agreement 
and  Notes  Which  China  Was  Compelled  to  Sign  .  373 

C     Text  of  the  Military  Agreement 421 

D     Memorial  of  the  "Black  Dragon"  (Japanese)  Society 

Concerning  Japan's  Policy  in  China      ....   426 

E  Extracts  from  "A  Memorial  for  the  Advancement 
of  German  Interests  in  China  Issued  by  the  Ger- 
man Association  of  Shanghai 432 

F     Collection  of  Laws  and  Regulations  of  the  Russian 

Government  Published  by  the  Ruling  Senate.        .  441 


FOREWORD 

This  work  is  not  presented  as  a  non-partizan  or  an  impartial 
discussion  of  the  subject.  It  could  not  be  that,  for  it  embodies 
the  deep  convictions  formed  and  accumulated  in  the  course  of 
years  of  close  contact  with  the  matters  at  issue,  and  the  opin- 
ions which,  I  hope,  shine  through  the  presentation  of  the  mate- 
rial were  born  in  the  process  of  "living  with"  the  problem. 
Few  foreigners  that  is,  few  Westerners  could  live  in  the  far 
East  during  the  last  twenty  years  and  still  be  impartial  on  the 
questions  included  in  the  position  of  China  and  her  contacts 
with  Japan. 

Some  of  the  facts  and  much  of  the  criticism  presented  in  the 
following  pages  were  suppressed  or  repressed  during  the  Great 
War  for  reasons  at  times  connected  with  the  war  politics  of 
nations,  and  at  times  because  of  legal  restraints  upon  their 
publication.  That  time  of  restricted  publicity  has  passed  with 
the  need,  or  the  fancied  need  for  it,  and  foreign  residents  of 
China  and  Japan  now  feel  that  the  truth,  and  nothing  less 
than  the  whole  truth,  about  these  matters  should  be  known  to 
Western  peoples.  The  design  of  this  work,  therefore,  is  to 
present  the  case  as  it  appears  to  an  overwhelming  majority 
of  foreiem  residents  of  the  East.  I  have  not  encumbered  the 
book  by  giving  much  of  the  contrary  side  of  events  and  of  the 
contrary  arguments.  As  in  the  case  of  Germany  and  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  German  military  party  for  the  Great  War, 
the  evidence  is  decisively  preponderating,  although  in  this  case 
Japan,  like  Germany,  can  put  in  a  more  or  less  plausible  de- 
fense. I  leave  that  defense  to  the  extensive  Japanese  propa- 
ganda in  America  and  elsewhere. 

I  have,  whenever  it  served  the  subject  and  argument,  chosen 


FOREWORD 

to  include  comments  of  my  own  that  were  published  previously 
rather  than  to  state  the  same  matters  again  in  slightly  different 
language;  and  I  also  have  preferred,  when  that  has  been  ger- 
mane, to  quote  from  other  writers,  from  official  reports  and 
documents,  and  from  the  columns  of  newspapers,  rather  than 
to  give  my  own  views  of  the  topics  under  discussion.  In 
choosing  the  newspapers  to  quote  I  have  whenever  possible 
given  preference  to  those  of  British  nationality,  because  the 
British  press  in  the  far  East  scarcely  can  be  accused  of  being 
incurably  anti-Japan  or  of  being  under  the  influence  of  ' '  Ger- 
man propaganda."  About  Japanese  affairs  I  have  quoted 
from  the  two  leading  foreign  papers  published  there — the 
"Japan  Advertiser,"  an  American  owned  and  edited  paper, 
and  the  "Japan  Chronicle,"  recognized  as  the  principal  Brit- 
ish organ.  The  "Japan  Chronicle"  especially,  because  of  the 
long  residence  there  of  its  editor  and  publisher,  is  recognized 
as  carrying  almost  an  authoritative  weight ;  and  it,  moreover, 
is  pertinent  that  it  is  published  under  the  severe  regulations 
of  the  Japanese  Government  press  censorship. 

The  sources  usually  are  given  in  conjunction  with  the  quo- 
tations except  in  case  of  private  reports  and  secret  documents, 
when  I  have  withheld  names  of  the  authors  and  where  I  ob- 
tained them.  They  are  in  all  cases,  however,  authentic.  I 
should  like  to  recommend  to  those  who  may  desire  additional 
light  on  this  subject  the  several  books  of  the  well-known  Eng- 
lish writer,  Lenox  Simpson  ("Putnam-Weale"),  and  the 
works  of  Professor  Hornbeck,  as  giving  recent  accounts  and 
criticisms  of  value. 

Thomas  F.  Millard 

New  York,  March  20,  1919. 


DEMOCRACY  AND 
THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 


DEMOCRACY  AND 
THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  ISSUE 

The  problem  as  posed  in  the  East — The  issue  the  same  as  in  Europe 
— Militarism  versus  democracy — Hopes  of  the  democratic  peoples  of 
Asia — Causes  of  war  in  the  far  East — Dr.  Charles  Eliot's  report — Dan- 
gerous tendencies — Protagonists  of  the  new  order — Viscount  Grey  on  a 
league  of  nations — Relation  of  the  Eastern  question  to  a  league — 
The  opposing  theory — Marquis  Okuma  on  diplomacy — Craft  and  secrecy 
its  requisites — Okuma  and  Bernhardi — Japan  and  the  question  of  alli- 
ances— Japan  and  the  spoils  of  war — Dr.  Xitobe's  opinions — The  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance — Its  relation  to  a  league  of  nations — Proposed  by 
Germany — Reasons  for  the  alliance  analyzed — Alliances  and  the  causes 
of  war — The  war  cloud  in  the  far  East — Need  for  measures  to  prevent 
war — The  problem  and  the  United  States — Essence  of  the  problem, 

THE  problem  of  the  Great  War  and  its  aftermath  as 
posed  in  the  far  East  is  identical  in  principle  with 
the  same  problem  elsewhere  in  the  world.  In  Europe 
the  issue  is  seen  distinctly  as  a  conflict  of  opposing  theories 
of  international  polity,  termed  concisely  militarism  and  de- 
mocracy. 

In  Europe  Germany  is  taken  as  the  apotheosis  of  auto- 
cratic militarism,  and  contrasted  with  her,  with  a  feeling 
of  being  marked  for  her  impending  assault  or  aggression,  were 
nations  that  were  weaker  in  the  sense  of  being  less  ready 
and  efficient  for  war  because  they  are  more  democratic.  In 
the  far  East  Japan  stands  for  autocracy  and  militarism,  and 
China  has  the  position  of  the  weak  and  apprehensive  democ- 

9 


4     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

racy.  As  the  issue  of  militarism  in  Europe  is  not  confined 
to  Europe  and  cannot  be  confined  there,  but  embraces  the 
whole  of  civilization,  so  is  the  issue  as  posed  in  the  far  East 
equally  embracing. 

This  issue  of  militarism  versus  democracy  in  recent  times 
has  been  so  extensively  analyzed  and  commented  on  that  all 
intelligent  persons  have  some  understanding  of  it  and  of  its 
terminology.  The  discussion  has  resolved  itself  into  terms 
and  phrases  standing  for  the  opposing  theories.  Certain 
things  are  associated  with  certain  other  things,  certain  con- 
ditions are  accompanied  by  certain  other  conditions,  certain 
causes  lead  to  certain  effects.  It  is  understood  that  the  auto- 
cratic forms  of  government  and  militarism  conform  with  and 
are  indispensable  to  each  other.  Predatory  imperialism  also 
is  indissolubly  connected  with  autocracy  and  militarism.  We 
have  become  familiar  with  the  euphemisms  which  imperial- 
istic diplomacy  has  coined  to  describe  its  processes:  "special 
position,"  "peaceful  penetration,"  "paramount  interests," 
"strategical  requirements,"  "spheres  of  influence,"  "defen- 
sive frontiers,"  "buffer  states,"  "strategical  railways," 
"secret  diplomacy,"  "economic  nationalism,"  all  these  are 
from  the  lexicon  of  predatory  imperialism,  and  have  covered 
the  earth. 

Opposed  to  the  policies  which  these  phrases  express,  a  new 
lot  of  phrases  have  been  coined:  "rights  of  weaker  nations," 
"self-determination  of  peoples,"  "autonomy  of  races,"  "open 
diplomacy." 

All  of  the  old-school  methods  of  world  politics,  and  the 
practical  applications  of  them,  have  been  worked  in  the  far 
East  until  the  democratic  and  weaker  nations  there  are  sick 
nigh  unto  death  of  them,  until  the  democratic  peoples  of  the 
Asiatic  world,  comprising  nearly  half  of  the  earth's  popu- 
lation, are  now  listening  with  strained  and  painful  expec- 
tation to  the  voices  of  the  new  day  as  expressed  in  the  new 
slogans. 

Although   the   principles   and   the    general   conditions   of 


THE  ISSUE  5 

the  issue  of  militarism  versus  democracy  in  the  far  East 
are  the  same  as  to  type  as  the  issue  in  Western  countries, 
I  shall,  in  trying  to  demonstrate  Oriental  aspects  of  the  ques- 
tion, confine  the  discussion  largely  to  utterances  and  ex- 
amples originating  or  applying  specially  to  the  East.  Just 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War,  Dr.  Charles  W.  Eliot, 
president  emeritus  of  Harvard  University,  made  a  visit  to 
the  far  East  to  investigate  and  to  report  on  conditions  there 
as  they  effect  peace  and  war.  Dr.  Eliot  made  an  exhaustive 
report,  from  which  I  will  quote : 

The  Causes  of  War  Have  Changed 

Advocacy  of  these  slow-acting  means  of  preventing  wars  in  the 
East  implies  that  within  the  superintended  areas  the  probable  causes 
of  international  war  have  changed  within  fifty  years.  Dynastic  and 
religious  wars,  and  wars  in  support  of  despotic  government  are  no 
longer  probable;  and  racial  antipathies  are  held  in  check  by  the 
superintending  European  powers  in  all  the  countries  to  which  that 
superintendence  extends.  Thus,  the  Pax  Britannica  has  practically 
put  an  end  to  the  racial  and  religious  warfare  which  from  time  to 
time  dislocated  the  Asiatic  countries  over  which  British  influence  now 
extends.  Small  outbreaks  of  racial  antipathy  or  religious  fanaticism 
occur  locally;  but  these  are  insignificant  exceptions  to  the  prevail- 
ing tranquillity.  The  fighting  Great  Britain  has  done  to  establish 
and  maintain  this  quieting  influence  has  been  fighting  on  a  small 
scale  compared  with  that  which  went  on  among  European  nations 
during  the  nineteenth  century,  or  among  Oriental  peoples  in  many 
earlier  centuries,  and  the  Pax  Britannica  has  therefore  been  a  great 
contribution  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 

It  is  not  only  in  the  East  that  the  probable  causes  of  international 
war  have  lately  changed.  All  over  the  world,  it  is  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  wars  for  dynastic  motives  will  occur  no  more,  and 
that  religious  motives  for  warfare  will  hereafter  be  incidental  or 
secondary  instead  of  primary.  It  is  also  reasonable  to  believe 
that  wars  in  support  of  absolute  monarchs  and  despotic  govern- 
ment will  henceforth  be  unknown,  so  general  is  the  worldwide 
movement  towards  constitutional  government  and  free  institutions — 
a  movement  from  fifty  to  three  hundred  and  fifty  years  old  among 
the  different  nations  of  the  West,  but  comparatively  recent  in  the 
East. 


6     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

The  Future  Causes  op  War 

What,  then,  will  be  the  probable  causes  of  international  war  in 
the  future? 

The  causes  of  war  in  the  future  are  likely  to  be  national  dis- 
trusts, dislikes,  and  apprehensions,  which  have  been  nursed  in  igno- 
rance, and  fed  on  rumors,  suspicions,  and  conjectures  propagated  by 
unscrupulous  newsmongers,  until  suddenly  developed  by  some  un- 
toward event  into  active  hatred,  or  widespread  alarm  which  easily 
passes  into  panic.  While  the  Eastern  peoples — far  and  near — will 
have  some  causes  of  their  own  for  war,  because  in  some  instances 
neither  their  geographical  limits  nor  their  governmental  institutions 
are  as  yet  settled,  among  the  Western  peoples  the  most  probable 
future  causes  of  war,  in  addition  to  national  antipathies,  will  be 
clashing  commercial  or  industrial  interests,  contests  for  new  markets 
and  fresh  opportunities  for  profitable  investments  of  capital,  and 
possibly,  extensive  migrations  of  laborers.  All  modern  governments, 
in  which  life,  liberty,  and  property  are  secured  by  public  law, 
desire  to  extend  the  commerce  and  trade  of  their  people,  to  develop 
their  home  industries  by  procuring  markets  for  their  products  in 
foreign  lands,  to  obtain  in  comparatively  unoccupied  or  undevel- 
oped parts  of  the  earth  opportunities  for  the  profitable  employ- 
ment of  their  accumulated  capital,  and  to  gain  room  for  a  possible 
surplus  of  population  in  the  future.  Eastern  and  Western  peoples 
alike  feel  the  desire  for  a  large,  strong  governmental  unit,  too  for- 
midable to  be  attacked  from  without,  too  cohesive  to  be  disintegrated 
from  within.  Both  East  and  West  exhibit  the  modern  irrepressible 
objection  to  alien  rule,  especially  when  such  rule,  like  that  of  the 
Manchus  or  the  Turks,  produces  poverty  and  desolation,  denies 
liberty,  and  prevents  progress. 

Several  Western  nations  which  have  the  saving,  or  accumulating 
habit,  are  eager  to  make  loans  to  remote  and  comparatively  poor 
nations  which  are  in  great  need  of  money  to  pay  for  costly  public 
works  of  transportation,  conservancy,  public  health,  and  public  se- 
curity. In  making  such  loans  the  bankers  of  each  Western  nation 
expect  the  support  and  protection  of  their  own  government.  As 
security  for  such  loans  the  borrowing  government,  national,  pro- 
vincial or  municipal,  pledges  some  of  its  resources;  and  if  the  ex- 
pected interest  or  dividend  is  not  paid,  the  lender  forecloses.  Hence 
serious  international  complications.  In  this  lending  business  the 
Western  powers  come  into  competition  with  each  other,  and  stimu- 
lated by  mutuai  jealousies,  engage  in  aggressive  operations  against 
the  Oriental  peoples,  who  have  been  as  a  rule  helpless  in  their  hands, 
until  Japan  adopted  and  improved  on  the  Western  military  organi- 


THE  ISSUE  7 

zation  and  methods  of  fighting,  and  succeeded  for  a  short  time  in 
borrowing  the  money  needed  to  pay  the  heavy  costs  of  a  modern 
"warfare. 

Dr.  Eliot 's  conclusions,  which  since  then  have  received  much 
confirmation  from  events  of  the  Great  War,  were  that  among 
the  principal  causes  for  wars  thereafter  in  the  far  East 
would  be,  (a)  frictions  among  Oriental  nations  due  to  clashes 
of  interest  and  ambitions,  and  possible  aggressions  one  upon 
another,  and  (b)  antagonisms  developing  from  commercial 
and  financial  competitions  there  of  foreign  nations. 

The  principal  protagonists  of  the  new  order  for  world  poli- 
tics have  been  President  Wilson,  Viscount  Grey,  Lord  Bryce, 
William  H.  Taft,  and  a  few  statesmen  in  Europe.  Those  men 
all  speak  out  of  ample  experience  in  political  finesse  and  ad- 
ministration. Certainly  no  higher  authority  on  modern  di- 
plomacy and  international  policy  lives  than  Lord  Grey.  In 
his  noteworthy  brochure  on  the  proposed  league  of  nations  as 
a  substitute  for  former  methods  of  handling  international  af- 
fairs he  wrote  [the  italics  are  mine]  : 

The  second  condition  essential  to  the  foundation  of  the  League  of 
Nations  is  that  the  Governments  and  peoples  of  the  States  willing  to 
found  it  understand  clearly  that  it  will  impose  some  limitations  upon 
the  national  action  of  each,  and  may  entail  some  inconvenient  obli- 
gations. 

Smaller  and  weaker  nations  will  have  rights  that  must  be  respected 
and  upheld  by  the  league.  Stronger  nations  must  forego  the  right 
to  make  their  interests  prevail  against  the  weaker  by  force,  and  all 
States  must  forego  the  right  in  any  dispute  to  resort  to  force  before 
other  methods  of  settlement  by  conference,  conciliation,  or  if  need 
be  arbitration,  have  been  tried. 

This  is  the  limitation.  The  obligation  is  that  if  any  nation  will 
not  observe  this  limitation  upon  its  national  actions,  if  it  breaks  the 
agreement  which  is  the  basis  of  the  league,  rejects  all  peaceful 
methods  of  settlement  and  resorts  to  force  against  another  nation, 
they  must  one  and  all  use  their  combined  force  against  it. 

The  economic  pressure  that  such  a  league  could  use  would  in  itself 
be  very  powerful,  and  the  action  of  some  of  the  smaller  States  com- 
posing the  league  could  not  perhaps  go  beyond  the  economic  pres- 
sure, but  those  States  that  have  the  power  must  be  ready  to  use  all 


8     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

the  force,  economic,  military,  or  naval,  they  possess.     It  must  be 
clearly  understood  and  accepted  that  deflection  from  or  violation  of 
the  agreement  by  one  or  more  States  does  not  absolve  all  or  any  of 
the  others  from  the  obligation  to  enforce  the  agreement. 
Anything  less  than  this  xs  of  no  value. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  bring  a  discussion  of  the  league 
of  nations  into  the  scope  of  this  work  except  to  show  how  the 
conditions  which  it  aims  to  eradicate  are  bound  up  as  im- 
portantly in  the  far  Eastern  question  as  they  are  in  the  situa- 
tion of  Europe.  There  is  general  agreement  in  the  democratic 
countries  that  something  must  be  devised  that  will  be  a  great 
improvement  over  the  old-school  diplomacy  to  prevent  or  to 
deter  ambitious  and  predatory  nations  from  disturbing  con- 
tinually the  peace  of  the  world;  and  it  will  be  of  little  use 
to  invent  and  organize  a  plan  to  do  this  if  there  is  no  ade- 
quate comprehension  of  the  work  which  it  has  to  do.  A 
solution  of  the  Eastern  question  is  a  part,  and  a  very  im- 
portant part,  of  the  work  a  league  or  its  substitute  has  be- 
fore it. 

It  is  an  open  secret  that  some  eminent  statesmen  in  Europe 
and  a  few  in  America  are  not  favorably  disposed  to  the  idea 
of  a  league  of  nations.  Mr.  Arthur  Balfour,  Lord  Lans- 
downe,  Georges  Clemenceau,  Baron  Sonnino,  are  some  states- 
men who  have  revealed  that  they  have  slight  faith  in  the 
ability  of  such  a  league  to  function  in  place  of  the  former 
system  of  alliances  between  powers.  In  the  East,  also,  there 
are  dissenters,  especially  in  Japan,  from  the  league  idea.  It 
is  interesting  to  note  the  views  of  Marquis  Okuma.  the  "Sage 
of  Japan,"  who  was  Japanese  prime  minister  when  the  Great 
War  started  and  for  two  years  afterwards,  who  was  responsi- 
ble for  Japan's  war  policy  in  its  inception,  and  since  the  death 
of  Marquis  Yamagata  is  Senior  Elder  Statesman.  Marquis 
Okuma  left  office  in  1916,  but  he  speaks  with  as  much  authority 
as  any  Japanese  living.  He  occasionally  warns  and  admon- 
ishes his  countrymen  about  questions  of  domestic  and  world 
politics,  and  recently  he  made  some  oracular  comments  on 


THE  ISSUE  9 

diplomacy.     On  his  views  the  "Japan  Chronicle"  of  May 
9,  1918,  said  editorially: 

Marquis  Okuma  has  a  remarkable  faculty  of  being  all  things  to 
all  men.  He  is  President  of  the  Japan  Peace  Society,  and  has  ex- 
pounded with  fluency  the  benefits  of  arbitration  and  the  necessity 
of  the  limitation  of  armaments  in  the  case  of  all  countries  save  Japan. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  can  contribute  to  a  militarist  organ  like  the 
"Kokumin"  an  article  which  is  the  negation  of  all  that  he  has  ad- 
vanced when  habited  as  an  apostle  of  peace.  He  is  jingo  and 
pacifist  by  turns.  To  a  deputation  of  American  publicists  he  will 
orate  on  the  bonds  uniting  Japan  and  America  and  eondemn  the 
journalism  which  sows  discord,  while  in  the  columns  of  his  magazine 
he  will  write  of  America  and  American  policy  in  the  most  provoca- 
tive manner. 

But  the  veteran  statesman  always  appears  more  natural  in  the 
guise  of  jingo  than  in  that  of  pacifist,  as  might  be  expected  from 
the  author  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands  on  China.  In  view  of  that 
episode  some  of  the  observations  which  he  makes  in  the  article  ap- 
pearing in  the  "Kokumin"  (translated  in  yesterday's  issue)  are  )f 
much  interest.  "International  relations,"  he  says,  "are  quite  unlike 
the  relations  subsisting  between  individuals.  Morality  and  sincerity 
do  not  govern  a  country's  diplomacy,  which  is  guided  by  selfishness, 
pure  and  simple.  It  is  considered  the  secret  of  diplomacy  to  fore- 
stall rivals  by  every  crafty  means  available."  Finally,  he  lays  lown 
the  proposition  that  a  nation  must  possess  both  wealth  and  military 
force  to  make  its  authority  felt. 

It  will  be  noted  that  there  is  a  great  similarity  in  the  point  of 
view  of  Bernhardi  and  Okuma.  "Might,"  says  the  former,  "is  at 
once  the  supreme  right,  and  the  dispute  as  to  what  is  right  is  settled 
by  the  arbitrament  of  war."  Again,  "A  most  difficult  problem  is 
raised  by  the  question  how  far,  for  political  objects  moral  in  them- 
selves, means  may  be  employed  which  must  be  regarded  as  reprehen- 
sible in  the  life  of  the  individual."  Or  still  again,  "The  relations 
between  two  States  must  often  be  termed  a  latent  war,  which  is 
provisionally  being  waged  in  peaceful  rivalry.  Such  a  position  jus- 
tifies the  employment  of  hostile  methods,  cunning,  and  deception,' 
just  as  war  itself  does,  since  in  such  a  case  both  parties  are  deter- 
mined to  employ  them." 

It  cannot  be  said,  therefore,  that  the  veteran  statesman  has  justi- 
fied the  policy  which  he  expounds  in  the  "Kokumin"  by  the  results 
accomplished,  and  we  are  glad  to  find  a  Japanese  journal  like  the 


10     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

"Asabi"  condemning  on  moral  grounds  his  advocacy  of  national 
egoism.  Marquis  Okuma's  disparagement  of  the  unmilitary  Allies 
and  appreciation  of  the  military  Teuton  may  therefore  be  discounted. 
The  end  is  not  yet. 

The  trend  of  Japanese  intellectual  reactions  from  the  war 
is  displayed  more  fully  in  later  chapters  of  this  work,  but 
as  showing  how  some  Japanese  thinkers  are  trying  to  adapt 
the  national  point  of  view  to  the  lessons  of  the  war  may  be 
taken  the  opinions  of  Dr.  Inazo  Nitobe,  who  has  taken  occa- 
sion to  warn  his  countrymen  that  too  frank  a  spirit  of  acqui- 
sition and  selfishness  may  react,  on  Japan.  Dr.  Nitobe,  it 
may  be  recalled,  is  well  known  as  the  inventor,  or  the  pro- 
tagonist and  interpreter,  of  "Bushido."  He  is  a  professor 
at  the  Imperial  University  at  Tokio  and  formerly  was  a  student 
at  Johns  Hopkins  University.  I  again  quote  the  "Japan 
Chronicle,"  of  July  11,  1918 \ 

Reprimands  like  that  which  Dr.  Nitobe  has  recently  administered 
to  his  countrymen  are  rather  rare  in  Japan,  where  national  self- 
satisfaction  is  generally  very  much  in  evidence.  Nothing:  is  more 
common  in  Japanese  writings  on  the  war  than  to  dwell  upon  the  im- 
mense sacrifices  which  Japan  has  made,  and  to  hint  at  the  rewards 
that  she  therefore  has  a  right  to  expect.  Dr.  Nitobe  compares 
Japan's  gains  with  the  other  Allies'  losses,  and  predicts  that  there 
will  be  a  bad  reaction  of  feeling  when,  on  the  settlement,  Japan's 
share  in  the  spoils  of  war  is  found  to  be  very  small.  In  making 
these  criticisms  Dr.  Nitobe  goes  much  further  than  would  be  becom- 
ing in  a  foreign  critic.  Some  time  ago,  when  the  "Chronicle"  sug- 
gested that  the  furnishing  of  supplies  for  handsome  payment  hardly 
came  within  the  definition  of  self-sacrifice,  a  Japanese  publicist  re- 
plied that  such  a  remark  was  more  outrageous  than  anathema.  The 
critic  would  probably  have  had  an  apoplexy  if  the  "Chronicle"  had 
gone  only  half  as  far  as  Dr.  Nitobe.  It  is  quite  natural,  of  course, 
that  native  criticism  should  be  more  patiently  borne  than  foreign. 

Dr.  Nitobe,  even  for  a  purveyor  of  home  truths,  is  almost  unduly 
severe.  We  have  frequently  pointed  out  in  these  columns  that  to 
Japan  the  war  is  not  the  same  thing  that  it  is  to  France  and  Eng- 
land, or  even  to  America.  The  mischief  that  Dr.  Nitobe  foresees 
arises  from  the  adulation  of  Japan  and  all  her  works  in  which  Mr. 


THE  ISSUE  11 

Balfour  takes  such  a  leading  part,  and  which  creates  a  false  impres- 
sion among  the  Japanese  of  the  part  that  this  country  plays  in  the 
war  and  leads  in  the  direction  of  the  disappointment  predicted. 

Dr.  Nitobe  takes  it  for  granted  that  at  the  peace  conference  some- 
thing approximating  to  the  settlement  talked  of  among  the  Allies 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war  will  be  effected,  and  that  everything 
will  be  settled  on  a  general  consideration  of  the  public  good,  while 
if  any  compensation,  territorial  or  monetary,  can  be  secured  from 
the  aggressors,  it  will  be  divided  among  the  Allies  according  to  their 
sufferings,  sacrifices,  and  needs.  Together  with  this  is  blended  an 
idea  of  the  resumption  of  the  old  relations  between  Japan  and  the 
powers,  which  means  that  the  powers  will  "advise"  Japan  not  to 
make  too  great  a  profit  at  the  expense  of  her  weaker  neighbours. 

How  far  such  relations  will  be  resumed  remains  to  be  seen. 
Japan  will  be,  by  that  time,  in  a  position,  commercially  and  finan- 
cially, much  more  comparable  with  that  of  the  powers,  but  will  be 
incalculably  behind  them  in  the  matter  of  armaments,  which  give 
special  point  to  advice.  Dr.  Nitobe  takes  a  much  higher  view  of 
international  politics  than  Marquis  Okuma.  The  late  Premier  was 
instrumental  in  bringing  Japan  into  the  war,  and  conceived  that  as 
soon  as  Japan's  power  in  the  far  East  was  demonstrated,  and  the 
value  of  her  allegiance  established,  the  European  Powers  would 
consider  it  best  to  refrain  from  protest  whatever  Japan  might  do  in 
China.  In  his  very  first  essay,  however,  he  overreached  himself,  and 
discovered  that,  preoccupied  as  the  powers  were  with  their  more  im- 
mediate affairs,  they  were  not  resigned  to  the  prospect  of  standing  by 
while  Japan  made  China  a  tributary  State.  Dr.  Nitobe  remembers 
that  it  was  nothing  but  the  diplomatic  protests  which  prevented  the 
Twenty-one  Demands  from  complete  enforcement,  and  as  a  political 
idealist  he  feels  the  discredit  accruing  from  this  situation  far  more 
than  he  would  ever  exult  in  an  increase  of  political  domination  over 
neighbouring  countries. 

Dr.  Nitobe  goes  to  the  trouble  of  confuting  the  Japanese  idea 
that  a  war  "to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy"  is  not  a  desir- 
able one.  It  is  not  probable  that  any  Japanese  ever  seriously  be- 
lieved that  the  objects  of  the  war  are  inimical  to  the  polity  of  Japan, 
though  some  may  have  made  this  an  excuse  for  their  perverse  pas- 
sion for  depreciating  the  Allies.  The  common  idea  of  those  who 
profess  such  concern  for  Japan's  peculiar  system  is  that,  bound  up 
with  the  devotion  of  all  Japanese  to  the  Imperial  House,  is  the 
preservation  of  the  privileges  of  the  persons  who  happen  now  to  be 
in  advantageous  positions.     Their  narrowness  of  view  is  the  natural 


12     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

complement  of  the  sort  of  patriotism  which  looks  only  to  spoils  in 
a  war  which  is,  to  a  degree  uncommon  in  international  struggles,  a 
moral  issue. 

In  the  far  East  the  question  of  the  basis  for  international 
politics  after  the  war  inevitably,  at  some  point  of  a  discus- 
sion, comes  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  This  alliance, 
except  the  secret  treaty  made  between  Japan  and  imperial 
Russia  during  the  war,  is  the  only  offensive  and  defensive 
alliance  between  powers  having  the  far  East  as  their  special 
field.  Later  in  this  work  I  mention  the  disposition  of  the 
Japanese  at  one  stage  of  the  war  to  throw  the  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  overboard;  but  that  sentiment  was  frankly 
based  on  calculated  self-interest.  It  is  interesting,  therefore, 
to  obtain  a  glimpse  of  Japanese  conception  of  the  alliance  in 
juxtaposition  with  the  idea  of  a  league  of  nations.  Discus- 
sions of  the  alliance  in  Japan,  and  especially  suggestions  and 
proposals  that  it  be  abrogated,  naturally  received  the  close 
attention  of  British  who  live  there,  and  the  "Japan  Chron- 
icle," the  leading  British  organ  in  Japan,  makes  this  com- 
ment editorially  in  its  issue  of  January  28,  1919: 

In  the  article  on  alliances  which  Dr.  Sawayanagi,  the  well-known 
educationist  and  for  a  time  Vice-Minister  of  Education,  has  con- 
tributed to  the  "Taiyo,"  he  puts  his  finger  on  one  of  the  root  causes 
of  the  war  which  has  destroyed  the  flower  of  European  youth  and 
threatened  the  fabric  of  civilisation  itself.  As  will  have  been  seen 
by  the  translation  of  the  article  appearing  in  Sunday's  issue,  Dr. 
Sawayanagi  raises  the  question  whether  the  time  has  not  come  for 
the  abrogation  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance.  Hitherto  this  sug- 
gestion has  been  made  by  Japanese  who  regarded  the  revision  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  m  1911,  removing  all  danger  of  Britain 
being  compelled  by  the  terms  of  the  compact  to  participate  in  war 
against  America,  as  destroying  the  value  of  the  agreement,  which, 
with  Russia  no  longer  a  foe  to  be  feared,  simply  acted  as  a  check  on 
Japan's  diplomatic  activity  in  the  far  East  without  conferring  any 
proportionate  advantage. 

Dr.  Sawayanagi  takes  up  a  different  attitude.  He  points  out  that 
Russia  is  now  in  such  a  disorganised  state  that  her  assumption  of  an 
aggressive  policy  in  the  East  has  removed  the  raison  d'etre  of  the 


THE  ISSUE  13 

Alliance,  but  his  chief  reason  for  suggesting  its  termination  is  that 
it  is  clearly  out  of  harmony  with  the  League  of  Nations  which  it  is 
assumed  the  Peace  Conference  will  in  some  form  or  other  bring  into 
being.  There  is  ample  justification  for  the  view  taken  by  Dr.  Sawa- 
yanagi.  President  Wilson  holds  very  strongly  not  only  that  a  League 
of  Nations  should  be  open  to  all  and  common  to  all,  but  that  a  partial 
League  of  States,  such  as  the  present  Allies,  might  be  used  for  selfish 
purposes,  and  would  destroy  the  very  objects  for  which  the  League 
of  Nations  was  framed.  Indeed  it  was  one  of  the  President's  five 
conditions  of  a  satisfactory  peace  that  "no  special  interest  of  any 
nation  can  be  made  the  basis  of  any  settlement  which  is  not  con- 
sistent with  the  common  interest  of  all."  This  evidently  rules  out 
alliances  for  special  objects  between  two  or  more  nations,  as  such  a 
policy  would  tend  to  set  up  groups  within  the  League,  creating  all 
the  old  animosities  and  constituting  a  serious  danger  to  the  peace 
of  the  world. 

The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  must  go  with  the  other  compacts, 
as  being  against  the  general  interest.  It  has  been  asserted  that  the 
conversion  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  agreement  of  1902  into  an  offen- 
sive and  defensive  alliance  in  1905  maintained  peace,  but  it  may  with 
equal  truth  be  contended  that  the  Alliance  narrowly  escaped  plung- 
ing Europe  prematurely  into  the  war  of  mutual  destruction  that 
actually  began  ten  years  later.  For  the  Alliance  came  about  not  so 
much  from  a  desire  to  maintain  peace  in  the  far  East  as  because  of 
hostility  to  Russia,  which  was  then  pursuing  an  aggressive  policy  in 
Central  Asia  and  the  far  East,  and  the  more  definite  character  given 
the  agreement  in  1905  was  clearly  with  the  object  of  preventing 
France  from  going  to  the  assistance  of  her  Russian  ally.  There 
were  occasions  during  the  progress  of  Rodjestvensky's  squadron  to- 
wards the  far  East  when  the  relations  between  Japan  and  France 
were  strained  almost  to  the  breaking  point,  owing  to  the  aid  given 
the  Russian  squadron  in  French  ports.  Had  the  two  powers  come 
into  armed  conflict  all  Europe  would  have  been  ablaze.  Britain 
would  have  come  in  on  the  side  of  Japan  against  France  and  Russia, 
and,  despite  the  Kaiser's  letters  to  the  Tsar  during  the  crisis,  it  is  not 
impossible  that  when  the  rupture  came  Germany  would  have  found 
her  interest  in  siding  with  Britain  rather  than  with  her  traditional 
enemies  on  the  east  and  west. 

Looking  back  upon  the  history  of  the  last  forty  years  with  the 
experience  of  the  last  five  years  as  a  guide,  it  becomes  clearly  evi- 
dent that  it  was  the  groups  of  alliances  which  kept  Europe  in  a 
perpetual  ferment  during  that  time,  and  altogether,  with  what  Bright 
called  the  "bloody  fetish"  of  the  balance  of  power,  encouraged  all 


14     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

the  nations  in  that  mad  race  of  armaments  which  in  due  course  ended 
in  an  explosion. 

It  is  curious  that  an  agreement  between  Britain  and  Japan  was 
first  mooted  by  the  German  charge  d'affaires  in  London,  Baron  von 
Eckardstein,  who  suggested  a  triple  alliance  between  Japan,  Great 
Britain,  and  Germany  respecting  affairs  in  the  far  East.  Count 
Hayasbi,  then  Japanese  Minister  in  London,  took  up  the  suggestion 
warmly,  obtained  the  approval  of  his  Government  and  approached 
Lord  Landsdowne,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary.  Sir  Claude  Mac- 
Donald,  British  Minister  to  Japan,  who  was  in  London  at  the  time, 
strongly  supported  an  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  and,  prompted  by 
Hayasbi,  brought  pressure  to  bear  on  tbe  British  Foreign  Office  by 
expressing  a  fear  that  Japan  might  make  an  alliance  with  Russia. 
Lord  Lansdowne,  who  at  first  was  not  very  sympathetic,  finally  ap- 
proved. The  German  participation  was  dropped,  and  an  alliance 
between  Britain  and  Japan  negotiated.  This  was  in  February,  1902. 
Prince  Ito,  then  on  his  way  to  endeavor  to  negotiate  an  arrangement 
with  Russia  of  differences  with  Japan,  was  thrown  over  by  Kasu- 
migaseki,  and  the  result  a  couple  of  years  later  was  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War. 

The  next  departure  from  the  British  Liberal  policy  of  being 
friendly  with  all  nations  but  allied  with  none  was  in  concluding  an 
entente  with  France  in  1904,  which  probably  had  the  effect  of  pre- 
venting France  joining  Russia  against  Japan,  and  thus  extending 
the  war  to  Europe,  though  it  was  evidently  regarded  as  necessary  to 
convert  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  in  the  following  year  into  a 
positive  instrument  of  offence  and  defence.  But  the  catastrophe  was 
only  postponed,  not  averted. 

The  existence  of  the  two  groups  of  alliances,  avowedly  framed  to 
ensure  peace,  made  war  inevitable.  So  much  is  evident  to-day.  It 
rests  with  the  Peace  Conference  to  devise  another  method.  The  old 
system  has  failed  utterly  and  disastrously.  In  a  common  agreement 
between  all  States  to  ensure  peace  there  may  be  security  for  the 
future.  But  such  an  arrangement  must  rigidly  exclude  all  public 
or  secret  agreements  of  alliance,  the  effect  of  which  would  be  to 
divide  the  nations  into  two  or  more  hostile  groups. 

Students  of  politics  and  conditions  in  the  far  East,  and 
foreigners  who  live  there,  almost  without  exception  feel  that 
unless  that  part  of  the  world  is  somehow  relieved  from  the 


THE  ISSUE  15 

pressure  of  the  imperial  ambitions  of  Japan,  another  war, 
which  beyond  doubt  will  involve  several  of  the  western 
powers,  including  America,  is  inevitable.  They  see  the  issue 
distinctly,  in  both  its  moral  and  political  aspects,  as  much  a 
Western  question  as  it  is  an  Eastern  one,  and  with  scarcely 
any  important  exceptions  they  feel  that  the  old  system  can- 
not be  so  revised  and  readjusted  that  it  can  assure  peace 
in  the  East  any  more  than  it  did  or  can  secure  peace  in  Europe. 
It  will  be  futile  to  patch  up  a  peace  in  Europe  while  leaving 
free  to  run  their  course  in  the  far  East  all  the  old  war- 
breeding  elements.  The  outcome  will  be  the  same  there  as  it 
was  in  Europe. 

For  America  all  the  applications  of  the  war  in  Europe 
can  also  be  taken  with  regard  to  a  war  in  the  far  East 
arising  from  the  issues  that  are  now  drawn  there.  The 
analogy  between  the  previous  policy  of  the  United  States  to- 
ward Europe  and  its  alliances,  its  ententes,  and  its  wars,  and  a 
similar  policy  toward  the  East,  is  exact.  Just  as  the  great 
war  has  demonstrated  the  fallacy  of  the  isolation  of  America 
from  the  scope  of  such  disputes  and  the  futility  of  treating 
our  contacts  with  these  questions  on  a  detached  basis  of 
"good  feeling"  and  good  wishes  for  all  the  nations  so  in- 
volved, and  of  "leaving  Europe  to  settle  its  own  quarrels," 
so  Americans  should  realize  that  the  Eastern  question  will 
not  settle  itself,  and  that  it  is  a  part  of  the  business  of  the 
United  States,  for  its  own  security  if  for  no  other  motive, 
to  help  settle  it  rightly. 

The  Eastern  question  can  be  expressed  in  two  words,  Japan 
and  China.  It  is  only  by  understanding  the  true  characters 
of  both  those  nations  and  the  problem  of  their  relation  to 
each  other  that  the  modern  issue  of  the  far  East  can  be  com- 
prehended. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   REAL   CHARACTER   OF   JAPAN 

Creation  of  modern  Japan — Myth  and  fable — The  parallel  with  mod- 
ern Germany — The  cult  of  emperor  divinity — Invention  of  a  new  religion 
— Japan's  historical  background — Bushido  a  recent  fabrication — Divine 
origin  of  the  Japanese  nation — The  military  autocracy — A  replica  of 
Prussianism — Why  Japan  has  mystified  the  West — Japanese  language  a 
screen — Evolution  of  Japanese  view  of  the  West — Foreign  patronage  now 
resented — Exclusion  of  "dangerous  thoughts"  from  Japan — American 
Constitution  in  that  category — A  striking  incident — Dilemma  of  Chris- 
tianity in  Japan — Trying  to  reconcile  it  with  emperor  divinity — Japan's 
constitutional  forms — Throne  not  responsible  to  people — All  rights  rest 
in  throne — Japan  and  democracy — Liberal  ideas  not  tolerated — A  theo- 
cratic state — The  Government  and  industry — Japan's  efficiency — State 
of  administration  in  Japan — Government  of  Japan's  dependencies — For- 
mosa and  Korea — A  Korean  appeal — Status  of  foreigners  in  Japan — The 
so-called  liberal  elements — Downfall  of  the  bureaucracy  predicted — 
Japan's  foreign  propaganda — Some  illustrations — Japan  after  the  war — 
Attitude  toward  league  of  nations — Question  of  armaments — Time  re- 
quired for  reform. 

THE  Japanese  Empire  in  its  present  national  form 
is  dated  by  most  historians  and  commentators  from 
1867,  when  the  "restoration"  occurred.  It  is  in- 
teresting and,  as  will  be  shown  later,  also  very  significant 
that  the  so-called  restoration  of  Germany  usually  is  taken 
from  1866,  when  that  nation  conclusively  proved  its  military 
superiority  over  Austria,  a  victory  that  was  a  forerunner 
of  the  war  of  1870  and  the  creation  of  the  modern  German 
Empire. 

In  estimating  the  character  of  modern  Japan,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  review  that  nation's  previous  history  only  with  regard 
to  the  origin  and  development  of  national  institutions  and 
characteristics  that  influence  the  nation  in  these  times.  An- 
cient Japan  is  no  more  an  issue  in  world  politics  to-day  than 

J9 


THE  KEAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  17 

is  ancient  Germany  or  ancient  Rome  or  Greece.  The  histories 
of  Rome  and  Greece  abound  in  matters  that  now  are  ad- 
mitted to  be  purely  mythological,  and  people  now  would 
not  take  them  seriously  in  considering  political  tendencies 
of  the  Italy  and  Greece  of  to-day.  Yet  a  vast  amount  of  the 
mythology  of  ancient  Japan,  without  western  peoples  being 
aware  of  it,  has  been  woven  into  western  popular  conceptions 
of  modern  Japan,  and  its  legends  have  obscured  the  real 
Japan  from  any  exact  comprehension  by  westerners.  In 
America  we  measure  Europe  with  a  fair  degree  of  accuracy 
because  we  have  the  same  historical  and  ethnological  origins, 
and  can  use  our  own  standards  of  measurement  in  our  com- 
parisons ;  but  a  great  majority  of  Americans,  and  Europeans, 
too,  have  been  measuring  Japan  by  the  almost  mythological 
standards  that  Japan  has  set  up  for  herself. 

There  is,  however,  little  about  modern  Japan  that  is  difficult 
of  comprehension,  and  nothing  at  all  that  is  mysterious. 
Japan  is  a  nation  whose  history  for  several  centuries  is  an 
open  record,  though  not  a  plainly  visible  record.  One  reason 
why  it  is  not  better  known  in  the  West  is  because  of  the 
difficulties  of  the  Japanese  language,  which  are  a  severe  ob- 
struction to  foreign  penetration  of  Japanese  literature  and 
current  thought;  another  reason  is  that  Japan  adroitly  set 
out  to  write  her  own  history  for  westerners  to  believe,  and 
the  West  has,  with  an  astounding  complacency,  taken  Japan's 
own  estimate  of  herself.  The  West,  in  effect,  has  given  Japan 
a  blank  draft  on  its  credulity,  and  allowed  the  Japanese  to  fill 
it  out  for  themselves.     Japanese  propaganda  has  done  that. 

Born  almost  exactly  at  the  same  time  with  modern  Ger- 
many, modern  Japan,  in  adapting  herself  to  western  civili- 
zation, has  conformed  almost  exactly  to  the  German  political 
system,  the  German  thesis  of  statecraft,  the  German  military 
organization,  the  German  conception  of  the  great  game  of 
welt-politik,  and  the  German  methods  of  playing  that  game. 
Intelligent  Japanese  do  not  dispute  this,  although  for  the 
last  few  years  it  is  not  a  fact  which  the  Japanese  Govern- 


18     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

ment  has  desired  to  spread  in  some  countries.  A  majority 
of  Japanese  military  leaders  were  educated  in  Germany, 
the  Japanese  Army  is  organized  after  the  German  model  and 
conception  of  discipline,  and  a  majority  of  Japanese  modern 
medical  practitioners,  and  many  leaders  in  the  educational 
and  scientific  life  of  Japan,  were  educated  in  Germany. 

But  it  has  not  been  those  origins  and  associations  that 
made  the  Japanese  admirers  and  imitators  of  Germany.  It 
has  been  Germany's  military  successes  and  rapid  rise  as  a 
power  that  induced  the  Japanese  to  believe  in  the  superiority 
of  the  German  system  and  the  German  efficiency  as  a  means 
of  national  expansion.  There  were,  of  course,  similarities  in 
German  and  Japanese  institutions  that  strengthened  those 
other  attractions.  For  instance,  the  dogma  of  the  divine 
right  of  emperors  which  was  dramatically  revived  in  Europe 
by  the  kaiser  was  paralleled  by  the  cult  of  emperor  divinity 
in  Japan.  Their  growth  and  development  were  contempor- 
aneous. Some  commentators  have  attributed  the  conception 
of  Japanese  statesmen  of  the  imperial  divinity  idea  as  a  means 
to  consolidate  the  rule  of  the  political  oligarchy  that  accom- 
plished the  restoration  and  rode  into  power  with  it  to  a 
study  of  the  development  of  the  same  idea  in  Germany.  That, 
however,  is  difficult  to  prove,  because  the  idea  sprang  and 
developed  in  the  two  nations  nearly  at  the  same  time.  A 
very  good  account,  and  a  reliable  one.  of  this  phase  of  modern 
Japan  is  given  by  a  recognized  authority  on  Japan,  Basil 
Hall  Chamberlain,  for  many  years  professor  of  Japanese  and 
philology  at  the  Imperial  University  in  Tokio,  and  the  author 
of  many  well-known  books  about  Japan.  In  a  little-known 
brochure  of  his,  "The  Invention  of  a  New  Religion,' ?  pub- 
lished in  1912,  Professor  Chamberlain  wrote  [my  italics]  : 

The  first  glimmer  of  genuine  Japanese  history  dates  from  the  fifth 
century  after  Christ,  and  even  the  accounts  of  what  happened  in  the 
sixtli  century  must  be  received  with  caution.  Japanese  scholars  know 
this  as  well  as  we  do;  it  is  one  of  the  certain  results  of  investigation. 
But  the  Japanese  bureaucracy  does  not  desire  to  have  the  light  let 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  19 

in  on  this  inconvenient  circumstance.  While  granting  a  dispensa- 
tion re  the  national  mythology,  properly  so  called,  it  exacts  belief  in 
every  iota  of  the  national  historic  legends.  Woe  to  the  native  pro- 
fessor who  strays  from  the  path  of  orthodoxy.  His  wife  and  chil- 
dren will  starve.  From  the  late  Prince  Ito's  grossly  misleading 
"Commentary  on  the  Japanese  Constitution"  down  to  school  com- 
pentlmms,  the  absurd  dates  are  everywhere  insisted  upon.  This 
despite  the  fact  that  the  mythology  and  the  so-called  early  history 
are  recorded  in  the  same  works,  and  are  characterized  by  the  like 
miraculous  impossibilities;  that  the  chronology  is  palpably  fraudu- 
lent; that  the  speeches  put  into  the  mouths  of  the  ancient  mikados 
are  centos  culled  from  the  Chinese  classics;  that  their  names  are  in 
some  cases  derived  from  Chinese  sources;  and  that  the  earliest  Japa- 
nese historical  narratives,  the  earliest  known  social  usages,  and  even 
the  centralized  Imperial  form  of  Government  itself  are  all  stained 
through  and  through  with  a  Chinese  dye,  so  much  so  that  it  is  no 
longer  possible  to  determine  what  percentage  of  the  old  native 
thought  may  still  linger  on  in  fragments  here  and  there. 

In  the  face  of  all  this,  moral  ideals  which  were  of  common  knowl- 
edge derived  from  the  teaching  of  the  Chinese  sages,  are  now  arbi- 
trarily referred  to  the  "Imperial  Ancestors."  Such,  in  particular, 
are  loyalty  and  filial  piety — the  two  virtues  in  which,  in  the  far- 
Eastern  world,  all  the  others  rest.  It  is  furthermore  officially  taught 
that,  from  the  earliest  ages,  perfect  concord  has  always  subsisted  in 
Japan  between  beneficent  sovereigns  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  grate- 
fully loyal  people  on  the  other.  Never,  it  is  alleged,  has  Japan  been 
soiled  by  the  disobedient  and  rebellious  acts  committed  in  other 
countries;  while  at  the  same  time  the  Japanese  nation,  sharing  to 
some  extent  in  the  supernatural  virtues  of  its  rulers,  has  been  dis- 
tinguished by  a  high-minded  chivalry  called  Bushido,  unknown  in 
inferior  lands. 

Such  is  the  fabric  of  ideas  which  the  official  class  is  busy  building 
up  by  every  means  in  its  power,  including  the  punishment  of  those 
who  presume  to  stickle  for  historic  truth. 

The  sober  fact  is  that  no  nation  probably  has  ever  treated  its  sov- 
ereigns more  cavalierly  than  the  Japanese  have  done,  from  the  be- 
ginning of  authentic  history  down  to  within  the  memory  of  living 
men.  Emperors  have  been  deposed;  Emperors  have  been  assas- 
sinated; for  centuries  every  succession  to  the  throne  was  the  signal 
for  intrigues  and  sanguinary  broils.  Emperors  have  been  exiled; 
some  have  been  murdered  in  exile.  From  the  remote  island  to  which 
he  had  been  relegated  one  managed  to  escape,  hidden  under  a  load 


20     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

of  dried  fish.  In  the  fourteenth  century  things  came  to  such  a  pasa 
that  two  rival  Imperial  lines  defied  each  other  for  the  space  of  fifty- 
eight  years — the  so-called  Northern  and  Southern  Courts;  and  it  was 
the  Northern  Court,  branded  later  by  historians  as  usurping  and 
illegitimate,  that  ultimately  won  the  day,  and  handed  on  the  Impe- 
rial regalia  to  its  successors.  After  that,  as  indeed  long  before  that, 
for  long  centuries  the  government  was  in  the  hands  of  Mayors  of 
the  Palace,  who  substituted  one  infant  sovereign  for  another,  gen- 
erally forcing  each  to  abdicate  as  soon  as  he  approached  man's 
estate.  At  one  period,  these  Mayors  of  the  Palace  left  the  Descend- 
ent  of  the  Sun  in  such  distress  that  His  Imperial  Majesty  and  the 
Imperial  Princes  were  obliged  to  gain  a  livelihood  by  selling  their 
autographs.  .  .  .  Even  in  the  present  reign — the  most  glorious  in 
Japanese  history — there  have  been  two  rebellions,  during  one  of 
which  a  rival  Emperor  was  set  up  in  one  part  of  the  country,  and 
a  republic  proclaimed  in  another. 

As  for  Bushidor  so  modern  a  thing  it  is  that  neither  Kaempfer, 
Siebold,  Satow,  nor  Rein — all  men  knowing  their  Japan  by  heart 
— ever  once  allude  to  it  in  their  voluminous  writings.  The  cause 
of  their  silence  is  not  far  to  seek:  Bushido  was  unknown  until  a 
decade  ago.  The  very  word  appears  in  no  dictionary,  native  or  for- 
eign, before  the  year  1900.  Bushido,  as  an  institution  or  a  code  of 
rules,  has  never  existed.  The  accounts  given  of  it  have  been  fabri- 
cated out  of  the  whole  cloth,  chiefly  for  foreign  consumption. 

Thus,  within  a  space  of  a  short  lifetime,  the  new  Japanese  re- 
ligion of  loyalty  and  patriotism  has  emerged  into  the  light  of  day. 

The  new  Japanese  religion  consists,  in  its  present  early  stage, 
of  worship  of  the  sacrosanct  Imperial  Person  and  of  His  Divine 
Ancestors,  of  implicit  obedience  to  Him  as  head  of  the  army  (a 
position,  by  the  way,  opposed  to  all  former  Japanese  ideas) ; 
furthermore,  of  a  corresponding  belief  that  Japan  is  as  far  su- 
perior to  the  common  ruck  of  nations  as  the  Mikado  is  divinely 
superior  to  the  common  ruck  of  Kings  and  Emperors.  Do  not  the 
early  history-books  record  the  fact  that  Japan  was  created  first, 
while  all  other  countries  resulted  merely  from  the  drops  that  fell 
from  the  creator's  spear  when  he  had  finished  his  main  work ! 

Thus  does  it  come  about  that  the  neo-Japanese  myths  concern- 
ing dates,  and  Emperors,  and  heroes,  and  astonishing  national  vir- 
tues already  begin  to  find  their  way  into  popular  English   text- 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  21 

books,  current  literature,  and  even  grave  books  of  reference.  The 
Japanese  governing  class  has  willed  it  so,  and  in  such  matters  the 
Japanese  governing  class  can  enforce  its  will  abroad  as  well  as  at 
home.  The  statement  may  sound  paradoxical.  Study  the  question 
carefully  and  you  will  find  that  it  is  simply  true. 

To  quote  but  one  official  utterance  out  of  hundreds,  Baron  Oura, 
minister  of  agriculture  and  commerce,  wrote  this  in  February  of 
last  year  [1911] : 

"That  the  majesty  of  our  Imperial  House  towers  high  above 
everything  to  be  found  in  the  world,  and  that  it  is  as  durable  as 
heaven  and  earth,  is  too  well  known  to  need  dwelling  on  here.  .  .  . 
If  it  is  considered  that  our  country  needs  a  religious  faith,  then,  I 
say,  let  it  be  converted  to  a  belief  in  the  religion  of  patriotism  and 
loyalty,  the  religion  of  Imperialism — in  other  words,  to  Emperor- 
worship. 

The  new  religion,  in  its  present  stage,  still  lacks  one  important 
item — a  sacred  book.  Certain  indications  show  that  this  lacuna 
will  be  filled  by  the  elevation  of  the  more  important  Imperial  re- 
scripts to  that  rank,  accompanied  doubtless  by  an  authoritative 
commentary,  as  their  style  is  too  abstruse  to  be  understood  of 
the  people.  ...  In  fact,  a  volume  on  the  whole  duty  of  Japanese 
man,  with  selected  Imperial  poems  as  texts,  has  already  appeared. 

One  might  have  imagined  that  Japan's  new  religionists  would 
have  experienced  some  difficulty  in  persuading  foreign  nations  to 
accept  the  truth  of  their  dogmas.  Things  have  fallen  out  other- 
wise. Europe  and  America  evince  a  singular  taste  for  the  mar- 
vellous, and  find  a  zest  in  self-depreciation. 

As  giving  a  Japanese  view  of  this  aspect  of  modern  Japan, 
I  shall  quote  from  "The  Political  Development  of  Japan," 
by  George  Etsujiro  Uyehara,  D.  Sc,  published  in  1910.  It 
can  be  noticed  that  Professor  Uyehara  adheres  to  the  fiction 
that  something  is  known  about  Japanese  history  in  remote 
ages,  for  he  speaks  of  matters  supposed  to  have  happened 
twenty-five  centuries  ago.  As  Professor  Chamberlain  remarks, 
no  Japanese  would  dare  to  contradict  or  discredit  any  of  the 
national  historical  myths.     Professor  Uyehara  says: 


22     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

The  Divine  Right  of  the  Emperor,  however  absurd  it  may  seem 
to  the  theorists  of  individualistic  idealism,  still  holds  a  predomi- 
nant place  in  the  minds  of  the  Japanese;  and  its  political  value 
seems  to  be  as  important  to  the  Japanese  nation  as  the  religious 
value  of  miracles  and  mythological  and  allegorical  stories  is  to 
certain  religions.  Therefore,  to  understand  practical  politics  in 
Japan,  we  must  make  a  careful  examination  of  the  effects  of  Mi- 
kado ism  upon  the  Japanese  body  politic. 

The  Divine  Kight  of  the  Emperor  is  the  fundamental  principle 
on  which  the  Japanese  polity  was  first  established  and  on  which 
it  still  rests.  The  first  national  organization  known  in  the  history 
of  Japan  was  religio-political  in  its  character.  The  common  wor- 
ship of  the  Sun-goddess,  with  the  Emperor  as  the  high  priest,  was 
one  of  the  chief  functions  of  the  government.  In  fact,  the  term 
matsurigoto,  meaning  worship,  is  etymologically  in  pure  Japanese 
identical  with  that  of  government.  In  speaking  of  Shinto,  the  old 
State  religion  of  Japan,  Dr.  Aston  says:  "Secular  and  sacred  are 
much  less  differentiated  in  Shinto  than  in  more  highly  developed 
religions.  The  Mikado  was  at  once  the  sovereign  and  the  high 
priest."  Thus  the  original,  the  fundamental  political  idea  of  the 
Japanese  seems  to  confirm  the  theory  which  Professor  Burgess 
pronounces  universal:  "The  unbiased  political  historian  will  not 
dispute  the  proposition — that  the  earliest  forms  of  the  State  were 
theocratic — but  he  will  teach  that  the  State  was  brought  through 
the  earlier  and  most  difficult  period  of  its  development  by  the  power 
of  religion.  .  .  .  This  is  entirely  comprehensible  from  the  stand- 
point of  a  correct  political  philosophy.  The  first  and  most  funda- 
mental psychological  principle  concerned  in  the  development  of 
the  State  is  that  of  Piety,  i.e.  reverence  and  obedience.  Unless  the 
character  of  the  mass  of  the  population  be  moulded  by  this  prin- 
ciple, the  reign  of  the  law  cannot  be  attained." 

However,  many  Western  nations  have  long  since  abandoned 
the  theocratic  form  of  State.  There  remains  here  and  there  only 
its  shadow;  already,  even  before  the  time  of  Plato,  various  forms 
of  State  seem  to  have  existed.  It  is  most  singular  that  Japan  has 
firmly  and  religiously  adhered  to  her  old  traditional  polity  and 
made  no  single  departure  from  it  in  the  twenty-five  centuries  of 
her  existence,  during  which  she  has  passed  through  many  vicissi- 
tudes, political,  social,  and  economic.  Many  changes  have  taken 
place  from  time  to  time  in  the  form  and  mechanism  of  her  govern- 
ment, but  its  fundamental  polity,  a  unique  fact  in  political  history, 
has  never  been  altered,  shaken,  or  transformed.  It  appeals,  there- 
fore, most  intensely  to  the  Japanese  people,  no  matter  how  primi- 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  23 

tive  and  childlike  its  origin,  and  is  engraven  on  their  hearts  and 
minds,  and  engenders  their  deepest  admiration,  reverence,  and 
afit'eetion. 

That  the  Mikado  reigns  and  governs  the  country  absolutely,  by 
a  Right  inherited  from  His  Divine  Ancestors,  is  the  unconscious 
belief  or  the  instinctive  feeling  of  the  Japanese  people.  Indeed, 
it  may  be  said  to  be  their  religion — religon  in  the  sense  of  the 
"inner  voice"  as  defined  by  Matthew  Arnold. 

The  military  autocracy,  a  replica  of  Prussianism,  that  has 
governed  Japan  since  the  restoration  exercises  its  power  in 
a  large  measure  by  standing  behind  the  person  of  the  emperor 
and  using  the  throne  as  a  symbol.  Japan  really  has  in  this 
period  been  governed  by  an  oligarchy  of  very  limited  numbers. 
Its  core  is  the  Genro,  a  small  group  of  Elder  Statesmen,  in- 
cluding only  half  a  dozen  or  so  men.  Political  parties  and 
groups  in  the  Diet  are  composed  of  followers  of  this  or  that 
member  of  the  Genro.  There  are  by-currents  of  political 
thought  and  influence,  gathered  in  the  survival  of  the  ancient 
clans,  in  the  military  class,  and  nowadays  in  the  new  plutoc- 
racy; but  all  of  those  are  controlled  by  the  oligarchy,  which 
clusters  closely  about  the  throne  and  prevents  any  undesirable 
influence  from  reaching  it.  Created  after  the  restoration  as  a 
symbol  through  which  the  aristocratic  autocracy  could  govern 
more  easily,  and  as  focusing  a  national  sentiment,  the  throne 
and  its  divine  attributes  have  in  time  taken  on  an  actual  power 
from  the  acceptance  by  the  people  of  its  divine  status.  Thus 
in  late  years  the  throne  at  times  has  threatened  to  overcast  the 
oligarchy,  and  it  is  conceivable  that  if  ever  a  man  of  real  ability 
should  become  emperor,  he  might  take  power  from  the  hands 
of  the  oligarchy  and  wield  it  himself.  Even  now  to  some 
extent,  the  throne  is  becoming  a  sort  of  Frankenstein  of  the 
oligarchy,  and  the  emperor  cannot  always  be  controlled  abso- 
lutely as  the  inner  governing  circle  wish.  The  system  works 
smoothly  as  a  rule,  especially  with  a  people  densely  ignorant 
in  the  mass,  as  long  as  the  throne  remains  complacently  a 
puppet  for  a  highly  intelligent  ruling  class;  and  it  has  ad- 


24     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

vantages,  as  Germany  had,  over  nations  democratically  and 
therefore  more  loosely  governed.  A  difference  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  imperial  divine  right  theory  in  Germany  and 
in  Japan  was  that  in  Japan  it  was  not  the  presumption  of 
an  emperor,  but  was  the  invention  of  subjects  as  a  device  to 
govern  a  superstitious  people;  while  in  Germany  it  was  a 
clever,  but  erotic  and  intensely  egotistical,  emperor  who  re- 
vived it,  and  it  was  taken  complacently  by  the  military  autoc- 
racy because  it  suited  their  ends.  It  is  a  curious  reflection 
that  western  peoples,  who  found  in  the  kaiser's  divine  pre- 
tensions only  a  matter  for  scorn  and  ridicule,  have  taken  the 
similar  pretension  of  the  mikado,  if  not  seriously,  at  least 
without  ridicule  or  resentment.  The  reason  is  to  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  the  western  popular  conception  of  Japan 
has  been  tinged  with  romanticism,  as  a  sort  of  play-nation, 
not  to  be  judged  seriously  or  by  critical  standards. 

In  his  work,  quoted  in  this  chapter,  Professor  Chamberlain 
states  that  a  principal  reason  why  Japan  had  succeeded  in 
understanding  the  West  well,  while  remaining  a  mystery  to  the 
West,  is  the  difference  in  languages.  Western  languages  are 
simply  composed  from  an  alphabet  of  twenty-six  letters,  while 
Japanese  is  an  idiograph  language  which  very  few  foreigners 
ever  master.  Undoubtedly,  the  Japanese  language  has  been 
one  of  the  best  screens  which  that  country  produces,  and  one 
which  has  been  of  singular  service  to  the  world  politics  of  the 
nation. 

In  the  course  of  its  development  modern  Japan  has  under- 
gone an  evolution  in  its  comprehension  of  the  West.  Japan 
began  to  understand  the  West  long  before  the  West  began 
to  understand  Japan,  because  the  Japanese  were  keen,  almost 
desperately  keen,  about  understanding  the  West,  while  the 
West  was  only  a  little  interested  about  Japan,  as  one  is  in- 
terested in  any  curio.  Japan  has  not  until  recently  pre- 
sented itself  to  the  West  as  a  serious  and  important  problem 
which  relates  directly  to  the  security  of  the  West,  while  from 
the  time  of  real  impact  of  the  West  upon  Japan,  a  period 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  25 

usually  dated  from  Commodore  Perry's  visit,  Japan  has  known 
that  the  West  stood  for  and  contained  the  knowledge  which 
Japan  must  acquire  if  she  were  to  rise  to  first  rank  among 
nations. 

But  as  time  passed,  and  the  Japanese  began  to  think  them- 
selves proficient  in  western  knowledge  and  science,  and 
especially  after  they  had  demonstrated,  at  least  to  their  own 
satisfaction,  a  superiority  over  even  western  powers  in  west- 
ern military  tactics,  they  took  on  another  attitude  toward 
western  institutions.  Having  for  so  long  assured  others  of 
the  divine  origin  of  their  country  and  its  preeminent  attri- 
butes, the  Japanese  began  to  believe  all  the  things  of  them- 
selves that  their  propaganda  had  somehow  induced  westerners 
to  believe  of  them.  This  developed  in  them  an  internal 
conceit  and  arrogance,  which  rarely,  except  with  the  vulgar 
classes,  showed  through  the  natural  outward  tact  and  polite 
demeanor  of  the  people,  but  which  nevertheless  ran  strongly 
in  Japanese  thought  and  character.  The  Japanese  developed 
self-confidence  and,  after  that,  self-sufficiency.  This  caused 
them  to  resent  any  attitude  of  patronage  and  condescension 
in  foreigners,  whether  this  was  merely  the  provincial  conceit 
of  the  ordinary  tourist  or  patronizing  of  a  more  subtle  char- 
acter. 

In  this  more  subtle  class  of  foreign  patronage  can  be  placed 
such  well-meant  works  as  missionary  and  educational  efforts. 
Only  recentty  the  Japanese  regarded  foreign  religious  mis- 
sions with  tolerance,  if  a  little  contemptuously,  and  they 
took  much  in  the  same  manner  as  they  were  bestowed  such 
benefactions  as  schools  and  hospitals.  It  is  different  now.  A 
nation,  or  a  people,  which  arrogates  to  itself  the  first  place  on 
earth  by  reason  of  its  divine  origin  and  associations,  and  which 
considers  itself  an  equal  or  the  superior  even  in  material 
and  military  power  of  any  nations  except  a  few,  rejects  in- 
stinctively a  patronage  which,  on  its  face,  assumes,  firstly, 
that  Japan  herself  cannot  afford  to  pay  for  such  institutions ; 
secondly,  that  she  is  benighted  and  needs  such  foreign  en- 


26     DEMOCKACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

lightenment ;  thirdly,  that  without  foreign  aid  she  could  not 
attain  it ;  and,  fourthly,  that  it  implies  the  superiority  of  the 
"West.  Japan  went  to  school  to  the  West  and  absorbed  its 
knowledge  with  avidity.  But  the  Japanese  now  feel,  rightly 
or  wrongly,  that  they  have  been  graduated.  Foreign  churches 
and  religious  missions  for  foreigners  in  Japan,  foreign  hos- 
pitals for  foreigners  in  Japan,  foreign  schools  for  foreigners 
in  Japan,  do  not  offend  the  Japanese  as  yet ;  but  foreign 
religious  missions  for  Japanese,  foreign  schools  and  hospitals 
for  Japanese,  irritate  the  rapidly  swelling  pride  and  conceit 
of  the  Japanese.  I  have  heard  of  a  recent  instance  of  how  an 
American  physican  in  Japan  journeyed  about  the  United 
States  soliciting  subscriptions  to  build  and  equip  a  medical 
school  and  hospital  in  Japan.  lie  raised  a  good  deal  of  money, 
and  when  he  returned  to  Japan  he  discovered  an  almost  im- 
perceptible coolness  toward  his  project  by  the  Japanese.  On 
investigating,  he  learnt  that  the  Japanese  did  not  feel  that 
they  were  in  need  of  foreign  charity  of  this  kind.  So  far 
tact  and  certain  exigencies  of  world  politics  have  repressed 
this  disposition  of  the  Japanese,  but  it  is  beginning  to  be 
shown  plainly  in  many  instances. 

A  very  interesting  demonstration  of  this  new  spirit,  and 
one  also  which  has  a  decided  political  significance  in  con- 
junction with  issues  of  the  Great  War,  is  the  so-called  Hepburn 
incident  which  occurred  in  1918.  I  quote  the  "Japan  Adver- 
tiser": 

SHALL  AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY  BE  ALLOWED  A 
CHANCE  IN  JAPAN? 

Minister  op   Education    Says   "No!"   in   Opposing   Establish- 
ment op  New  Chair  in  Imperial  University 

The  attentive  eyes  of  a  couple  of  hundred  professors  and  lec- 
turers as  well  as  4,000  students  of  the  Imperial  University  of 
Tokyo,  who  are  always  claiming  the  freedom  of  learning  without  the 
intervention  of  conservative  bureaucrats,  are  now  concentrated  upon 
the  peculiar  development  of  affairs  as  regards  the  official  sanction 
for  the  professorial  chair  on  America  and  American  Affairs,  which 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  27 

is  to  be  established  in  the  College  of  Law  by  the  donation  of 
yen  60,000  from  Mr.  Alonzo  Barton  Hepburn,  well  known  New  York 
banker  and  millionaire. 

The  situation  is  complicated,  but  the  f.ut  itself  is  that  Mr.  Ryo- 
hei  Okada,  Minister  of  Education,  has  voit  d  his  objection  to  the 
establishment  of  the  new  chair  in  Japan's  leading  educational  in- 
stitution on  the  ground  that  the  American  teaching  of  democracy 
will  be  harmful  to  Japan's  national  politics.  He  is  hesitating  to 
give  the  official  sanction  for  the  chair,  which  must  come  in  the  form 
of  an  Imperial  Ordinance,  according  to  the  official  regulations  of 
the  university. 

During  the  latter  part  of  last  year  Mr.  Hepburn's  donation  was 
reported.  Baron  Shibusawa,  who  was  first  consulted  by  the  New 
York  banker  upon  the  problem,  was  pleased  with  the  latter's  idea 
to  promote  Japanese-American  friendship  by  establishing  a  course 
in  the  university  on  American  affairs  and  sounded  the  university 
officials  regarding  the  question.  Apparently,  there  was  practically 
no  objection  on  the  part  of  the  university,  and,  in  consequence,  the 
negotiations  were  smoothly  earned  out. 

Baron  Megata,  who  was  then  in  America  as  the  head  of  Japan's 
financial  commission,  discussed  the  matter  with  Mr.  Hepburn  many 
times  and  the  plan  was  satisfactorily  concluded  at  the  end  of  last 
year  between  the  American  financier  and  the  Imperial  University 
of  Tokyo. 

Accordingly,  the  American  course,  consisting  of  three  lectures, 
"American  Independence"  by  Dr.  Nitobe,  "The  American  Consti- 
tution" by  Professor  Minobe  and  "American  Diplomacy"  by  Pro- 
fessor Yoshlno,  was  inaugurated  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  A 
grand  ceremony  for  the  opening  of  the  new  course  was  held,  with 
President  Baron  Yamakawa's  speech  of  congratulation,  followed 
by  a  talk  by  Professor  Hijikata,  the  Dean  of  the  Law  College. 

As  the  course  was  quite  new  to  the  students,  and  as  the  lecturers 
were  all  the  best  and  most  popular  speakers,  the  course  soon  became 
a  center  of  interest.  On  every  Saturday  afternoon,  when  the  lec- 
tures were  given,  the  large  auditorium  was  crowded  by  several  hun- 
dred young  students,  consisting  not  only  of  those  entered  in  the 
College  of  Law  but  hundreds  of  others  who  were  studying  litera- 
ture, medicine,  science,  engineering  and  even  agriculture. 

At  the  same  time  a  plan  was  made  by  the  faculty  to 
select  a  candidate  to  fill  the  chair  in  the  future.  He  was 
to  be  one  who  specialized  in  the  course,  some  young,  energetic 
and  intelligent  graduate  of  the  college.  It  is  said  that  if  the  selec- 
tion was  settled,   the  new   professor  was  to   be   sent  to   America 


28     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

at  once.  Furthermore,  it  was  promised  by  the  university  authori- 
ties that  the  new  professor  might  spend  one-third  of  every  year 
in  America,  even  after  he  began  regular  service.  The  original  plan 
was  on  an  even  larger  scale.  It  was  proposed  that  the  new  pro- 
fessor should  also  serve  as  an  university  extension  lecturer,  travel- 
ing all  around  the  Empire  to  give  lectures  on  America  and  Ameri- 
can affairs  to  public  audiences  in  various  cities  and  towns. 

Turning  to  the  trouble  now  in  consideration,  it  is  worth  recalling 
the  Imperial  Ordinance  on  the  Imperial  University,  which  was 
originally  issued  in  1886  and  revised  in  1890  and  1893. 

Article  1  of  the  Ordinance  says:  "It  is  the  purpose  of  the  Im- 
perial University  to  teach  and  investigate  such  arts  and  sciences 
as  those  demanded  by  the  state." 

Article  18  says:  "The  variety  and  number  of  the  professorial 
chairs  is  to  be  decided  by  the  Imperial  Ordinance,  which  is  to  be 
issued  for  special  necessity." 

The  principles  expressed  in  these  two  articles  are  declared  to  be 
the  fundamental  ideas  which  explain  the  nature  of  the  present  con- 
troversy. In  an  interpretation  by  the  Minister  of  Education,  ac- 
cording to  a  university  professor,  the  new  course  on  America  not 
only  fails  to  fill  the  requirement  of  "such  arts  and  sciences  as  those 
demanded  by  the  state,"  but  is  rather  harmful  to  the  welfare  of 
the  state.  As  the  establishment  of  any  new  professorial  chair  is 
to  be  decided  by  Imperial  Ordinance,  in  accordance  with  Article  18, 
Mr.  Okada,  the  Minister  for  Education,  holds  practically  the  full 
power  for  sanctioning  the  new  American  chair. 

Japanese  officialdom  does  not  invite  the  introduction  of  demo- 
cratic propaganda  into  Japan,  and  fears  even  to  hear  the  word 
"democracy,"  just  as  the  Japanese  people  a  hundred  years  ago 
shuddered  before  the  word  "Christianity,"  a  professor  at  the  Im- 
perial University  said  to  an  "Advertiser"  reporter  yesterday.  Be- 
sides the  government  officials,  several  university  professors,  though 
they  represent  the  minority,  hold  the  similar  views  toward  the  men- 
tion of  American  democracy.  C  le  professor  declared  yesterday 
that  Professor  Shinkichi  Uyesugi,  who  holds  the  chair  for  Japaneese 
Constitutional  Law  in  the  university,  was  disgusted  by  the  faculty's 
decision  to  establish  the  new  American  course  and  approached 
Premier  Co  ant  Terauchi  a  couple  of  months  ago,  asking  the  Pre- 
mier to  intervene. 

There  have  been  whispers,  of  course,  to  the  effect  that  the  Min- 
ister of  Education  is  not  solely  responsible  for  the  desire  to  ban 
the  American  course  of  study;  that  there  may  be  others  behind  the 
curtain.    But  the  question  still  remains,  and  it  is  one  which  has 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  29 

deeply  stirred  Japanese  educational  circles.  Shall  the  rising  gen- 
eration of  Japan  be  permitted  to  receive  the  democratic  ideas  of 
America  or  shall  the  doors  be  slammed  in  the  face  of  "dangerous 
thoughts"  t 

And  the  "Japan  Chronicle"  commented  on  the  matter 
editorially,  on  May  16,  1918,  as  follows: 

Some  time  ago,  Mr.  Hepburn,  the  nephew  of  a  well-known  mis- 
sionary, offered  a  large  sum  of  money  for  the  establishment  of  a 
Chair  of  American  History  at  the  Tokio  Imperial  University. 
The  generous  donor  had  a  sentimental  attachment  to  Japan,  and 
he  desired,  as  is  evident  from  the  nature  of  the  gift,  to  promote 
a  better  understanding  between  the  two  countries,  conceiving  pos- 
sibly that  Japan,  about  whose  feet  still  cling  the  rags  of  the  feudal 
system,  might  profit  by  a  better  knowledge  of  the  struggles  of  a 
country  which  had  begun  the  creation  of  constitutional  govern- 
ment from  the  beginning — not  built  upon  old  foundations — and 
might  therefore  be  expected  to  have  useful  knowledge  to  impart. 
When  the  news  was  first  received  of  this  benefaction  it  was  stated 
in  the  Japanese  newspapers  that  the  new  Chair  was  to  be  for  the 
study  of  the  American  Constitution,  and  jocular  remarks  were 
made  about  it  being  tantamount  to  an  importation  of  "dangerous 
thoughts."  It  was  not  supposed  that  there  could  be  any  serious 
obstacle  to  the  execution  of  the  American  donor's  wishes,  but  when 
the  benefaction  was  next  heard  of  the  American  Constitution  had 
been  modified  to  American  History,  and  whereas  it  might  have  been 
expected  that  the  offer  would  be  accepted  with  alacrity,  months  go 
by,  and  still  official  permission  is  not  given  for  the  creation  of  the 
new  Chair.  On  top  of  this  comes  the  announcement  by  Mr.  Okada, 
the  Minister  for  Education,  that  a  Chair  of  Shinto  is  to  be  estab- 
lished at  the  Imperial  University  at  Tokio,  and  to  this  one  of  the 
Professors  of  the  University  added  that  it  had  been  considered  wise 
to  establish  this  new  Chair  before  the  advent  of  the  American 
foundation.  In  other  words,  American  history  is  of  the  nature  of 
"dangerous  thoughts,"  but  since  the  poison  cannot  very  well  be 
avoided,  it  is  wise  to  take  the  antidote  first.  Comment  made  by 
way  of  a  joke  turns  out  to  be  the  very  serious  conclusion  of  the 
highest  authorities  in  the  country. 

It  is  one  of  those  cases  where  it  is  almost  impossible  to  effect  in 
imagination  a  transposition,  so  as  to  see  how  a  situation  will  ap- 
pear to  other  people.  If  one  of  Japan's  war  millionaires  wished 
to  endow  a  chair  of  Japanese  history  or  even  of  Shinto  at  Harvard, 


30     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

what  would  be  the  effect?  It  is  possible  that  the  Harvard  authori- 
ties would  reply  that  though  they  felt  very  grateful  they  had  no 
expectation  of  a  large  number  of  students  attending  the  lectures 
and  therefore  suggested  that  the  millionaire  reconsider  his  offer. 
Or  they  might  accept  it  with  alacrity.  The  one  thing  that  is  most 
unimaginable  is  that  the  American  Government  would  hasten  to 
present  the  University  first  with  a  Chair  of  Republicanism  or  of 
Episcopal  Methodism.  Or  if  such  an  offer  were  made  to  Oxford, 
it  would  never  enter  the  head  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  that  the  Em- 
pire's safety  or  the  country's  morals  demanded  the  prior  establish- 
ment of  a  Chair  of  Druidism.  It  is  quite  easy  to  fancy  Mr.  G.  B. 
Shaw  founding  a  Cambridge  Chair  of  Dangerous  Thoughts, — and 
easier  to  imagine  its  being  accepted  than  to  conceive  of  its  rejection. 

One  of  the  effects  of  Japan  entering  into  relations  with  foreign 
countries  has  been  the  growth  of  an  official  obscurantism  about 
those  matters  which  are  supposed  to  affect  the  honour  of  the  nation 
and  of  the  Imperial  House.  Under  the  Shogunate  little  enough 
respect  was  shown  to  the  Sovereign;  but  during  a  half-century  in 
which  the  West  has  learnt  to  criticise  and  question  all  things.  Japan 
has  gone  so  far  as  dismissing  professors  for  doubting  historical 
dates.  So  far  as  modern  history  is  concerned,  the  searchlight  of 
criticism  is  free  to  search  out  its  details,  but  when  it  goes  back  be- 
yond documented  times  it  becomes  too  sacred  for  critical  research. 

The  object  of  the  men  who  desire  to  organise  Japanese  opinion 
and  belief  according  to  sealed  pattern  is  solely  the  honour  and 
glory  of  Japan,  but  their  method  is  the  outcome  of  a  strange  lack 
of  faith  in  the  abilities  and  genius  of  the  Japanese  people. 

Does  Mr.  Okada  really  believe  that  the  forces  which  move  Japan 
are  different  from  those  which  govern  the  rest  of  humanity?  And 
has  he  so  little  imagination  as  to  be  unable  to  draw  a  conclusion 
from  the  fact  that  the  countries  where  thought  is  most  free  are 
those  which  have  made  the  most  progress?  Beliefs,  like  knowledge, 
progress,  and  when  they  are  not  allowed  to  progress  they  die;  yet 
it  would  be  very  surprising  to  hear  that  the  new  Chair  of  Shinto 
was  intended  to  encourage  a  spirit  of  free  inquiry,  research,  and 
generalisation  from  the  ancient  history  of  Japan,  for  that  is  the 
very  last  thing  that  the  official  classes  understand  by  the  study  of 
Shinto. 

It  is  curious  that  the  Japanese,  who  are  so  solicitous  regarding 
what  other  nations  think  of  them,  do  not  reflect  on  the  influence 
on  their  international  relations  of  the  cult  of  an  exclusive  nation- 
ality. 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  31 

Many  intimations  of  late  have  also  given  notice  that  the 
Japanese  Government  is  growing  resentful  of  the  Christian 
missionary  propaganda  and  proselyting  in  Japan,  although 
this  matter  carries  with  the  handling  of  it,  and  especially 
with  any  attempt  to  curb  or  to  expel  it,  a  most  delicate  ques- 
tion, one  so  full  of  irritations  of  western  sentiments  and 
moral  beliefs  that  the  Japanese  Government  is,  and  well  may 
be,  reluctant  to  raise  the  issue.  That  Christian  tenets  and 
propaganda  are  directly  opposed  to  the  concept  of  emperor 
divinity  and  worship  is  quite  apparent  to  most  minds;  but, 
oddly,  there  is  an  effort  in  Japan  to  reconcile  the  two.  Out 
of  many  instances  that  I  have  heard  of,  I  quote — the  italics 
are  mine — again  from  Professor  Chamberlain's  brochure,  "The 
Invention  of  a  New  Religion"': 

The  Rev.  Dr.  Ebina,  one  of  the  leading  lights  of  the  Protestant 
partorate  in  Japan,  plunges  more  deeply  still  into  this  doctrine, 
according  to  -which,  as  already  noted,  the  whole  Japanese  nation 
is,  in  a  manner,  apotheosised.     Says  he: 

"Though  the  encouragement  of  ancestor  worship  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  part  of  the  essential  teaching  of  Christianity,  it  [Chris- 
tianity] is  not  opposed  to  the  notion  that,  when  the  Japanese  Em- 
pire was  founded,  its  early  rulers  were  in  communication  with  the 
Great  Spirit  that  rules  the  universe.  Christians,  according  to  this 
theory,  without  doing  violence  to  their  creed,  may  acknowledge  that 
the  Japanese  nation  is  of  divine  origin.  It  is  only  when  we  realize 
that  the  Imperial  Ancestors  were  in  close  communion  with  God, 
that  we  understand  how  sacred  is  the  country  in  which  we  live. 
(Dr.  Ebina  ends  by  recommending  the  Imperial  Rescript  on  edu- 
cation as  a  text  for  Cliristian  sermons). 

In  truth  the  Christian  movement  in  Japan  is  confronted 
with  a  serious  dilemma — a  dilemma  that  is  leading  its  foreign- 
protagonists  in  Japan  into  some  queer  elisions  of  Christian 
teaching  and  dogma  in  their  effort  to  retain  their  hold  on 
Japanese  converts,  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  it  possible 
for  those  converts  still  to  be  orthodox  subjects  of  the  mikado. 
It  further  is  interesting  to  recall  that  of  Japan's  fulsome 
adulators  none  have  been  more  energetic  in  singing  her  praises 


32     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

unstinted,  in  condoning  her  delinquencies,  and  in  defending 
her  foreign  policy,  than  some  prominent  Christian  mission- 
aries. The  missionaries  who  live  and  work  in  Korea,  Formosa, 
and  China,  however,  have  a  different  tale  to  tell,  although 
the  conditions  under  which  they  have  to  work  requires  them 
often  to  suppress  their  criticisms. 

In  previous  books  I  have  written  fully  about  Japanese  politi- 
cal institutions — the  constitution,  the  ballot  suffrage,  the  par- 
liament, and  the  various  machinery  of  Government — and  will 
review  those  matters  but  briefly  here.  One  point  might  be 
noted,  that  the  constitution  of  Japan  did  not  spring  from  the 
people,  but  is  held  to  be  the  gift  of  the  emperor  to  the  people, 
thus  preserving  the  throne  as  the  origin  even  of  popular 
rights  and  liberty  and  the  fountain  of  all  authority.  In  his 
"The  Political  Development  of  Japan,"  Professor  Uyehara 
wrote,  "Old  Japan  never  had  a  Magna  Charta,  nor  a  Bill  of 
Rights,  nor  any  political  manifesto  involving  abstract  princi- 
ples of  justice,  equality,  liberty,  and  the  rights  of  men."  The 
constitution  derives  its  authority  not  from  the  people,  but 
from  the  throne.  The  throne  is  not  in  any  sense  held  to  be 
responsible  to  the  cabinet  or  to  the  Diet,  or  to  the  people  for 
its  administrative  acts.  The  Diet  is  responsible  solely  to  the 
throne,  not  to  the  people.  The  Cabinet  is  responsible  to  the 
throne,  not  to  the  Diet.  Regarding  the  constitution  Professor 
Uyehara  wrote : 

The  doctrine  of  sovereignty  is  embodied  in  the  major  premises 
of  the  present  Constitution  of  Japan.  The  logical  severity  and 
rigidity  of  its  structure,  perhaps,  surpass  that  of  the  present  Con- 
stitution of  France,  though  the  fundamental  doctrines  embodied 
in  these  two  documents  are  as  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other 
as  the  Poles.  The  main  thesis  of  the  Japanese  Constitution  is  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Emperor,  whereas  that  of  the  French  Constitu- 
tion is  the  doctrine  of  vox  populi  vox  dei. 

Article  IV.  of  the  Constitution  of  Japan  states  that  "the  Em- 
peror is  the  head  of  the  Empire,  combining  in  Himself  all  the 
Powers  of  the  State." 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  33 

In  one  of  his  articles  from  Japan  to  the  "Daily  Mail"  of 
London,  written  in  1918,  Bernard  Falk  criticized  the  ten- 
dency of  foreigners  to  over-praise  Japan,  and  the  "Japan 
Chronicle"  thus  commented: 

It  will  be  noted  that  Mr.  Falk  is  not  quite  so  strongly  impressed 
by  Japanese  enthusiasm  for  the  war  and  her  determination  to  make 
the  world  safe  for  democracy  as  some  observers  viewing  things  from 
England  or  America.  Viscount  Ishii,  who  does  talk  English  fluently, 
would  perhaps  have  convinced  the  correspondent  of  the  "Daily  Mail" 
that  things  in  Japan  are  not  what  they  seem.  "It  is  waste  of  time 
and  it  is  folly,"  says  Mr.  Falk,  "to  talk  to  Japan  of  democracy  or 
in  terms  of  high-flown  idealism.  The  average  Japanese  does  not 
comprehend  the  meaning  of  democracy."  This  will  come  as  a  shock 
to  readers  of  Viscount  Ishii's  speeches  [in  America]  and  of  the 
eulogistic  references  to  Japan  of  Mr.  Balfour  and  Lord  Robert 
Cecil.  Mr.  Falk  has  something  to  say  on  this  head  also.  In  com- 
menting on  the  news  sent  out  to  Japan  by  wire  he  says:  "It  may 
be  sincerely  hoped  that  the  continual  outpouring  of  sickly  and 
flattering  patronage  which  has  characterised  British  references  to 
Japan  will  cease.  Sensible  men  in  Japan  are  not  moved  by  it  and 
others  jump  to  wrong  conclusions,  exaggerate  its  importance,  and 
become  violently  chauvinistic — always  a  danger  in  a  country  which 
is  essentially  nationalistic." 

The  Japanese  have  reached  a  point  when  they  are  some- 
what irritated  even  by  the  flattery  of  foreign  statesmen  and 
politicians,  for  when  this  flattery  is  obviously  overdone,  it  is 
taken  as  a  reflection  on  the  good  sense  of  the  Japanese,  or 
as  satire.  This  applies  only  to  the  educated  class  of  the 
Japanese,  who  compose  the  Government,  the  university  pro- 
fessors, the  other  professions,  and  the  upper  business  elements. 
The  Japanese  masses  are  unaware  of  any  satire  in  foreign 
flattery,  for  they  have  been  told,  and  believe  readily,  that  such 
modern  scientific  utilities  as  electricity,  telephones,  wireless 
telegraph,  and  machinery,  are  the  inventions  of  the  Japanese. 
Does  not  this  credulity  coincide  with  the  belief  that  Japan  is 
of  divine  origin  and  the  foremost  nation  on  earth,  which  is  the 
foundation  of  Japanese  patriotism? 


34     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

A  great  deal  has  been  said,  and  much  more  probably  will 
be  said  in  favor  of  allowing  Japan  a  kind  of  paternal  position 
in  respect  to  China  and  other  backward  states,  so  called,  in  the 
far  East.  Aside  from  the  moral  and  institutional  character- 
istics of  the  Japanese  nation  as  they  relate  to  this  suggestion, 
especially  vis-a-vis  a  genuinely  democratic  country  like  China, 
there  is  the  question  of  Japan's  competency  to  fulfil  such  a 
mandate  from  civilization  on  the  basis  of  efficiency.  Japan's 
economic  and  industrial  efficiency  is  closely  connected  with 
the  Government.     Dr.  Uyehara  writes  [my  italics]  : 

Under  such  circumstances  the  Japanese  people  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  place  implicit  trust  in  their  government.  Their  economic 
conditions  were  never  so  distressing  as  to  make  them  declare  that 
"the  government  is  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the  peo- 
ple." It  was  understood  by  them  that  the  government,  being  an 
authority  above,  should  take  the  initiative  in  all  important  matters 
of  State  and  lead  the  people,  and  the  people  should  follow  in  strict 
obedience.  This  idea  is  still  consciously  or  unconsciously  dominant 
in  the  minds  of  the  Japanese  masses.  Hence  the  Japanese  as  a 
nation  are  like  a  well-disciplined  army,  but  as  individuals  are  little 
better  than  disbanded  soldiers.  This  is,  perhaps,  the  strongest 
and  the  weakest  point  of  the  Japanese  nation. 

The  excessive  dependence  of  the  people  on  the  government,  or  the 
omnipotence  of  the  government  itself  (Seifumanno-Shugi),  as  Mr. 
Shimada  calls  this  peculiar  mental  habit  of  the  people,  has  certain 
advantages  and  disadvantages  in  the  development  of  the  country. 

That  Japan  has  never  experienced  a  violent  constitutional  revo- 
lution in  her  history  is,  no  doubt,  largely  due  to  this  peculiar  mental 
habit  of  her  people. 

A  close  observer  would,  perhaps,  be  more  struck  by  the  socialistic 
tendency  of  the  Japanese  State  than  by  its  military  and  political 
achievements.  Indeed,  this  most  monarchical  State  is  found  to  be 
most  socialistic.  In  Japan,  State  initiative  and  supervision  in  in- 
dustrial matters  is  very  strong,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Govern- 
ment is  wot  responsible  to  the  people  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term. 
The  entire  postal  system,  telephones,  and  telegraphs,  are  owned 
and  operated  by  the  State;  nearly  all  the  gas.  the  electric,  and 
water  plants  throughout  the  country  belong  to  the  State  or  to  the 
municipality.    Again,  all  railways  are  now  nationalised,  and  even 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  35 

the  tobacco,  salt,  and  camphor  industries  are  a  State  monopoly. 
There  are  in  Japan  very  few  great  commercial  and  industrial  un- 
dertakings, such  as  banking,  shipbuilding,  shipping,  and  naviga- 
tion, etc.,  completely  carried  out  by  private  individuals.  The  Jap- 
anese people  are  habitually  inclined  to  wait  for,  or  to  depend  on 
governmental  initiative  or  subsidy  for  a  great  industrial  or  com- 
mercial enterprise.  The  "Constitution,"  says  Baron  (now  Vis- 
count) Kaneko,  "has  been  issued,  and  laws  and  codes  have  been 
brought  to  a  certain  perfection,  and  we  now  possess  a  complete 
skeleton  of  a  State.  But  in  the  point  of  muscle  and  blood  which 
I  term  the  economic  State,  it  is  far  from  complete.  It  does  not 
require  much  study  to  find  out  that,  in  spite  of  the  satisfactory 
development  of  codes  of  laws  and  of  a  military  system,  the  economic 
condition  of  our  country  is  most  discouraging." 

The  economic  position  of  Japan  was  considerably  improved 
during  the  Great  War,  when  the  country  was  able  to  have 
all  the  advantages  of  being  one  of  the  allies,  while  at  the  same 
time,  in  so  far  as  feeling  the  strain  of  the  war,  it  was  almost 
the  same  as  a  neutral.  Japanese  industry  received  a  tre- 
mendous stimulus  by  the  war,  and  made  great  profits.  Never- 
theless, we  find  the  "Japan  Chronicle,"  in  an  editorial  en- 
titled "Japanese  Efficiency  in  Practice,"  published  on  Jan- 
uary 30,  1919,  saying : 

It  is  remarkable  that  at  a  time  when  the  administration  in  Japan 
itself  is  so  bad  that  it  seems  on  the  verge  of  break-down,  Japanese 
chauvinists  should  be  pressing  the  Government  to  add  to  its  respon- 
sibilities by  insisting  on  the  control  of  railways  in  Siberia.  Every 
day  they  have  before  them  evidence  that  the  railways  administra- 
tion is  so  over-taxed  that  it  often  appears  in  danger  of  collapse. 
The  rolling-stock  is  quite  inadequate  for  the  demands  upon  it, 
either  of  passenger  or  goods  traffic.  No  proper  attention  is  paid 
to  the  equipment  of  the  railways,  with  the  result  that  engines,  car- 
riages, and  goods  trucks  are  constantly  under  repair.  No  pro-, 
vision  is  made  for  times  of  abnormal  pressure,  such  as  at  the  New 
Year,  either  as  regards  passengers  or  freight.  If  a  train  loses  time 
on  its  journey  from  some  unexpected  incident,  no  attempt  ever 
seems  to  be  made  to  make  up  for  the  time  lost :  a  train  will  be  timed 
by  the  schedule  to  stay  at  a  certain  station  for  ten  minutes,  and  it 
will  be  kept  there  ten  minutes  even  if  a  couple  of  hours  late,  for  no 
reason  whatever  save  that  it  is  scheduled  for  that  period.     Connec- 


36     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

tions  are  constantly  lost.  Trains  coming  from  a  long  distance, 
such  as  from  beyond  Karuizawa  to  Himeji,  a  run  of  four  or  five 
hundred  miles,  are  included  in  the  local  service  of  the  districts 
through  which  they  pass,  stopping  at  every  station  on  the  way, 
with  the  result  that,  being  constantly  late,  they  simply  disorganise 
the  local  traffic.  As  showing  the  lack  of  co-ordination,  trains  of 
empty  trucks  may  be  seen  leaving  an  industrial  centre  like  Osaka 
instead  of  the  trucks  being  utilised  on  the  return  journey.  No  at- 
tempt seems  to  be  made  to  keep  the  administration  of  the  railways 
up  to  date  by  adopting  the  improved  methods  of  foreign  countries. 
In  the  majority  of  cases  the  stations  are  a  discredit  to  the  service; 
the  waiting-rooms  are  filthily  dirty,  even  newly-built  stations  like 
Tokyo  and  Yokohama  rapidly  deteriorating,  while  the  latrines 
would  in  any  other  country  be  the  subject  of  prosecution  by  the 
sanitary  inspector.  About  the  only  part  of  the  service  that  can  be 
commended  is  the  through  mail  trains,  which  are  well  appointed 
and  keep  time,  and  with  these  may  be  bracketed  the  electric  sen-ice 
between  Yokohama  and  Tokyo  both  for  speed  and  punctuality. 
Otherwise  the  condition  of  the  railways  goes  from  bad  to  worse. 

Instead  of  seeking  to  obtain  control  over  the  Siberian  railways, 
and  thus  still  further  deplete  its  small  staff  of  railway  experts,  the 
Japanese  Government  would  do  well  to  engage  American  or  British 
railway  experts  for  the  reorganisation  of  its  own  lines.  In  the  end 
money  would  be  saved,  while  the  service  would  be  improved. 

But  it  is  not  only  in  the  matter  of  railways  that  the  Govern- 
ment administration  appears  on  the  verge  of  collapse.  Inefficiency 
is  rife  throughout  all  the  departments  of  State  organisation.  It 
is  only  necessary  to  point  to  the  post  office  and  the  telegraphs,  to 
the  local  tramway  services,  to  the  condition  of  the  roads,  to  the  in- 
adequate protection  afforded  by  the  police,  in  order  to  realise 
the  extent  of  the  break-down  of  State  and  local  administration,  etc. 

Japan's  policy  of  railway  penetration  of  China  and  Siberia 
is  of  course  political  strategy,  and  has  little  relation,  except 
as  a  means  for  evasion  of  the  "open  door,"  to  economic 
efficiency  either  in  those  countries  or  in  Japan.  Neither  has 
Japan's  pretension  to  act  as  the  representation  of  civilization 
in  directing  reform  in  China  or  in  Siberia  any  genuine  found- 
ation in  her  administrative  fitness  for  that  work.  Japan's 
administration  of  her  own  dependencies,  Korea  and  Formosa, 
is  an  ill-concealed  scandal.     In  Formosa  the  natives  are  not 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  37 

allowed  educational  advantages,  for  they  might  inculcate 
sentiments  of  revolt  against  Japanese  rule ;  they  are  exploited 
as  laborers  for  the  Japanese  sugar  and  tea  planters,  and  ac- 
quire easily  the  drug  habits  inculcated  by  Japanese  traders. 
In  Korea  the  situation  is  in  some  respects  even  more  repre- 
hensible.1 

On  the  evening  before  I  was  to  sail  from  Shanghai  for 
America,  last  December,  a  man  came  to  see  me  in  my  apart- 
ment in  the  Astor  House.  When  my  servant  showed  him  in, 
I  at  first  thought  that  he  was  a  Japanese  dressed  in  foreign 
clothing.  But  he  proved  to  be  a  Korean,  a  Christian,  who 
had  been  driven  by  Japanese  persecution  to  leave  his  native 
land.  Disguised,  he  had  escaped  across  the  Yalu  River  into 
Manchuria,  and  had  succeeded  in  getting  through  the  Japanese 
zone  into  China  proper.  At  Shanghai  he  was  then  doing 
Y.  M.  C.  A.  work  among  Koreans,  and  he  came  with  a  card 
of  introduction  from  a  friend  of  mine  in  the  Y.  M.  C.  A. 
organization  of  China.  The  man  said  that  he  had  heard  I 
was  going  to  Washington  and  to  Paris,  and  he  came  to  ask 
a  favor  of  me.  Koreans  were  very  anxious  to  have  the  case 
of  Korea  presented  to  the  peace  conference,  and  they  did 
not  know  how  to  get  it  done.  No  Korean  can  leave  his  country 
except  with  a  Japanese  passport,  which  usually  they  cannot 
obtain.  Neither  during  the  war  can  they  travel  anywhere 
without  a  passport.  Would  I.  he  asked,  take  a  short  memorial, 
a  presentation  of  Korea's  appeal  to  the  conference,  and  de- 
liver it  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  or  to  one  of  the 
American  delegates  at  Paris?  He  asked  me  if  I  thought 
there  was  any  chance  to  have  the  case  of  Korea  reopened 
at  the  conference.  I  told  him  that  I  thought  there  was  slight 
chance  for  that  to  be  done.  He  said  that  Koreans  had  raised 
a  sum — about  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  I  think  he  said — 
to  pay  the  expenses  of  a  Korean  delegation  to  go  to  Paris. 

i  Accounts  of  Japan's  taking  of  Korea  and  her  administration  there 
are  given  in  the  author's  previous  hooks,  "America  and  the  Far  Eaetern 
Question,"  and  "Our  Eastern  Question." 


38     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Some  Koreans  in  America  were  to  go,  he  said.  After  hand- 
ing me  his  memorial,  which  was  type- written,  he  left.  In 
March,  1919,  I  read  a  news  dispatch  from  Washington  to 
the  effect  that  the  Government  had  refused  to  issue  pass- 
ports to  some  Koreans  who  wanted  to  go  to  Paris,  because 
it  had  no  right  to  grant  passports,  they  being  technically 
Japanese  subjects,  and  Japan  had  objected  to  the  passports 
being  issued. 

I  have  a  copy  of  the  memorial  which  the  Korean  Christian 
handed  to  me.  It  begins  with  a  review  of  the  histories  of 
Japan  and  Korea  and  the  events  which  led  to  the  annexation 
of  Korea  by  Japan.     It  then  proceeds: 

The  present  condition  of  Korea  may  be  described  in  three  parts: 
1.  Spiritually. 

Knowing  that  a  nation  depends  on  the  spirit  of  its  citizens,  the 
Japanese  are  trying  in  every  wajr  to  stop  our  spiritual  development. 
Christianity  in  Korea  has  been  recognized  as  the  national  religion, 
from  which  we  have  learned  the  meaning  of  democracy  and  the 
value  of  liberty.  Since  the  American  missionaries  introduced  our 
people  to  the  Saviour  of  the  world,  the  number  of  Christians  has 
grown  steadily  and  so  fast  that  there  are  now  more  than  half  a  mil- 
lion of  people  living  under  the  light  of  life.  Thus  Christianity  is 
playing  the  most  important  role  in  our  spiritual  development.  But 
in  Korea  Christianity  itself  is  in  state  of  persecution  by  the  Bud- 
dhist or  Shintoist  rulers.  For  example,  in  1911,  about  two  hun- 
dred of  our  best  Christians  were  arrested  and  imprisoned,  giving 
the  pretext  of  conspiracy  against  Terauchi,  the  then  governor- 
general.  To  every  church  the  Japanese  send  two  or  three  spies 
to  overhear  what  preachers  preach  and  pray.  On  the  other  hand. 
Buddhism,  Confucianism  and  Shintoism  are  strongly  encouraged 
among  the  Koreans.  But  finding  that  this  plan,  being  behind 
time,  cannot  succeed,  they  employ  and  send  the  Japanese  pastors 
to  Korea,  not  to  preach  but  to  bend  their  whole  effort  in  assimila- 
tion. They  even  force  us  to  worship  their  King  as  a  God,  to  our 
greatest  pang. 

There  is  only  one  newspaper  in  our  own  language  in  Korea,  but 
even  that  is  managed  and  published  under  Japanese  administration. 
Magazines  are  not  allowed :  even  though  it  be  allowed,  it  cannot 
give  any  benefit  to  Koreans,  for  the  protocols  should  be  carefully 
examined  by  the  police  before  publishing. 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  39 

Public  meetings  are  absolutely  forbidden  in  any  place  and  at 
any  time.  Not  a  single  university  nor  a  library  club  exists  in 
Korea.  There  are  four  colleges  being  run  by  the  government; 
but  literature,  history  and  politics  are  not  taught,  but  merely  vo- 
cational education,  and  they  can  admit  no  more  than  eight  or  nine 
hundred  students.  There  are  only  three  middle  schools,  but  very 
low  graded ;  moreover,  all  the  lessons  are  taught  in  Japanese.  What 
a  waste  of  national  ability  it  is!  Their  purpose  of  educating  us 
is  to  enhance  our  loyalty  to  their  Emperor  and  not  to  guide  us  to 
become  good  citizens.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  bible  teaching  is 
not  allowed  in  either  Christian  or  non-Christian  schools,  and  Eng- 
lish is  prohibited  lest  the  Koreans  know  the  affairs  of  the  world, 
so  the  Koreans  are  both  "blind"  and  "deaf"  to  the  current  move- 
ments of  the  world  civilization.  Under  such  conditions  how  can 
you  expect  the  Koreans  to  be  cultivated  and  uplifted? 

2.  Politically. 

It  is  safe  to  say  that  Korea  is  governed  by  police  and  soldiers. 
We  have  neither  rights  nor  liberty,  but  the  duty  of  paying  taxes. 
There  is  no  safety  even  for  private  houses  and  letters.  There  is 
neither  parliament  nor  municipality,  so  the  wrongs  done  by  the 
brutal  Japanese  policy  are  nowhere  to  be  appealed  and  redressed. 
All  the  laws  and  affairs  are  made  and  executed  by  the  few  Japanese 
officers  and  no  Koreans  have  any  part  in  it.  Thus  you  can  imagine 
what  kind  of  life  the  Koreans  are  living. 

3.  Economically, 

Co-operation  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  economics,  but  the 
Japanese  do  not  allow  the  Koreans  to  co-operate  in  developing 
their  country.  The  minimum  of  capital  is  placed  so  high  for  cor- 
porations by  the  law  that  an  ordinary  Korean  cannot  afford  to  start 
it.  And  in  case  he  can  afford  to  do  so,  his  inexperience  will  turn 
him  out  a  failure.  Thus  we  have  no  company  or  factory  that  can 
be  called  a  corporation.  The  Koreans,  in  this  way,  are  compelled 
to  make  their  living  by  only  cultivating  the  land.  But  so  many 
Japanese  immigrants  are  coming  over  every  year  that  very  soon  all 
the  land  shall  be  occupied  by  them.  And  for  lack  of  capital  no 
mines  are  allowed  to  be  opened  by  the  Koreans.  The  Japanese  an- 
nounce to  the  world  that  they  are  helping  Korea  fiancially,  but  it  is 
nominal;  on  the  contrary,  they  are  profiting  greatly  by  exporting 
our  national  wealth  to  their  country  and  imposing  heavy  taxes  on 
us.  Thus  Korea  is  drained  of  her  money  and  resources  rapidly, 
and  difficulty  of  living  has  therefore  been  the  inevitable  result. 

Understanding  that  they  cannot  Japanize  the  Koreans,  the  Japan- 
ese are  trying  to  destroy  Korea  by  these  cruel  policies,  which  are 


40     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

their  own  invention.  "What  is,  then,  left  for  Koreans  to  do?  They 
are  lost  in  a  maze.  Yet  they  are  not  despondent  and  indeed  noth- 
ing can  discourage  them.  They  are  struggling  with  all  their  hearts, 
minds  and  hodies  for  independence,  justice  and  peace.  For  this 
we  are  crying  to  the  conscience  of  the  world,  especially  to  the 
Americans  who  uphold  the  grand  principles  of  President  Wilson 
that  a  nation  should  be  ruled  in  accordance  with  the  consent  of 
the  governed.  As  long  as  Japan  practices  these  cruel  policies  the 
world  peace  which  we  so  much  desire  can  never  be  realized. 

In  conclusion  we  declare  that  we  are  not  conquered,  but  merely 
only  cheated  and  destroyed  by  the  Japanese  falsehood.  This  same 
falsehood  and  their  imperialism  is  going  to  ruin  all  Asia,  not  let- 
ting the  admirable  ideas  of  President  Wilson  of  peace  and  democ- 
racy get  a  foothold  in  Asia. 

Korea  must  be  redeemed.  Democracy  must  exist  in  Asia.  Now, 
you  Americans  once  guaranteed,  in  the  first  treaty  between  Korea 
and  the  United  States  of  America  some  thirty  years  ago,  the  inde- 
pendence of  Korea.  Therefore  we  appeal  to  you  to  help  us  secure 
this  same  independence. 

The  picture  of  conditions  in  Korea  given  by  this  memorial 
is  not  overdrawn.  The  situation  of  the  native  inhabitants 
under  Japan 's  rule  actually  is  that  of  serfdom.  Yet  I  do  not 
see  what  can  be  done  about  it  now,  for  it  scarcely  is  probable 
that  the  powers  will  want  to  add  a  new  complication  of  small 
nationalities  to  the  numerous  ones  in  Europe  that  they  al- 
ready have  to  deal  with.  Yet  in  principle  the  case  of  Korea 
is  as  much  entitled  to  consideration  as  the  case  of  Jugo-Slavia, 
Poland  and  Czech-Slavia.  It  would  embarrass  Japan  exceed- 
ingly to  have  an  inquiry  by  the  conference,  or  by  a  commis- 
sion of  a  league  of  nations,  into  her  administration  of  Korea 
and  Formosa.  The  Koreans,  muzzled  and  suppressed  as  they 
are,  nevertheless  tried  by  popular  demonstrations  in  March, 
1919,  to  attract  the  attention  of  civilization  to  their  case. 
When  he  sent  his  inspiring  words  winging  around  the  world, 
President  Wilson  probably  had  little  idea  where  they  would 
penetrate  or  the  hopes  they  would  raise  among  far-away  sup- 
pressed peoples. 

The   bad  state   of   administration   in  Japan  was   empha- 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  41 

sized  in  1918  by  wide-spread  industrial  disturbances,  by 
strikes,  and  rioting.  The  rice  riots,  so  called,  had  to  be  sup- 
pressed by  the  military,  with  the  loss  of  many  lives.  The 
Government  was  alarmed,  and  took  measures  to  cheapen  the 
price  and  improve  the  distribution  of  the  food  consumed  by 
the  masses,  granting  a  subsidy  for  the  purpose.  Mutterings 
of  a  social  and  economic  upheaval  are  frequent  in  Japan. 
The  war  prosperity  has  made  many  new  millionaires,  and 
vastly  increased  the  wealth  of  many  former  millionaires,  but 
it  has  not  improved  the  condition  of  the  masses ;  and  with  the 
coming  of  peace  a  serious  economic  reaction  is  feared. 

The  status  of  foreigners  in  Japan  is  not  understood  in  the 
West,  where,  however,  a  good  deal  is  heard  about  the  alleged 
discrimination  of  some  western  nations  against  Japanese  on 
"race"  grounds.  Having  given  a  thorough  analysis  of  the 
Japanese-American  emigration  question  in  previous  books, 
I  shall  refer  to  it  only  briefly  here,  to  call  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  laws  of  Japan,  and  the  administration  of  justice 
in  the  courts  of  Japan  (and  also  wherever  Japanese  courts 
exercise  jurisdiction,  as  in  China),  discriminate  against  for- 
eigners notoriously.  Foreigners  cannot  own  real  property 
in  Japan,  and  of  late  years  even  the  right  of  foreigners  to 
do  business  there  has  been  made  largely  nominal  by  the 
enforcement  of  interpretations  and  regulations  that  compel 
them  to  take  Japanese  into  partnership.  As  to  "race  equal- 
ity," Chinese  laborers  are  excluded  from  Japan,  as  they  are 
from  America  and  other  western  countries,  and  for  the  same 
reasons;  and  Korean  laborers,  although  now  subjects  of 
Japan,  are  not  privileged  to  work  there  when  they  compete 
with  Japanese. 

It  is  necessary  in  this  connection  to  make  the  point  clearly 
that  the  Japanese  Government  for  years  has  been  using  this 
"race"  and  emigration  question  as  a  diplomatic  "herring" 
across  the  trail  of  world  politics.  The  Japanese  Government 
never  really  presses  for  an  examination  and  adjustment  of 
this  question,  but  the  Japanese  propaganda  harps  on  it  fre- 


42     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

quently  for  the  purpose  of  raising  a  dust.     This  from  the 
"Japan  Chronicle"  of  February  13,  1919: 

A  little  story  about  Dean  Inge  bas  been  working  its  way  faithfully 
around  the  English  papers,  and  from  time  to  time  turns  up  in  the 
mails.  The  Dean  met  a  "very  interesting  and  intelligent"  Japanese 
one  day.  It  is  not  very  flattering  to  Japan  to  think  it  necessary  to 
put  in  tbe  adjectives  as  though  such  qualities  were  unlooked-for  and 
extraordinary,  but  that  by  the  way.  The  Dean  told  his  interesting 
and  intelligent  acquaintance  that  he  thought  Japan  ought  to  join  tiie 
League  of  Nations.  On  which  he  was  asked,  in  reply,  whether  he 
thought  that  Japan  had  any  call  to  disarm  and  join  such  a  League 
when  her  people  were  not  allowed  to  enter  America  and  Australia 
as  colonists.  The  Dean  said  that  that  was  a  very  difficult  point,  but 
that  he  was  afraid  that  the  Australian  and  American  workman  would 
shrink  from  no  violence  to  keep  the  Japanese  out.  That  Chinese 
workmen  are  excluded  from  Japan,  and  that  it  is  easier  for  a 
Japanese  to  purchase  land  in  California  than  for  a  Calif ornian  to 
do  so  in  Japan, — of  these  things  the  good  Dean  was,  of  course, 
blissfully  unaware. 

A  point  that  I  frequently  have  brought  out  myself  in  dis- 
cussion of  this  question,  also  was  clearly  stated  by  the  "Japan 
Chronicle"  editorially  in  December,  1918: 

It  has  been  remarked  before  that  Japan  uses  the  exclusion  griev- 
ance rather  as  a  diplomatic  counter  than  as  an  ideal.  The  assiduity 
which  Japanese  Consuls  abroad  display  in  getting  the  children  of 
Japanese  registered  as  Japanese  subjects  betokens  no  very  earnest 
desire  that  Japanese  should  have  the  right  of  naturalisation  about 
which  so  much  is  heard  from  time  to  time.  And  when  it  comes  to 
demanding  that  foreigners  should  have  the  right  to  demand  privi- 
leges of  free  entry  and  land-ownership,  the  request,  if  made  at  the 
Peace  Conference  and  acceded  to,  would  have  some  curious  results. 
For  instance,  it  would  give  Japanese  employers  the  right  to  import 
Chinese  labour,  which  they  would  be  very  ready  to  do  on  account  of 
its  cheapness  and  tractability.  It  would  give  Chinese  the  right  to 
buy  land  and  engage  in  agriculture  in  Japan — a  right  which  at  pres- 
ent is  most  jealously  guarded  as  the  exclusive  privilege  of  natives  of 
the  soil.  In  a  country  so  well  filled  as  Japan  there  is  the  minimum 
danger  from  the  competition  of  foreign  labour  of  any  sort,  and  there 
is  far  less  difference  between  the  wages  of  the  Chinese  labourer  and 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  43 

those  of  the  Japanese  than  there  is  between  those  of  the  Japanese 
and  those  of  the  Californian.  Yet,  though  the  Japanese  are  ex- 
tremely exclusive  themselves,  they  work  up  a  fine  fever  of  insulted 
dignity  when  it  is  made  difficult  for  them  to  acquire  land  in  America. 
The  Japanese  themselves,  however,  acknowledge  the  expediency  of 
special  restrictions  on  the  influx  of  strangers  in  sparsely  populated 
tracts,  for  in  the  famous  Foreign  Land-ownership  Act,  which  is  kept 
for  show  but  not  for  use,  the  Hokkaido  is  specially  excluded,  appar- 
ently lest  any  foreigner  come  in  and  develop  on  a  large  scale. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that,  were  Japan  to  make  her  land  as 
accessible  to  strangers  as  she  would  like  to  see  that  of  California, 
there  would  be  serious  economic  difficulties  through  Chinese  com- 
petition. Nor  would  her  present  position  abroad  be  greatly  im- 
proved by  the  concessions  demanded.  Chinese  and  Korean  compe- 
tition would  follow  them  wherever  they  went,  and  while  in  many 
cases  the  Japanese  by  smartness  and  handiness  would  be  able  to  win 
their  way,  they  would  find  freedom  for  Chinese  labour  in  the  coun- 
tries to  which  they  most  desire  to  emigrate  a  heavier  burden  than 
the  present  restrictions  on  anj7  entry  of  Asiatics  at  all.  Emigration 
to  Korea  and  Manchuria  is  not  very  popular  because,  in  spite  of  all 
the  encouragement  given,  the  advantages  offered,  and  the  great  pos- 
sibilities of  the  soil,  the  Japanese  find  it  very  hard  to  compete 
against  the  natives.  They  would  not  find  it  less  hard  if  every  kind 
of  Asiatic  from  lands  just  as  crowded  as  Japan  were  free  to  enter 
the  various  Promised  Lands  along  with  them. 

I  would  not  give  the  impression  that  there  is  no  sentiment 
among  Japanese  in  favor  of  more  liberal  political  institu- 
tions or  of  "democratic"  institutions.  Such  sentiment  exists 
among  a  small  group  of  educated  men  and  advanced  thinkers, 
but  they  seldom  dare  to  express  those  views,  and  then  quali- 
fiedly.  Some  commentators,  however,  profess  to  perceive  in 
Japan  the  stirrings  of  genuine  democratic  and  constitutional 
inclinations.  This  alleged  disposition  became  apparent  es- 
pecially after  the  defeat  of  the  Central  alliance  was  certain. 
"Writing  in  the  December  (1918)  number  of  "Nihon  Yujiro 
Nihomjhr'  (Japan  and  Japanese),  Dr.  Yujiro  Miyake,  one 
of  the  most  inflential  editors  in  Japan,  predicted  that  Ger- 
many's downfall  would  bring  the  downfall  of  the  bureaucracy 
in  Japan.    He  wrote : 


44     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

It  is  difficult  to  define  what  we  call  bureaucrats  in  Japan,  but 
practically  they  are  those  who  belong  to  the  Choshu  and  Satsuma 
clans,  having  controlling  power  over  the  Privy  Council  and  the 
House  of  Peers  as  well  as  to  a  certain  extent  over  the  governmental 
offices.  They  say  that  Prince  Yamagata  leads  the  Japanese  bureau- 
crats, but  we  say  more  correctly  that  a  certain  number  of  men  lead 
the  faction  in  the  name  of  Prince  Yamagata. 

The  fundamental  idea  of  Japanese  bureaucracy  is  the  superiority 
of  government  or  officials  of  the  government  over  the  people.  They 
think  that  officials  are  superior  to  commoners  in  all  respects,  so  that 
they  are  always  afraid  of  the  appearance  of  the  abler,  greater  and 
more  influential  men  outside  of  their  own  circle. 

The  Japanese  Army  was  organized  in  accordance  with  the  Ger- 
man system.  So  with  Japanese  politics,  laws,  science  and  every- 
thing else.  Thus  Japan  was  Germanized.  The  admirers  of  the 
German  military  system  were  apt  to  think  that  the  German  political 
system  would  be  the  best  in  the  world,  just  as  her  military  system 
was.  The  followers  of  the  German  science,  on  the  other  hand, 
blindly  declared  that  Japan  should  follow  Germany  in  all  depart- 
ments of  her  national  activity. 


"We  are.  indeed,  glad  that  our  countrymen  have  gradually  realized 
their  fallacies,  as  the  result  of  the  Allied  victory  and  the  downfall 
of  German  militarism.  Amongst  all,  those  of  the  medical  circle 
were  first  awakened.  Except  Japanese  physicians  of  an  older 
generation,  who  still  stick  to  the  German  method,  men  of  the 
younger  generations  are  now  looking  for  the  source  of  their  learn- 
ings in  France,  England  and  America.  Next,  the  military  circle 
is  awakening,  slowly  though,  and  Japanese  military  authorities  now 
recognize  the  strength  of  the  French  Army.  But  it  may  take  some 
time  before  they  realize  fully  why  the  British  and  American  armies 
are  strong  and  useful. 

The  last  to  awaken  are  those  of  the  political  circle,  especially 
the  bureacrats.  They  are  now  struck  dumb  with  amazement.  They 
now  have  no  time  to  think  over  the  situation.  Indeed,  the  change 
is  too  great  and  too  astonishing  to  them.  We  are  earnestly  await- 
ing the  time  when  they  will  finally  realize  the  whole  thing.  But, 
is  it  possible?  We  are  glad,  however,  that  the  people  have  already 
awakened.  They  do  not  see  the  bureaucrats  with  the  same  eyes 
with  which  the  bureaucrats  see  them.  The  general  situation  has 
changed,  no  matter  whether  militarists  or  bureaucrats  are  still 
dreaming  their  old  dreams. 


THE  KEAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  45 

The  illusions  about  Japan  which  have  been,  and  still  are 
to  a  great  extent,  prevalent  in  western  countries  are  due  to 
a  combination  of  causes  and  circumstances,  but  the  chief 
reason  for  them  has  been  the  propaganda  conducted  in  west- 
ern countries,  indeed  throughout  the  whole  world,  by  the 
Japanese  Government.  As  an  English  writer  put  it  some 
years  ago,  Japan  is  past-master  of  the  art  of  "window-dress- 
ing." The  task  of  Japan's  national  propaganda  has  been 
to  "window  dress"  that  country,  its  national  characteristics, 
institutions,  ideals,  purposes,  and  acts.  Its  success  has  been 
remarkable.  As  an  example  of  this  "window-dressing,"  take 
the  Japanese  railways  in  Korea  and  Manchuria.  They  were 
equipped  with  the  latest  American  cars,  Pullmans  and  diners. 
At  all  places  where  tourists  are  likely  to  stop,  the  railways 
have  built  and  operate  good  hotels.  Tourists  are  amazed  to 
find  at  places  like  Seoul,  Mukden,  Dairen,  Port  Arthur,  and 
Changchun,  modern  hotels,  with  staffs  of  well-trained  serv- 
ants. They  naturally  contrast  these  up-to-date  methods  with 
conditions  on  the  Chinese  government  railways,  and  conclude 
that  Japan  is  progressive  and  efficient  while  China  is  un- 
progressive  and  inefficient.  Tourists  do  not  know,  or  seldom 
think  about  those  trains  and  those  hotels  being  Japanese 
national  propaganda;  that  they  are  run  at  a  heavy  loss,  the 
deficits  being  made  up  by  the  Japanese  Government. 
Equally  wrong  conclusions  often  are  made  about  the  visible 
evidences  of  Japanese  progressiveness  in  those  parts  of  China 
where  Japan  has  established  a  firm  foothold,  as  in  Manchuria 
and  Shantung ;  or  what  transpires  in  Korea  and  Formosa  be- 
hind the  screen  of  obvious  material  development. 

I  believe  that  the  Japanese  Government  is  sincere  in  some  of 
its  professions  of  changes  of  policy  made  since  the  downfall  of 
the  Central  alliance;  but  it  is  merely  a  change  of  policy,  not 
a  change  of  heart.  Moreover,  it  is  a  change  of  policy  not 
from  moral  conviction,  but  for  expediency  and  under  com- 
pulsion, or  the  fear  of  compulsion.  Japan's  foreign  friend- 
ships go  whatever  way  her  advantage  lies,  or  in  some  phases 


46     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

her  friendship  moves  in  the  line  of  which  nation  she  fears; 
that  is,  Japan  is  inclined  to  line  up  with  power.  She  was  be- 
coming: indifferent  to  the  friendship  and  opinion  of  America 
while  America  was  relatively  weak  among  the  powers,  or  was 
considered  so.  She  began  again  to  value  the  friendship  and 
opinion  of  America  from  the  moment  it  was  evident  that 
America  would  become  formidable  in  a  naval  and  military 
way,  which  would  give  force  in  world  politics  to  the  vast  eco- 
nomic resources  and  man  power  and  wealth  of  America. 

In  a  private  memorandum  which  I  wrote  in  the  autumn 
of  1917,  in  connection  of  certain  remarks  made  to  me  by 
Viscount  Motono,  then  Japanese  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
I  said: 

Thus,  for  the  first  time  since  the  writer  has  had  a  knowledge  of 
Eastern  conditions,  the  United  States  really  holds  the  balance  of 
power  in  that  region,  if  it  chooses  to  exercise  it.  The  dependence 
of  France  and  England  on  America  in  bringing  an  end  of  the  war 
in  their  favor  makes  those  nations  amenable  to  just  suggestions 
from  America  relating  to  the  Eastern  question. 

As  to  Japan's  sincerity  in  her  present  professions  of  a  change  of 
policy  in  China,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  why  she  has  changed 
and  what  caused  her  to  change;  nor  should  there  be  any  relaxation 
of  the  conditions  that  give  power  over  and  pressure  on  her.  Even 
if  it  is  taken  for  true  that  the  statements  given  by  Viscount  Motono 
to  me  represent  a  genuine  and  sincere  reversal  of  attitude,  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  as  yet  this  reversal  is  only  in  attitude,  and  is 
not  yet  translated  into  practice.  Moreover,  it  sliould  not  be  pre- 
sumed that  even  a  genuine  reversal  of  opinion  by  a  small  group  of 
Japanese  statesmen  can  at  once  undo  with  the  mass  psychology  of 
the  Japanese  nation  the  results  of  years  of  cultivation  of  a  totally 
different  thesis  of  national  power  and  expansion.  The  Japanese, 
having  for  a  generation  been  taught  to  dream  of  imperial  power 
and  expansion  by  the  sword,  will  not  at  once  mentally  consent  to 
accept  a  comparatively  minor  place  in  the  world :  for  there  can  be 
hardly  any  doubt,  if  disarmament  comes  and  nations  hereafter  must 
develop  according  to  peaceful  economic  laws,  that  such  a  condition 
will  consign  Japan  to  be  a  second  or  third  class  nation.  Therefore, 
whatever  Japanese  statesmen  and  propaganda  may  utter  now,  it 
must  be  kept  in  mind  that  their  hearts  have  not  changed,  and  that 
it  will  take  years  before  they  will  become  reconciled  to  accept  a 


THE  REAL  CHARACTER  OF  JAPAN  47 

lesser  place  in  the  world  than  their  own  exaggerated  ambitions  and 
the  fulsome  compliments  of  western  writers  have  taught  them  to 
aspire  to.  During  this  period  of  readjustment  it  can  be  expected 
that,  secretly,  they  will  constantly  be  plotting  and  planning  to  gain 
advantage  along  the  line  of  their  old  [Prussian]  theorem  of  na- 
tional expansion,  and  only  constant  vigilance  will  be  able  to  hold 
them  in  check. 

The  Japanese  Government's  subsequent  policy  in  China 
showed  how  accuratel}'  I  estimated  its  alleged  change  of 
heart  in  1917. 

Japan's  attitude  to  a  league  of  nations  eventually  will 
depend  on  what  such  a  league  turns  out  to  be.  If  the  idea 
is  adopted  by  the  principal  Allied  powers,  then  Japan  also 
will  accept  it,  at  least  temporally,  for  she  would  be  isolated 
otherwise.  One  thing  is  clear:  if  such  a  league  enforces 
proportional  disarmament,  Japan  will  be  very  much  cha- 
grined, and  will  evade  those  provisions  if  she  can.  Already 
the  expressions  of  Japanese  statesmen  and  officials  distinctly 
foreshadow  that  attitude.  For  to  reduce  her  armaments 
materially  will  deprive  Japan  of  her  only  genuine  title  to 
rank  as  a  "power."  Marquis  Okuma,  when  he  last  was 
premier  of  Japan,  in  1915,  wrote  in  "Shin  Nijon": 
"Diplomacy,  to  be  really  effective  and  successful,  must  be 
backed  up  by  sufficient  national  strength.  It  is  only  ten 
or  fifteen  years  since  Japanese  diplomacy  began  to  carry 
weight  with  foreign  countries,  and  it  began  from  the  time 
that  western  powers  commenced  to  recognize  Japan's  mili- 
tary strength." 

The  Japanese  Government  to-day,  notwithstanding  the 
Great  War,  its  outcome  and  its  lessons,  cannot  conceive  inter- 
national politics  carried  on  except  by  the  old  methods  and 
gaged  by  the  old  reckonings.  It  will  be  many  years  before 
Japan,  as  well  as  Germany,  actually  can  revise  her  national 
character  to  accept  and  meet  new  conditions. 


CHAPTER  III 
japan's  policy  in  the  great  war 

A  devious  course — A  policy  of  opportunism — How  it  was  circum- 
scribed— Japan's  rating  of  other  nations — ''Powers''  and  lesser  nations 
— America  not  a  '"power" — Why  Japan  entered  the  war — Not  so  obli- 
gated by  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance — No  quarrel  with  or  hostility  to 
Germany — Japan's  forehandedness  in  declaring  war — Her  motives  an- 
alyzed— Periods  of  Japan's  war  policy — Its  various  motivations — Gov. 
erned  by  expediency  and  opportunity — Lessons  of  the  war — Making 
Japan's  army  and  navy  obsolete — How  foreigners  in  the  East  view  Japan 
— Destruction  of  former  international  standards — The  anti-British  agi- 
tation in  Japan — Control  of  publicity  by  the  Government — Secret  diplo- 
macy in  wartime — The  secret  treaty  with  Russia — Putting  pressure  on 
her  allies — Using  the  German  entente  possibility — Oblique  methods — 
The  veto  of  events — Entrance  of  America  in  the  war — The  Russian  rev- 
olution— A  German-Russo-Japanese  entente — Count  Terauchi's  views — 
Baron  Goto's  opinions — Pro-German  sentiment  in  Japan — Japan's  posi- 
tion at  the  peace  conference — What  she  really  wants — Fear  of  political 
and  moral  isolation — The  question  of  Kiaochou. 

JAPAN'S  course  during  the  war  was  so  devious  and  at 
times  so  oblique  that  only  by  keeping  clearly  in  mind 
its  ruling  motive  is  her  policy  comprehensible.     That 
ruling  motive  was  imperial  aggrandizement. 

When  hostilities  began,  the  Japanese  Government  probably 
may  have  been  surprised  at  the  suddenness  of  the  outbreak, 
but  it  was  not  caught  unprepared.  Such  a  situation,  while 
perhaps  not  actually  expected  to  happen  soon,  lorn:  had  been 
calculated  on;  just  as  in  Europe  the  German  Government 
had  every  possibility  of  the  situation  there  checked  up  and  an 
orderly  plan  ready-made  to  handle  it.  Japanese  statesmen 
were  fully  apprised  (far  better  than,  for  instance,  the  Ameri- 
can Government  was)  of  the  exact  niceties  of  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe ;  how  the  nations  probably  would  take  sides 
according  to  their  different  interests,  ambitions,  compulsions, 

48 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         49 

aud  alliances ;  and  the  military  preparations  and  resources  of 
all  of  them.  In  the  event  of  a  great  European  war,  the  Jap- 
anese Government  had  previously  calculated  the  resultant 
situation  and  how  it  would  affect  Japan's  own  imperial  aims. 
The  writings  and  other  utterances  of  leading  Japanese  states- 
men, publicists,  professors,  and  military  experts  within  the 
last  twenty  years  reveal  this  unmistakably. 

Japan's  imperial  opportunity,  with  Europe  occupied  and 
exhausting  itself  in  a  gigantic  war,  of  course  was  quite  defi- 
nitely circumscribed  by  geographical  and  other  conditions. 
Although  many  Japanese  writers  and  some  politicians  in- 
dulged in,  and  at  times  gave  expression  to,  wild  dreams  of 
world  dominion,  practical  Japanese  statesmanship  confined 
its  plans  within  limits.  Looking  eastward,  the  probability  of 
acquisition  did  not  extend  beyond  some  islands  in  the  Pacific. 
Looking  to  the  south,  Japan  had  very  definitely  included  the 
Dutch  East  Indies  within  the  scope  of  her  possible  expansion. 
Siberia  contained  distinct  possibilities.  But  incomparably  the 
greatest  field  for  Japan's  imperial  expansion  lay  to  the  west, 
in  China. 

With  respect  to  the  conditions  by  which  Japan's  imperial 
expansion  program  could  be  worked  out,  Japanese  statesman- 
ship naturally  was  guided  by  the  generally  accepted  tenets  of 
diplomacy  and  military  science  as  they  were  held  when  the 
great  war  began  and  by  the  status  and  characteristics  of 
nations  as  they  existed  then.  Certain  nations  were  classed 
as  "powers,"  and  the  other  nations  were  variously  graded 
as  second  class,  third  class,  trailing  off  into  weak  and  backward 
states  and  uncivilized  peoples.  By  Japan's  computation  (I 
have  seen  a  confidential  memorandum  giving  the  rating  of 
nations  as  calculated  by  the  Japanese  army  and  navy  staffs 
in  1912)  the  United  States  was  rated  a  second-class  nation, 
not  as  a  power.  The  powers  were,  first,  Germany ;  then,  Great 
Britain.  Russia,  and  France,  and  of  course  Japan  herself. 
The  United  States  was  not  rated  as  a  power,  because  that 
nation  had  hardly  any  army,  and  its  navy  was  not  being  kept 


50     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

up.  It  is  evident  that  Japan  then  expected  that  the  cult 
known  as  pacifism  would  be  able  to  control  the  military  and 
naval  policies  of  the  United  States.  Japanese  statesmen  and 
thinkers — many  of  their  writings  show  this — also  were  count- 
ing on  the  extension  of  the  voting  suffrage  to  women  in  Amer- 
ica further  to  weaken  the  fighting  impulses  of  our  nation  and 
to  place  it  permanently  among  the  weaker  nations.  As  to 
military  and  naval  power,  these  were  estimated  according  to 
the  existing  ideas  of  the  experts  as  to  tactics,  arms,  and  the 
elements  of  military  strength. 

Among  the  powers  Japan  had  an  open  alliance  with  one 
of  the  greatest  of  them,  Great  Britain,  which  applied  to  the 
far  East  and  India.  It  has  been  generally  believed  in  Amer- 
ica, and  also  elsewhere,  that  Japan  entered  the  war  because 
she  was  required  to  do  so  by  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance. 
That  is  not  correct,  although  at  the  time  it  entered  the  war 
and  for  some  time  afterward  the  Japanese  Government  dis- 
tinctly gave  out  that  impression.  This  attitude  was  main- 
tained as  long  as  it  served  Japan's  purposes;  but  later,  after 
America  had  entered  the  war  and  was  aiding  the  cause  of  the 
Allies  in  an  unselfish  way,  an  attempt  was  made  to  show  that 
Japan  had  entered  the  war  solely  from  motives  of  lofty  prin- 
ciple. In  a  speech  made  at  Boston  on  the  Fourth  of  July, 
1917,  Viscount  Ishii,  then  on  a  special  mission  to  America, 
stated  definitely  that  Japan  was  not  obligated  to  enter  the 
war  by  the  terms  of  the  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  but  had 
done  so  because  she  recognized  the  peril  to  the  world  which 
a  victory  of  Germany  would  bring.  This  habit  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government  of  adapting  its  announced  motives  to  suit 
the  circumstances  is  very  well  exposed  by  some  editorial  com- 
ment of  the  "Japan  Chronicle": 

Viscount  Ishii,  of  course,  is  making  [in  America]  just  the  sort  of 
speeches  that  is  liked  by  people  who  like  that  sort  of  thing.  His 
ascription  of  the  rumours  of  a  Japanese-German  rapprochement  to 
German  intrigue  is  rather  hard  on  Mr.  Gregory  Mason,  as  the  fa- 
mous interview  with  Count  Terauchi  is  the  only  thing  in  the  way  of 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         51 

such  a  rumour  that  has  been  heard  for  some  time.  Two  years  ago, 
Viscount  Ishii  suggested  to  the  American  Ambassador  as  directly  as 
he  could  that  Germany  was  at  the  bottom  of  every  mischief-making 
rumour,  and  now  he  makes  the  remarkable  statement  that  in  mid- 
Pacific  his  slumbers  were  disturbed  by  the  question,  "Are  you  going 
into  alliance  with  Germany?"  There  must  be  Germans  concealed 
under  the  bunks  in  the  trans-Pacific  liners  to  disturb  the  thoughts  of 
passengers  with  evil  suggestions — something  like  the  serpent  whis- 
pering in  the  ear  of  the  sleeping  Eve.  However,  perhaps,  like  the 
serpent,  the  voice  that  disturbed  the  Viscount  was  only  an  allegory. 
What  is  a  good  deal  more  interesting  is  that  Viscount  Ishii  stated 
in  his  Fourth  of  July  speech  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  which  compelled  Japan  to  participate  in  the  war. 
That  is  the  view  that  has  always  seemed  obvious,  though  some  of 
the  highest  authorities  have  declared  that  Japan  entered  the  war  "in 
accordance  with  the  obligations  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty." 
When,  on  one  occasion,  we  pointed  out  that  had  participation  been 
obligatory  under  the  treaty  Japan  would  have  come  in  automatically 
instead  of  coming  in  only  contingently  after  Germany  had  rejected 
the  terms  of  her  ultimatum,  we  were  very  severely  admonished  in  the 
Japanese  press,  and  the  terms  of  the  declaration  of  war  were  quoted 
to  show  how  malicious  we  were.  But  here  is  Viscount  Ishii  officially 
repudiating  the  obligation !  It  is  of  course  all  the  more  creditable  to 
Japan  that  no  treaty  obligation  was  needed,  but  that  is  not  how 
many  prominent  Japanese  have  regarded  the  matter  hitherto. 

The  circumstances  through  which  Japan  entered  the  war 
were  extensively  considered  in  a  previous  book  of  mine  ("Our 
Eastern  Question,"  1916),  and  the  subject  is  given  further 
mention  later  in  this  work.  At  this  point  I  am  only  trying 
to  disclose  the  obscurantism  of  Japan's  diplomacy  relating  to 
the  war.  It  can  be  taken  now  as  officially  established  that 
Japan  did  not  enter  the  war  because  required  so  to  do  by  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  Therefore,  when  war  started  in 
Europe,  Japan  had  no  quarrel  with  Germany  and  no  apparent 
cause  to  go  to  war  against  her.  Germany  had  given  to  Japan 
absolutely  no  provocation  for  war  that  ever  has  been  dis- 
closed. So  if  Japan  then  decided  to  make  war  on  Germany 
it  was  for  some  purpose  of  her  own  that  was  not  connected 
with  the  causes  of  the  war  in  Europe,  except  that  the  war  in 


52     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Europe  gave  Japan  an  opportunity  to  attack  nations  safely 
that  otherwise  she  would  not  have  ventured  to  assail.  The 
great  war  made  it  possible  for  Japan  to  take  possession  of  such 
possessions  as  Germany  had  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  in  China 
before  they  could  be  taken  by  the  nations  already  at  war 
against  Germany.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  possibility  that 
Japan  would  seize  this  opportunity  was  not  overlooked  by 
the  Allied  powers.  In  order  to  forestall  a  British  occupation 
of  the  German  islands  in  the  Pacific,  a  Japanese  naval  force 
was  despatched  to  occupy  them  before  an  answer  was  received 
to  Japan's  ultimatum  to  Germany,  and  the  arrival  of  the 
naval  squadron  was  immediately  followed  by  a  number  of 
Japanese  merchant  ships  loaded  with  Japanese  immigrants 
and  their  possessions  prepared  for  permanent  settlement.  A 
reckoning  of  the  speed  of  these  ships,  and  taking  the  time  of 
their  arrival  at  the  islands,  shows  that  they  must  have  left 
Japan  before  the  declaration  of  war  against  Germany.  That 
was  forehandedness  quite  up  to  the  Prussian  standard,  and 
almost  equal  in  efficiency  to  Japan's  forehandedness  in  at- 
tacking Russia,  in  1904,  before  severing  diplomatic  relations. 
Japan's  motives  were  obvious  enough  to  those  who  under- 
stand far  Eastern  conditions.  There  were  some  desirable  pos- 
sessions of  a  nation  engaged  in  the  European  war  lying  easily 
accessible  to  a  Japanese  occupation.  The  alinement  of  the 
powers  in  the  war  clearly  indicated  that  within  a  few  months 
Germany  would  be  cut  off  from  the  sea  because  of  the  great 
naval  preponderance  of  the  nations  arrayed  against  her :  and 
then  in  due  course  the  Caroline  and  Marshall  islands,  and 
possibly  Tsingtau  too,  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  one  of  the 
European  allies.  Japan  did  not  want  that  to  happen,  and 
neither  did  she.  want  the  Kiaochou  leasehold  to  revert  to 
China  if  there  was  a  possibility  of  obtaining  it  for  herself. 
To  seize  the  German  possessions  in  the  Pacific  and  China  of 
course  required  Japan  to  declare  war  on  Germany.  Japan 
had  no  hostility  to  Germany.  Quite  the  contrary,  for  of  all 
Western  nations  the  Japanese,  especially  the  governing  class, 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         53 

admired  Germany  the  most.  Furthermore,  most  Japanese 
military  experts  believed  that  Germany  ultimately  would  win 
the  war.  In  that  case  it  would  be  possible  after  the  war  for 
Japan  to  adjust  matters  with  Germany  by  negotiation;  she 
could  take  chances  on  that.  Meanwhile  there  was  virtually 
no  danger  in  taking  over  Germany's  possessions  in  China  and 
the  Pacific.  That  was  the  reasoning  of  Japanese  statesman- 
ship on  the  question  of  participation  in  the  war,  as  was  con- 
clusively demonstrated  by  the  circumstances  and  by  Japan's 
subsequent  actions. 

It  is  possible  now,  moreover,  to  get  some  perspective  on  the 
motives  of  Japan  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  by  revelations 
that  are  constantly  being  made  of  what  she  hopes  to  obtain 
in  the  peace  terms.  This  volume  could  be  filled  with  quota- 
tions from  the  writings  and  speeches  of  Japanese  statesmen, 
leading  educators,  politicians,  and  publicists  on  these  ques- 
tions ;  but  I  shall  take  as  a  typical  view  one  recently  expressed 
by  a  leading  member  of  the  Diet.  I  quote  from  an  editorial 
of  the  "Japan  Chronicle"  of  December  26,  1918: 

Imperialism  and  aggression,  which  were  to  come  to  an  end  with 
this  war,  have  seldom  received  more  frank  expression — not  even  by 
Treitsehke  and  Bemhardi — than  in  the  speech  which  Mr.  Hamada, 
Vice-President  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  recently  delivered 
at  a  meeting  in  Hyogo  of  the  Kokuminto.  As  reported  by  Japanese 
papers,  Mr.  Hamada  said  that  at  the  Peace  Conference  Japan's 
attention  must  be  directed  to  questions  relating  to  the  permanent 
possession  of  the  South  Sea  Islands  now  under  occupation,  the  secur- 
ing of  rights  and  interests  in  Tsingtau,  and  the  control  of  the  Chi- 
nese Eastern  Railway.  He  admitted  that  if  the  principle  of  no- 
indemnities  and  no-annexations,  which  he  wrongly  attributed  to 
President  Wilson,  were  endorsed  by  the  Peace  Conference,  it  would 
be  difficult  to  carry  these  points.  Still,  he  thought  that  if  Japan's 
delegates  were  sufficiently  persistent,  they  might  be  able  to  accom- 
plish all  that  Japan  required.  As  America  had  a  scheme  of  naval 
expansion,  which  in  his  opinion  was  designed  with  a  view  to  counter- 
acting the  influence  of  the  British  navy,  so  Japan  must  expand  her 
navy  to  counterbalance  the  navy  of  America.  Apparently,  in  Mr. 
Hamada's  opinion,  this  project  would  receive  the  support  of  Britain, 
and  thus  Japan's  object  of  extending  her  territory  would  be  attained, 


54     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

for  such  a  scheme  of  naval  expansion  would  make  it  imperative  for 
Japan  to  retain  possession  of  the  South  Sea  Islands  as  a  naval  sta- 
tion. With  unabashed  cynicism,  and  apparently  with  that  strange 
confidence  often  shown  that  Japanese  is  a  secret  and  unknown 
tongue,  he  went  on  to  suggest  how  Japan's  promise  to  retrocede 
Tsingtau  might  be  kept  in  the  letter  without  affecting  the  ultimate 
aim  of  establishing  Japanese  control.  Tsingtau,  he  said,  "may  be 
retroceded  to  China,  so  far  as  formality  is  concerned,  .  .  .  but  steps 
must  at  the  same  time  be  taken  to  arrange  with  China  for  keeping 
the  territory  as  a  base  for  the  Japanese  fleet  and  succeeding  to  all 
the  rights  and  interests  possessed  by  Germany  prior  to  the  war." 
Aganist  what  menace  is  this  Japanese  naval  station  on  the  Chinese 
coast  to  be  maintained?  Is  America  the  enemy  or  is  it  China  that 
must  be  kept  in  subjection?  Mr.  Hamada,  Vice-President  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  confines  himself  to  the  declaration  that 
these  steps  are  necessary  for  Japan's  national  defence  and  her  eco- 
nomic development  in  China.  Furthermore,  it  is  essential  in  his 
opinion  for  Japan  to  take  control  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway 
"for  the  purpose  of  Japan's  national  defence,"  just  as  the  Germans 
in  1871  annexed  Alsace-Lorraine  in  order  that  the  frontier  of  the 
Fatherland  might  be  rendered  safe.  Mr.  Hamada  claimed  that  the 
dispatch  of  Japanese  troops  to  Siberia  justified  her  claim  to  the 
control  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  and  that  if  she  failed  to 
secure  it  "her  intervention  in  Siberia  was  at  once  meaningless  and 
a  failure."  Of  any  idea  that  the  expedition  was  to  assist  the  Allies 
by  extirpating  German  influence  in  Siberia  and  suppressing  the 
thousands  of  German  prisoners  of  whom  so  much  was  heard  prior 
to  the  expedition,  there  is  no  evidence  at  all  in  Mr.  Haraada's  speech. 
In  his  view  the  Siberian  campaign  was  undertaken  by  Japan  to 
obtain  certain  territorial  and  economic  advantages,  and  he  scolds  the 
Kenseikai  for  opposing  an  expedition  that  had  such  objects  in  view. 

The  view  expressed  by  this  important  member  of  the  Diet 
is  not  exceptional,  but  beyond  doubt  expresses  the  real  senti- 
ments of  a  great  majority  of  politically  intelligent  Japanese, 
and  it  is  the  view  expressed  by  at  least  ninety  per  cent,  of 
published  comments  on  these  topics  of  leading  Japanese  and 
the  Japanese  press  in  the  course  of  the  war. 

With  such  motives  and  objects,  Japan's  war  policy  became 
subject  solely  to  expediency  as  applied  to  those  motives  and 
objects,  which  is  to  say  that  it  varied  according  to  circum- 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         55 

stances.     The  variations  of  the  policy  can  be  comprehended 
by  dividing  it  into  periods,  which  I  differentiate  as  follows: 

(a)  Period  of  military  calculation  on  old  lines. 

(b)  Period  of  direct  intimidation  of  China. 

(c)  Period  of  comprehension  of  the  part  of  resources,  indus- 
try, and  finance  in  modern  war. 

(d)  Effects  of  these   developments  on  Japanese   political 
thought. 

(e)  Period  of  belief  in  a  victory  of  Germany. 

(f)  Anti-British  period. 

(g)  Entrance  of  America  into  the  war. 
(h)   The  collapse  of  Russia. 

(i)   Period  of  pot-hunting  and  claim-jumping  in  China. 

(j)  Period  of  Siberian  developments. 

(k)   The  collapse  of  autocracy. 

These  so-called  periods,  or  some  of  them,  more  or  less  over- 
lapped one  another,  yet  each  represents  a  distinguishable 
phase  of  Japanese  political  opinion  and  motivation  with  re- 
gard to  the  war.  The  progress  of  military  operations  in 
Europe  soon  revealed  that  many  theories  of  tactics  and  arma- 
ment upon  which  the  previously  existing  military  organiza- 
tions were  predicated  must  be  relegated  in  favor  of  new  tactics 
and  appliances.  The  war  was  scarcely  two  years  old  when  it 
became  evident  that  Japan's  army  and  navy  were  out  of  date. 
That  of  course  could  be  remedied  in  time ;  meanwhile  the  coun- 
try had  been  drained  of  surplus  supplies,  arms,  and  muni- 
tions to  sell  them  to  Russia.  But  the  thing  that  impressed 
Japanese  statesmen  more  strongly  was  the  demonstration  that 
no  nation  lacking  ample  supplies  of  certain  raw  materials,  and 
an  efficient  and  highly  specialized  economic  organization,  could 
hope  successfully  to  wage  war  against  nations  possessing  those 
resources.  In  short,  Japanese  experts  began  to  understand 
that  according  to  the  new  standards  Japan  was  not  a  power, 
but  in  reality  was  a  second-class  nation.  How  was  this  to  be 
remedied?  The  chief  elements  of  national  sufficiency  on  a 
modern  war-making  basis  are  not  possessed  by  Japan  within 


56     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

her  present  territories.  They  are  possessed  by  China,  and 
also  are  to  be  found  in  Siberia.  Incidentally  they  exist  in 
some  degree  in  the  Philippines;  but  acquisition  of  those  is- 
lands by  Japan  has  been  dismissed  as  a  possibility  since  the 
demonstration  of  America's  war-making  strength.  These  con- 
siderations gave  fresh  impetus  to  Japan's  Asian  continental 
policy,  and  caused  her  to  extend  efforts  to  control  the  iron, 
coal,  and  oil  resources  of  China  and  Siberia. 

I  think  it  will  be  interesting  and  illuminating  to  insert  at 
this  place  some  extracts  from  a  letter — the  italics  are  mine — 
written  in  1918  by  a  leading  American  resident  in  China  to  a 
friend  in  the  United  States.  I  withhold  the  names  of  the 
writer  and  the  recipient,  but  vouch  for  the  authenticity  of  the 
letter : 

Several  months  have  passed  since  my  last  letter  to  you  because  I 
have  taken  it  for  granted  that  your  thoughts  and  interests  must  be 
concentrated  upon  the  more  decisively  important  events  at  home  and 
in  Europe;  but  while  the  attention  of  the  western  world  has  been 
absorbed  in  that  struggle,  the  East  has  been  undergoing  a  no  less 
important  development  of  its  own :  or  rather,  Japan  has  been  taking 
full  advantage  of  the  critical  situation  of  her  allies,  first,  to  demand 
and  obtain  a  comparative  free  hand  in  the  Extreme  East  and  par- 
ticularly in  China,  and  secondly,  to  use  this  advantage  to  her  own 
exclusive  benefit  in  obvious  detriment  to  China  especially  and 
scarcely  less  so  to  the  dominant  nations  of  the  West.  Japan  has 
worked  assiduously  and  skillfully,  but  the  factor  which  above  all 
(except  her  geographical  propinquity,  her  instinctive  understanding 
of  Asiatic  psychology  and  her  detachment  from  the  West)  has  given 
her  temporary  superiority  over  the  white  races  is  the  utter  unscrupu- 
lousness  and  the  lack  of  all  principle  ichich  characterize  her  policy 
and  actions,  together  with  her  willingness  and  ability  to  face  and 
deal  with  men  and  facts  as  they  are.  and  not  (as  we  Americans  are 
so  apt  to  do)  as  we  would  like  to  believe  them.  Neither  in  the  minds 
of  Japan's  leaders  nor  in  the  public  opinion  of  the  nation  as  a  whole 
has  there  yet  been  developed  any  trace  of  international  honor,  or  of 
that  altruism  towards  weak  or  subject  nations  which  is  so  striking  a 
feature  of  our  own  foreign  policy. 

Japan's  rise  from  Medievalism  is  too  recent,  and  in  the  twentieth 
century  she  presents  the  interesting  spectacle  of  a  pirate  nation, 
pursuing  a  purely  opportunist  pobcy — a  striking  counterpart  here 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         57 

in  the  East  to  the  role  which  Germany  has  played  during  the  pres- 
ent generation  in  the  West.  In  fact,  so  similar  have  been  the  policies 
which  have  actuated  both  those  nations  that  it  is  startling  until  we 
remember  that  throughout  her  entire  modern  rise  Japan  has  taken 
Germany  as  her  pattern  and  has  founded  her  present  structure  on 
an  essentially  Prussian  model.  It  would  be  easy  and  not  uninter- 
esting to  trace  the  parallel  between  modern  Prussianism  and  modern 
Japan :  not  merely  in  military  and  naval  affairs,  but  in  the  entire 
system  and  principle  of  government;  in  the  federal  control  of 
education,  warped  and  twisted  to  unprincipled  national  aims  and 
which  eliminates  free  thought  and  internal  criticism;  in  the  making 
of  treaties  with  the  mental  reservation  to  adhere  only  to  such  of  the 
provisions  as  would  be  clear  advantage  to  itself  and  to  disregard 
them  utterly  when  it  might  seem  advantageous  to  do  so,  and  with  true 
Prussian  disregard  of  all  restraining  morality;  and,  among  other 
things  by  the  conduct  of  a  very  expensive  and  insidious  propaganda 
in  foreign  countries. 

In  this  last  Japan  has  far  surpassed  her  teacher,  probably  because 
of  a  more  acute  realization  of  the  difficulty  of  the  task;  and  it  is  in 
America  where  the  Japanese  propaganda  has  been  most  active  and 
where,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  it  has  been  marvelously  successful. 
.  .  .  The  Japanese  propaganda  constitutes  a  danger  more  subtle  but 
of  scarcely  less  importance  to  America  and  the  white  races — to  what 
we  might  call  the  whole  corpus  of  Anglo-Saxon  political  philoso- 
phy— than  that  which  we  are  now  combating  openly  in  Europe;  and 
to  the  success  of  this  propaganda  America  seems  to  lend  itself  easily, 
almost  greedily,  by  its  comfortable  pacifism  and  especially  by  its  lack 
of  interest  and  lack  of  fixed  and  continuing  policy  in  foreign  affairs, 
aided  to  an  extent  by  certain  American  business  interests  the  suc- 
cess of  whose  immediate  plans  in  Japan  or  connected  with  Japan 
would  be  endangered  by  any  diminution  of  cordiality.  Americans 
are  inclined  to  believe  only  what  they  want  to  believe  (or  at  least 
so  it  seems  to  us  out  here),  and  accept  with  eagerness  every  verbal 
protestation  of  Japan's  friendship  and  good  will,  and  even  of  her 
altruism  toward  China  and  good  faith  toward  her  allies  in  far  East- 
ern affairs;  and  the  times  when  these  protestations  become  more 
frequent  and  more  fulsome  almost  always  indicate  the  times  uhen 
Japan's  actions  to  the  contrary  are  more  obvious  and  drastic.  The 
soothing  vapourings  of  Ishii,  for  instance,  in  reference  to  develop- 
ments in  China  and  Japan's  attitude  thereto  are  so  diametrically 
opposed  to  the  truth  as  to  cause  utter  incredulity  among  Americans 
here  that  they  could  possibly  be  taken  seriously  at  home. 

Japan's  influence  in  the  American  press  is  easier  to  understand. 


58     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

The  influence  of  some  few  papers  (possibly  the )  may  have 

been  bought  outright.  An  American  editor  of  national  iniluence 
who  passed  through  the  East  a  few  months  ago  stated  privately 
that  he  was  made  a  definite  offer  of  $200,000  to  promote,  in  America 
the  interests  of  Japan,  it  being  specially  explained  to  him  that  he 
would  be  asked  to  print  no  lies  made  out  of  the  whole  cloth,  but  only 
to  suppress,  minimize,  or  to  explain  away  everything  unfavorable  to 
Japan,  and  at  the  same  time  to  feature  in  a  skillful  manner  what- 
ever might  tend  to  increase  American  confidence  and  trust  in  Japan. 
If  Japan  had  gone  no  further  her  methods  would  merely  have  been 
of  Prussian  crudeness,  but  her  skill  lay  in  the  campaign  which,  had 
preceded  the  offer.  Before  this  editor  had  left  the  United  States, 
before  he  had  even  contemplated  the  trip,  he  began  to  meet,  appar- 
ently by  chance,  an  increasing  number  of  Japanese  and  Americans 
who  had  traveled  in  Japan,  who  persuaded  him  that  the  distrust  of 
Japan  was  due  merely  to  racial  antagonism  and  to  the  misunder- 
standing resulting  from  mutual  ignorance,  and  that  he  would  per- 
form a  very  real  service  for  America  and  for  the  peace  of  the  world 
by  going  to  Japan  and  making  himself  an  authority  on  the  whole 
far  Eastern  question.  During  his  stay  in  Japan  he  was  received 
with  the  simply  charming  hospitality  which  the  Japanese  accord  to 
all  foreigners  of  any  possible  influence,  and  was  apparently  given 
access  to  all  shades  of  Japanese  opinion.  ...  It  was  all  done  with 
German  thoroughness  of  detail  and  with  Japanese  skill,  and,  man  of 
broad  training  as  he  was,  he  was  led  to  convince  himself  that  he 
would  be  doing  a  patriotic  duty  as  an  American  to  conduct  his 
paper  on  a  pro-Japanese  policy.  There  was  no  hint  of  a  bribe  in 
the  way  the  financial  offer  was  made;  and  it  was  only  after  he  left 
Japan  that  he  was  able  mentally  to  orient  himself.  .  .  .  The  pro- 
Japanese  policy  of  the for  many  years  is  believed  to  have 

had  its  origin  in  the  captivating  hospitality  and  courtesy  showered 

on when  he  visited  Japan.     No  one  who  knew  him  even  by 

his  writings  supposes  for  a  second  that  he  was  bribed.  ...  In 
Japan  (another  example  of  Prussian  thoroughness)  there  is  a  highly 
organized  system  for  the  entertainment  and  proper  instruction  of 
prominent  foreign  tourists.  The  most  dangerous,  because  the  most 
misinformed  person,  is  the  tourist  who  has  spent  a  few  weeks  in 
Japan.     Many   foreigners   have   fallen   easy   prey   to   this    method. 

notably ,  who  was  decorated  with  the  Sacred  Treasure 

for  advocating  in  America  a  Japanese  trusteeship  for  China.  .  .  . 
The  latest  activity  of  Japan's  propaganda  was  her  effort  to  secure 
the  consent  of  the  other  allied  Powers  for  an  exclusive  Japanese  in- 
tervention in  Siberia,  which,  were  she  once  in  possession  she  would 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         59 

never  let  go,  and  which  would  place  her  in  direct  touch  with  Russia 
and  Germany,  and  thus  in  a  position  to  extort  new  benefits  for  her- 
self from  her  present  allies,  and  eventually  to  consolidate  a  Russian- 
German-Japanese  alliance.  This  is  far  from  being  an  idle  dream, 
or  the  nightmare  of  a  Japanopbobe.  By  many  of  the  sanest  students 
of  the  far  East  it  is  regarded  as  the  greatest  menace  of  the  imme- 
diate future.  It  is  well  known  that  Japan  keeps  in  close  touch  with 
Berlin,  ready  perhaps  to  switch  over  at  any  time  it  would  advantage 
her  to  do  so ;  a  policy  of  extorting  benefits  from  the  Allies  to  remain 
with  them  while  playing  with  Germany  by  remaining  inactive.  Out 
here  it  is  believed  that  America's  entrance  prevented  such  a  shift  by 
Japan  at  the  time  of  the  Russian  collapse. 

Following  the  realization  that  the  war  was  destroying  many 
of  the  formerly  accepted  standards  of  comparative  military 
and  naval  power,  came  a  generally  accepted  belief  among 
Japanese,  and  in  the  Japanese  Government,  that  the  Central 
powers  would  win  the  war.  The  Japanese  Government  was 
not  at  all  dismayed  by  that  possibility;  in  fact,  one  scarcely 
can  doubt  that  they  would  have  preferred  such  an  outcome  to 
an  Allied  victory,  although  a  stalemate  of  mutual  exhaustion, 
with  its  comparative  augmentation  of  Japan's  military  power 
and  international  influence,  probably  would  be  preferred  to 
any  other  result.  With  Europe  exhausted  and  divided  into 
two  comparatively  equal  groups  of  hostile  nations,  Japan's 
diplomatic  position  would  be  much  enhanced  because  of  her 
increased  value  to  whatever  side  she  would  decide  to  all}'  her- 
self. 

With  that  contingency  in  view,  it  became  evident  that  the 
existing  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  might  become  an  embarrass- 
ment, for  it  would  cripple  Japan's  freedom  to  make  new 
arrangements  provided  the  result  of  the  war  should  make  such 
a  course  expedient  and  advantageous.  These,  it  hardly  can  be 
doubted,  were  the  ideas  and  motives  that  actuated  the  remark- 
able wrave  of  anti-British  sentiment  and  criticism  which  per- 
vaded Japan  in  1915  and  extended  into  1916.  I  gave  consid- 
erable attention  to  this  topic  in  my  last  previous  book  (''Our 
Eastern  Question'"),  and  I  shall  limit  reference  to  it  here  to 


60     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

some  quotations  from  "The  Far  East  Unveiled,"  by  Frederic 
Coleman,  F.R.G.S.,  published  in  1918.  Mr.  Coleman  was  dur- 
ing almost  the  whole  period  of  the  war  an  important  agent 
of  British  war  propaganda,  and  he  twice  visited  the  far  East 
on  that  mission.  His  full  reports  to  the  British  Government 
would  be  interesting,  and  his  two  books  containing  his  observa- 
tions may  be  taken  to  represent  such  matter  as  the  British 
Government  desired  or  was  willing  to  have  published  during 
the  war.  In  the  chapter  entitled,  "An  Anti-British  Cam- 
paign, ' '  Mr.  Coleman  wrote : 

"No  Englishman  will  ever  forget  the  anti-British  campaign  in  the 
Japanese  press  when  Britain  was  fighting  for  her  life." 

The  speaker  was  one  of  the  most  prominent  Englishmen  in  the  far 
East.  His  voice  vibrated  with  emotion  as  he  spoke,  though  his  tone 
was  low  and  his  manner  quiet  and  thoughtful.  I  knew  that  he  was 
not  given  to  impulsive  and  careless  utterances. 

"I  have  been  given  to  understand  by  prominent  Japanese,"  I  said, 
"that  the  press  campaign  that  criticized  England  so  severely  and 
advocated  the  abrogation  or  sweeping  revision  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  emanated  from  and  was  conducted  by  a  most  irresponsible 
section  of  the  press." 

"That  is  not  true,"  was  the  reply.  "The  paper  that  began  the 
business  was  'The  Yamato,'  a  Tokio  paper  that  certainly  could  not 
be  termed  a  particularly  influential  one.  But  the  rest  of  the  press 
of  Tokio,  with  hardly  an  exception,  joined  in  the  hue  and  cry.  Are 
you  surprised  that  we  felt  it  deeply?  Is  it  not  natural  that  we 
should  look  for  friendly  sympathy  from  an  ally  at  a  time  when  we 
were  engrossed  in  a  struggle  for  our  very  existence?  Is  it  to  be 
wondered  that  when  we  received  a  stab  in  the  back,  instead  of  the 
support  for  which  we  had  a  right  to  look,  the  knife  should  go  deep 
and  leave  a  nasty  scar?" 

That  those  unfamiliar  with  the  press  campaign  that  caused  so 
much  heartburning  among  the  more  thoughtful  of  the  English  resi- 
dents of  Japan  may  grasp  its  full  meaning,  I  quote  the  following 
paragraphs  from  a  pamphlet  of  English  authorship  published  in 
Tokio  as  an  answer  to  a  Japanese  magazine  article  on  the  subject. 

"Article  VI,  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement  says,  'The  present 
Agreement  will  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  (from  1911).'  The 
same  Article  continues:     'If  when  the  date  for  its  expiration  ar- 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         61 

rives,  either  Ally  is  engaged  in  war  the  Alliance  shall  continue  until 
peace  is  declared.'     Nothing  would  seem  to  be  plainer. 

"The  ordinary  newspaper  reader  throughout  the  world  interprets 
the  present  agitation  in  Japan  for  the  abrogation  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Agreement  as: 

"(1)  An  attempt  to  get  rid  of  an  Agreement  which  has  not  run 
for  more  than  half  the  number  of  years  contracted  for. 

"(2)  An  attempt  to  get  rid  of  it  in  war  time,  which  it  had  been 
expressly  agreed  should  not  be  done. 

"(3)  An  attempt  to  get  rid  of  it  because  some  Japanese  think 
that  Japan  could  do  better  for  herself  in  China  if  no  Agreement 
existed. 

"(4)  An  attempt  to  get  rid  of  it  because  some  Japanese  think 
Great  Britain  is  not  doing  well  in  the  war  or  is  not  going  to  do 
well.  In  other  words,  that  the  attitude  of  the  Japanese  will  be  dif- 
ferent when  the  British  navy  wipes  out  the  German  fleet,  or  when 
Germany  is  driven  from  France. 

"(5)  An  attempt  to  get  rid  of  it  which  continued  for  many 
months  without,  apparently,  being  reproved." 

The  Japanese  I  talked  with  admitted  that  an  anti-British  press 
campaign,  advocating  openly  the  abrogation  or  revolutionary  revi- 
sion of  the  Anglo-Japanese  treaty,  took  place  in  Japan  when  Britain 
was  at  war.  But  they  minimized  the  importance  of  the  papers  that 
took  part  in  it,  declared  it  was  aimed  against  the  English  in  the  far 
East  rather  than  against  Britain  as  a  power,  and  said  the  obscure 
press  was  out  from  under  any  real  control  and  not  worth  bothering 
one's  head  about. 

The  Englishmen  in  Japan  did  not  pass  over  the  subject  so  lightly. 
The  quieter  the  Englishman  the  more  deeply  he  felt  the  disloyalty 
of  the  attack. 

The  fact  that  the  campaign  took  place  did  not  tend  to  better  feel- 
ing between  English  and  Japanese  in  the  far  East.  That  is  a  pity, 
for  the  feeling,  without  such  extraneous  aids  to  make  it  bitter,  was 
quite  sufficiently  unsympathetic  one  for  the  other. 

No  person  who  is  familiar  with  the  conditions  and  regula- 
tions under  which  newspapers  are  published  in  Japan  credits 
for  a  moment  the  assertion  that  the  anti-British  agitation  in 
Japan  during  the  war  was  made  against  the  wishes  of  the 
Government.     Those  who  criticized  the  alliance  with  Great 


62     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Britain  and  advocated  its  repeal  or  drastic  revision  included 
prominent  Japanese  politicians,  leading  educators,  men  prom- 
inent in  business,  and  even  some  men  in  the  Government.  The 
control  of  the  Japanese  Government  over  the  press  in  Japan 
is  virtually  absolute  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war.  Editions  of 
newspapers  frequently  are  suppressed  for  the  most  trivial  in- 
fractions of  regulations,  for  actions  that  arbitrarily  are  con- 
strued by  the  authorities  to  infract  regulations,  or  in  some 
cases  for  alleged  infractions  of  regulations  that  never  have 
been  issued.  Nearly  every  newspaper  in  Japan  has  a  "jail 
editor,"  a  Japanese  employed  to  take  responsibility  for  its 
infractions  of  the  regulations  and  suffer  the  penalty.  Within 
the  last  twelve  months  a  foreign  editor  in  Japan  has  been 
convicted  and  sentenced  to  prison  for  publishing  an  extract 
from  a  foreign  newspaper  discussing  political  institutions  in 
Japan.  As  an  example,  of  which  I  could  give  hundreds,  of 
how  the  Japanese  Government  controls  publicity  in  Japan, 
take  the  following  editorial  comment  of  "The  Japan  Chron- 
icle": 

By  an  unfortunate  coincidence,  in  the  same  issue  in  which  we  were 
telegraphically  informed  that  Viscount  Ishii  [in  America]  once 
more  declared  Japan  to  be  using  her  efforts  to  attain  an  interna- 
tional democracy,  there  appeared  a  paragraph  reporting  a  sequel  to 
the  Tagawa  case.  Now  in  that  case  it  is  very  difficult  to  see  any 
tendency  towards  the  extension  of  democracy  in  Japan,  whatever 
may  be  wished  internationally.  Mr.  Tagawa,  M.  P.,  who  was 
Under-Secretary  to  the  Judicial  Department  in  the  Okuma  Adminis- 
tration, wrote  an  article  criticising  the  Genro  for  interfering  in  the 
selection  of  a  new  Cabinet,  which  Mr.  Tagawa  maintained  was  an 
Imperial  prerogative.  The  article  was  temperate  in  tone  and  to 
most  people  would  appear  a  moderate  essay  on  a  constitutional 
issue.  Nevertheless  Mr.  Tagawa  was  prosecuted  and  sentenced  to  a 
term  of  five  months'  imprisonment,  which  was  finally  confirmed  by 
the  Court  of  Cassation.  A  number  of  his  friends,  including  Mr. 
Ozaki  Yukio,  formerly  Minister  for  Justice,  thereupon  contributed 
to  a  Tokyo  magazine  a  series  of  appreciations  of  Mr.  Tagawa's 
character.  This  has  offended  the  authorities,  and  the  Editor  of  the 
magazine  has  been  called  to  the  Procurator's  Office  for  examination, 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         63 

the  expectation  being  that  a  prosecution  will  ensue  on  a  charge  of 
defending  a  criminal. 

The  inference  is  that  in  Japan  it  is  not  only  illegal  to  criticise 
the  Elder  Statesmen  for  what  is,  rightly  or  wrongly,  regarded  as 
unconstitutional  action,  but  dangerous  to  express  sympathy  with  one 
who  has  been  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  the  use  of  very  elemen- 
tary rights  of  free  speech. 

We  should  be  glad  to  find  Viscount  Ishii  delivering  an  essay  to 
Americans  on  the  principles  of  democracy  as  illustrated  by  the 
Tagawa  case.  Probably  if  his  attention  were  directed  to  it  he 
would  say  that  it  was  all  part  of  the  German  intrigue  to  divide  the 
Allies.  In  this  category  we  must  place  the  San  Francisco  school 
trouble,  the  alien  land  laws  in  certain  States,  and  the  Twenty-One 
Demands  on  China  by  Japan.  The  Germans  are  certainly  a  won- 
derful people.  < 

All  the  Englishmen  with  whom  I  have  discussed  the  anti- 
British  agitation  in  Japan  are  emphatically  of  the  opinion 
that  it  was  instigated  and  privately  steered  by  the  Japanese 
Government,  which  suppressed  it  when  it  had  served  the  pur- 
pose it  was  designed  for.  That  purpose  was  to  impress  upon 
Great  Britain  and  the  Allies  in  Europe  that  it  was  necessary 
to  satisfy  Japan  in  order  to  hold  her  with  the  Allies.  The 
military  situation  in  Europe  at  that  time  was  especially  favor- 
able to  enable  Japan  to  put  this  psychological  pressure  on  her 
allies.  Russia's  military  strength  had  been  broken.  Serbia 
had  been  crushed,  the  Dardanelles  expedition  had  failed,  and 
the  Central  alliance  had  been  strengthened  by  the  addition 
of  Bulgaria.  Germany  without  apparent  difficulty  was  hold- 
ing her  own  on  the  western  front  and  was  able  to  make  steady 
headway  on  the  eastern  front.  There  was  little  visible  pros- 
pect of  an  acquisition  of  strength  to  the  Allies  that  would 
change  the  balance  in  their  favor.  (Japan  might  have  sup- 
plied it.  but  had  no  thought  of  doincr  so.)  As  regarded  by 
Japanese,  America  was  incurably  pacific  and  would  not  enter 
the  war  under  any  provocation.  Moreover,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment knew  about  the  secret  agreements  that  were  being 
made  among  the  European  Allied  governments,  whereby  the 
demands  of  Russia,  and  later  of  Italy,  were  conceded  by 


64     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

France  and  Great  Britain,  in  return  for  concessions  or  mili- 
tary support.  If  Russia  and  Italy  could  press  for  acquisitory 
gains  in  the  event  of  a  victory  of  the  Allies  and  as  compensa- 
tion for  participation  in  the  war,  why  should  not  Japan  also 
take  advantage  of  the  predicament  of  Europe  to  obtain  her 
bit? 

To  Japanese  in  general,  and  also  to  Japanese  statesmen,  the 
moral  issues  of  the  war  as  voiced  by  European  statesmen  were 
merely  political  platitudes  uttered  under  pressure  of  expedi- 
ency, and  for  effect  upon  the  common  sort  of  mankind  and 
neutral  nations,  and  which  bore  slight  relation  to  the  real  ob- 
jects of  governments  in  prosecuting  the  war  or  to  the  settle- 
ment of  its  issues.  Japan's  knowledge  of  diplomacy  and 
world  politics  had  been  learned  in  the  European  school,  the 
school  of  Talleyrand  and  Metternich.  Japanese  statesmen 
had  studied  the  history  of  Europe,  its  previous  wars,  and  its 
previous  treaties  of  peace :  and  they  absolutely  were  unable  to 
conceive  that  a  new  set  of  principles  for  adjusting  the  issues 
of  a  war  would  or  could  be  adopted  in  this  case.  So  Japan 
worked  steadily  through  the  war  to  seize  any  opportunity 
that  came  to  strengthen  her  position  in  world  politics,  and  to 
safeguard  it  by  agreements  with  other  powers,  and  to  create 
trading-points  to  use  at  the  peace  conference.  In  doing  this 
Japan  almost  brazenly  utilized  the  possibility  that  she  could, 
if  she  wanted  to,  at  any  time  make  a  separate  peace  and  a 
subsequent  alliance  with  Germany  as  a  lever  on  her  allies. 
"Why  should  she  not  ?  Other  nations  in  the  Allied  group  had 
done  it. 

Early  in  1916  the  Japanese  Government  thought  the  time 
auspicious  to  get  certain  issues  adjusted  with  Russia,  and  it 
moved  accordingly.  In  that  case  the  German  alternative  was 
utilized,  as  is  shown  by  diplomatic  papers  published  after  the 
Russian  revolution: 

From  M.  Sazonoff,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the 
Ambassadors  at  London,  Paris,  and  Tokio.     Dated  May  11.  1916 
The  Japanese  Government   has  informed  me   that   the   German 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         65 

Ambassador  at  Stockholm  has  twice  approached  the  Japanese  Am- 
bassador and  attempted  to  convince  him  of  the  desirability  for  con- 
cluding peace  between  Germany,  Russia,  and  Japan.  I  informed 
Motono  that  I  should  be  quite  prepared  to  listen  to  Germany's  peace 
proposals,  on  the  condition  that  they  should  be  simultaneously  made 
to  Russia,  France.  England,  and  Japan.  As  regards  Italy,  since  she 
is  not  yet  at  war  with  Germany,  there  is  no  necessity  for  demanding 
that  an  application  should  be  made  to  her  also  by  Germany,  but  we 
will  keep  her  informed  about  these  proposals,  because  the  relations 
to  them  can  only  be  determined  by  the  Allies  together. 

Addition  for  Tokio.  Please  thank  the  Japanese  Government  for 
this  invaluable  communication. 

As  a  result  of  this  method,  Japan  was  able  to  conclude  with 
the  Russian  Imperial  Government  a  new  treaty,  signed  in  the 
summer  of  1916.  There  were,  in  fact,  two  agreements,  one 
published  and  one  secret.  The  secret  treaty  made  then  be- 
tween Russia  and  Japan  was  published  by  the  Russian  revo- 
lutionists after  the  imperial  regime  was  overthrown.  The 
italics  are  mine.     It  follows : 

RUSSO-JAPANESE  TREATY 

The  Russian  Imperial  Government  and  the  Japanese  Imperial 
Government,  aiming  to  strengthen  the  firm  friendship  between  them, 
established  through  the  secret  agreements  of  July  17-30,  1907,  June 
21,  July  4,  1910,  and  June  25,  July  8,  1912,  have  agreed  to  supple- 
ment the  aforesaid  secret  agreements  with  the  following  articles: 

Article  1 

Both  the  high-contracting  parties  recognize  that  the  vital  interests 
of  one  and  the  other  of  them  require  the  safeguarding  of  China  from 
the  political  domination  of  any  third  Power  whatsoever,  having  hos- 
tile designs  against  Russia,  or  Japan:  and  therefore  mutually  obli- 
gate themselves,  in  the  future  at  all  times  when  circumstances 
demand,  to  enter  into  open-hearted  dealings,  based  on  complete  trust, 
in  order  to  take  necessary  measures  with  the  object  of  preventing  the 
possibility  of  occurrence  of  said  state  of  affairs. 

Article  2 

In  the  event,  in  consequence  of  measures  taken  by  mutual  consent 
of  Russia  and  Japan,  on  the  basis  of  the  preceding  article,  a  deelara- 


66     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

tion  of  war  is  made  by  any  third  Power,  contemplated  by  Article  1 
of  this  agreement,  against  one  of  the  contracting  parties,  the  other 
party,  at  the  first  demand  of  its  ally,  must  come  to  its  aid.  Each 
of  the  high-contracting  parties  herewith  covenants,  in  the  event  such 
a  condition  arises,  not  to  conclude  peace  with  the  common  enemy, 
without  preliminary  consent  therefor  from  its  ally. 

Article  3 

The  conditions  under  which  each  of  the  high-contracting  parties 
will  lend  armed  assistance  to  the  other  side,  by  virtue  of  the  preced- 
ing article,  as  well  as  the  means  by  which  such  assistance  shall  be 
accomplished,  must  be  determined  in  common  by  the  corresponding 
authorities  of  one  and  the  other  contracting  parties. 

Article  4 

It  is  requisite  to  have  in  view  that  neither  one  nor  the  other  of 
the  high-contracting  parties  must  consider  itself  bound  by  Article  2 
of  this  agreement  to  lend  armed  aid  to  its  ally,  unless  it  be  given 
guarantees  by  its  allies  that  the  latter  will  give  it  assistance  corre- 
sponding in  character  to  the  importance  of  the  approaching  conflict. 

Article  5 

The  present  agreement  shall  have  force  from  the  time  of  its  exe- 
cution, and  shall  continue  to  be  in  force  until  July  1-14,  of  the  year 
1921. 

In  the  event  the  other  of  the  High-Contracting  Parties  does  not 
deem  it  necessary  twelve  months  prior  to  the  end  of  said  period,  to 
declare  its  unwillingness  to  continue  the  present  agreement  in  force, 
then  the  said  agreement  shall  continue  in  force  for  a  period  of  one 
year  after  the  declaration  of  one  of  the  Contracting  Parties  dis- 
claiming the  said  agreement. 

Article  6 

The  present  agreement  must  remain  profoundly  secret  except  to 
both  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties. 

In  witness  whereof  the  persons  invested  with  full  powTer  by  both 
parties,  have  signed  and  affixed  their  seals  to  the  present  agreement 
at  Petrograd  on  the  20th  of  June- July  3.  of  the  year  1916,  winch 
corresponds  in  the  Japanese  calendar  to  the  third  day  of  the  seventh 
month  of  the  fifth  year  of  the  reign  of  Tais. 

(Signatures). 

Sazonofp. 
Motoxo. 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         67 

Several  things  in  this  secret  treaty  are  significant.  It  was 
apparently  made  without  the  knowledge  of  the  other  Allied 
powers.  It  scarcely  can  be  assumed,  however,  that  the  '  *  third 
power"  against  which  this  treaty  nominally  was  intended  to 
protect  the  interests  of  Japan  and  Russia  m  China  was  one  of 
the  European  allies  of  Japan  and  Russia.  That  construction 
of  the  treaty  would  convict  the  nations  that  made  it  of  down- 
right underhandedness,  or  by  logical  inference  of  an  expecta- 
tion of  a  betrayal  of  them  by  some  of  their  allies.  It  was  not 
directed  against  a  nation  in  the  Central  alliance;  in  that  case 
this  treaty  would  be  unnecessary,  for  Japan  and  Russia 
already  were  allied  and  at  war  against  the  nations  of  the  Cen- 
tral alliance.  There  is  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  the  identity  of 
the  "third  power"  mentioned  in  this  treaty.  It  is  directed 
at  the  United  States.  Japan  recognized  the  United  States  as 
the  nation  most  likely  to  oppose  and  withstand  Japan's  designs 
in  China,  and  the  Japanese  Government,  while  the  war  was 
straining  her  allies,  at  favorable  moments  (which  meant  usu- 
ally at  times  when  the  Allies  were  being  hard  pressed,  and  at 
some  unfavorable  turn  of  the  military  or  political  situation) 
was  quietly  pressing  the  Allied  powers  to  agree  to  Japan's 
special  position  in  China  and  other  matters.  From  Russia 
Japan  procured  recognition  not  only  of  her  special  position 
in  China,  but  also  was  to  have  the  military  support  of  Russia 
in  the  event  that  a  "third  power"  would  attempt  to  disturb 
the  arrangements  of  Japan  in  China.  In  a  supplementary 
agreement  with  Russia,  made  at  the  same  time  this  treaty  was 
signed,  and  also  in  the  terms  of  other  secret  and  published 
treaties  between  the  same  governments  made  since  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  just  exactly  how  they  would  divide  their  inter- 
ests and  positions  in  China  had  been  clearly  defined.  Japan 
probably  made  use  of  Russia's  pressing  need  of  supplies  from 
Japan,  and  financial  credits  to  pay  for  them,  to  gain  Russia's 
consent.  At  the  same  time  Russia  was  depending  to  an  even 
greater  extent  on  supplies  and  credits  from  America,  yet  the 
Imperial  Russian  Government  did  not  fear  to  make  a  diplo- 


68     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

matic  trade  against  America  secretly.     America  was  still  con- 
sidered an  amateur  in  world  politics. 

It  is  so  seldom  that  one  finds  really  discerning  criticism  of 
Eastern  affairs  in  the  American  press  that  the  following  edi- 
torial comment  of  the  "Boston  Transcript"  about  this  Russo- 
Japanese  treaty  is  worth  quoting: 

No  "armed  demonstration  against  America"  can  actually  be  dis- 
covered in  the  secret  treaty  which  the  late  Okuma  government  en- 
tered into  with  the  imperial  government  of  Russia,  as  published  in 
the  Bolshevik  organ  at  Petrograd.  But  the  treaty,  which  mani- 
festly is  genuine,  is  a  new  evidence  that  the  Okuma  regime  was 
perfectly  ready  to  enter  into  agreements  with  everybody  against 
everybody  else,  if  by  that  means  a  point  could  be  gained  for  its  pur- 
pose here  and  there.  Japan  had  a  hard  and  fast  treaty  with  Great 
Britain,  which  apparently  made  the  two  countries  firm  partners  in 
the  East.  But  this  did  not  prevent  Okuma  from  attempting  a  secret 
alliance  with  Russia  and  Germany  to  defeat  the  purposes  of  both 
Great  Britain  and  America.  That  was  one  of  his  projects  at  the 
very  time  when  Japan  was  nominally  at  war  with  Germany.  Know- 
ing the  treachery  of  the  Czar  to  the  Allied  cause,  Okuma  was  appar- 
ently ready  to  take  advantage  of  it  to  get  into  quasi-respectable 
relations  with  Germany.  All  this  was  unspeakably  base.  But 
Okuma  fell  from  power  largely  by  reason  of  his  treacherous  methods. 
Has  his  fall  altered  the  Japanese  character?  No  one  can  say  that. 
We  need  to  keep  our  eyes  open  in  dealing  with  these  highly  gifted 
people.  But  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  no  understanding  of 
the  Okuma  sort  exists  between  Germany  and  the  present  Govern- 
ment of  Japan,  and  in  the  meantime  there  is  no  real  Russian  govern- 
ment of  any  kind  in  existence.  The  Bolshevik  diplomatic  publica- 
tions will  make  a  highly  interesting  chapter  of  diplomatic  history 
when  they  are  all  at  hand  and  digested. 

It  was  in  the  summer  of  1916  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment also  induced  Great  Britain  (as  was  revealed  at  Paris 
after  the  peace  conference  had  met)  to  sign  a  secret  agree- 
ment consenting  to  Japan's  retention  of  the  former  German 
insular  possessions  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  that  lie  north  of  the 
equator. 

But  events  have  a  way  frequently  of  putting  to  naught  the 
best-laid  plans  of  diplomats,  and  soon  after  the  Russo-Japan- 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         69 

ese  secret  alliance  was  signed  and  sealed,  two  momentous 
events  made  it  of  no  value  to  Japan.  These  events  were  the 
entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  and  the  revolution 
in  Russia. 

The  possibility  of  a  German-Russo-Japanese  entente  after, 
or  perhaps  even  during  the  war,  did  not  become  active  in 
Japanese  political  discussion  until  some  time  after  the  revolu- 
tion in  Russia,  and  when  its  results  began  to  appear.  Count 
Terauchi  had  succeeded  Marquis  Okuma  as  head  of  the  Japan- 
ese cabinet,  and  in  the  spring  of  1918,  at  a  time  when  the 
Siberian  question  was  to  the  fore,  Gregory  Mason,  editor  of 
the  "Japan  Advertiser"  and  then  on  the  point  of  leaving 
Japan,  had  an  interview  with  the  Japanese  premier,  which 
was  published  in  "The  Outlook"  (New  York)  in  May,  1918. 
Count  Terauchi 's  remarks  to  Mr.  Mason  were  written  out  by 
Mr.  Y.  Tsurumi,  who  acted  as  interpreter,  were  then  submit- 
ted to  the  premier  and  to  the  home  and  foreign  ministries, 
and  re-revised  by  Count  Terauchi.  The  interview  there- 
fore can  be  taken  as  "official."  I  quote  from  the  inter- 
view: 

"Count  Terauchi,  you  may  permit  me  to  ask  a  very  bold,  straight- 
forward question,"  I  said,  "for  I  should  like  to  dispel  the  misunder- 
standing that  is  prevailing  among  certain  sections  of  Americans. 
Now  that  the  Berlin-Bagdad  dream  has  been  shattered,  certain  Ger- 
man newspapers  have  begun  to  talk  of  a  Berlin-Tokio  connection 
through  Russia.  Some  Americans  are  possessed  of  the  opinion  that 
there  is  a  possibility  of  Japan's  forming  an  alliance  with  Germany 
after  the  war,  if  the  conclusion  of  the  present  war  should  favor  such 
possibility.     What  is  your  Excellency's  opinion  about  this?" 

"That  will  depend  entirely  on  how  the  present  war  may  end,"  said 
General  Terauchi.  "It  is  impossible  to  predict  the  changes  which 
the  conclusion  of  this  war  may  bring.  If  the  exigencies  of  the  inter- 
national relationships  demand  it,  Japan,  being  unable  to  maintain  a 
position  of  total  isolation,  may  be  induced  to  seek  an  ally  in  Ger- 
many; but,  as  far  as  I  can  judge  from  the  existing  condition  of 
affairs,  I  see  no  such  danger.  In  other  words,  I  believe  that  Japan's 
relations  with  the  Entente  Allies  will  continue  unaltered  after  the 
present  war." 


10    DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

The  publication  of  this  interview  caused  a  small  furor  in 
Japan,  and  the  press  and  government  officials  attempted  to 
explain  away  the  premier's  statement,  and  even  to  dispute  its 
authenticity,  of  which  there  is  no  reasonable  doubt.  Coming 
exactly  as  it  did,  and  when  the  situation  of  the  Allies  as  a 
whole  was  very  sensitive  to  such  ideas,  the  statement  of  the 
Japanese  Premier  made  a  deep  impression.  How  it  was  re- 
ceived by  the  pro-Ally  press  in  the  East  can  be  illustrated  by 
some  editorial  comment  of  the  "Japan  Advertiser"  of  May 
29,  1918 : 

It  cannot  be  said  that  an  examination  of  the  context  modifies  the 
face  value  of  the  passages  we  have  quoted.  Mr.  Mason  clearly  had 
in  his  mind  the  possibility  that  German  power  would  overspread 
Russia,  and  was  seeking  a  clue  to  Japan's  policy  in  that  event.  He 
began  with  questions  about  Japanese  intervention  in  Siberia — a 
burning  question  at  that  moment.  Would  Japan  intervene?  Would 
she  intervene  singly  or  conjointly  with  the  Allies?  What  would  she 
think  of  a  small  "buffer"  Russia,  with  Germany  holding  the  Baltic 
provinces  and  Japan  occupying  eastern  Siberia?  Suppose  Ger- 
many and  Japan  were  finally  face  to  face  in  Asia?  Would  they 
meet  as  rivals  or  as  friends?  Since  those  questions  were  asked  two 
incidents  have  shown  how  much  they  were  to  the  point.  One  was 
the  kite  flown  in  connection  with  Mr.  Collyn's  visit  to  London  which 
in  effect  held  out  the  proposal  that  Germany  would  make  a  "good 
peace"  in  the  West  if  she  got  her  way  in  the  East.  The  other  was 
President  Wilson's  words  on  May  19,  a  fortnight  after  the  "Outlook" 
interview  had  been  published  in  America,  in  which  he  said:  "The 
Germans  seek  for  an  opportunity  to  have  a  free  hand,  particularly 
in  the  East,  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  conquest  and  exploitation. 
Every  proposal  with  regard  to  concessions  in  the  West  involves  res- 
ervations with  regard  to  the  East.  Now,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned, 
I  intend  to  stand  by  Russia  as  well  as  by  France." 

Count  Terauchi's  answer  to  Mr.  Mason's  questions  was  that 
"Japan,  being  unable  to  maintain  a  position  of  total  isolation,  may 
be  induced  to  seek  an  ally  in  Germany."  He  went  on  at  once  to  say 
that  he  believed  there  wis  no  such  danger  and  to  express  his  belief 
that  after  the  war,  as  before,  Japan's  relations  with  the  Entente 
Powers  would  remain  unaltered.  Further,  it  is  not  only  just  to 
Count  Terauchi  but  essential  to  an  understanding  of  the  question,  to 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         71 

point  out  that  the  hypothetical  ease  was  constructed  by  Mr.  Mason. 
Count  Terauchi's  was  not  the  originating  mind.  He  stated  what 
Japan  might  do  in  certain  circumstances,  and  at  once  added  that  he 
did  not  believe  that  the  circumstances  would  ever  come  to  pass.  But 
if  it  is  candidly  examined  does  that  meet  the  point?  The  circum- 
stances which  the  interviewer  sketched  are  not  figments  of  the  imag- 
ination. Germany  is  devoting  all  her  energies  to  the  task  of  making 
them  actual ;  she  has  made  considerable  progress,  and,  so  far  as  Rus- 
sia is  concerned,  it  would  be  difficult  to  set  a  limit  to  her  progress. 
How  are  those  possibilities  to  be  prevented  from  becoming  accom- 
plished facts  except  by  all  the  Allies  putting  as  much  energy  into 
the  fight  as  Germany  is  doing,  opposing  her  ambitions  with  "force, 
force  to  the  utmost,  force  without  stint  or  limit"?  What  is  force 
of  amis  without  force  of  will?  It  is  not  the  part  of  the  leaders  of 
Allied  nations  to  outline  opportunist  policies  for  the  hour  of  defeat 
but  to  concentrate  their  energies  on  making  defeat  impossible.  It 
may  be  said  that  opportunism  is  a  universal  policy,  and  that  Count 
Terauchi  has  only  given  a  characteristically  blunt  expression  to  a 
creed  which  all  statesmen  in  their  hearts  confess.  We  do  not  see 
how  any  one  can  admit  the  premise  with  this  war  before  them,  and 
especially  in  view  of  the  white  heat  of  energy  with  which  America 
has  set  herself  to  a  task  so  remote  from  her  traditional  preoccupa- 
tions, so  devoid  of  material  gain.  Be  that  as  it  may,  there  is  cynical 
opportunism  and  enlightened  opportunism.  The  former  waits  on 
events,  intent  on  securing  its  individual  profit,  from  the  welter;  the 
latter  seizes  the  opportunity  to  achieve  the  result  which  it  prizes. 
We  cannot  imagine  that  Count  Terauchi  meant  to  tell  the  world  that 
Japan  would  await  the  result  and  stand  in  with  the  winner,  but  we 
cannot  escape  the  feeling  that  the  impression  which  his  words  will 
create  will  be  something  like  that. 

As  frequently  is  the  case  in  such  instances,  this  discussion 
served  rather  to  bring  into  relief  the  pro-German  trend  of 
Japanese  political  thought  than  to  prove  its  non-existence.  In 
1918  the  "Daily  Mail"  (London)  sent  one  of  its  staff  corre- 
spondents, Bernard  Falk,  to  the  far  East  to  write  about  con- 
ditions there.  He  interviewed  many  prominent  Japanese  in 
and  out  of  the  Government,  among  them  Baron  Goto,  then 
minister  of  foreign  affairs.  That  interview  was  devoted  prin- 
cipally to  a  discussion  of  the  question  of  intervention  in 


72     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Siberia,  but  it  touched  also  on  other  phases  of  the  war.  I  will 
quote  from  the  interview,  as  published  in  the  "Japan  Adver- 
tiser" of  June  13,  1918: 

"Has  Japan  any  ground  for  complaint  against  the  Allies?" 

"Of  course  you  have  heard  of  the  differences  of  opinion  regarding 
the  exports  of  steel  from  America  to  Japan,  but  the  differences  never 
amounted  to  much,  and  the  whole  question  was  treated  in  a  good 
spirit  by  both  nations.  Just  now  I  think  the  United  States  is  as 
satisfied  with  the  result  of  the  negotiations  as  Japan  is.  No,  we 
have  no  cause  of  complaint." 

"But  we  might  fairly  complain  of  those  Japanese  politicians  who 
appear  to  regret  that  Japan  is  not  allied  with  Germany?" 

"I  do  not  say  there  are  not  such  men  amongst  us,  but  it  is  quite 
a  common  thing  in  any  country  for  men  apposing  the  government  to 
say  whatever  suits  their  book  and  make  political  capital,  which  is 
why  such  politicians  exist  in  Japan.  The  people  of  Great  Britain 
may  rest  assured  that  so  long  as  the  Japanese  Empire  exists  the 
Japanese  people  are  their  good  friends." 

"And  to  me  some  Japanese  newspapers  are  scarcely  suggestive  of 
enthusiasm  for  the  Allied  cause?" 

"Please  do  not  mistake  temporary  partisan  political  phenomena 
for  solid  convictions.  Believe  me,  there  is  little  reason  to  suppose 
tliat  indifference  or  adverse  criticism  are  deeply  founded." 

"Further,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  Japanese  people  utterly  fail 
to  visualise  British  achievements  in  their  true  proportions  or  to 
realize  how  much  stronger  Great  Britain  has  become  in  a  naval  and 
military  sense?" 

"There  may  be  people  foolish  enough  to  underestimate  your  naval 
and  military  strength,  but  I  would  not  place  them  among  our  respon- 
sible thinking  elements.  Possibly  the  Japanese  people  may  have 
expected  more  showy  results  from  your  armed  forces.  You  know 
how  a  coup  de  theatre  appeals  to  common  people." 

"Personally,  I  find  it  difficult  to  reconcile  the  German  morale  of 
your  army  and  the  Germanized  character  of  your  culture  with  the 
universality  of  the  English  language.  Please  explain  this  contradic- 
tion of  the  common  experience  that  with  the  prevailing  language 
goes  the  culture  of  a  people?" 

"The  question  is  a  good  one.  I  have  never  heard  it  from  a  for- 
eigner before  though  he  may  have  had  it  in  mind.  The  condition 
you  depict  does  exist  in  Japan ;  you  see  German-like  soldiers  side  by 
side  with  an  English  speaking  population.  If  I  may  be  allowed  to 
say  so  that  is  a  beautiful  part  of  our  national  character.     Japan 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         73 

absorbs  the  civilization  of  every  country,  but  whether  one  studies 
England  or  Germany  it  is  always,  with  us,  from  the  viewpoint  of 
the  Japanese  people.  So  those  soldiers  who  look  to  you  so  German 
have  in  reality  entirely  Japanese  minds;  so  also  the  people  whom  you 
hear  speaking  English  are  yet  Japanese  in  thought.  In  other  words, 
borrowed  civilization  and  borrowed  beautiful  things  are  only  to 
round  off  our  own  character,  not  to  displace  it.  I  stayed  in  Ger- 
many for  many  years.  I  studied  there  and  people  may  think  me 
pro-German.  I  am  not  pro-German  at  all.  I  am  not  anti-English. 
I  am  quite  Japanese  sharing  the  national  views  regarding  our  in- 
ternational relationships." 

"I  do  not  quite  follow  you  when  you  say  that  you  are  not  anti- 
English.     I  would  expect  that?" 

"What  I  want  to  say  is  that  I  am  not  one-sided.  I  am  very  im- 
partial, but  when  it  comes  to  choose  between  enemy  and  ally,  of 
course  towards  the  enemy  I  cannot  be  pro-German  because  a  pro- 
German  is  an  enemy  and  towards  a  friend  I  cannot  be  unfriendly 
as  anti-English.  What  I  wish  to  convey  above  all  is  that  I  am 
Japanese,  but  at  this  juncture  when  we  are  fighting  an  enemy  how 
can  I  be  indifferent  to  the  Allied  Powers?  Please  understand  me 
correctly." 

"Do  you  believe  in  the  permanency  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alli- 
ance r 

"The  question  has  come  to  me  before  from  foreigners,  including 
some  Englishmen.  If  the  whole  world  changes,  if  the  sun  were  to 
rise  in  the  west,  then  anything  might  happen.     Otherwise — " 

"The  strange  pro-Japanese  demonstration  in  Berlin  on  the  day 
Germany  declared  war  on  Russia  still  mystifies  people  in  England 
who  know  the  facts.     Can  you  explain  it?" 

"Interpretation  is  difficult  but  I  will  give  you  my  view.  Before 
the  war  there  was  no  incident  hurting  the  feelings  of  the  two  na- 
tions (Germany  and  Japan).  We  were  on  very  cordial  terms. 
Therefore  when  the  German  people  thought  that  in  the  coming  war 
Japan  might  take  sides  on  her  own  account,  they  did  not  believe 
Japan  would  do  any  harm  against  Germany  and  they  wanted  to 
demonstrate  their  friendliness." 

"Did  they  not  think  you  would  take  an  opportunity  to  move 
against  Russia?" 

"Some  may  have  thought  so  but  I  do  not  agree.  Germany  must 
have  known  that  Japan  and  Russia  would  remain  good  friends." 

"Critics  of  Japan  say  you  fight  for  your  own  materialistic  ends 
and  not  for  ideals?" 

"Japan  had  no  particular  reason  to  go  to  war  with  Germany. 


74     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

She  came  in  in  obedience  to  the  obligations  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance.    And  to  keep  faith.     The  facts  are  there  to  justify  us." 

"But,  pardon  ine,  that  was  duty,  not  idealism?" 

"True,  but  behind  the  duty  was  the  ideal.  The  late  Emperor 
Meiji  left  30,000  poems  enshrining  the  beautiful  ideals  of  mankind 
and  in  any  moment  of  stress  or  crisis  the  nation  turns  to  tbem  as  to 
a  Bible." 

That  interview  with  the  Japanese  foreign  minister  very  well 
represents  Japan 's  war  policy  as  the  Japanese  present  it.  It 
is  interesting  to  note,  however,  that  Baron  Goto,  in  talking  to 
an  English  journalist,  adheres  to  the  fiction  that  Japan  entered 
the  war  in  obedience  to  the  terms  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alli- 
ance, an  assertion  which  Viscount  Ishii,  talking  to  impress 
Americans,  expressly  contradicted  less  than  a  month  later  at 
Boston. 

"With  regard  to  the  pro-German  sentiment  of  Japanese,  Ber- 
nard Falk  wrote  in  one  of  his  articles  to  the  "Daily  Mail": 

Except  among  a  few  Tokio  professors  there  is  no  desire  in  Japan 
for  a  German  victory,  though  her  morale  and  army  culture  and  prev- 
alent ideas  are  largely  German,  despite  the  fact  that  everybody  of 
note  talks  English.  There  is  considerable  admiration  for  German 
military  achievements,  leading  in  some  cases  to  doubts  whether  in 
the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  Japan  has  backed  the  right  horse. 

It  no  doubt  was  true  that  in  1918  Japanese  were  more 
doubtful  of  a  German  victory  in  the  war  than  they  were  in 
1915  and  1916,  and  by  that  time  it  was  pretty  evident  that  the 
Allies  were  the  stronger,  with  the  addition  of  America,  so  any 
uneasiness  that  existed  about  having  backed  the  wrong  horse 
was  lessened. 

During  the  war  the  Japanese  Government  changed  three 
times.  A  ministry  headed  by  Marquis  Okuma  was  in  power 
when  the  war  began.  Okuma  long  has  posed  as  a  man  of  a 
democratic  trend  of  political  thought,  and  in  that  attitude  he 
at  times  has  been  very  useful  to  Japan,  whenever  in  the  course 
of  events  it  was  deemed  expedient  by  the  oligarchy  to  present 
a  "liberal"  front  to  the  world,  or  to  speak  through  a  "liberal" 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         75 

mouthpiece.  In  fact,  Okuma  is  one  of  the  Elder  Statesmen, 
which  is  the  inner  circle  of  the  oligarchy  whose  power  was 
built  upon  and  rests  now  on  the  cult  of  emperor  divinity :  and 
no  ministry  in  Japan  ever  pursued  a  more  frankly  imperial- 
istic policy  than  this  Okuma  administration  did.  When 
Okuma 's  government  (as  every  Japanese  ministry  does  in- 
variably) became  so  entangled  and  involved  in  its  political 
crossings  and  turnings  that  it  was  necessary  to  shift  the  scen- 
ery, a  ministry  with  Count  Terauchi  as  premier  came  into 
office.  The  Terauchi  ministry  lasted  until  the  autumn  of 
1918,  when  the  Allied  war  aims  as  expressed  by  President 
Wilson  had  been  formulated  on  a  platform  of  relegating  autoc- 
racy and  imperialistic  aggressions  of  nations,  and  the  defeat 
of  Germany  was  portended  almost  with  certainty;  and  Jap- 
anese statesmen  thought  it  well  to  begin  to  adapt  the  Japanese 
Government  to  this  change  in  world  conditions.  If  the  world 
was  to  be  made  safe  for  democracy,  then  Japan  would  be 
democratic.  This  means  that  having  swung  from  a  "liberal" 
to  a  militarist  ministry  when  it  looked  as  if  militarism  would 
become  established  by  the  war,  the  Government  now  would 
ape  democracy  by  swinging  even  farther  back  toward  liber- 
alism. So  the  Hara  ministry  took  office  with  a  flourish  of 
democratic  trumpets.  It  took  office,  it  is  interesting  to  ob- 
serve, almost  exactly  at  the  time  when  Germany,  in  prepara- 
tion for  making  peace,  also  changed  coats,  and  placed  the  Gov- 
ernment in  the  hands  of  a  so-called  "liberal"  ministry. 
Japan  also  was  getting  ready  for  the  peace,  and,  as  usual,  took 
her  cue  from  Germany. 

With  peace  actually  in  sight,  almost  every  editor  and  publi- 
cist in  Japan  turned  to  writing  Japan's  peace  terms.  There 
was  remarkable  similarity  among  them.  The  terms  outlined 
by  Marquis  Okuma,  in  the  "Kokumin"  of  October  22,  1918, 
are  representative.     They  follow: 

(1)  Japan  should  approve  all  decisions  to  be  reached  by  Great 
Britain,  France  and  the  United  States  so  far  as  the  territorial  altera- 
tions in  the  Western  front.  Central  Europe,  Balkans  and  in  the  Afri- 


76     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

can  colonies  are  concerned,  as  she  has  no  direct  interest  in  the  affairs 
of  these  territories. 

(2)  Japan's  attitude  towards  the  problems  relating  to  the  future 
of  Germany  and  Russia  should  be  decided  in  accordance  with  the 
conclusion  reached  by  the  Allied  conference,  but  Japan  should  declare 
first  that  the  fundamental  principle  applicable  in  settling  the  prob- 
lem should  be  founded  on  the  universal  desire  to  obtain  the  perma- 
nent peace  of  the  world. 

(3)  The  problems  relating  to  war  indemnity  should  be  settled  by 
the  Allied  conference. 

(4)  The  future  of  the  Samoan  Islands,  which  has  caused  various 
diplomatic  controversies  between  Great  Britain,  the  United  States 
and  Germany,  should  be  decided  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  the 
former  two  Powers,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  German  bases  in 
the  Pacific. 

(5)  The  German  New  Guinea,  which  is  now  occupied  by  the  Brit- 
ish should  not  be  returned  to  Germany.  Australia  would  not  consent 
to  the  retrocession,  even  though  the  home  government  of  Great 
Britain  might  accept  it.  The  principle  should  also  be  applicable  to 
the  Bismarck  Islands. 

(6)  Japan  should  hold  those  islands  like  Marshall,  Caroline,  and 
others,  which  are  now  occupied  by  the  Japanese  navy,  as  it  is  dan- 
gerous to  return  them  to  Germany,  and  as  there  is  no  reason  to  let 
the  other  Powers  occupy  them. 

(7)  The  cable  line  between  Tsingtao  and  the  southern  islands, 
which  is  now  occupied  by  the  Japanese  navy,  should  be  held  by 
Japan.  The  cable  line  is  a  property  owned  by  a  private  concern,  so 
that  Germany  should  buy  it  up  before  conceding  it  to  Japan. 

(8)  Japan  should  return  Tsingtao  to  China,  as  she  has  declared; 
but  she  should  have  the  right  to  hold  the  exclusive  settlement  there 
and  various  organs  and  buildings  attached  to  the  settlement.  The 
Tsinan  Railway,  which  is  a  property  of  a  private  concern,  should  be 
bought  up  by  the  German  Government  and  then  should  be  conceded 
to  Japan. 

(9)  The  problems  relating  to  the  maintenance  of  order  in  Siberia 
should  be  settled  by  the  Allied  conference,  but  all  the  Allied  Powers 
should  refrain  from  any  action  or  demand  for  acquiring  concessions 
in  Siberia. 

(10)  The  relations  between  China  and  other  Powers  should  be 
based  upon  the  principle  of  open-door  and  equal  opportunity. 

For  a  wonder,  the  conditions  given  by  Marquis  Okuina  I 
believe  actually  did  represent  about  what  Japan  really  wanted, 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         77 

as  far  as  they  went.  She  wanted  to  keep  the  Marshall  and 
Caroline  Islands,  and  had  made  a  secret  agreement  with  Great 
Britain,  the  only  Allied  power  that  has  an  interest  in  the 
matter,  to  that  effect.  Japan's  main  desire  is  to  retain  her 
hold  in  Shantung  province  and  at  Tsingtau.  To  do  that,  she 
had  marked  out,  and  acquired  by  forcing  the  Chinese  inhabit- 
ants to  sell  their  lands,  a  large  area  at  Tsingtau  for  a  Japa- 
nese "  concession, "'  and  similar  areas  at  Tsinan  and  other 
places  in  Shantung.  With  those  concessions,  and  the  special 
rights  wrung  from  China  by  the  agreement  of  1915  and  its 
supplements,  and  with  possession  of  the  Tsingtau-Tsinan  rail- 
way, Japan  would  be  content  for  a  time.  In  Siberia  Japan 
is  indeed  anxious  that  the  Allied  powers  "should  refrain  from 
any  action  or  demand  for  acquiring  concessions  in  Siberia," 
for  that  would  give  other  powers  a  foothold  there,  which 
Japan  does  not  want  them  to  obtain. 

It  is  of  slight  consequence  whether  Japan  obtains  the 
Marshal]  and  Caroline  islands  by  annexation  or  by  becoming 
a  mandatory  of  a  league  of  nations.  Objection  to  Japan  own- 
ing the  islands  made  by  other  nations,  is  solely  strategical, 
because  of  their  possible  use  for  naval  bases  and  wireless  sta- 
tions ;  but  if  a  league  of  nations  becomes  a  reality,  and  arma- 
ments are  kept  within  reasonable  and  proportionate  bounds, 
such  strategical  points  have  little  value. 

While  Marquis  Okuma's  list  covers  what  Japan  wanted  of 
the  peace  conference  in  terms  of  territory  and  vested  interests, 
it  by  no  means  includes  all  of  what  Japan  wants  to  secure. 
I  shall  summarize  what  I  believe  to  be  what  Japan  really 
wants  in  world  politics  at  this  stage  of  the  game : 

1.  Confirmation  by  the  powers  of  agreements  made  by  them 
with  Japan  during  the  war. 

2.  Recognition  by  the  powers  of  agreements  which  Japan 
has  obtained  from  China  during  the  war. 

3.  Recognition  by  the  powers  of  Japan's  paramountcy  in 
the  settlement  of  far  Eastern  questions. 

That  is  what  Japan  wants,  and  there  will  be  tremendous 


78     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

disappointment  in  Japan  if  those  objects  are  not  secured. 
Japan's  attitude  toward  every  question  in  the  settlement  of 
war  issues  will  be  determined  solely  by  their  relation  to  those 
propositions.  The  first  five  articles  of  Marquis  Okuma's  list 
refer  to  questions  in  which  Japan  has  no  interest  except  as 
they  affect  the  world  balance  of  power,  and  Japan  will  adapt 
her  policy  to  whatever  balance  of  power  emerges  from  the 
war.  Discussing  the  first  three  months  of  the  peace  confer- 
ence in  the  New  York  "Evening  Post,"  of  March  8,  David 
Lawrence  wrote: 

The  Japanese  delegates  are  the  mystery  of  the  conference.  They 
say  least  and  interfere  less  in  what  is  going  on.  Silently  they  listen 
to  what  is  said  and  rarely  make  comment.  The  Japanese  delegation 
always  appeared  to  be  on  cordial  terms  with  all  the  other  delegations. 
They  seemed  merely  interested  onlookers,  but  promise  subsequently 
to  take  a  vital  part  in  the  conference. 

Japan  was  merely  an  interested  onlooker  at  the  conference 
until  matters  that  touch  her  interests  would  come  up.  Except 
for  the  flurry  about  China  revealing  some  matters  connected 
with  Japan's  attitude  in  China  (that  incident  is  discussed 
later  in  this  volume),  the  Japanese  delegation  observed  a  de- 
tached attitude  in  the  early  months  of  the  Paris  conference. 
Japan  went  to  the  conference,  as  she  entered  the  war.  in  a 
spirit  of  opportunism.  She  was  prepared  for  all  ordinary 
eventualities.  If  the  conference  was  handled  in  the  usual  way 
and  controlled  by  the  usual  motives,  which  Japan  rather  ex- 
pected, and  hoped,  the  Japanese  Government  felt  able 
to  hold  its  own.  Japan  knew  that  other  nations  in  the 
allies'  group  had  pursued  an  oblique  course  during  the  war, 
and  would  go  to  the  conference  to  urge  claims  and  secret 
agreements  no  whit  better,  and  in  cases  worse  than  those  Japan 
wanted  to  get  recognized.  The  Japanese  Government  knew 
also  that  the  nations  whose  objects  and  motives  were  identical 
in  principle  with  those  of  Japan  would  be  in  a  large  majority 
at  the  conference.  Here  was  good  ground  for  diplomatic 
trading,  and  Japan  went  with  a  number  of  "trading  horses" 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         79 

in  her  diplomatic  bag.  She  also  was  fairly  well  supplied  with 
issues  that  can  be  used  as  ' '  smoke-screens, ' '  and  as  offsets  with 
powers,  like  the  United  States,  that  cannot  be  induced  by 
the  old-fashioned  trading  process.  Among  these  "smoke- 
screens" is  the  so-called  "race-equality"  issue,  with  its  corol- 
lary of  Japanese  immigration  to  the  United  States,  Canada, 
and  Australia.  Japan,  of  course,  did  not  want  a  league  of 
nations;  but  she  is  quite  prepared,  if  a  league  is  organized, 
to  join  it,  and  to  claim  her  right  to  be  its  mandatory  in  the  far 
East. 

The  great  fact  that  confronts  Japan  as  a  result  of  the  war 
is  that  her  former  method  of  reckoning  international  values 
must  be  changed  completely.  The  list  of  international  ratings 
has  to  be  revised  radically.  The  powers  now  are,  apparently, 
America,  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan.  In 
this  list,  it  is  evident  that  some  of  the  nations  are  rated  as 
powers  only  by  courtesy,  when  they  really  have  dropped  to  the 
position  of  second-class  nations.  Japan  herself  has  dropped 
back,  in  fact,  into  the  second  class;  for  she  has  not  the  re- 
sources to  encounter  successfully  a  real  power.  For  instance, 
before  the  Great  War  Japanese  experts  rated  America  as  a  na- 
tion in  the  second  class,  and  felt  certain  of  Japan's  ability  to 
worst  America  in  any  war  about  issues  outside  the  North 
American  continent.  Japan  has  no  such  illusions  now.  Jap- 
anese experts  know  that  Japan  has  slight  chance  in  a  war 
between  those  nations  alone  to  defeat  America  on  any  issue. 
Japanese  statesmen  feel  also  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 
is  not  likely  to  be  renewed  by  Great  Britain,  and  that  an  en- 
tente of  America  and  Great  Britain  is  almost  sure  to  follow 
the  war.  The  collapse  of  Russia  and  the  temporary  eclipse  of 
Germany  leaves  Japan  with  no  place  to  go  in  case  she  takes 
issue  with  America  or  Great  Britain.  The  Japanese  delega- 
tion, furthermore,  carried  to  the  peace  conference  a  feeling  of 
uneasiness  about  the  probable  exposure  of  her  real  role  during 
the  war  and  the  sentiments  of  some  of  her  allies  about  that; 
in  short,  Japan  dreaded  a  moral  isolation, 


80     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Certain  moral  embarrassments  of  Japan's  position  were 
very  well  put  by  the  well-known  English  author  and  authority 
on  China,  Lenox  Simpson  (" Putnam- Weale"),  in  November, 
1918: 

In  these  circumstances  nothing  is  more  amazing  than  the  sugges- 
tion Japan  is  reported  in  the  press  to  have  made  that  her  advisers 
advise  China  regarding  China's  peace  programme.  If  there  is  one 
power  left  in  the  world  that  resembles  Germany  in  her  methods  of 
conducting  national  business,  and  in  the  constitutional  predominance 
of  the  military  caste,  that  power  is  Japan.  In  her  view  countries 
are  still  the  estates  of  princes  and  the  peoples  are  merely  their  sub- 
jects. In  all  the  literature  that  has  poured  out  of  Japan  during  the 
war  there  is  no  indication  that  the  aim  and  purpose  of  democracy  is 
in  the  least  bit  understood;  for  although  a  "popular"  Cabinet  has 
just  been  installed  in  office,  the  constitution  has  not  been  changed, 
nor  have  Ministers  been  made  by  the  machinery  of  law  responsible 
to  Parliament.  Precisely  the  same  language  can  be  applied  to  Mr. 
Hara  and  his  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet  as  President  Wilson  lias  just 
addressed  to  the  government  presided  over  bjr  the  Prince  Max  of 
Baden — namely,  that  it  is  evident  that  the  people  have  no  means  of 
commanding  the  acquiescence  of  the  military  authorities  of  the  em- 
pire in  the  popular  will,  that  the  power  of  the  emperor  to  control 
the  policy  of  the  empire  is  unimpaired;  and  that  the  determining 
initiative  still  remains  with  those  who  have  hitherto  been  the  masters. 

Consequently,  bearing  in  mind  what  has  gone  on  openly  in  the  far 
East  under  cover  of  the  war,  and  remembering  the  many  subversive 
measures  attempted  against  China  under  the  heading  of  desiderata, 
it  is  ivithm  the  range  of  possibility  that  unless  constitutional  adjust- 
ments making  for  the  supremacy  of  the  civil  power  speedily  come  in 
Japan,  she  may  encounter  the  humiliating  experience  of  having  the 
German  plenipotentiaries  inquiring  of  her  at  the  Peace  Congress 
whether  they  are  dealing  with  the  authorized  representatives  of  a 
Parliamentary  government  or  the  agents  of  an  autocratic  regime; 
and  if  the  latter,  that  any  discussion  be  postponed  until  the  popular 
standard  which  has  been  forced  on  Germany  be  likewise  forced  on 
Japan. 

The  sudden  ending  of  the  war  thunder-struck  the  Japanese 
Government  and  people.  So  ill  prepared  was  the  public  in 
Japan  for  it  that,  when  the  terms  of  the  armistice  were  re- 
ceived, the  Government  would  not  permit  the  full  publication 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         81 

of  them  for  several  days,  so  the  people  could  be  prepared  to 
receive  the  news. 

Before  leaving  the  topic  of  Japan's  policy  in  the  war,  it  may 
be  well  to  introduce  some  evidence  of  Japan's  position  and 
obligations  regarding  the  Tsingtau  question.  The  real  atti- 
tude of  the  Japanese  Government,  I  am  convinced,  is  reflected 
accurately  by  the  views  of  the  Japanese  member  of  the  Diet 
previously  given  in  this  chapter ;  but  that  of  course  is  not  the 
published  official  attitude.  On  the  day  Japan's  ultimatum  to 
Germany  was  sent,  Marquis  Okuma,  then  Premier  of  Japan, 
gave  the  following  statement,  which  was  communicated  to  the 
press  in  America  by  the  Japanese  official  propaganda  in  New 
York,  the  "East  and  "West  Bureau":  "Japan's  proximity  to 
China  breeds  many  absurd  rumors;  but  T  declare  that  Japan 
acts  with  a  clear  conscience,  in  conformity  with  justice,  and 
in  perfect  accord  with  her  ally  [Great  Britain].  Japan  has 
no  territorial  ambition,  and  hopes  to  stand  as  the  protector 
of  peace  in  the  Orient."  A  few  days  later,  at  Tokio,  Marquis 
Okuma.  in  a  public  address,  said:  "Japan's  warlike  opera- 
tions will  not  extend  beyond  the  limits  necessary  for  the  at- 
tainment of  the  object  of  the  defense  of  her  own  legitimate 
interests.  The  Imperial  Government  will  take  no  such  action 
as  could  give  to  a  third  party  any  cause  for  anxiety  or  un- 
easiness regarding  the  safety  of  their  territorities  or  posses- 
sions." And  on  August  24,  1914,  Marquis  Okuma  tele- 
graphed a  message  to  the  American  people  through  "The  In- 
dependent" (New  York),  as  follows: 

I  gladly  seize  the  opportunity  to  send,  through  the  medium  of  the 
"Independent,"  a  message  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  who 
have  always  been  helpful  and  loyal  friends  of  Japan.  It  is  my 
desire  to  convince  your  people  of  the  sincerity  of  my  Government 
and  of  my  people  in  all  their  utterances  and  assurances  connected 
with  the  present  regrettable  situation  in  Europe  and  the  far  East. 
Every  sense  of  loyalty  and  honor  obliaes  Japan  to  cooperate  with 
Great  Britain  to  clear  from  these  waters  the  enemies  who  in  the  past, 
the  present  and  the  future  menace  her  interests,  her  trade,  her  ship- 
ping, and  her  people's  lives.     The  far  Eastern  situation  is  not  of  our 


82     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

seeking.  It  was  ever  my  desire  to  maintain  peace,  as  will  be  amply 
proved;  as  President  of  the  Peace  Society  of  Japan  I  have  con- 
sistently so  endeavored.  I  have  read  with  admiration  the  lofty 
message  of  President  Wilson  to  his  people  on  the  subject  of  neu- 
trality. We,  of  Japan,  are  appreciative  of  the  spirit  and  motives 
that  prompted  the  head  of  your  great  nation,  and  we  feel  confident 
that  his  message  will  meet  with  a  national  response. 

As  Premier  of  Japan,  I  have  stated  and  I  now  again  state  to  the 
people  of  America  and  of  the  world  that  Japan  has  no  ulterior 
motive,  no  desire  to  secure  more  territory,  no  thought  of  depriving 
China  or  other  peoples  of  anything  which  they  now  possess.  My 
Government  and  my  people  have  given  their  word  and  their  pledge, 
which  will  be  as  honorably  kept  as  Japan  always  keeps  promises. 
(My  italics.) 

Early  in  December,  1914,  Baron  Kato  took  the  occasion  of 
an  interpellation  in  the  Diet,  to  shift  Japan's  position  in 
respect  to  Kiaochou.  The  proposition  is  included  in  the  fol- 
lowing questions  and  answers,  published  in  the  Japan  press : 

Questions 

(a)  Whether  Kiaochou  will  be  returned  to  China? 

(b)  Whether  the  Imperial  Government  of  Japan  were  pledged  to 
China,  or  to  any  other  Power,  in  the  matter  of  the  final  disposition 
of  Kiaochou? 

(c)  Whether  the  clause  in  the  ultimatum  referring  to  the  final 
restitution  of  Kiaochou  to  China  did  not  bind  the  action  of  Japan? 

Baron  Kato's  Replies 

(a)  The  question  regarding  the  future  of  Kiaochou  was,  at  pres- 
ent, unanswerable. 

(b)  Japan  had  never  committed  herself  to  any  foreign  Power  on 
this  point. 

(c)  The  purpose  of  the  ultimatum  to  Germany  was  to  take  Kiao- 
chou from  Germany  and  so  to  restore  peace  in  the  Orient.  Restitu- 
tion after  a  campaign  was  not  thought  of  and  was  not  referred  to  in 
the  ultimatum. 

In  the  years  1915  and  1916  the  utterances  of  Japanese  states- 
men and  the  Japanese  press  distinctly  adopted  a  tone  repudi- 
ating the  original  promises  to  return  Kiaochou  to  China,  and 
began  to  invent  diplomatic  euphemisms  for  that  repudiation. 


JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  THE  GREAT  WAR         83 

The  real  reason,  of  course,  was  that  the  war  situation  indi- 
cated that  Japan  safely  could  repudiate  those  promises  and 
could  act  as  she  liked  in  China.  However,  after  America 
entered  the  war,  Japanese  comment  on  the  Kiaochou  question 
played  it  about  "fifty-fifty,"  so  that  either  attitude  could  be 
adopted,  as  expediency  dictated.  When  China  had  become 
one  of  the  Allies'  group,  and  the  defeat  of  the  Central  alliance 
was  established,  the  original  attitude  was  resumed.  After 
reaching  Paris  as  head  of  the  first  Japanese  delegation  to  the 
conference,  Baron  Makino  gave  an  official  statement  as  fol- 
lows: 

Japan  is  now  pledged  to  return  to  China  this  harbor  and  port 
built  with  German  money,  together  with  the  territory  of  Kiaochou, 
which  China  will  receive  eighty  years  sooner  than  she  could  possibly 
have  secured  it.  The  treaty  of  1915,  under  which  this  restoration  is 
to  be  made,  contains  no  secret  clauses,  and  an  agreement  entered  into 
in  September,  1918,  regarding  future  Chino-Japanese  cooperation  in 
Shantung  contains  no  stipulation  which  is  more  or  less  than  a  just 
and  mutually  helpful  settlement  of  outstanding  questions. 

There  the  issue  rests  at  this  writing.  Its  eventual  disposi- 
tion probably  will  extend  to  the  war's  aftermath. 


CHAPTER  IV 

CHINA   AND   THE   WAR 

Sentiments  of  Chinese  about  the  war — Apprehension  of  Japan — Ef- 
forts to  preserve  China's  neutrality  and  territorial  integrity — The  first 
proposal — Outline  of  the  situation — China's  rights  and  wishes  disre- 
garded— Japan's  ultimatum  to  Germany — China's  sovereignty  ignored — 
Great  Britain's  attitude — Position  of  the  United  States — Japan's  over- 
running of  Shantung — The  next  move — Japan's  twenty-one  demands — 
Her  oblique  course — The  "Agreement"  forced  upon  China — China's  pro- 
test— Statement  by  the  United  States — Dilemma  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment— China's  first  offer  to  join  the  Allies — Its  discouraging  reception 
— China's  second  offer  to  join  the  Allies — Conditions  of  this  offer — Plan 
blocked  by  Japan — Irritation  of  Japanese  press — Japan's  attitude  de- 
fined, 

WHEN  the  Great  War  began,  China  had  not  become 
stabilized  from  the  Revolution  of  1911  and  the  at- 
tempt at  counter-revolution  in  1913 ;  but  the  Gov- 
ernment under  the  Presidency  of  Yuan  Shih  K'ai  gradually 
was  establishing  its  authority  over  the  country,  with  a  fair 
prospect  of  working  out  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  internal 
situation.1  President  Yuan  estimated  events  with  consider- 
able prevision,  and  at  once  took  measures  to  prevent  China 
from  being  vicariously  involved.  He,  in  common  with  other 
close  observers  of  far-Eastern  polities,  felt  that  China's  cause 
for  uneasiness  sprung  not  from  acts  of  any  of  the  belligerents 
in  Europe,  but  centered  in  the  course  of  Japan. 

"With  few  exceptions,  the  Chinese  felt  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  only  surprise  at  its  sudden  outbreak,  and  almost  a 
complete  confusion  regarding  its  causes  and  issues.     If  Amer- 

i  The  events  embraced  in  the  situation  of  China  at  that  time  and  in 
the  years  from  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War  to  1916,  are  extensively 
narrated  and  criticized  in  a  previous  book  of  the  author's,  "Our  Eastern 
Question,"  published  in  1916. 

84 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  85 

icans  candidly  will  recall  their  own  general  state  of  mind 
about  the  war  when  it  began,  they,  perhaps,  will  comprehend 
the  intellectual  reactions  of  Chinese  to  that  stupendous  event. 
As  between  the  two  groups  of  belligerents,  the  Chinese  had 
no  decided  predilections  or  sympathies,  and  only  vague  no- 
tions about  the  rights  and  wrongs  of  the  matter.  The  Chinese 
even  did  not  have,  as  in  the  case  of  most  Americans,  ties  of 
religious,  political,  and  ethnological  origin  with  the  nations  at 
war  to  stimulate  interest  and  to  aline  sympathy  China  had 
endured  humiliations  and  what  the  Chinese  regard  as  wrongs 
and  injustice  at  the  hands  of  most  of  the  nations  at  first  in- 
cluded in  the  war.  As  between  them,  if  there  was  any  tip- 
ping of  the  scale,  it  is  probable  that  the  Chinese  felt  less  re- 
sentment against  Germany  than,  for  instance,  against  Russia 
or  Great  Britain ;  and  certainly  even  at  that  time  the  Chinese 
were  much  more  apprehensive  of  Japan  than  of  any  nation 
in  Europe. 

Indeed,  without  doubt  it  was  apprehension  of  Japan  that 
dominated  the  actions  of  the  Chinese  Government  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  war,  and  the  same  fundamental  reason  has  mo- 
tivated China's  policy  throughout  the  war.  All  students  of 
Eastern  politics  felt  at  once  that  Japan  would  regard  the  situ- 
ation in  the  light  of  opportunism.  It  was  natural,  as  in  the 
case  of  America  and  other  nations,  that  the  first  thought  of 
China  was  to  assume  and  to  sustain  a  position  of  absolute 
neutrality.  The  measures  taken  by  the  Chinese  Government 
to  protect  the  interests  of  China  and  to  secure  her  neutrality 
can  be  summarized  as  follows : 

1.  A  proposal  to  neutralize  under  China's  control  all  Chi- 
nese territories  leased  to  foreign  belligerent  nations  or  nations 
which  might  thereafter  become  belligerents. 

2.  A  proposal  to  limit  any  warlike  acts  by  any  belligerents 
in  Chinese  territory  to  specified  areas. 

3.  A  proposal  that  China  would  join  the  Allies. 

These  three  measures  were  not,  of  course,  made  simulta- 
neously.    The  second  followed  the  failure  of  the  first;  the 


86     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

third  was  a  consequence  of  the  rejection  of  the  others  and  the 
policy  of  Japan. 

The  first  proposal  was  made  in  the  spirit  of  absolute  neu- 
trality. In  order  to  make  its  application  general,  and  to 
avoid  the  appearance  of  being  directed  against,  or  in  favor  of, 
any  power  or  belligerent  side,  this  plan  would  have  included 
the  leased  territories  of  Kiaochou  (German),  the  leased  terri- 
tories at  Kowloon  and  Weihaiwei  (British),  the  leased  ter- 
ritory of  Kwangtung,  including  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny 
(Japanese),  and  regions  policed  by  Russia  aud  Japan  under 
the  Manchurian  railway  agreements.  Had  China  been  a 
strong  nation,  dealing  with  other  nations  on  a  genuine  basis 
of  equality  and  self-determination,  there  would  have  been  no 
question  as  to  her  course:  she  simply  would  have  announced 
her  intentions  to  the  world,  and  have  taken  over  control  of  the 
territories  as  a  measure  of  self-protection,  and  few  would 
have  questioned  the  propriety  of  the  action  or  her  right  so  to 
act.  But  if  China  had  been  a  self-determining  nation,  she 
never  would  have  granted  these  leaseholds,  which  were  ob- 
tained and  held  by  those  powers  for  their  own  strategical 
reasons. 

At  the  time  the  proposal  to  neutralize  the  foreign  strate- 
gical leaseholds  in  China  was  advanced,  Japan  was  a  neutral ; 
and  the  friendly  offices  of  Japan  and  the  United  States,  as 
the  two  principal  neutral  powers,  were  solicited  by  the  Chi- 
nese Government  in  inducing  the  belligerent  nations  to  con- 
sent. And  curiously,  but  not  surprisingly  to  those  conversant 
with  conditions,  it  was  neutral  Japan,  not  one  of  the  belli- 
gerents, that  blocked  the  proposal.  Germany  probably  would 
have  consented,  for  by  so  doing  she  stood  to  lose  no  definite 
advantage,  since  it  was  inevitable  in  any  case  that  Tsingtau 
would  soon  be  made  useless  as  a  base  for  German  naval  opera- 
tions by  joint  or  separate  action  of  the  British,  French,  and 
Russian  navies;  indeed,  the  German  legation  at  Peking  was 
receptive  to  the  proposal,  foreseeing  that  refusal  would  tend 
to  draw  Japan  into  the  war.     Great  Britain  was  also  receptive, 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  87 

since  she  would  sustain  no  appreciable  loss  strategically  by 
neutralizing  Weihaiwei,  and  the  elimination  of  Germany's 
far-Eastern  base  would  be  accomplished  without  disadvan- 
tageous^ involving  China.  Such  a  course  also  would  coin- 
cide with  general  British  interests  vis-a-vis  China.  The 
friendly  offices  of  the  United  States  were  enlisted,  or  an  at- 
tempt was  made  to  enlist  them ;  and  it  appears  that  the  United 
States  took  some  tentative  steps  toward  bringing  the  powers 
into  compliance.  However,  the  opposition  of  Japan  and  the 
confused  and  flustered  state  of  international  affairs  delayed  ac- 
tion until  Japan  precluded  further  moves  by  sending  an  ulti- 
matum to  Germany  on  August  15,  1914 : 

We  consider  it  highly  important  and  necessary  in  the  present  sit- 
uation to  take  measures  to  remove  the  causes  of  all  disturbances  of 
the  peace  in  the  Far  East,  and  to  safeguard  the  general  interests 
as  contemplated  by  the  agreement  of  alliance  between  Japan  and 
Great  Britain. 

In  order  to  secure  a  firm  and  enduring  peace  in  Eastern  Asia, 
the  establishment  of  which  is  the  aim  of  the  said  agreement,  the 
Imperial  Japanese  Government  sincerely  believes  it  to  be  its  duty 
to  give  the  advice  to  the  Imperial  German  Government  to  carry  out 
the  following  two  propositions: 

First.  To  withdraw  immediately  from  Japanese  and  Chinese 
waters  German  men-of-war  and  armed  vessels  of  all  kinds,  and  to 
disarm  at  once  those  which  cannot  be  so  withdrawn. 

Second.  To  deliver  on  a  date  not  later  than  September  15  to 
the  Imperial  Japanese  authorities,  without  condition  or  compensa- 
tion, the  entire  leased  territory  of  Kiaochou,  with  a  view  to  the 
eventual  restoration  of  the  same  to  China. 

The  Imperial  Japanese  Government  announces  at  the  same  time 
that  in  the  event  of  not  receiving  by  noon  on  August  23,  1914,  an 
answer  from  the  Imperial  German  Government  signifying  its  un- 
conditional acceptance  of  the  above  advice  offered  by  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Government,  Japan  will  be  compelled  to  take  such  action 
as  she  may  deem  necessary  to  meet  the  situation. 

The  attitudes  of  the  various  interested  powers,  as  developed 
by  this  incident  of  the  effort  to  protect  China's  neutrality, 
were  significant.  Russia  was  indifferent  at  first,  but  when 
Japan's  opposition  developed,  she  was  precluded  by  open  and 


88     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

secret  agreements  with  Japan  from  assenting,  or  at  least  from 
signifying  approval.  Great  Britain  (or  British  interests  and 
the  British  press  in  China)  seemed  favorably  disposed  to  the 
proposal  until  Japan's  position  developed.  Great  Britain, 
entering  upon  a  long  and  precarious  war,  probably  felt  that 
it  was  inexpedient  to  create  friction  with  Japan  at  the  outset. 
France,  her  whole  attention  concentrated  on  the  German  in- 
vasion, was  too  distracted  to  give  attention  to  the  matter  or 
to  estimate  how  it  would  affect  the  course  of  the  war,  or 
French  interests  in  the  far  East.  It  is  probable  that  France 
merely  followed  Great  Britain  and  Russia.  The  time  was  too 
short  for  the  United  States  and  other  neutral  nations  to  or- 
ganize any  effective  action  to  stay  Japan's  hand  and  to  pro- 
tect China.  Events  were  marching  with  seven-league  boots, 
and  the  disinterested  statesmanship  of  the  world  in  most  cases 
was  unable  to  anticipate  or  direct  them. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  terms  of  Japan's  ulti- 
matum to  Germany  concerning  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao- 
chou  state  as  its  objects  almost  exactly  what  it  was  proposed 
to  accomplish  by  China's  plan  for  neutralization.  The  dif- 
ferences were  that  by  China's  proposal  she  would  have 
taken  control  over  the  territory,  which  belonged  to  her  na- 
tional domain,  and  furthermore,  that  acts  of  all  the  belliger- 
ents within  China's  territories  would  also  have  been  neutral- 
ized. That  did  not  suit  Japan,  because  she  purposed  making 
use  of  the  opportunity  to  install  herself  in  Germany's  posi- 
tion in  China  and  also  to  extend  that  position.  Aside  from 
that  ultimate  motive,  Japan  by  her  action  arrogated  to  herself 
prerogatives  which  belonged  exclusively  to  China.  By  what 
right  of  international  law  or  custom,  for  instance,  did  Japan 
order  Germany  (for  her  ultimatum  amounted  to  an  order, 
although  called  "advice")  to  withdraw  all  her  war-ships  and 
armed  vessels  "from  Chinese  waters"?  Yet  the  ultimatum 
did  that  in  plain  words.  At  the  very  moment  when  Japan's 
ultimatum  was  delivered,  the  Chinese  Government  was  con- 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  89 

ducting  diplomatic  conversations  with  all  the  belligerent  and 
two  neutral  powers  (Japan  and  the  United  States)  to  remove 
from  or  intern  German  war-ships  in  her  waters,  and  allied 
war-ships  as  well.  All  allied  and  central  alliance  war-ships 
were  in  due  course  interned  in  Chinese  waters  that  China  con- 
trolled. It  was  remarked  at  the  time  that  Japan  had  taken 
the  opportunity  early  in  the  war  to  assert  a  kind  of  protec- 
torate or  suzerainty  over  China;  a  presumption  that  alarmed 
China  even  more  than  it  offended  her  by  covert  diplomatic 
insult. 

Regarding  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain  then  I  wrote  in 
"Our  Eastern  Question": 

There  are  two  theories  for  Great  Britain's  course  at  the  time. 
One  is  that  Great  Britain  initiated  Japan's  action  by  requesting 
her  aid  under  the  alliance.  The  other  theory  is  that  Japan  herself 
took  the  initiative,  contrary  to  the  real  desire  of  her  ally,  and  by 
force  of  circumstances  compelled  Great  Britain  to  acquiesce  with, 
and  officially  to  sanction,  this  diplomatic  fiction.  I  believe  in  the 
latter  theorem.  It  coincides  with  the  logic  of  facts  and  conditions, 
with  British  interests  in  China,  and  with  an  honorable  regard  for 
Great  Britain's  obligations  toward  China  and  other  nations  com- 
mitted to  the  'open  door'  and  'integrity  of  China'  policies;  and 
there  is  plenty  of  evidence  to  support  it. 

Nothing  that  I  know  of  has  happened  since  I  expressed 
that  opinion  to  make  me  change  it;  but,  rather,  the  whole 
course  of  events  in  the  East  and  the  trend  of  different  na- 
tional policies  there  as  they  have  been  influenced  by  the  war 
have  tended  to  confirm  it.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that 
when  Japan  had  definitely  taken  her  stand,  and  undertaken  a 
course  of  action  which  would  put  her  at  war  with  Germany 
on  the  Tsingtau  issue,  the  British  Government  accepted  it  as 
a  fait  accompli,  and  since  then  has  shaped  its  utterances  and 
policy  accordingly,  however  dubious  it  must  at  times  have 
felt  about  the  outcome,  and  dissatisfied  as  it  undoubtedly  has 
been  with  many  of  Japan's  subsequent  acts. 

When  the  Chinese  Government  had  failed  in  its  effort  to 


90     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

eliminate  the  foreign  leaseholds  in  China  as  military  areas 
and  contention-points  between  the  belligerents,  its  next  move 
was  to  try  to  limit  the  scope  of  military  operations  against 
Tsingtau  to  the  territory  at  Kiaochou  leased  to  Germany. 
This  seemed  a  most  reasonable  and  just  condition,  but  it  was 
rejected  by  Japan  for  reasons  which  were  soon  to  appear. 
On  the  declaration  by  Japan  of  war  against  Germany,  Great 
Britain  announced  that  she  would  join  with  her  ally  in  the 
operations  to  take  Tsingtau.  It  is  a  good  illustration  of  the 
real  sentiments  and  motives  of  the  Allies  with  regard  to  this 
matter  that  this  technically  proper  and  correct  action  by 
Great  Britain  should  have  been  resented  by  Japan,  and  criti- 
cized with  asperity  by  the  Japanese  press,  which  accused 
Great  Britain  of  participating  only  for  the  purpose  of  cir- 
cumscribing Japan  in  her  policy  in  China,  and  to  give  Great 
Britain  a  technical  voice  in  the  disposal  of  the  Kiaochou 
leasehold  after  the  war.  There  is  no  reasonable  doubt  that 
these  were  the  objects  of  the  British  Government  in  partici- 
pating in  the  Tsingtau  expedition,  for  the  few  hundreds  of 
British  troops  were  not  needed,  and  their  part  was  perfunc- 
tory, because  the  senior  Japanese  commanding  officer  pur- 
posely arranged  it  that  way.  British  troops  were  careful  to 
respect  Chinese  susceptibilities,  for  they  did  not  go  outside  the 
territory  included  in  the  German  leasehold.  On  the  con- 
trary, Japan  found  excuses  to  spread  her  troops  over  a  con- 
siderable part  of  Shantung  province  outside  the  German 
leased  territory,  and  to  seize  the  railway  bet\w...i  Tsingtau 
and  Tsinan,  the  capital  of  Shantung,  over  its  entire  length. 
So  easily  had  Japan  established  herself  in  Shantung  prov- 
ince, and  so  correctly  did  she  gage  the  extent  of  preoccupation 
of  her  allies  in  Europe  and  the  indifference  or  reluctance  to 
act  of  the  stronger  neutral  nations,  that  by  the  beginning  of 
1915  she  was  ready  to  move  further  to  extend  her  control  of 
China.  On  January  18  the  Japanese  minister  at  Peking,  Mr. 
Hioki,  presented  a  series  of  demands  set  out  in  five  groups  and 
twenty-one  articles.     Since  this  infamous  act  has  been  widely 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  91 

discussed,1  and  the  original  twenty-one  articles,  the  false 
eleven  articles,  and  the  so-called  agreement  which  China  at 
the  end  of  negotiations  was  forced  literally  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet  to  sign,  all  are  given  as  appendices  to  this  volume,  I 
include  only  a  summary  here.  For  this  nothing  perhaps  will 
serve  better  than  the  following  outline  of  Japan's  action 
taken  from  "Our  Eastern  Question,"  pages  147-148: 

(a)  Presentation  of  demands  in  twenty-one  articles,  coupled  with 
a  strong  admonition  to  China  that  both  haste  and  secrecy  were  in- 
sisted on  by  Japan;  (b)  Continuous  pressure  on  China  to  force 
her  to  concede  the  demands  en  bloc,  without  discussion;  (c)  Re- 
peated warnings  to  China  not  to  inform  other  powers  of  the 
negotiations,  even  confidentially;  (d)  First  publications  of  news 
about  the  demands  were  categorically  denied  by  the  Japanese 
Government;  (e)  Newspapers  in  Japan  were  warned  by  the  Govern- 
ment not  to  publish  or  discuss  the  demands;  (f)  Japan's  diplomatic 
representatives  abroad  were  instructed  to  deny  and  discredit  news 
about  the  demands;  (g)  The  Japanese  minister  at  Peking  denied 
to  inquiries  of  other  legations  that  any  demands  had  been  made; 
(h)  "When  copies  of  the  original  demands,  procured  from  the 
Chinese  Government,  were  received  by  other  foreign  governments, 
the  Japanese  Government  still  denied  the  twenty-one  articles,  and 
presented  a  list  of  eleven  articles,  omitting  the  most  objectionable 
matters. 

An  ethical  analysis  of  this  action  of  Japan  will  disclose  that 
it  probably  transcends  in  obliquity  any  act  of  any  other  na- 
tion during  the  war.  It  marked  the  beginning  of  what  an  emi- 
nent Englishman  who  is  conceded  to  be  a  leading  authority  on 
China  and  the  far  East  recently  termed  in  a  conversation  with 
me,  "Japan's  policy  of  treachery  to  and  blackmail  of  her 
allies."  Not  only  did  Japan  seek  by  military  intimidation, 
at  a  time  when  China  was  defenseless  and  unable  to  obtain 
succor,  to  bring  that  vast  country  under  its  suzerainty,  and  to 
undermine  all  other  foreign  interests  and  opportunities  in 
China,  including  and  especially  those  of  Japan's  leading  ally  in 
the  war,  but  she  tried  to  do  this  in  secret.     Japan  not  only  did 

i  Chapters  VIII  and  IX  of  the  author's  book,  "Our  Eastern  Question," 
give  a  full  account  of  the  presentation  and  character  of  these  demands. 


92     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

not  previously  inform  the  allied  governments  of  her  intended 
action  toward  China,  which  would  completely  overturn,  if 
successful,  the  existing  international  status  in  the  far  East; 
she  resorted  to  diplomatic  falsehood  and  subterfuge  to  con- 
ceal her  moves  from  her  allies  as  well  as  from  other  govern- 
ments. 

After  protracted  negotiations,  in  which  China  in  vain 
sought  help  from  other  powers  and  tried  to  evade  and  soften 
the  conditions,  she  was  finally  brought  to  accept  Japan's 
terms  by  an  ultimatum,  delivered  by  the  Japanese  minister 
at  Peking  on  May  7,  1915,  in  these  words : 

The  Imperial  Japanese  Government  hereby  again  offer  their  ad- 
vice and  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government,  upon  this  advice,  will 
give  a  satisfactory  reply  by  six  o'clock  p.  m.  on  the  ninth  day  of 
May.  It  is  hereby  declared  that  if  no  satisfactory  reply  is  received 
before  or  at  the  specified  time,  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government 
will  take  such  steps  as  they  may  deem  necessary. 

As  Japan  had  previously  made  certain  naval  and  military 
moves  to  intimidate  China,  and  all  efforts  to  induce  any  other 
power  to  intervene  in  her  behalf  having  failed,  the  Chinese 
Government  on  May  8  accepted  Japan's  ultimatum,  and  a 
week  later  signed  an  "agreement"  substantially  dictated  by 
Japan.  This  agreement  was  considerably  modified  from  its 
original  form  through  pressure  made  by  other  powers  and  re- 
straints on  Japan  caused  by  the  shifting  international  situa- 
tion. Great  Britain  probably  had  insisted  on  the  elimination 
of  certain  clauses  of  the  original  demands  which  would  have 
circumscribed  and  crippled  British  economic  position  and  in- 
terests in  China.  The  United  States  also  exerted  an  influence 
in  China's  behalf,  and  was  instrumental  in  persuading  Japan 
to  abandon  Group  V  of  the  original  demands.  Group  V  was 
the  most  far-reaching  and  objectionable  of  the  demands,  be- 
ing equivalent  to  placing  China  under  Japan's  suzerainty. 
Japan  stopped  at  a  point  where,  as  she  was  then  convinced, 
to  go  further  would  excessively  irritate  her  allies,  alarm  the 
United  States,  and  drive  China  to  armed  resistance,  a  situa- 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  93 

tion  which  Japan  feared  because  of  the  international  compli- 
cations it  would  create,  and  adverse  reactions  on  her  own  eco- 
nomic war  prosperity.  It  was  fortunate  for  China  that  Yuan 
Shih  K'ai  was  president  at  the  time,  for  he  coupled  political 
sagacity  with  stubborn  courage,  and  had  vowed  to  fight,  how- 
ever hopeless  armed  resistance  might  be,  rather  than  yield 
China's  sovereignty. 

In  an  official  statement  regarding  the  negotiations  the  Chi- 
nese Government  said : 

It  is  plain  that  the  Chinese  Government  proceeded  to  the  fullest 
extent  of  possible  concession  in  view  of  the  strong  national  senti- 
ment manifested  by  the  people  throughout  the  whole  period  of  the 
negotiations.  All  that  the  Chinese  Government  strove  to  maintain 
was  China's  plenary  sovereignty,  the  treaty  rights  of  foreign  Pow- 
ers in  China,  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity.  ...  In  consid- 
ering the  nature  of  the  course  they  should  take  in  reference  to  the 
ultimatum,  the  Chinese  Government  was  influenced  by  its  desire 
to  preserve  the  Chinese  people,  as  well  as  a  large  number  of  foreign 
residents  in  China,  from  unnecessary  suffering,  and  also  to  prevent 
the  interests  of  friendly  powers  from  being  imperiled.  For  these 
reasons  the  Chinese  Government  was  constrained  to  comply  in 
full  with  the  ultimatum,  but,  in  complying,  the  Chinese  Government 
disclaims  any  desire  to  associate  itself  with  any  revision  which 
may  thus  be  affected  in  the  various  conventions  and  agreements 
concluded  between  other  powers,  with  respect  to  the  maintenance 
of  China's  territorial  independence  and  integrity,  the  preservation 
of  the  status  quo,  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  the 
commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China. 

With  reference  to  China's  action  in  accepting  Japan's  ulti- 
matum, I  thus  wrote  in  "Our  Eastern  Question,"  pages  161- 
163: 

I  have  in  previous  chapters  sketched  the  general  internal  situation 
of  China  at  that  time,  to  whose  complications  were  added  those 
caused  by  the  great  war.  The  Chinese  Government  was  charged 
with  a  triple  responsibility — to  preserve  its  own  neutrality,  to  main- 
tain neutrality  among  belligerents,  and  to  safeguard  without  dis- 
crimination all  foreign  interests  in  China  at  a  period  when  many 
of  those  interests  were  handicapped  in  protecting  themselves. 
Moreover,  the  Chinese  Government,  after  Japan's  demands  became 


94     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

known,  was  confronted  with  a  serious  internal  political  difficulty. 
Chinese  popular  sentiment  was  aroused  to  a  hilherio  unknown  ex- 
tent by  Japan's  aggressions,  and  demanded  that  the  Peking  Govern- 
ment should  reject  the  demands.  The  Peking  Government  had, 
therefore,  to  meet  Japan's  menacing  diplomacy,  and  at  the  same 
time  so  to  conduct  affairs  as  to  prevent  popular  indignation  among 
Chinese  from  naming  up  in  an  attempt  to  overthrow  the  Govern- 
ment. In  this  connection,  Mr.  Hioki's  verbal  statements  to  Yuan 
Shili  K'ai,  when  presenting  the  original  demands  in  January,  are 
interesting.  Mr.  Hioki  then  said,  if  China  did  not  promptly  com- 
ply with  Japan's  demands,  that  Japan  might  be  unable  to  restrain 
the  activities  of  the  group  of  Chinese  counter-revolutionists  then 
sojourning  in  Japan — or  in  other  words,  Japan  threatened  to  in- 
stigate another  internal  revolution  in  China.1  Yuan  Shih  K'ai's 
dilemma  is  obvious.  If  he  rejected  Japan's  demands,  Japan  would 
use  military  force  to  obtain  them,  which  China  could  not  resist 
successfully.  If  he  accepted  Japan's  demands,  even  in  part,  the 
Chinese  radical  party  opposing  the  Government  would  accuse  Y'uan 
of  betraying  his  country,  and  perhaps  would  succeed  in  starting 
another  rebellion  on  that  issue,  especially  if  the  revolution  received 
further  financial  and  other  assistance  from  Japan.  If  he  decided 
to  resist  Japan,  and  make  such  a  fight  as  was  possible,  the  whole 
country  would  be  plunged  into  disorder,  and  such  progress  as  had 
been  made  toward  reconstruction  would  be  thrown  back,  while  all 
foreign  residents  and  interests  in  the  country  would  be  imperiled. 
In  these  circumstances,  Yuan  chose  the  wiser  course.  He  conceded 
what  he  must,  and  saved  such  exceptions  as  he  could,  hoping  that 
China  would  get  a  hearing  before  civilization  later. 

The  United  States  Government,  which  had  during-  the 
course  of  the  negotiations  shown  its  interest  by  making  in- 
quiries of  Japan  and  China,  and  diplomatically  cautioning 
Japan,  delivered  on  May  16,  1915,  through  the  American 
minister  at  Peking,  this  note : 

In  view  of  the  circumstances  of  the  negotiations  which  have 
taken  place  or  which  are  now  pending  between  the  Government 
of  China  and  the  Government  of  Japan  and  the  agreements  which 
have  been  reached  as  a  result  thereof,  the  Government  of  the  United 

i  As  constituting  a  remarkable  revelation  of  Japan's  provocative  pol- 
icy in  China,  the  memorial  of  the  Black  Dragon  Society  given  in  Ap- 
pendix D  is  well  worth  reading. 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  95 

States  has  the  honor  to  notify  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Re- 
public that  it  cannot  recognize  any  agreement  or  undertaking  which 
has  been  entered  into,  or  which  may  be  entered  into  between  the 
Governments  of  China  and  Japan  impairing  the  treaty  rights  of 
the  United  States  and  its  citizens  in  China,  the  political  or  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Republic  of  China,  or  the  international  policy 
commonly  known  as  the  open  door  policy. 

An  identical  note  was  handed  to  the  Japanese  Government 
through  the  American  embassy  at  Tokio.  If  any  of  the  other 
powers  protested  or  indorsed  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations, 
they  did  not  make  their  attitudes  public.  Probably  the  Brit- 
ish, French,  and  Russian  governments  did  not  consider  it 
expedient  to  voice  any  objections  at  that  time.  But  that  the 
principal  Allied  governments  were  disturbed  by  the  course 
of  their  Oriental  ally  soon  was  to  be  definitely  confirmed. 

From  the  day  war  was  declared  in  Europe,  Yuan  Shih  K'ai 
without  doubt  realized  that  China's  war  problem  was  con- 
tained in  one  word,  Japan,  and  his  astute  mind  was  busy 
with  schemes  to  protect  his  country.  His  first  thought  (I 
have  this  information  from  men  who  during  this  period  were 
the  Chinese  President's  closest  advisers)  had  been  of  America, 
but  the  outcome  of  the  early  efforts  to  protect  China's  neu- 
trality and  right  of  self-determination,  and  the  matter  of  the 
twenty-one  demands,  had  convinced  him  that  while  the  Wash- 
ington Government  did  not  approve  Japan's  policy,  it  was 
not  prepared  to  take  any  very  forcible  action  to  obstruct  it. 
As  a  possible  solution,  Yuan  had  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war  thought  about  China  joining  the  Allies.  Soon  after 
Japan  began  military  and  naval  operations  in  Shantung,  and 
after  Japan  had  rejected  the  request  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment to  limit  the  zone  of  operations  to  the  German  leased  ter- 
ritory, Yuan  proposed  that  China  would  send  troops  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  capture  of  Tsingtau,  and  that  any  movements 
outside  of  the  leased  territory  should  be  entrusted  to  Chinese 
troops.  This  proposal  was  communicated  to  Sir  John  Jordan, 
the  British  minister  at  Peking.     It  appears  that  Yuan  Shih 


96     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

K'ai  then  acted  entirely  on  his  own  initiative,  for  even  those 
of  his  immediate  entourage  did  not  know  about  the  proposal 
when  it  was  made.  It  was  not  until  the  matter  of  China  join- 
ing the  Allies  came  up  in  a  different  form,  over  a  year  after- 
ward, that  Yuan  informed  others  of  his  first  effort.  Accord- 
ing to  Yuan's  version  of  the  conversation  between  himself  and 
the  British  minister,  Sir  John  Jordan  discouraged  such  action 
by  China.  It  appears  that  the  British  minister  gave  this  ad- 
vice on  his  own  responsibility,  without  communicating  the 
matter  to  his  ally  colleagues,  the  Russian  and  French  min- 
isters. Whether  Sir  John  Jordan  at  that  time  communicated 
the  proposal,  and  his  own  view,  to  his  own  Government,  I 
do  not  know,  but  one  presumes  that  he  did.  The  significance 
of  the  incident  is  apparent,  If  the  British  minister  advised 
Yuan  Shih  K'ai  against  joining  the  Allies  then  on  his  own 
responsibility,  and  without  first  ascertaining  the  opinion  of 
Downing  Street,  the  consequences  of  the  policy  rest  on  Sir 
John  Jordan;  if  the  British  Government  was  informed,  and 
inspired  its  minister's  views,  its  reason  for  rejecting  an  ally 
then  is  a  matter  of  conjecture.  The  logical  presumption  is 
that  Japan  was  opposed  to  having  China  join  the  Allies,  and 
the  British  Government  had  its  reasons,  perhaps  expediency, 
perhaps  previous  commitments,  for  permitting  Japan  to 
handle  the  situation. 

In  the  autumn  of  1915  (October  28),  the  principal  Allied 
powers  (Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  Japan)  addressed 
a  joint  note  to  China  advising  against  the  mooted  restoration 
of  the  monarchy,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  cause  dissen- 
sion and  disorder  in  the  country.  This  note  marked  a  very 
interesting  point  of  tortuous  war  diplomacy  in  the  far  East, 
because  the  Japanese  Government,  which  had  been  secretly 
instigating  the  movement  in  north  China  for  the  restoration 
of  the  monarchy  and  trying  to  tempt  Yuan  Shih  K'ai  along 
that  path  by  private  promises  of  support,  and  at  the  same 
time,  by  its  agents  in  south  China,  was  promoting  an  anti- 
monarchy  party  in  that  region,  now  by  its  public  utterance 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  97 

opposed  a  change  of  government  in  China.  Japan's  plan  to- 
ward China  was  very  simple  as  to  its  thesis,  having  one  major 
object  and  several  subordinate  variants.  The  major  object 
was  to  disrupt  and  disorganize  China  and  implant  Japan's 
control  on  the  ruins  under  the  excuse  of  being  obligated  to 
protect  civilization  by  preserving  order.  As  means  to  accom- 
plish that  end,  Japan  played  a  two-faced  game  in  China's 
internal  politics  and  a  two-faced  game  in  international  poli- 
tics. Just  as  in  respect  to  China's  form  of  government  Japan 
maintained  close  intercourse  with  and  gave  aid  and  comfort 
to  the  Chinese  radical  republican  faction,  while  really  desiring 
a  monarchy,  with  a  puppet  emperor  under  Japan's  control, 
so  in  world  politics  Japan  had  elected  to  aline  herself  with 
the  Allies  while  at  heart  desiring  and  expecting  Germany  to 
win.  These  Machiavellian  tactics  are  almost  incomprehensible 
to  habitual  American  thought,  but  they  are  the  A  B  C  of 
Oriental  diplomacy.  After  the  twenty-one  demands,  none  of 
the  chief  Allied  governments  could  have  had  any  doubts  about 
Japan's  real  attitude  toward  the  war. 

At  the  time  the  Allied  powers  presented  this  advice.  Yuan 
Shih  K'ai  was  in  the  midst  of  a  very  difficult  situation  both 
nationally  and  internationally.  On  October  30,  two  days 
after  the  presentation  of  the  advice  to  suspend  the  restoration 
movement,  a  foreign  adviser  of  the  Chinese  Government  per- 
sonally suggested  to  Yuan  Shih  K'ai  that  a  way  out  of 
China's  difficulties  would  be  for  China  to  join  the  Allies. 
To  his  surprise,  he  was  told  that  this  proposal  already  had 
been  twice  advanced  by  Yuan,  early  in  the  war  and  again  in 
August,  1915.  Having  been  rebuffed  once,  Yuan  was  circum- 
spect in  his  second  attempt  to  break  into  the  Allies'  consor- 
tium, for  he  now  feared  the  difficulties  that  Japan's  opposi- 
tion would  cause.  As  before,  he  approached  the  British  lega- 
tion in  Peking,  where  the  suggestion  was  regarded  as  inaus- 
picious in  that  it  would  ruffle  Japan.  I  am  credibly  informed 
that  in  private  conversations  with  Yuan  Shih  K'ai,  Sir  John 
Jordan,  the  British  minister,  expressed  that  opinion,  which 


98     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Yuan  took  to  represent  the  attitude  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment. However,  this  time  Yuan  did  not  confine  his  ap- 
proaches to  the  British  legation  alone.  By  then  he  had  a 
tolerably  clear  conception  of  the  real  motives  and  attitudes  of 
the  various  powers  and  the  conditions  that  circumscribed 
them.  Yuan  also  sounded  the  French  and  Russian  legations, 
and  sought  the  opinion  of  the  American  legation.  From  a 
source  close  to  Yuan.  I  learned  that  the  suggestion  that  China 
would  join  the  Allies  was  favorably  received  by  both  the 
French  and  Russian  legations,  which  no  doubt  communicated 
their  opinions  of  the  China  situation  to  their  governments. 
By  that  time  there  seems  to  have  developed  an  opinion  among 
the  Allied  powers  that  a  limit  should  be  set  to  Japan's  "free 
hand"  in  the  East  and  that  a  check  upon  her  was  necessary. 

In  the  conversation  of  October  30  Yuan  informed  his  for- 
eign adviser  that  he  had  proposed  that  China  would  join  the 
Allies  on  certain  conditions;  namely,  (a)  a  guaranty  of  the 
protection  of  China  by  the  Allies  against  any  reprisals  by 
Germany  in  the  future,  (b)  reversion  to  China  of  the  German 
leasehold  and  German  concessions  in  China,  (c)  the  Allied 
governments  to  agree  to  the  extradition  of  political  offenders 
from  the  foreign  settlements  in  China.  The  third  condition 
probably  requires  some  explanation.  It  was  pointed  at  a 
peculiar  situation  whereby  revolutionary  plotters  against  the 
Chinese  Government  were  able  to  use  the  foreign  settlements 
as  bases  of  their  revolutionary  operations,  and  was  the  occa- 
sion of  intense  embarrassment  to  Yuan  Shih  K'ai  in  efforts  to 
pacify  the  country  and  stabilize  his  government. 

The  official  attitude  of  the  American  Government  vis-a-vis 
China  joining  the  Allies  at  that  time  of  course  was  indicated 
by  the  position  of  the  United  States  as  a  neutral,  but  I  am 
informed  that  the  American  minister  expressed  his  private 
opinion  to  Yuan  Shih  K'ai  that  such  a  move  probably  would 
save  China. 

The  diplomatic  conversations  on  this  subject  at  Peking  led 
to  formal  consultations  among  the  Allied  powers.     On  Novem- 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  99 

ber  23,  1915,  the  ambassadors  of  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Russia  had  an  audience  with  Viscount  Ishii,  the  Japanese 
minister  of  foreign  affairs,  at  Tokio,  when  they  formally  re- 
quested on  behalf  of  their  governments  that  Japan  would  join 
with  their  governments  in  inviting  China  to  enter  the  war  on 
the  side  of  the  Allies.  From  a  perfectly  reliable  source  I 
have  an  account  of  what  happened.  As  the  results  of  this 
formal  audience,  and  the  motives  which  it  demonstrated,  rank 
importantly  in  the  diplomatic  history  of  the  far  East  and  of 
the  war,  a  brief  analysis  of  some  of  its  elements  is  pertinent. 
In  a  recent  conversation  with  one  of  the  leading  authorities 
on  the  politics  of  the  far  East,  an  Englishman,  he  remarked: 
''One  reason  for  the  weakness  and  error  of  British  policy  in 
the  far  East  during  the  war  is  that  it  has  been  wrongly  ad- 
vised by  its  principal  representatives  at  Peking  and  Tokio, 
either  from  their  failure  to  grasp  the  real  situation  or  from 
timidity  or  hesitation  in  stating  it  to  the  home  Government." 

On  the  occasion  of  that  audience  at  Tokio  the  ambassadors 
of  the  three  European  powers  personally  were  but  slightly 
conversant  with  actual  conditions  in  China,  a  lack  of  knowl- 
edge that  placed  them  at  a  disadvantage  in  treating  with  Vis- 
count Ishii.  The  three  ambassadors  presented  the  views  of 
their  governments,  and  some  arguments  why  China  should  be 
asked  to  join  the  Allies.  Viscount  Ishii  demurred  both  to  the 
proposal  and  to  the  arguments  that  were  advanced.  He  said 
that  Japan  considered  developments  with  regard  to  China  as 
of  paramount  interest  to  her,  and  she  must  keep  a  firm  hand 
there.  Japan  could  not  regard  tvith  equanimity  the  organi- 
zation of  an  efficient  Chinese  army  such  as  would  be  required 
for  her  active  participation  in  the  war,  nor  could  Japan  fail 
to  regard  with  uneasiness  a  liberation  of  the  economic  activi- 
ties of  a  nation  of  400,000,000  people. 

I  have  italicized  Viscount  Ishii 's  views,  which  contain  the 
essence  of  Japan's  attitude  toward  China  then  and  now. 
Japan  wanted  to  keep  China  weak  both  in  a  military  and  an 
economic  sense.     China  was  marked  to  provide  Japan's  prin- 


100     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

cipal  "reward"  when  the  Allies,  if  they  won  the  war,  came  to 
divide  the  spoils.  Japan  did  not  want  to  have  her  self-as- 
signed part  of  the  spoils  merged  into  the  general  pot,  or  per- 
haps be  deprived  of  it  by  bringing  China  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Allies.  Where,  except  in  China,  could  Japan 
then  hope  to  obtain  adequate  practical  "compensation"  for 
her  "services  to  the  Allies"?  In  this  connection,  I  recall  a 
remark  of  Viscount  Motono,  Japanese  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  made  to  me  in  the  course  of  an  interview  in  his  library 
at  Tokio  in  September,  1917,  that  "The  creation  of  a  large 
and  efficient  Chinese  army  would  be  a  serious  question  for 
Japan." 

The  audience  of  the  Allied  ambassadors  with  Viscount  Ishii 
resulted  in  no  action,  Viscount  Ishii's  views  being  confirmed 
in  writing  a  few  days  afterward,  and  transmitted  to  London, 
Petrograd,  and  Paris.  It  however  brought  out  positively 
that  Japan  was  opposed  to  augmenting  the  strength  of  the 
Allies  by  including  China. 

During  the  period  when  the  Chinese  Government  was  hav- 
ing these  conversations  with  a  view  to  joining  the  Allies,  and 
when  the  British,  French,  and  Russian  governments  had  ap- 
proved the  plan  and  were  using  their  influence  to  induce 
Japan  to  assent,  the  Japanese  legation  at  Tokio,  and  Japan's 
diplomatic  officials  in  different  parts  of  China,  privately  were 
doing  all  they  could  to  dissuade  the  Chinese  from  such  a 
course.  I  have  definite  information  from  reliable  persons 
who  then  were  in  positions  to  have  positive  knowledge  of 
those  events,  that  Japanese  consular  officials  at  Shanghai. 
Hankow,  and  Canton  were  directing  a  propaganda  opposed  to 
Yuan  Shih  K'ai's  plan  to  join  the  Allies.  Also,  the  Japanese 
legation  at  Peking  worked  assiduously  against  the  proposal, 
even  advising  Yuan  confidentially,  but  unofficially,  that  such 
a  course  probably  would  involve  China  in  serious  difficulties. 

Probably  inspired — certainly  tolerated  by  the  Government, 
for  the  press  in  Japan  is  strictly  regulated,  and  is  forbidden 
expressly  to  publish  news  or  to  comment  on  foreign  affairs 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  101 

except  by  official  permission — by  the  Foreign  Office,  the 
Japanese  press  indulged  in  a  tirade  against  the  suggestion 
that  China  would  become  an  Ally,  and  was  especially  bitter 
in  its  criticism  of  Great  Britain,  which  power  was  accused  of 
having  devised  the  plan  in  order  to  rob  Japan  of  her  proper 
place  and  just  rewards.  Some  Japanese  publicists  took  the 
occasion  to  point  out  that  Japan  had  an  alternative  to  re- 
maining in  the  Allied  group,  and  that  Japan,  as  other  powers 
did,  must  give  primary  consideration  to  her  own  interests. 
This  eruption  of  the  Japanese  press  was  the  first  distinct  in- 
timation of  a  pro-German  trend  of  Japanese  thought,  and  a 
consideration  of  the  possibility  of  a  rapprochement  with  Ger- 
many in  case  Japan's  relations  with  her  allies  should  become 
unsatisfactory  or  disadvantageous.  It  may  be  said  also  to 
mark  the  beginning  of  the  anti-British  wave  of  sentiment 
which  was  noticeable  in  Japan  during  a  considerable  period. 

Thus  the  second  attempt  to  bring  China  into  the  Allies' 
group  as  a  belligerent,  resulted  in  failure. 


CHAPTER  V 

CHINA   AND   THE   WAR — CONTINUED 

China's  position  in  1916 — Chinese  sentiment  about  the  war — No  tan- 
gible reason  to  fear  Germany — Real  fear  of  Japan — Suspicion  of  the 
Allies — The  United  States  takes  a  hand — Influence  of  America  at  Peking 
— Invitation  to  China  to  sever  relations  with  Germany — Diplomatic 
situation  caused  by  this  proposal — How  the  powers  stood — The  atti- 
tude of  Japan — Sounded  by  Russia — Some  secret  correspondence — 
What  Japan  wanted — British  and  French  influence — Japan's  oblique 
course — China's  internal  situation — The  United  States  advises  China — 
Questions  raised  by  this  action — Irritation  of  Japan — Misrepresenting 
the  issue — Japan- American  relations — Meaning  of  Root-Takahira  agree- 
ment— Japan's  anti-American  propaganda  in  China — Some  examples — 
The  analogy  of  Korea — The  Chinese  point  of  view — Shifting  of  Japanese 
attitude — Advantages  to  China  in  declaring  war — Effort  to  detach  China 
from  America — China  declares  war — Her  action  analyzed — New  turn  to 
events. 

FROM  the  autumn  of  1915  until  the  following  summer 
Chinese  politics  was  concerned  chiefly  with  the  move- 
ment to  revive  the  monarchy,  with  Yuan  Shih  K'ai  as 
emperor,  culminating  in  failure  and  the  death  of  Yuan.  Gen- 
eral Li  Yuan  Hung,  the  "Father  of  the  Revolution,"  who  had 
been  vice-president,  succeeded  to  the  presidency.  Li  Yuan 
Hung  is  an  estimable  character,  but  he  lacked  Yuan  Shih 
K'ai's  firmness  and  grasp  of  international  affairs.  His  for- 
eign policy  was  very  simple  in  theory — to  try  to  hold  a  middle 
course  and  keep  China  out  of  trouble. 

Like  every  other  nation  in  the  world,  China's  policy  dur- 
ing the  war  was  subject  to  the  influence  of  events.  By  the 
summer  of  1916,  when  Li  Yuan  Hung  assumed  the  presidency, 
some  things  were  perfectly  clear  to  the  Peking  government, 
and  other  matters  were  problematical.  The  outstanding 
practical  fact  which  confronted  China  was  the  Japan  danger. 

102 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  103 

Here  was  the  situation:  Japan's  policy  in  China  seemed  to 
have  the  tacit  assent,  if  not  the  approval,  of  the  other  Allied 
powers,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia,  and  the  Allied 
group  had  twice  repulsed  offers  by  China  to  join  them  in 
circumstances  which  showed  Japan's  predomination  in  the 
far-Eastern  policy  of  the  Allies;  the  Central  powers  were 
showing  no  disposition  to  raise  difficulties  for  China,  but  on 
the  contrary,  were  assuming  a  conciliatory  attitude;  the  one 
great  neutral  power  to  which  China  might  have  turned  for 
support,  America,  continued  to  pursue  what  to  Chinese 
seemed  an  aloof  and  dubious  policy. 

The  war  situation  at  that  time  was  becoming  more  favor- 
able to  the  Central  powers.  Russia's  offensive  military 
strength  had  been  broken,  and  the  diversion  of  Rumania's 
entrance  already  was  reacting  against  the  Allies.  The  pros- 
pect of  a  victory  for  the  Allies  appeared  to  be  slight  to  those 
who  looked  at  the  situation  impartially;  indeed,  the  situation 
tended  toward  an  end  of  the  war  that  would  be  advantageous 
to  Germany.  A  victory  for  the  Allies  as  then  constituted 
and  motivated  held  no  hope  for  China ;  on  the  contrary,  such 
an  outcome  foreshadowed  Japan's  undisputed  ascendency  in 
the  far  East  and  her  unqualified  paramountcy  in  China.  A 
feeling  was  growing  among  the  Chinese  that  an  ending  of  the 
war  in  Germany's  favor,  or  with  the  influence  of  Germany  in 
world  affairs  undiminished,  presented  China's  best  chance 
of  relief  from  Japan's  aggressions.  Chinese  statesmen  could 
see  no  advantage  to  China,  since  she  was  not  admitted  into 
the  Allied  group,  in  further  aggravating  Germany.  A  sub- 
dued resentment  of  and  distrust  of  the  Allies  by  Chinese  had 
been  created  by  some  phases  of  Allied  propaganda  in  China 
since  the  war  began.  In  volume  of  publicity  and  facilities 
the  British  press  and  news  services  had  almost  a  command- 
ing advantage  in  the  field,  yet  their  enforced  subordination 
to  political  exigencies  growing  out  of  the  relations  of  the 
British  and  Japanese  governments  vis-a-vis  Japan's  course 
in  the  war  and  policy  in  China  at  times  led  them  into  incon- 


104     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

sisteneies  and  hypocrisies  that  were  obvious  to  thinking 
Chinese.  Also  during  this  period  France  was  represented 
at  Peking  by  a  minister  who  on  several  occasions  affronted 
Chinese  sensibilities  very  seriously  by  a  lack  of  tact  and 
bruskness  in  handling  certain  questions  There  was  nothing 
in  the  professed  war  policy  of  the  Allies,  or  in  its  reactions 
as  they  had  so  far  been  felt  in  China,  to  arouse  a  sentimental 
support  among  the  Chinese.  It  was  of  little  use  for  the  Al- 
lied press  in  China  to  argue  the  brutal  character  of  German 
policy  and  how  a  German  victory  would  menace  China,  when 
it  was  the  brutal  character  of  the  Allies'  policy — or  one  of 
the  Allied  powers,  Japan — that  was  keeping  Chinese  states- 
men awake  of  nights.  The  Chinese  only  read  about  (those 
who  did  read)  the  predatory  policy  of  Germany  in  the  Allied 
press;  they  knew  about  the  predatory  policy  of  Japan  from 
actual  contact,  and  they  saw  the  British  and  French  press  in 
China  ignore  or  condone  and  extenuate  Japan's  conduct. 
By  the  beginning  of  1917  a  deep  distrust  of  the  Allies  had 
taken  root  with  the  politically  intelligent  class  of  the  Chinese, 
which  was  coupled  with  a  growing  disbelief  in  the  probability 
of  an  Allied  victory.  To  Chinese  politicians  a  victory  of 
the  Allies  was  definitely  taking  the  shape  of  a  recognized 
suzerainty  of  Japan  over  China,  and  a  victory  of  the  Cen- 
tral powers  was  taking  the  shape  of  a  possibility  of  escape 
from  Japanese  domination. 

It  was  the  United  States  that  injected  a  fresh  and  potent 
influence  into  the  far-Eastern  situation.  The  first  import- 
ant manifestation  of  a  change  in  the  American  attitude  to- 
ward the  war  was  the  passage  in  the  summer  of  1916  of  an 
act  of  Congress  authorizing  and  providing  for  a  larger  navy. 
A  condition  that  had  reduced  the  influence  of  America  at 
Peking  to  that  of  an  academic  friend  was  the  lack  of  mili- 
tary and  naval  strength  of  that  nation.  Chinese  politicians 
believed  in  the  friendly  sentiments  and  good  intentions  of 
the  American  people  and  Government,  but  a  succession  of  ex- 
periences had  about  convinced  them  that  the  United  States 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  105 

would  not,  or  could  not,  carry  its  opinion  against  an  armed 
power  like  Japan.  Early  in  1917  there  were  premonitions 
that  the  United  States  might  become  a  belligerent.  Then 
came  its  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  and 
the  invitation  by  the  American  Government  to  other  neutral 
nations  to  join  with  it  by  taking  similar  action  as  a  protest 
against  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  by  the  Central 
powers.  The  Chinese  Government  received  this  invitation, 
which  brought  on  another  crisis  of  China's  war  policy. 

Official  notification  that  the  United  States  had  broken  re- 
lations with  Germany  was  received  at  the  American  legation 
in  Peking  about  noon  on  February  4,  1917.  The  American 
minister,  Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  at  once  requested  an  interview 
with  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  who  at  that  time  was  Chinese  min- 
ister of  foreign  affairs.  Dr.  Wu  was  seriously  ill,  and  his 
son,  C.  C.  Wu,  counselor  of  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs, 
arranged  a  consultation  for  that  night  between  Dr.  Reinsch, 
President  Li  Yuan  Hung  and  Premier  Tuan  Chi-jui,  at  which 
Mr.  Wu  represented  the  Wai  Chiao-pu  (Foreign  Office). 
Dr.  Reinsch  presented  to  President  Li  the  invitation  of  the 
American  Government  to  China  to  join  with  the  United  States 
and  other  hitherto  neutral  nations  in  severing  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  Germany  as  a  protest  against  ruthless  submarine 
warfare.  President  Li  Yuan  Hung  was  sympathetic,  but 
feared  the  possible  consequences  to  China ;  Premier  Tuan  was 
reserved  and  cautious.  Dr.  Reinsch  presented  the  case  and 
urged  quick  action.     No  decision  was  reached  that  night. 

Further  conferences  took  place  on  the  next  and  succeeding 
days,  and  an  acute  diplomatic  situation  became  focused  on 
the  proposal  of  the  American  Government.  I  was  in  Peking 
then,  and  followed  developments  as  closely  as  I  could.  Other 
legations  and  persons  not  connected  with  governments  took 
part  in  urging  the  Chinese  Government  to  accept  the  invita- 
tion of  the  United  States,  or  to  reject  it.  The  various  govern- 
ments lined  up.  The  Central  group  (Germany  and  Austria) 
was  against  such  action  by  China,  of  course.     Of  the  Allied 


106     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

group  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  Italy  were  favor- 
able, and  Japan  was  opposed.  Japan's  opposition,  as  usual, 
was  oblique.  The  Japanese  legation  at  Peking  exerted  its 
influence  secretly  to  deter  the  Chinese  Government  from  ac- 
cepting the  American  invitation.  In  a  private  interview  with 
President  Li  Yuan  Hung,  the  Japanese  minister  pointed  out 
the  risks  that  China  would  run  by  following  the  lead  of 
America;  that  America  was  not  a  military  power,  and  even 
if  she  entered  the  war,  her  participation  would  have  little 
effect;  that  America  always  talked  big  and  acted  little,  and 
frequently  had  left  China  in  the  lurch;  that  Germany  could 
not  be  defeated  by  the  Allies,  and  therefore  the  safest  course 
for  China  was  to  remain  out  of  the  struggle  and  rely  upon 
Japan  to  protect  her  interests  in  the  settlement ;  that  after 
the  war  there  would  surely  be  a  complete  understanding  be- 
tween Japan  and  Germany,  which  would  enable  Japan  to 
guarantee  China's  security.  A  private  interview  in  similar 
tone  was  had  between  the  Japanese  minister  and  Premier 
Tuan  Chi-jui,  and  at  the  same  time  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Office  at  Tokio  was  communicating  these  arguments  to  the 
Chinese  legation  there. 

Since  by  their  secret  treaty,  made  in  1916,  but  then  not 
published,  Japan  and  Russia  mutually  had  agreed  to  inform 
and  consult  each  other  with  regard  to  actions  toward  China, 
the  Russian  ambassador  at  Tokio  approached  the  Japanese 
Foreign  Office  in  this  instance.  Among  the  secret  documents 
published  after  the  revolution  in  Russia  was  the  following 
report  of  a  conversation — the  italics  are  mine — between  M. 
Krupensky,  the  Russian  ambassador  to  Japan,  and  Baron 
Motono,  the  Japanese  minister  of  foreign  affairs  [my  italics]  : 

japan's  territorial  war  aims 

From  M.  Krupensky,  the  former  Russian  ambassador  at  Tokio; 
Despatch  dated  February  8,  1917. 

I  never  omit  an  opportunity  for  representing  to  the  minister 
for  foreign  affairs  the  desirability,  in  the  interests  of  Japan  herself, 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  107 

of  China's  intervention  in  the  war,  and  only  last  week  I  had  a  con- 
versation with  him  on  the  subject.  Today  I  again  pointed  out  to 
him  that  the  present  moment  was  particularly  favorable,  in  view 
of  the  position  taken  up  by  the  United  States,  and  the  proposal  made 
by  them  to  the  neutral  powers  to  follow  their  example,  and  more 
particularly,  in  view  of  the  recent  speeches  of  the  American  minis- 
ter at  Peking.  Viscount  Motono  replied  that  he  would  be  the  first 
to  welcome  a  rupture  between  China  and  Germany,  and  would  not 
hesitate  to  take  steps  in  this  direction  at  Peking  if  he  were  sure 
that  the  Chinese  Government  would  go  in  that  direction.  So  far, 
however,  he  had  no  such  assurance,  and  he  feared  lest  unsuccessful 
representations  at  Peking  might  do  harm  to  the  Allies.  He  prom- 
ised me  to  sound  the  attitude  of  Peking  without  delay,  and,  in 
case  of  some  hope  of  success,  to  propose  to  the  cabinet  to  take 
a  decision  in  the  desired  direction. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  minister  pointed  out  the  necessity  for 
him,  in  view  of  the  attitude  of  Japanese  public  opinion  on  the 
subject,  as  well  as  with  a  view  to  safeguard  Japan's  position  at 
the  future  peace  conference,  if  China  should  be  admitted  to  it,  of 
secttring  the  support  of  the  Allied  powers  to  the  desires  of  Japan 
in  respect  of  Shantung  and  the  Pacific  islands.  These  desires  are 
for  the  succession  to  all  the  rights  and  privileges  hitherto  possessed 
by  Germany  in  the  Shantung  province  and  for  the  acquisition  of 
the  islands  to  the  north  of  the  equator  which  are  now  occupied  by 
the  Japanese. 

Motono  plainly  told  me  that  the  Japanese  Government  would  like 
to  receive  at  once  the  promise  of  the  Imperial  [Russian]  Govern- 
ment to  support  the  above  desires  of  Japan.  In  order  to  give  a 
push  to  the  highly  important  question  of  a  break  between  China 
and  Germany,  /  regard  it  as  very  desirable  that  the  Japanese  should 
be  given  the  promise  they  ask:  this  the  more  so  as,  so  far  as  can 
be  seen  here,  the  relations  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan  have 
of  late  been  such  as  to  justify  a  surmise  that  the  Japanese  aspira- 
tions would  not  meet  with  any  objections  on  the  part  of  the  Lon- 
don cabinet. 

DESPATCH   DATED  MARCH   1,   1917 

The  minister  for  foreign  affairs  asked  me  today  whether  I  had 
received  a  reply  from  the  Imperial  [Russian]  Government  relat- 
ing to  Japan's  desires  on  the  question  of  Shantung  and  the  Pacific 
islands,  and  told  me  that  the  Japanese  Government  would  very  much 
like  to  have  at  the  earliest  moment  a  promise  from  us  on  the  subject. 


108     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

To  the  British,  French,  and  Italian  governments  the  pros- 
pect of  the  United  States  entering  the  war  as  an  antagonist 
to  Germany  came  as  an  event  of  stupendous  importance, 
which  promised  to  turn  a  situation  portending  stalemate  or 
possible  defeat  into  a  good  chance  for  the  Allies  to  win  the 
war.  Therefore,  even  if  they  had  not  been  otherwise  inter- 
ested in  China,  those  governments  probably  would  have  sup- 
ported any  move  by  the  American  Government  tending  to 
draw  neutral  nations  into  sympathy  and  alinement  with  the 
Allies.  Their  legations  at  Peking  were  sympathetic  to  the 
American  proposal,  and  so  advised  the  Chinese  Government. 
It  was  realized  by  all  diplomats  at  Peking  that  Japan  did 
not  want  China  to  get  into  the  war,  especially  not  on  the  side 
of  the  Allies.  Japan  might  have  liked  to  see  China  join  with 
Germany,  for  she  could  have  given  no  effective  help  to  Ger- 
many, and  that  action  would  have  provided  Japan  with  a 
good  excuse  to  occupy  the  country.  Here,  however,  was  a 
new  situation,  and  the  diplomatic  world  wondered  how  the 
Tokio  cabinet  would  take  it.  Among  diplomats  at  Peking  it 
was  pretty  well  understood  how  the  Japanese  Government 
would  feel,  but  how  would  it  act?  The  inquiry  of  the  Rus- 
sian ambassador  at  Tokio  throws  light  on  Japan's  attitude. 
The  Tokio  Foreign  Office  without  doubt  perceived  that  there- 
after, especially  if  America  entered  the  war,  it  would  be 
difficult  for  Japan  to  sustain  any  longer  an  attitude  of  keep- 
ing China  out  of  the  Allied  consortium.  But,  in  exchange 
for  her  consent  to  withdraw  its  objection  to  China  joining 
the  Allies,  the  Japanese  Government  expressly  told  M.  Kru- 
pensky  that  Japan  wanted  the  assurance  of  the  Allied  powers 
that  her  possession  of  the  Pacific  islands  north  of  the  equator 
that  had  belonged  to  Germany  would  be  guaranteed  by 
them,  and  that  her  position  in  Shantung  also  would  be 
recognized.  Stripped  of  its  diplomatic  euphemism,  this  meant 
that  Japan  would  not  help  to  bring  China  into  the  Allied 
group  if  that  would  result  in  depriving  Japan  of  her 
"whack"  in  China. 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  109 

It  is  probable  that  the  revolution  in  Russia  prevented  the 
Russian  Foreign  Office  from  formally  giving  to  Japan  the 
desired  assurances  about  the  Pacific  islands  and  Shantung, 
for  the  revolution  broke  soon  after  the  receipt  of  M.  Krupen- 
sky's  despatch  at  Petrograd.  Whether  the  British  and 
French  governments  were  asked  by  Japan  to  give  similar  as- 
surances regarding  Shantung,  and  whether  they  gave  the 
assurances,  remains  at  the  time  I  write  a  diplomatic  secret 
which  the  deliberations  of  the  peace  conference  probably  will 
expose.  At  that  time  (February,  1917),  the  Japanese  am- 
bassador at  Washington  went  to  the  state  department  and 
stated  that  William  J.  Bryan,  when  he  was  secretary  of  state, 
had  promised  to  respect  Japan's  special  position  in  China, 
and  asked  in  the  event  of  China  and  America  entering  the 
war  with  the  Allies  that  the  American  Government  would 
support  Japan's  position  in  Shantung  province  and  also  her 
claim  to  the  Pacific  islands  north  of  the  equator.  I  am  re- 
liably informed  that  Secretary  of  State  Lansing  said  that  he 
knew  of  no  promise  of  that  nature  ever  given  by  the  state 
department,  and  he  declined  to  commit  the  American  Govern- 
ment in  the  matter.  In  that  interview,  so  I  am  informed, 
the  Japanese  ambassador  told  Mr.  Lansing  that  Germany 
had  approached  Japan  with  a  view  to  coming  to  an  under- 
standing. It  is  interesting  to  note  how  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment, when  it  had  occasion  to  procure  some  commitment 
in  its  favor  from  one  of  the  Allies  or  co-belligerents,  almost 
invariably  would  throw  out  an  intimation  of  how  Japan  might 
get  what  she  wanted  from  Germany. 

Events  at  Peking,  however,  moved  more  rapidly  than  Ja- 
panese diplomacy  calculated  they  would.  The  American 
minister  with  indefatigable  energy  was  urging  the  Chinese 
Government  to  accept  the  American  suggestion.  The  pre- 
mier, Tuan  Chi-jui,  was  the  strong  man  in  the  Government, 
and  really  represented  it  in  the  negotiations,  as  Wu  Ting- 
fang's  illness  prevented  him  from  participating  actively.  The 
Wai  Chiao-pu  was  well  represented  by  his  son,  C.  C.  Wu, 


110     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

who  took  part  in  most  of  the  conversations.  It  developed 
that  China  wanted  something  by  way  of  definite  assurances, 
and  asked  that  the  American  Government  would  promise  that 
China  would  be  consulted  in  the  peace  settlement  as  to  the 
disposition  of  her  territory  and  other  questions.  Dr.  Reinsch 
was  unable  officially  to  give  such  an  assurance,  as  the  cable 
communication  with  America  just  then  became  temporarily 
interrupted;  but  he  gave  his  personal  opinion,  in  the  event 
that  China  followed  the  advice  of  the  United  States,  that  the 
American  Government  without  doubt  would  use  its  influence 
to  have  China's  rights  respected.  Among  those  at  Peking  who 
labored  to  induce  the  Chinese  Government  to  follow  the  ad- 
vice of  America  were  several  British  and  American  press  cor- 
respondents, and  especially  Dr.  George  E.  Morrison,  for  many 
years  the  Peking  correspondent  of  "The  Times"  of  London 
and  now  political  adviser  of  the  Chinese  Government ;  and  Dr. 
J.  C.  Ferguson,  an  American  adviser.  Dr.  Wellington  Koo, 
Chinese  minister  at  "Washington,  also  urged  his  Government 
at  that  juncture  to  adopt  the  advice  of  the  United  States. 
Among  foreigners  in  China,  except  Japanese,  there  was  al- 
most unanimity  of  opinion  that  China's  opportunity  to  escape 
foreign  domination  and  a  further  restriction  of  her  autonomy 
and  territory  lay  in  getting  under  the  wing  of  America.  By 
dint  of  much  argument  the  leading  men  in  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment were  induced  to  accept  this  view,  and  on  February 
9,  China  took  the  momentous  step  of  severing  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  Germany. 

The  official  correspondence  follows: 

The  American  Minister  at  Peking  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
[Note — Copy.] 

Peking,  February  4th,  1917. 
Excellency : 

I  have  the  honor  to  advise  Your  Excellency  that  I  have  been  in- 
structed by  my  Government  to  make  to  you  the  following  notification 
in  its  behalf: 

This  Government,  in  view  of  the  recent  announcement  by  the 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  111 

German  Government  of  its  intention  to  renew  indiscriminate  sub- 
marine warfare,  has  no  alternative  but  to  pursue  the  course  laid 
down  in  its  note  to  the  German  Government  on  April  18th,  1916. 
It  will  therefore  recall  the  American  Ambassador  and  his  suite  at 
Berlin,  and  will  forthwith  deliver  to  the  German  Ambassador  in 
Washington  passports  for  himself  and  his  suite. 

I  am  further  instructed  to  say  that  the  President  is  reluctant  to  be- 
lieve that  Germany  will  actually  carry  out  the  threats  made  against 
neutral  commerce,  but,  if  it  is  done,  the  President  will  ask  from 
Congress  authority  to  use  the  national  power  to  protect  American 
citizens  engaged  in  peaceful  and  lawful  errands  on  the  high  seas. 
The  course  taken  is,  in  the  view  of  the  President,  in  entire  conformity 
"with  the  principles  enunciated  by  him  in  his  address  to  the  Senate 
on  January  22nd,  and  he  therefore  believes  that  it  will  make  for  the 
peace  of  the  world  if  the  other  neutral  Powers  can  find  it  possible  to 
take  action  similar  to  that  taken  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States. 

I  avail,  etc. 

[sd.]  Paul  Reinsch. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  German  Minister  at  Peking. 
[Note — Translation.  ] 

Peking,  9th  day,  2nd  month, 
6th  year  of  the  Republic. 
[February  9th,  1917.] 
Your  Excellency: 

A  telegraphic  communication  has  been  received  from  the  Chinese 
Minister  at  Berlin  transmitting  a  note  from  the  German  Government 
dated  February  1st,  1917,  which  makes  known  that  the  measures  of 
blockade  newly  adopted  by  the  Government  of  Germany  will,  from 
that  day,  endanger  neutral  merchant  vessels  navigating  in  certain 
prescribed  zones. 

The  new  measures  of  submarine  warfare  inaugurated  by  Germany, 
imperilling  the  lives  and  property  of  Chinese  citizens  to  even  a 
greater  extent  than  the  measures  previously  taken  which  have  already 
cost  China  so  many  lives,  constitute  a  violation  of  the  principles  of 
international  law  at  present  in  force,  and  an  interference  with  legiti- 
mate commercial  intercourse  between  neutral  states  and  between 
neutral  states  and  belligerent  powers ;  if  we  submit  to  this  method  of 
warfare  it  will  be  equivalent  to  an  admission  on  our  part  that  this 
arbitrary  and  unjustifiable  course  of  action  is  in  accordance  with 
international  law. 


112     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

The  Chinese  Government,  therefore,  protests  energetically  to  the 
Imperial  German  Government  against  the  measures  proclaimed  on 
February  1st,  and  sincerely  hopes  that  with  a  view  to  respecting  the 
rights  of  neutral  states  and  to  maintaining  the  friendly  relations  be- 
tween these  two  countries,  the  said  measures  will  not  be  carried  out. 

In  case,  contrary  to  its  expectations,  its  protest  be  ineffectual,  the 
Government  of  the  Chinese  Republic  will  be  constrained,  to  its  pro- 
found regret,  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  at  present  existing  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  It  is  necessary  to  add  that  the  attitude  of 
the  Chinese  Government  has  been  dictated  purely  by  the  desire  to 
further  the  cause  of  the  world's  peace  and  the  maintenance  of  the 
sanctity  of  international  law. 

I  avail,  etc. 

[sd.]    Wu  TlNG-FANG. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  American  Minister  at  Peking. 
[Note — Translation.] 

Peking,  9th  day,  2nd  month, 

6th  year  of  the  Republic. 

„        „      „  [February  9th  1918] 

Your  Excellency: 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  February  4th,  1917,  informing  me  that  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  in  view  of  the  adoption  by  the  German 
Government  of  its  new  policy  of  submarine  warfare  on  the  1st  of 
February,  has  decided  to  take  certain  action  which  it  judges  neces- 
sary as  regards  Germany. 

The  Chinese  Government,  like  the  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  is  reluctant  to  believe  that  the  German  Government  will 
actually  carry  into  execution  those  measures  which  imperil  the  lives 
and  property  of  citizens  of  neutral  states  and  jeopardize  the  com- 
merce, even  legitimate,  between  neutrals  as  well  as  between  neutrals 
and  belligerents  and  which  tend,  if  allowed  to  be  enforced  without 
opposition,  to  introduce  a  new  principle  into  international  law. 

The  Chinese  Government  being  in  accord  with  the  principles  set 
forth  in  Your  Excellency's  note  and  firmly  associating  itself  with  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  has  taken  similar 
action  by  protesting  energetically  to  the  German  Government  against 
the  new  measures  of  blockade.  The  Chinese  Government  also  pro- 
poses to  take  such  action  in  the  future  as  may  be  deemed  necessary 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  principles  of  international  law. 

I  avail,  etc. 

[sd.]   WU  TiNG-FAtfG. 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  113 

Japan  was  surprised  at  China's  sudden  decision,  but  the 
Tokio  Government  immediately  issued  a  statement,  approving 
the  action,  so  phrased  as  to  give  to  uninformed  persons  an 
impression  that  China's  action  was  taken  by  the  advice  of 
Japan. 

Six  months  passed  between  China's  breaking  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany  and  her  declaration  of  war  against 
that  power,  and  during  this  period  the  diplomatic  struggle 
at  Peking  to  sway  China's  policy  was  continued.  The  situa- 
tion was  complicated  by  an  internal  political  quarrel  between 
the  executive  branch  of  the  Government  and  the  parliament, 
which  eventually  caused  the  dissolution  of  parliament  and 
a  breach  between  the  northern  and  southern  Chinese  parties, 
and  had  as  an  interlude  the  fiasco  of  the  restoration  of  the 
monarchy.  As  these  phases  of  China's  internal  politics  are 
closely  related  to  the  war  policy  of  the  nation  and  form  its 
background,  some  explanation  of  them  is  pertinent.  I  quote 
some  comments  of  my  own,  published  in  "Millard's  Review," 
Shanghai,  of  June  9,  1917 : 

China  is  again  in  the  throes  of  one  of  the  recurring  political 
crises  which  periodically  threaten  to  disrupt  the  nation,  and  which 
are  so  discouraging  to  her  foreign  friends.  The  issue  is,  as  usual, 
somewhat  indistinct,  both  as  to  principle  and  expediency;  but  the 
chief  elements  can  be  discovered.  At  bottom,  it  is  a  struggle  for 
control  of  the  Government  between  Chinese  political  parties — or 
factions  is  a  better  term,  for  a  Chinese  political  party,  as  these  are 
understood  in  western  countries,  has  not  yet  come  into  existence. 
Roughly,  these  factions  are  described  as  the  Military  Party,  and 
the  so-called  Liberal  Party — the  latter  being  named  the  Kuoming- 
tang.  The  Military  Party  is  chiefly  composed  of  the  Tuchuns,  or 
military  commanders  of  the  various  provinces  and  districts.  Nearly 
all  the  troops  now  under  arms  in  China  are  controlled  by  the 
Tuchuns,  and  this  gives  them  such  political  power  as  they  possess. 
The  Liberal  Party  has  a  majority  in  the  Parliament — a  Parliament 
which  was  elected,  or  selected  by  factional  caucuses,  prior  to  the 
last  rebellion,  and  which  was  dissolved  by  Yuan  Shih  K'ai.  The 
Military  Party  has,  since  the  death  of  Yuan  Shih  K'ai,  and  the 
assumption  of  the  Presidency  by  Li  Yuan  Hung,  held  the  principal 
Cabinet    offices,   under   General    Tuan    Chi-jui,   recently   Premier. 


114     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

General  Tuan  took  office  when  the  State  seemed  to  be  crumbling, 
alter  the  sudden  death  of  Yuan,  and  managed  to  organize  a  Govern- 
ment, such  as  it  was.  Parliament,  when  it  reassembled,  became  the 
center  of  opposition  to  the  Premier's  Government,  as  it  had  been 
in  Yuan  Shih  K'ai's  administration.  There  is  little  in  this  contest 
between  Parliament  and  the  Executive  branches  of  Government  to 
distinguish  it,  in  principle,  from  similar  contests  in  other  countries 
since  the  struggle  for  democratic  government  began.  There  are 
the  usual  disputes  over  rights,  precedence,  power  and  privileges, 
as  between  the  two  branches  of  Government.  A  difficulty  is  that, 
in  China,  there  is  no  recognized  constitution;  a  temporary  instru- 
ment exists,  but  its  legality  and  application  are  matters  of  dispute. 

Here  are  all  the  elements  for  political  friction,  and  of  course 
the  friction  developed.  This  was  not  unexpected;  it  even  was  not 
altogether  undesirable  in  a  republic,  academically,  provided  it  was 
restrained  within  proper  bounds.  But,  when  Parliament  and  the 
Premier  disagreed — and  they  usually  did  disagree — there  was  a 
deadlock  which  frequently  blocked  the  wheels  of  administration. 
An  old  story.  The  Premier  tried  to  have  his  way,  and  Parliament, 
while  obstructing  him,  sought  opportunities  to  put  the  Premier  in 
a  hole.  Between  the  factions,  President  Li  Yuan  Hung  has  tried 
to  be  neutral,  and  to  shape  his  course  by  the  provisional  constitution, 
and  the  advice  of  foreign  constitutional  lawyers.  His  course  has 
always  been  moderate,  and  conciliatory,  and  he  has  coutinually 
striven  to  preserve  peace,  and  to  work  out  a  solution  on  republican 
lines.  As  the  schism  widened,  the  Premier  drew  to  him  the  Tuchuns, 
and  they  formed  a  partial  solidarity  as  opposed  to  the  majority 
in  Parliament.  The  quarrel  developed  into  a  complete  breach,  and 
the  Premier  induced  the  President  to  summon  the  Tuchuns  to  Peking 
for  consultation.  Some  of  the  influential  Tuchuns  responded,  and 
went  to  Peking;  where  they  agreed  to  demand  the  dissolution  of 
Parliament  as  necessary  to  the  administration  of  the  Government. 
On  the  other  hand.  Parliament — or  the  Kuomingtang  majority — 
insisted  on  the  dismissal  of  the  Premier,  and  the  appointment  of  a 
Premier  and  Cabinet  harmonious  with  and  satisfactory  to  Parlia- 
ment. In  this  situation,  the  Premier  resiimed  (or  was  dismissed 
by  the  President)  and  left  Peking.  The  Tuchuns  soon  followed 
him  to  Tientsin,  and  announced  their  independence  of  the  Central 
Government,  threatening  a  military  advance  on  the  capital  unless 
their  conditions  were  complied  with,  and  Parliament  was  dissolved. 
This  is  a  rough  outline  of  recent  events. 

In  attempting  to  discern  the  merits  of  this  dispute,  and  the  bet- 
ter course  to  adopt,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  what  are,  or  may 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  115 

be  the  real  underlying  causes  of  dissension,  and  the  fundamental 
principles  involved.  The  Military  Party  claims  that  the  present 
Parliament  has  no  legal  basis  for  existence,  and  this  argument  is 
not  without  plausibility.  The  Liberal  Party  claims  that  it  is  try- 
ing to  sustain  in  China  the  vital  principles  of  republican  and  con- 
stitutional government.  Therefore,  the  issue  has  two  phases — 
what  is  right  in  principle,  and  what  is  politically  expedient.  As 
a  matter  of  principle,  taking  constitutional  forms  as  they  are  gen- 
erally understood  and  applied,  the  Tuchuns  are  wrong  hi  dictating 
to  the  Government,  and  in  demanding  the  dissolution  of  Parliament. 
In  short,  a  group  of  generals  assert  the  right  to  decide  legal  ques- 
tions, and  to  enforce  their  interpretation  of  constitutional  issues. 
This  assumption  is  subversive  of  constitutional  government — there 
is  no  doubt  on  that  point.  So  on  the  main  issue,  Parliament  is 
technically  in  the  right.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Military  Party 
have  a  very  good  argument  on  grounds  of  political  expediency. 
The  Tuchuns  contend  that  order  is  the  first  requirement  of  the 
Chinese  Government  at  this  juncture;  that  order  cannot  be  main- 
tained except  by  the  Government  controlling  troops,  and  that  the 
Tuchuns  have  the  troops — therefore,  the  Tuchuns  are  the  only 
officials  who  can  maintain  order,  and  their  wishes  must  be  con- 
sulted in  the  composition  of  the  Cabinet,  and  the  decision  of  ad- 
ministrative questions.  Furthermore,  the  Tuchuns  claim  that  if 
they  would  yield  to  Parliament,  and  obey  its  injunctions,  that  the 
result  merely  would  be  that  they  would  be  removed  from  their 
commands,  and  replaced  by  members  of  the  other  Party,  who  when 
in  power  would  be  not  a  whit  less  arbitrary  in  using  the  army  for 
partisan  advantage  than  the  present  Military  Party  is.  There  is 
much  in  the  present  state  of  Chinese  polities  to  bear  out  this  argu- 
ment. As  for  Parliament,  its  case  must  now  rest  solely  on  the 
technical  basis  for  its  existence.  As  a  functioning  constitutional 
body  it  has  so  far  been  a  failure. 

The  drawn-out  controversy  which  preceded  and  brought  on  the 
crisis  developed  some  interesting  matters.  An  argument  used  by 
the  Liberal  Party  to  undermine  the  Premier  with  the  people  was 
that  he  plans  to  betray  the  country  to  Japan ;  and  that  he  has  re- 
cently concluded  a  secret  agreement  with  Japan  whereby  Japan  is 
to  sustain  the  Military  Party  in  restoring  the  monarchy  in  China, 
and  be  compensated  by  concessions  and  supervision  over  some  of 
China's  administrative  functions.  A  prominent  member  of  the 
Liberal  Party  said  to  me  recently:  "I  wonder  if  the  American 
Government  understands  why  Japan,  which  has  for  some  time  sup- 
ported our  Party  in  Chinese  poUtics,  is  now  supporting  the  Pre- 


116     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

mier's  party?"  The  reason,  according  to  my  questioner,  is  that  the 
ex-Premier  had  planned  to  betray  China  into  the  bands  of  Japan. 
This  accusation,  coming  from  men  who  for  years  have  been  sus- 
pected of  themselves  being  closely  associated  with  Japanese  designs 
and  policy  in  China,  is  at  least  interesting. 

With  reference  to  Japan's  part  in  these  complications,  and  her 
possible  course  in  case  China  becomes  embroiled  in  civil  war  at 
this  time,  I  think  that  less  apprehension  need  be  felt  now  than  if 
this  crisis  had  come  some  months,  or  a  year  ago.  "World  events 
are  taking  a  course  that  compels  modification,  or  at  least  suspen- 
sion, of  some  phases  of  Japan's  policy  toward  China,  as  exemplified 
by  Group  V  of  the  twenty-one  demands.  "Without  accusing  Japan 
of  insincerity  in  her  present  professions  of  change  of  heart  on 
these  matters  of  policy,  it  can  be  pointed  out  that,  even  if  she 
should  still  want  to  press  Group  V  and  to  seize  the  opportunity 
which  civil  war  in  China  would  give  for  intervention  here,  world 
conditions  are  far  less  favorable  to  a  consummation  of  such  a 
project  than  formerly.  The  revolution  in  Russia  and  the  military 
and  political  reconstitution  of  America  that  is  taking  place,  with 
the  reactions  of  those  events  on  other  Powers  now  and  in  the  fu- 
ture, profoundly  affect  Japan's  position,  and  therefore  probably 
will  influence  her  policy  in  China. 

At  that  juncture  the  American  Government  took  cognizance 
of  the  state  of  China  and  sought  to  check  its  disorderly  ten- 
dencies by  addressing  to  China  a  friendly  note  of  advice. 
This  act  at  once  became  the  subject  of  wide-spread  criticism, 
for  it  was  a  further  innovation  in  the  far-Eastern  policy  of 
the  United  States.  I  include  here  some  of  my  own  comments 
made  at  the  time.  In  "Millard's  Review"  of  June  16,  1917, 
I  wrote: 

Action  by  the  United  States  in  officially  requesting  all  the  allied 
powers  to  address  China  in  terms  similar  to  the  American  note 
sent  last  week  (advising  China  against  becoming  involved  in  civil 
war)  has  unusual  significance.  When  the  American  note  was  pub- 
lished, the  Japanese  semi-official  press  immediately  began  to  crit- 
icize it  in  a  somewhat  irritated  tone,  on  the  theory  that  it  is  rather 
an  impudence  for  America  to  advise  China,  without  first  consulting 
Japan.  Some  editors  even  have  held  that,  in  case  it  was  necessary 
to  advise  China,  Japan  ought  to  insist  that  any  advice  be  given 
through  Tokio  exclusively.     This  argument  is  directly  in  line  with 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  117 

the  hypothesis  which  Mr.  Zumoto  and  other  Japanese  publicists 
have  been  propagating  so  sedulously  during  the  last  two  or  three 
years,  and  amounts  almost  to  an  assertion  of  Japan's  right  to 
manage  China  to  the  exclusion  of  other  nations.  This  last  note  of 
the  American  Government  seems  like  a  direct  retort  to  those  as- 
sumptions. Not  only  does  the  United  States  take  her  own  course 
in  advising  China,  but  she  now  goes  further,  and  directly  asks  the 
Allies,  including  Japan,  to  join  in  giving  the  same  advice.  In  one 
sense,  this  can  be  taken  as  a  straw  indicating  the  answer  that  may 
be  given  to  Mr.  Zumoto's  speculations  about  how  far  America  will 
go,  as  he  puts  it,  in  "interfering  between  China  and  Japan,"  or 
being  a  'political  busybody  in  Eastern  affairs."  It  begins  to  ap- 
pear that  American  foreign  policy  already  is  taking  forms  not  as 
yet  comprehended,  in  all  their  significance,  in  Japan,  and  which 
are  of  intense  interest  to  Chinese.  This  action  of  America,  and  the 
reasons  which  have  prompted  it,  are  of  course  quite  apart  from 
China's  reception  of  the  advice,  and  even  of  the  other  powers'  re- 
sponse to  America's  request. 

And  in  " Millard's  Review"  of  June  23,  1917,  I  wrote  fur- 
ther: 

For  the  time,  more  interest  has  been  evinced  in  the  note  of  the 
American  Government  to  China,  and  its  effort  to  have  certain  other 
nations  join  with  it  in  this  pacific  advice,  than  in  phases  of  internal 
politics.  There  is  some  obscurity  about  the  sending  of  this  note, 
as  to  time  and  circumstances;  but  it  seems  to  have  been  the  in- 
tention of  the  American  Government  to  present  the  note  to  China, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  provide  other  nations  with  copies  of  it, 
asking  them  to  address  China  in  similar  terms.  Evidently  it  was 
not  intended  to  make,  action  by  America  in  any  way  dependent  or 
conditional  on  conjunction  with  any  other  nations,  for  the  note 
was  presented  independently,  without  waiting  for  replies  from 
other  powers.  These  replies  have  now  been  made,  to  the  effect 
(as  to  Great  Britain  and  France  at  least)  that  while  they  agree  in 
principle  with  the  advice  given  by  America  and  with  its  objects, 
they  are  inhibited  from  joining  in  the  advice.  Analyzed,  this  hardly 
can  mean  anything  else  than  that  Great  Britain  and  France,  at 
some  previous  time,  have  made  engagements  (probably  with  Japan 
and  Russia,  or  with  either)  which  are  not  abrogated,  and  which 
deter  those  powers  from  acting  with  America  at  this  time. 

Perhaps  one  purpose  of  the  American  note  was  to  bring  this 
revelation.    If  Great  Britain  and  France  think  the  American  ad- 


118     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

vice  sound  in  principle,  and  correct  as  to  objects,  why  not  join 
with  America  in  trying  to  influence  China  by  friendly  moral  suasion, 
in  the  interest  of  maintaining  peace  among  Chinese  at  this  time, 
and  probably  also  with  the  additional  object  of  rinding  a  way  peace- 
fully to  sustain  democratic  institutions  in  this  country t  The  an- 
swer logically  must  be  that,  at  some  time  within  the  last  few  years, 
perhaps  since  the  great  war  began,  Japan  has  wrung  commitments 
from  these  powers  regarding  their  policies  in  China.  If  this  is 
true,  then  undoubted^  America  wants  to  know  it,  and  the  way  has 
been  paved  to  find  out  exactly  what  the  status  is.  The  time  is 
coming  when,  in  the  far  East  as  well  as  in  Europe,  all  the  hold- 
over agreements  of  the  secret  school  of  diplomacy,  which  plaj'ed 
so  powerful  a  part  in  getting  the  world  into  this  war,  will  have  to 
be  put  face  up  on  the  table.  This  is  the  intimation  carried  in  world 
politics  by  this  American  note  to  China.  It  is  indicative  of  funda- 
mental diplomatic  moves  that  are  taking  place  as  a  result  of  en- 
trance of  America  into  the  war. 

The  Japanese  press  in  Japan  and  that  part  of  the  press 
in  China  controlled  by  Japan  made  an  issue  of  this  incident 
of  the  American  advice  to  China.  As  usual,  the  criticism 
was  linked  with  a  systematic  misrepresentation  of  the  facts 
and  with  garbled  news  despatches  about  the  affair.  I  quote 
from  two  leading  Japanese  newspapers  on  the  topic: 

FROM   THE   "TOKIO   ASAHl" 

That  the  advice  recently  given  to  China  by  Dr.  Paul  Reinsch, 
American  Minister  to  China,  was  clearlj'  interference  in  the  do- 
mestic politics  of  China  cannot  be  denied.  Only  it  is  not  clear 
with  what  motive  that  advice  was  given.  It  had  been  interpreted 
in  good  faith  that  the  advice  was  given  under  instructions  issued 
carelessly  by  the  American  Government,  based  upon  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  American  Minister  in  Peking.  But  we  now 
have  come  to  learn  of  the  true  intention  and  motive  of  the  Amer- 
ican advice  from  the  reasons  made  public  for  sending  that  advice 
by  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  as  per  our  special  despatch 
from  New  York.  According  to  the  entire  tenor  of  the  American 
advice  to  China,  America  meant  from  the  first  to  interfere  with 
the  domestic  affairs  of  that  country.  She  purposely  exaggerated 
the  mobilization  of  Japanese  troops  and  the  urgency  of  prepara- 
tions of  the  Entente  Powers  against  the  war  situation  as  reasons 
for  this  advice.     We  considered  the  rumor  of  a  Japanese  invasion 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  119 

of  Siberia  very  seriously  in  connection  with  the  rumor  of  a  separate 
peace  by  Russia.  Now  this  horrible  scheme  has  been  made  use  of 
in  the  American  advice  to  China.  Even  if  the  rumor  in  question 
were  true,  the  contention  that  Japan  needs  to  prepare  to  mobilize 
in  Manchuria  sooner  or  later  on  behalf  of  the  Entente  Powers  does 
not  by  any  means  justify  America's  independent  interference  in 
China's  domestic  politics  by  over-riding  other  nations. 

FROM   THE  "YAMATO"    (TOKIO) 

America's  recent  action  was  at  great  variance  with  the  policy 
hitherto  pursued  by  that  country.  It  is  still  fresh  in  the  memory 
of  the  Powers  that  America  withdrew  from  the  Quintuple  Syndicate 
in  China  on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  wish  to  interfere  in  Chinese 
politics,  and  that  when  the  Japanese  Government  approached 
America  with  a  proposal  of  advising  Yuan  Shih  Kai  to  postpone 
the  establishment  of  a  monarchy,  she  declined  to  take  concerted 
action  with  Japan  and  other  Powers  for  a  similar  reason.  Yet 
America  has  now  precipitately  interfered  in  China's  domestic 
politics  independently  of  the  other  Powers,  who  are  assuming  the 
passive  attitude  of  lookers-on.  Moreover,  America  must  be  aware 
of  the  superior  position  enjoyed  by  Japan  in  China,  which  may  be 
compared  to  that  enjoyed  by  America  in  Mexico.  Yet  while  Japan 
has  abstained  from  taking  any  steps  whatever  in  Mexieo,  in  defer- 
ence to  America's  special  position  there,  America  has  interfered 
in  China's  domestic  politics  by  ignoring  Japan's  position  there. 

The  "Japan  Advertiser,"  the  American  paper  at  Tokio, 
had  this  to  say : 

Anyone  who  knows  anything  about  America's  policy  in  China 
will  appreciate  that  America  has  no  political  ambitions,  no  de- 
sires for  spheres  of  influence  or  any  political  or  financial  control 
in  China.  The  note  addressed  by  the  United  States  Government 
was  a  friendly  one  and  merely  advisory,  and  expressed  a  desire 
to  see  China  set  aside  her  factional  political  disputes  at  this  critical 
time. 

We  regret  the  comments  in  the  Japanese  press  and  we  regret 
the  interviews  which  were  given  to  the  foreign  press,  because  we 
have  worked  and  wish  to  continue  to  work  for  closer  and  more 
friendly  relationships  between  Japan  and  the  United  States.  There 
never  was  a  time  when  conditions  were  more  favorable  to  the  pro- 
moting of  a  closer  and  better  understanding  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, nor  has  any  administration  in  Japan  stood  on  a  broader  and 


120     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

saner  foreign  policy  to  assure  such  results  than  that  of  those  in 
power  at  the  present  time. 

We  regret  it  because  suspicion  will  now  be  attached  to  Japan's 
motives.  The  note  which  the  United  States  sent  to  China  is  one 
which  any  and  every  nation  having  the  interests  of  China  at  heart 
should  be  willing  and  ready  to  subscribe  to.  There  is  nothing  in 
it  which  any  nation  can  justly  take  exception  to. 

I  want  to  elucidate  the  matter  of  this  advice  of  the  United 
States  to  China  now  because  it  was  a  forerunner  of  import- 
ant events,  and  because  it  was  a  fairly  distinct  revelation  of 
certain  international  purposes  and  alinements.  The  Amer- 
ican note  in  itself  was  inoffensive  in  tone  and  had  no  ulterior 
objects.  It  simply  suggested  to  China  that  the  moment  was 
very  unpropitious  for  any  nation  to  become  internally  disor- 
ganized, and  that  such  a  situation  contained  special  dangers 
for  China.  Why  any  other  power  should  object  to  such  an 
influence  being  applied  at  that  time  to  the  situation  of  China 
one  scarcely  can  see,  unless  other  powers  should  desire  to  have 
China  in  disorder.  I  bring  these  points  out  here  because 
later  on  this  same  question  of  the  foreign  powers  advising 
China  about  the  same  condition  came  up  again  in  somewhat 
different  circumstances.  The  Japanese  propaganda  about  the 
incident  then  was  a  prelude,  as  it  developed  subsequently,  to 
certain  purposes  of  the  Ishii  mission  to  America.  In  "Mil- 
lard's Review,"  June  23,  1917,  I  wrote: 

Japan  has  followed  the  example  of  the  principal  Allied  nations 
of  Europe,  and  is  sending  a  commission  to  America  composed  of 
eminent  Japanese.  The  Japanese  press  attaches  great  importance 
to  this  visit,  and  no  doubt  it  will  be  given  considerable  prominence 
in  the  United  States,  where  it  will  be  "boosted"  by  the  full  machin- 
ery of  Japan's  organized  publicity  there.  I  am  very  glad  this 
commission  is  to  visit  the  United  States  at  this  time,  but  hardly 
for  exactly  the  reasons  which  the  Japanese  press  advances.  The 
well-worn  formula,  "to  create  a  better  understanding  in  America  of 
Japan's  true  purposes,"  which  is  the  ostensible  purpose  of  the 
visit  as  ascribed  by  the  Japanese  press,  is  of  course  merely  the 
customary  balderdash.  Such  visits  of  Japanese,  and  Japan's 
propaganda  in  America  have  heretofore  been  used  principally  to 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  121 

prevent  Japan's  purposes  from  being  understood  there.  I  regard 
the  purposes  of  this  mission  as  follows :  First,  to  get  into  the  lime- 
light along  with  the  other  powers  before  the  American  public,  so 
as  to  absorb  some  reflected  popularity  and  to  keep  Japan's  view- 
point to  the  fore;  Second,  to  insinuate  Japan's  theorem  of  adjust- 
ing the  war  issues  as  they  apply  to  the  East  into  the  thought  of 
the  American  people  and  American  Government.  Of  course,  this 
is  perfectly  legitimate  from  Japan's  standpoint,  and  is  just  what 
the  special  missions  of  other  nations  went  to  America  to  do  in 
their  own  behalf.  Without  doubt,  the  Japanese  mission  will  be 
received  as  politely  as  the  other  missions  were,  and  what  the  com- 
missioners have  to  say  will  be  listened  to  seriously.  In  one  way, 
however,  I  think  the  Japanese  press  is  a  little  wrong  in  perspective 
on  the  mission,  and  its  effects  in  America.  It  assumes  rather  too 
much  that  these  eminent  Japanese  will  tell  a  lot  to  Americans,  and 
is  inclined  to  ignore  what  Americans  may  tell  these  Japanese.  I 
welcome,  and  the  American  Government  also  should  welcome,  this 
chance  to  tell  Japan  privately,  but  in  perfectly  plain  terms,  how 
the  United  States  regards  some  of  the  fundamental  problems  con- 
nected with  far  Eastern  conditions  and  politics;  and  to  make  it 
plain  to  Japan  that  hereafter  the  United  States  intends  to  inter- 
est itself  actively  in  the  solution  of  these  questions.  Once  this  is 
accepted  in  Japan  as  a  fact,  there  will  be  a  great  and  I  hope  a 
permanent  improvement  in  the  relations  between  Japan  and  Amer- 
ica. 

One  thing  that  ought  to  be  impressed  on  these  commissioners  is 
that  the  United  States  will  not  submit  to  being  thrust  into  the 
position  of  a  satellite  of  Japan  in  respect  to  China;  nor  of  Europe 
either.  Emphasis  of  this  point  need  not  mean  nor  display  any  sug- 
gestion of  antipathy  to  Japan,  or  of  opposition  to  her  legitimate 
commercial  expansion  in  China,  or  anywhere;  nor  of  indisposition 
of  Americans,  or  the  American  Government,  to  cooperate  with 
Japan  whenever  cooperation  is  legitimate  and  feasible.  But  Amer- 
ica, in  dealing  with  China,  should  remain  a  free  agent,  with  full 
independent  powers  of  action  in  matters  of  particular  interest  to 
our  nation  and  which  are  or  should  be  outside  the  scope  of  inter- 
vention by  other  nations.  "We  allow  this  position  to  Japan,  and 
should  insist  on  retaining  it  for  ourselves.  I  have  no  patience 
with  publicists  in  America  who  are  disposed  to  concede  a  contention 
so  frequently  advanced  by  the  Japanese  semi-official  press,  that 
under  the  Root-Takahira  Agreement  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment is  required  or  obligated  to  consult  Japan  before  taking  im- 
portant steps  in  China.     Recently,  according  to  reports  telegraphed 


122     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

from  America  by  Japanese  news  services,  the  "New  York  Evening 
Post,"  a  leading  pacifist  organ,  argues  that  the  United  States  ''should 
understand  Japan's  special  predominance  in  China,  and  not  take 
any  diplomatic  action  there  without  first  consulting  Japan,  be- 
cause there  is  a  convention,  etc."  The  Japanese  papers  garble 
utterances  of  this  kind  so  frequently  that  I  may  be  doing  the 
"Evening  Post"  an  injustice  to  credit  it  with  having  advanced  this 
argument,  but  it  is  in  line  with  utterances  of  that  paper  that  I 
have  seen  before.  When  it  advances  (if  it  has  done  that)  the 
argument  that  the  Root-Takahira  Agreement  commits  the  United 
States  to  consult  Japan  in  all  diplomatic  moves  made  in  respect 
to  China,  it  takes  an  utterly  untenable  position,  which  will  not 
bear  analysis. 

The  Root-Takahira  Agreement  consists  of  identic  notes  ex- 
changed between  the  then  Japanese  Ambassador  at  Washington 
and  Elihu  Root,  then  Secretary  of  State,  by  which  both  Govern- 
ments, in  identical  terms,  engage  to  sustain  the  status  quo  in  China 
and  the  principle  of  equal  commercial  opportunity  here  and  the 
territorial  integrity  of  China.  Article  5  says:  "Should  any  event 
occur  threatening  the  status  quo  as  above  described  or  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity  as  above  defined,  it  remains  for  the 
two  Governments  to  communicate  with  each  other  in  order  to  ar- 
rive at  an  understanding  as  to  what  measures  they  may  consider 
it  useful  to  take."  Does  this  seem  to  require  the  United  States  to 
consult  Japan  previous  to  sending  a  Note  to  China,  which  is  aimed 
to  sustain  the  principle  of  the  Root-Takahira  convention?  And 
if  it  should  be  so  construed,  does  it  not  bind  Japan  in  exactly  the 
same  way?  Does  the  Japanese  press  contend  that,  before  taking 
any  steps  in  China,  Japan  must  previously  consult  the  United 
States,  under  the  terms  of  the  Root-Takahira  convention?  And 
if  so,  why  did  not  Japan  previously  inform  the  United  States  of 
her  intention  to  present  the  famous  twenty -one  demands  to  China? 
The  assumption  that  this  last  American  note  need  first  be  visaed 
by  Japan  before  being  presented  to  China  is  preposterous,  and 
efforts  to  inject  this  idea  into  American  opinion  and  policy,  and  into 
Chinese  thought,  should  be  resisted. 

The  Chinese  Government  took  the  advice  of  the  American 
Government  in  the  same  spirit  that  it  had  been  given,  and 
replied,  thanking  the  American  Government  for  its  advice 
and  stating  that  the  matter  would  be  given  careful  attention. 
For  the  moment  the  advice  made  a  strong  impression  on  the 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  123 

fractious  political  groups  in  China  and  among  the  intelligent 
Chinese  generally;  and  had  it  then  been  supported,  as  the 
United  States  asked,  by  similar  advice  of  all  the  Allied 
powers,  it  might  have  been  made  practically  effective;  but 
none  of  the  other  powers  officially  supported  the  advice,  and 
one  of  them,  Japan,  had  different  plans  about  China. 

From  the  time  when,  in  February,  China  had  severed 
diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  there  was  pressure  at 
Peking  to  induce  the  Government  to  follow  the  breaking  of 
relations  with  a  declaration  of  war.  China's  reluctance  to 
do  that  had  been  modified  by  the  entrance  of  the  United 
States  as  a  belligerent.  The  declaration  of  war  by  America 
had  indeed  altered  the  whole  war  situation  for  China,  but  the 
full  meaning  of  the  changes  it  wrought  in  war  policy  did  not 
at  once  penetrate  Chinese  thought.  As  the  two  belligereut 
groups  were  defined  before  America  entered  the  war,  the 
Chinese  had  little  faith  in  the  protestations  of  any  of  the 
warring  powers.  The  Chinese  did  not  think  that  Great  Brit- 
ain or  France  or  Italy  had  any  special  invidious  designs  upon 
China,  but  they  firmly  believed  that  Japan  had  such  designs 
and  that  Japan  had  somehow  obtained  from  her  Allies  the 
privilege  of  doing  as  she  liked  with  China.  This  hypothesis 
was  constantly  being  confirmed  by  circumstances.  To  the 
Chinese  the  attitude  of  the  powers,  and  Japan,  toward  the 
American  advice  to  China  was  circumstantial  evidence  of  a 
secret  recognition  among  them  of  Japan's  paramountcy  in  the 
far  East.  At  that  time  the  Japanese  press  was  busily  sow- 
ing suspicion  of  America  among  the  Chinese.  I  commented 
on  some  phases  of  that  propaganda  in  " Millard's  Review" 
of  August  11,  1917,  as  follows: 

Some  erave  matters  are  broached  in  the  leading  editorial  of  "The 
Herald  of  Asia,"  [the  Tokio  magazine  edited  by  Mr.  Zumoto],  under 
the  title,  "American  Friends  of  China."  The  article  begins  by 
mentioning  the  publication  in  book  form  of  impressions  gained 
by  Mr.  Tadasaburo  Yamamoto  (described  as  a  millionaire  ship- 
owner)  during  a  recent  visit  to  China.     The  author  describes  his 


124     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

conversations  with  a  number  of  prominent  Chinese,  among  whom 
was  Mr.  Tang  Shao  Yi,  who  is  quoted  as  having  said:  "It  is  the 
Americans  who  led  the  Koreans  to  the  loss  of  their  independence. 
Americans  instigated  Korean  politicians  in  schemes  of  national  in- 
dependence, which  unsettled  the  minds  of  the  Korean  people.  This 
was  doubtless  a  contributing  cause  of  the  annexation  of  that  coun- 
try by  Japan.  Americans  are  now  apparently  trying  to  make  China 
follow  in  Korea's  fatal  footsteps/'  That  certainly  is  a  remark- 
able point  of  view.  One  wonders  just  what  Mr.  Tang  had  in  mind 
in  casting  now  this  veil  of  suspicion  over  American  policy  in  China. 
However,  "The  Herald  of  Asia"  proceeds  to  interpret :  "Mr.  Tang 
Shao  Yi  doubtless  speaks  from  personal  knowledge  when  he  says 
that  the  same  fatal  mistake  which  some  of  their  compatriots  made 
in  Korea  is  now  being  committed  by  a  group  of  Americans  in 
China.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  for  a  moment  that  any  hint  is 
here  intended  that  the  consequence  would  be  the  same  as  in  the 
case  of  Korea.  China  is  now  passing  through  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant crises  in  her  history.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  dangerous  rocks 
are  ahead  of  her,  but  we  have  too  much  faith  in  the  race  virility 
of  her  people  to  believe  that  she  will  ever  pass  under  alien  rule. 
It  is  not,  however,  to  be  denied  that  a  number  of  Americans  in 
the  far  East  are  pursuing  a  line  of  policy  which  is  calculated  to 
thwart  understanding  and  good  will  between  the  two  great  Asiatic 
nations  which  common  interests  should  make  the  best  of  friends." 
But  Mr.  Zumoto,  it  appears,  is  only  using  Tang  Shao  Yi's  alleged 
views  as  a  text  to  preach  a  little  sermon  to  China  by  citing  the 
horrible  example  of  Korea.  "The  Herald  of  Asia"  proceeds:  "It 
may  reasonably  be  doubted  whether  Korean  independence  could 
have  been  saved  even  if  she  was  free  from  all  instigations  by  her 
American  friends.  Having  proved  herself  incapable  of  self-re- 
generation during  over  twenty  years  of  her  intercourse  with  the 
outside  world,  it  was  obvious  that  she  badly  needed  guidance  and 
instruction  from  a  strong  Power  vitally  interested  in  her  preserva- 
tion from  hostile  foreign  aggressions.  When  the  struggle  for  su- 
premacy in  Korea  between  Japan  and  Russia  ended  in  our  favor, 
there  was  no  longer  any  doubt  as  to  who  should  be  Korea's  pro- 
tector and  guide.  To  any  candid  observer  it  was  plain  that  the 
only  wise  and  patriotic  course  for  the  Koreans  was  to  accept  the 
logic  of  events  and  grasp  in  an  open-hearted  manner  Japan's  out- 
stretched hands  of  friendship  and  assistance.  Had  they  done  so, 
they  might  not  have  been  able  to  secure  their  independence,  but 
they  certainly  would  have  been  able  to  retain  in  their  hands  a 
large  measure  of  national  autonomy.  .  .  .  The  Koreans  may  perhaps 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  125 

be  pardoned  for  their  failure  to  seize  the  unique  opportunity  of 
bettering  their  national  fortunes  thus  offered  by  Japan.  ...  It 
may  not  be  quite  correct  to  say,  as  Mr.  Tang  is  alleged  to  have 
said,  that  it  was  her  American  friends  who  caused  the  loss  of 
Korea's  independence.  But  it  seems  perfectly  safe  to  say  that 
Korea's  American  friends,  with  few  exceptions,  did  much  to  re- 
tard the  process  of  her  reconciliation  with  Japan  and  to  that  extent 
contributed  to  her  final  annexation  by  Japan." 

These  extracts  from  the  article  of  "The  Herald  of  Asia"  are 
enough  to  give  its  tone  and  argument.  According  to  the  editor, 
the  Koreans  perhaps  would  have  lost  their  independence  and 
autonomy  anyhow  since  that  fate  was  inevitable  (although  the  in- 
dependence of  Korea  was  guaranteed  by  Japan  in  her  declaration 
of  war  on  Russia,  in  the  first  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  and  in 
the  treaty  of  peace  with  Russia),  but  that  loss  was  hastened  and 
aggravated  because  of  the  sympathy  of  Americans  living  in  Korea 
with  the  national  sentiments  of  the  Koreans.  "The  Herald  of 
Asia's"  argument  about  Korea  is  not  pointed  at  the  American 
Government,  for  it  is  well  known  that  President  Roosevelt  was 
most  accommodating  (even  ignoring  a  treaty  then  in  existence 
between  the  United  States  and  Korea)  by  falling  in  gracefully 
with  Japan's  policy  of  acquisition ;  so  it  narrows  to  a  revival  of  the 
old  accusation  of  pernicious  political  activity  of  American  educa- 
tional and  religious  missionaries  in  Korea.  We  had  thought  that 
this  accusation  was  (at  least  among  intelligent  westerners)  suffi- 
ciently disproved  by  the  revelations  at  the  trial  of  the  so-called 
conspiracy  cases  at  Seoul  a  few  years  ago.  To  American  mission 
organizations  can  be  left  the  task  of  defending  the  status  of  that 
work  in  Korea ;  but  when  "The  Herald  of  Asia"  draws  an  analogy 
of  China  with  Korea,  and  of  the  disposition  of  Americans  living  in 
China  to  sympathise  with  the  wish  of  Chinese  to  sustain  China's 
national  existence,  that  thesis  requires  demonstration. 

"With  the  case  of  Korea,  the  alleged  unfortunate  (to  the  Koreans) 
sympathy  of  Americans  there  without  doubt  is  meant  to  apply,  and 
in  practice  does  apply  to  American  missions;  and  the  inference 
clearly  is  that  in  case  American  missionaries  in  China  show  a 
similar  sympathy  with  Chinese  in  their  wish  to  preserve  their  na- 
tionality, that  Chinese  ought  to  beware  of  such  sympathy  and  of 
actions  springing  out  of  it  as  likely  to  have  a  result  here  similar 
to  what  occurred  in  Korea.  The  inference  of  course  also  applies 
to  Americans  in  China  of  other  occupations  who  hold  such  views. 
As  to  the  sentiment  of  American  missionaries  and  educators  in 
China  on  this  point,  it  is  pertinent  to  recall  the  striking  letter 


126     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

written  by  a  leading  American  churchman  in  China  to  President 
Wilson  soon  after  the  presentation  at  Peking  of  the  famous  de- 
mands in  twenty-one  articles,  in  1915:  "In  the  very  nature  of  the 
case,  every  American  missionary,  Catholic  and  Protestant,  sym- 
pathizes with  China  in  her  desire  to  preserve  her  independence 
and  integrity.  Indeed,  while  our  missionaries  are  not  preaching 
politics,  our  usefulness  with  the  Chinese  would  be  immediately  at 
an  end  if  they  felt  that  we  were  out  of  sympathy  with  their  as- 
pirations to  preserve  their  national  freedom  and  independence. 
The  Japanese  Government  understands  that  all  missionaries,  and 
especially  Americans,  whether  they  express  it  or  not,  feel  in  their 
hearts  hostility  to  any  effort  on  Japan's  part  to  secure  control  of 
China  by  threats  of  force.  Christianity  inspires  individuals  to  be 
loyal  to  God  rather  than  to  man,  and  to  contend  for  freedom  to 
worship  Him  according  to  the  dictates  of  their  own  consciences. 
Such  convictions  are  necessarily  in  conflict  with  any  attempt  at 
military  dictation  to  a  nation  by  an  alien  Government  and  race. 
The  Japanese  Government  as  instinctively  feels  the  antagonism  of 
Christianity  to  her  progress  in  Korea  and  in  China  as  the  Roman 
Government  felt  the  antagonism  of  early  Christianity  to  her  im- 
perial despotism.  Hence,  Japan's  attempts  by  threats  of  force 
and  through  her  efforts  to  impose  secrecy  on  China  to  secure  the 
control  of  this  nation,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case  will  lead  her 
also  to  hinder,  cripple,  and  if  possible  to  destroy  the  work  of 
Christian  missionaries  in  China." 

Humanity  has  a  short  memory;  but  we  think  that  "The  Herald 
of  Asia"  mistakes  somewhat  by  believing  that  the  world's  memory 
is  shorter  than  it  really  is;  and  if  it  is  short  of  memory  the  world 
often  is  long  of  remembrance.  Does  Mr.  Zumoto  think  that  Group 
V  is  so  soon  forgotten? — and  that  the  world  also  has  forgotten 
that  the  United  States  was  the  only  power  which  excepted  publicly 
to  Japan's  action  then?  There  is  a  general  disposition,  in  the  in- 
terest of  keeping  appearances,  to  be  willing  to  allow  that  incident 
to  drop  into  the  limbo  of  relegated  matters  that  have  been  out- 
crops of  the  great  war,  and  which  are  now  slipping  away  in  the 
course  of  developing  the  war's  objects  on  new  and  broader  lines. 
But  Japan  never  has  definitely  repudiated  nor  relinquished  Group 
V;  and  until  that  is  done  it  cannot  be  forgotten,  nor  overlooked. 
For  reasons  that  are  daily  becoming  more  apparent,  Japan  is  now 
hindered  from  presently  pursuing  a  frankly  predatory  policy  in 
China,  for  predatory  policies  are  distinctly  going  out  of  fashion 
among  the  more  enlightened  nations  that  in  the  main  compose  the 
existing  Allied  association — the  nations  which  must  conquer  mill- 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  127 

tarism  if  it  is  to  be  conquered.  We  may  be  sure,  further,  that 
if  militarism  is  suppressed  in  Europe,  that  it  will  not  be  allowed 
to  survive  in  dangerous  form  in  the  far  East.  And  with  an  ex- 
tinction or  suppression  of  militarism  there  also  will  be  an  enforced 
deletion  of  political  policies  based  on  militarism.  Therefore  Amer- 
icans who  live  in  China  need  feel  no  hesitation  in  giving  play  to 
their  natural  democratic  disposition  to  sympathize  with  China's  na- 
tional aspirations.  In  so  acting  they  are  sure  of  being  in  line  with 
the  announced  policy  of  the  American  Government,  and  with  prin- 
ciples that  democracy  is  now  struggling  to  keep  alive  in  the  world. 
By  the  way,  '"The  Herald  of  Asia"  deprecates  any  criticism  of  Ja- 
pan's policy  in  China  by  Americans;  but  that  paper  by  its  article 
shows  that  it  considers  efforts  of  the  Japanese  press  to  sow  sus- 
picion of  America  among  Chinese  to  be  perfectly  legitimate. 

I  want  to  mention  here  that  Tang  Shao  Yi  told  me  a  year 
or  more  after  I  wrote  those  comments  that  he  had  been  al- 
together misquoted  by  the  Japanese  author,  who  perverted 
his  meaning. 

During  the  period  when  China  was  being  urged  by  the 
United  States  and  other  of  the  Allied  powers  excepting  Japan 
to  declare  war  against  Germauy  I  frequently  discussed  the 
situation  confidentially  with  prominent  Chinese  politicians 
of  both  factions,  and  I  obtained  in  that  way  a  very  good  idea 
of  the  Chinese  point  of  view  on  the  war.  Perhaps  I  cannot 
express  that  view  better  than  to  quote,  without  giving  his 
name,  an  eminent  Chinese  as  he  spoke  privately  to  me  on  one 
of  those  occasions  when  I  was  urging  that  China  should  follow 
the  advice  of  the  American  Government  and  enter  the  war. 
He  said: 

I  am  in  favor  of  China  entering  the  war,  but  only  on  the  ex- 
press stipulation  and  promise  of  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  and  France  that  certain  things  will  be  assured  to  China.. 
We  want  the  definite  promises  of  those  powers  that  China  will 
be  protected  against  Japan;  that  under  no  circumstances  will  any 
of  them  hereafter  recognize  or  support  any  claim  or  pretension  of 
Japan  to  a  special  position  in  China,  or  to  any  kind  of  a  para- 
mountcy  in  relation  to  China.  Frankly,  we  Chinese  believe  that 
Great  Britain  and  France  already  have  committed  their  govern- 
ments to  support  Japan  on  these  questions;  therefore,  we  want  the 


128     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

unequivocal  promises  of  those  governments  that  whatever  arrange- 
ments they  have  made  with  Japan  or  any  other  power  that  are  of 
such  a  character  will  be  abrogated.  We  Chinese  do  not  believe 
that  the  United  States  ever  has,  or  is  now  contemplating,  the 
recognition  of  Japan's  paramountey  in  respect  to  China;  but  if 
America  has  no  thought  of  that  policy,  why  does  your  Govern- 
ment permit  to  proceed  uncontradicted  from  any  official  source 
the  plain  imputations  of  Japan's  propaganda  and  press  that  Japan 
is  entitled  to  a  paramount  position  in  China? 

I  think  I  have  observed  among  the  other  nations  a  disposition 
primarily  to  consider  their  own  positions  and  interests,  and  so  we 
Chinese  may  be  excused  for  thinking  first  about  this  war  in  terms 
of  the  interests  and  security  of  China.  You  say  we  can  trust  the 
United  States,  and  especially  President  Wilson,  to  get  justice  for 
China  at  the  peace  conference.  As  to  that,  your  Government  has 
always  talked  very  well  about  China,  but  at  the  pinch  it  usually 
has  left  her  in  the  lurch  by  refusing  to  take  any  active  part  in 
aiding  her,  or  even  to  enforce  your  own  policies  here.  As  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  he  is  but  a  man  and  will  die  in  time,  and  his  tenure 
of  office  ends  in  a  short  while.  He  cannot  answer  for  his  suc- 
cessors or  the  policies  of  succeeding  governments.  As  for  me,  I 
have  begun  to  doubt  if  the  United  States  ever  will  have  either  the 
power  or  the  will  to  be  of  much  real  aid  to  China.  Good  wishes 
are  fine  things,  but  we  need  practical  help  and  a  practical  display 
of  force  behind  our  nation.  We  do  not  now  trust  Great  Britain 
or  France,  because  of  their  apparent  acceptance  of  Japan's  policy 
toward  China.  We  cannot  afford  to  repose  trust  in  the  United 
States  until  it  proves  to  us  that  it  has  the  will  and  the  power  to 
help  us.  The  United  States  never  has  been  a  military  nation,  and 
in  the  East  international  politics  moves  in  terms  of  military  power. 
So  while  we  believe  in  the  good  purposes  of  America,  we  cannot 
put  our  dependence  solely  on  her.  A  league  of  nations,  you  say; 
but  such  a  league  is  at  present  a  mere  vision.  It  is  only  if  the 
United  States,  acting  with  the  other  western  powers,  will  give  us 
definite  promises  that  I  favor  China  entering  the  war.  Separated 
from  America,  we  do  not  trust  Great  Britain  and  France.  Separ- 
ated from  Great  Britain  and  France,  we  do  not  believe  that  Amer- 
ica will  be  strong  enough  to  put  a  check  on  Japan.  Moreover,  who 
can  tell  which  side  will  win  the  war?  Japanese  military  and  naval 
experts  have  told  me  privately  that  Germany  is  sure  to  win ;  and 
in  that  event  how  will  China's  position  be  improved  by  assailing 
her  now? 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  129 

At  that  time,  the  summer  of  1917,  the  resources  of  Amer- 
ica for  war  and  their  effects  on  the  military  situation  were 
but  slightly  comprehended  in  China,  but  the  influence  of  the 
United  States  was  growing  with  each  passing  month.  Japan's 
diplomacy  still  was  discouraging  China  from  entering  the 
war,  but  this  opposition  was  less  obvious — that  is,  more  secret 
— than  formerly.  The  Japanese  press  still  was  critical  of 
the  proposal  that  China  would  become  a  belligerent.  Its  gen- 
eral attitude  is  very  well  outlined  by  some  comments  of  the 
''Japan  Chronicle,"  printed  in  August,  1917.  The  " Japan 
Times"  is  considered  a  mouthpiece  of  the  Tokio  Foreign  Of- 
fice, published  in  English. 

While  on  the  subject  of  the  attitude  of  the  "Japan  Times"  con- 
cerning Gennan  influence,  it  is  instructive  to  go  back  a  few  mouths. 
Today  the  Tokio  journal  is  convinced  that  any  opposition  to  the 
declaration  of  war  by  China  must  be  due  to  the  influence  of  Ger- 
man gold.  But  a  few  months  ago,  when  it  would  have  been  pos- 
sible for  China  to  join  the  Allies  without  much  friction,  the  "Japan 
Times"  was  most  vehement  in  its  objections  to  such  a  course.  In 
those  days  it  saw  the  influence  of  German  gold  in  a  proposal  that 
would  have  effectually  destroyed  German  intrigues  in  China.  As 
recently  as  last  October  the  Tokio  journal  was  denouncing  "the 
English  journalist  Simpson"  ("Putnam  Weale")  as  "the  party" 
who  is  endeavoring  to  obtain  the  admission  of  China  to  the  ranks 
of  the  Allies,  and  to  show  its  opinion  of  anyone  who  advocated 
such  a  scheme  professed  to  accept  as  true  a  Japanese  rumor  that 
Mr.  Simpson  had  tried  to  "blackmail"  the  Governor-General  of 
Mukden.  Furthermore,  the  "Japan  Times"  worked  itself  into  a 
white  heat  of  indignation  over  the  suggestion  that  "Great  Britain 
is  again  scheming  to  induce  China  to  enter  the  war  on  the  Allies' 
side,"  declared  the  story  to  be  unthinkable,  suggested  that  such 
action  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  would  be  "unprincipled"  and 
professed  to  a  suspicion  that  German  machinations  were  behind 
the  scheme.  The  tendency  of  the  whole  article  was  to  suggest  that 
if  Britain  held  views  in  favor  of  China  joining  the  Allies,  she  was 
guilty  of  an  unpardonable  offence.  Since  then  the  Japanese 
Government  has  been  changed.  A  new  Administration  has  come 
in  with  a  different  policy.  The  objections  which  Japan  held  to 
China  joining  the  Allies  have  been  withdrawn.     Consequently  the 


130     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

"Japan  Times"  has  promptly  turned  its  coat.  Where  a  few  months 
ago  the  suggestion  that  China  should  join  the  Allies,  or  the  state- 
ment that  Britain  was  encouraging  her  to  do  so  was  the  result  of 
German  machinations,  today  the  opinion  that  it  would  he  a  mis- 
take for  China  to  enter  actively  into  the  war  must  also  be  inspired 
by  German  gold.  We  are  left  to  speculate  on  the  inspiring  mo- 
tive of  the  volte  face  of  the  ''Japan  Times,"  which  within  seven 
months  can  hold  two  absolutely  contradictory  opinions,  on  each 
occasion  suggesting  that  those  who  hold  the  opposite  opinion  must 
be  dishonest. 

As  valid  reasons  why  China  should  enter  the  war  against 
Germany  were  cited  certain  conditions  affecting  her  that 
would  thereby  be  relieved  or  ameliorated.  These  conditions 
are  summarized  in  a  memorandum  submitted  to  the  Chinese 
Government  by  Dr.  George  E.  Morrison  in  August,  1916,  as 
follows : 

1.  The  share  of  the  Boxer  indemnity  which  China  has  to  pay  to 
Germany  is  $135,000,000,  and  to  Austria  $6,000,000— a  totai  of 
$141,000,000.     These  amounts  would  revert  to  China. 

2.  Of  these  amounts,  without  any  increase  of  her  present  bur- 
dens, China  could  obtain  from  the  Allies  a  loan  of  not  less  than 
$100,000,000. 

3.  China  is  at  present  paying  to  Germany  on  account  of  the  Boxer 
indemnity  and  on  account  of  railway  and  other  loans,  £6,000  per 
day.  The  payment  of  that  money  would  at  least  be  suspended 
until  after  the  war,  and  in  case  of  the  £2,000  per  day  paid  for  the 
Boxer  indemnity,  it  would  never  recur. 

4.  The  German  concessions  at  Tientsin  and  Hankow  would  re- 
vert to  China,  or  they  might  be  embodied  in  International  Settle- 
ments, the  creation  of  which  would  materially  lessen  China's  fric- 
tion with  the  foreign  Powers. 

5.  By  terminating  her  treaties  with  Germany  China  would  be  able 
make  new  and  more  advantageous  treaties  after  the  war,  and  pos- 
sibly have  a  general  revision  of  treaties. 

6.  In  the  Customs  there  are  118  Germans  employed,  41  in  the 
indoor  and  77  in  the  outdoor.  By  their  removal  vacancies  would  be 
made  which  could  be  filled  by  Chinese  students,  of  whom  24  per  year 
are  turned  out  by  the  Customs  College  and  are  waiting  employment. 

When  it  was  evident  that  the  united  urging  of  the  Amer- 
ican, British,  and  French  governments,  and  the  influence  of 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  131 

individual  foreigners,  would  bring  China  into  the  war,  Jap- 
anese diplomacy  made  a  characteristic  manoeuver.  The 
Chinese  Government  was  advised  by  Japan  to  declare  war  as 
one  of  the  Allies,  and  not  as  a  separate  nation.  This  was  a 
scheme  to  detach  China  from  the  United  States,  which  power 
never  had  formally  joined  the  Allies,  and  attach  her  to  the 
Allies,  thereby  making  her  a  part  of  and  subject  to  the  private 
agreements  made  among  the  nations  composing  the  original 
alliance.  Of  course  Japanese  diplomats  did  not,  in  present- 
ing the  question  to  Chinese  officials,  put  it  quite  that  way; 
but  the  Japanese  press  in  its  comments  plainly  revealed  that 
as  the  motivation  of  the  plan.  China  decided,  however,  still 
to  follow  the  example  of  the  United  States,  and  independently 
declared  war  against  Germany  and  Austria  on  August 
14,  1917.  1  discussed  that  action  contemporaneously  in 
"Millard's  Review"  of  August  18: 

China  has  declared  war  on  Germany  and  Austria.  This  momen- 
tous decision  opens  vistas  that  none  can  fathom  now,  and  contains 
possibilities  for  this  nation  which  cannot  be  calculated  accurately. 
Yet  any  candid  attempt  at  fore-measurement  of  the  eventual  re- 
sults of  this  action  must  consider  it  favorably.  Taken  as  a  move 
in  a  political  formula,  this  act  is  logical.  By  first  protesting  to 
Germany,  in  conjunction  with  the  United  States  and  other  then  neu- 
tral nations,  against  Germany's  unrestrained  submarine  warfare, 
China  took  an  attitude  that  led  almost  inevitably  to  the  next  step — 
severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany.  At  that  point  the 
matter  hung  fire  for  several  months,  for  various  reasons.  The 
former  Government  was  inclined  to  take  the  next  step,  but  it  showed 
a  disposition  to  make  the  step  conditional  on  actions  or  promises  to 
be  given  to  China  by  the  Entente  allied  nations.  In  so  insisting 
China  was  well  within  her  privileges  and  rights;  for  China  without 
doubt  has  very  vital  interests  which  are  indissolubly  bound  up  in 
the  outcome  of  the  war — the  assurance  hereafter  of  her  national 
integrity  and  autonomy,  the  recovery  by  her  of  rights  and  posses- 
sions which  during  the  application  of  the  now-declining  "sphere" 
and  "special  position"'  international  theorem  were  wrested  from  her 
or  established  by  forcible  presumption,  the  adjustment  of  fiscal 
matters  affected  by  agreements  with  other  nations. 

But  the  principal  nations  of  the  allied  association   have  taken 


132     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

the  position  that  China  ought  not  to  enter  the  war  as  a  bargain- 
maker,  but  rather  should  enter  as  a  matter  of  principle,  and  having 
once  entered  she  then  could  depend  on  the  allied  association  of  na- 
tions to  apply  to  China  the  broad  principles  which  are  now  in 
process  of  being  formulated  into  a  fixed  understanding  among  those 
nations — principles  whose  guiding  thought  is  to  keep  alive  the 
spirit  and  forms  of  democracy  in  the  world  and  to  bring  a  peace 
making  it  possible  for  unmilitary  and  inoffensive  nations  to  live  in 
security.  In  fact,  China  had  small  basis  for  trying  to  enter  the 
war  as  a  bargain-maker.  She  had  plenty  of  precedents  in  history 
for  that  attitude,  and  enough  precedents  in  the  way  some  nations 
have  come  into  this  war.  But  bargaining  in  this  case  means  having 
something  to  give  that  is  useful  in  prosecuting  the  war — and  when 
it  came  to  that  kind  of  bargaining  China  had  little  to  give  in  mate- 
rial factors.  If  her  only  asset  or  claim  to  consideration  rested  on 
what  she  could  deliver  to  the  allied  association  by  way  of  material 
help  to  them  in  prosecuting  the  war,  then  China's  position  was 
weak.  For  instance,  if  all  that  the  allied  association  had  in  mind 
was  to  use  China  to  augment  their  military  power  during  this  war 
for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  Central  Alliance,  this  object  might 
be  obtained  by  using  China  as  a  sort  of  international  trading-stamp 
by  granting  to  some  powers  in  the  allied  association  certain  desired 
advantages  of  "special  position"  and  "paramountcy"  in  China  in 
return  for  those  powers  supplying  military  forces  for  use  in  Europe. 
That  method  of  course  would  have  to  discard  all  pretence  of  paying 
attention  to  the  rights  of  weaker  nations.  It  is  morally  indefen- 
sible; but  when  China  sought  to  put  her  entrance  as  a  belligerent 
on  a  bargaining  basis  she  was  resigning  voluntarily  the  arguments 
inherent  with  her  moral  position  as  a  "weaker  nation"  in  the  sense 
this  phrase  is  now  being  used  in  relation  to  aims  of  the  war  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  allied  association. 

Other  elements  besides  this  moral  issue  contributed  to  delay  action 
by  China.  Chief  among  these  were  the  complications  caused  by  an 
internal  disintegration  of  the  Chinese  Government  which  has  led  the 
nation  to  the  brink  of  civil  strife.  At  a  time  when  the  question  of 
declaring  war  against  Germany  was  being  discussed  actively  at 
Peking,  the  dispute  between  the  parties  arrived  at  an  acute  stage 
which  precipitated  the  dissolution  of  Parliament,  was  followed  by 
the  abortive  restoration  of  the  monarchy,  and  then  by  a  return  to 
authority  in  the  Government  of  Tuan  Chi-jui.  Almost  at  the  incep- 
tion of  that  crisis  the  American  Government  advised  China  in  effect 
that  for  the  moment  the  question  of  declaring  war  on  Germany  was 
of    less    importance    than    the    maintainance    of    internal    order. 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  133 

Whether  that  advice  (which  stirred  up  a  little  international  tempest 
of  tea-pot  proportions)  actually  influenced  the  Chinese  or  not,  the 
internal  situation  did  for  a  while  obscure  and  suspend  the  question 
of  entering  the  war.  But  the  war  question  could  not  for  long  re- 
main in  the  background,  because  it  virtually  encompasses  most  of 
the  other  issues  involved  with  China's  situation.  No  doubt  the 
Government  at  Peking  felt  the  influence  of  those  other  forces  in 
making  its  decision  to  declare  war. 

Effects  of  China's  action  on  her  foreign  relations  and  interna- 
tional position  have  wider  scope.  In  the  far  East  the  first  effect 
that  will  be  thought  of  is  connected  with  Japan.  By  entering  the 
war  China  shifts  her  international  position  from  that  of  a  neutral 
(which  in  practice  has  come  to  mean  a  nation  or  individual  whose 
rights  no  belligerents  feel  obligated  to  respect)  to  that  of  a  member 
or  associate  of  a  belligerent  group  which  includes  Japan.  It  will 
be  very  interesting  to  notice  how  Japan  as  a  Government  will  take 
this  change  of  China's  status  that  so  materially  alters  Japan's  posi- 
tion vis-a-vis  China.  We  already  know  what  Japan  thought  about 
China  joining  the  Allies  when  it  was  first  proposed  nearly  two 
years  ago.  At  that  time  Japan  (if  we  can  judge  by  the  outbursts 
of  the  semi-official  Japanese  press)  very  strongly  dissented  to  the 
proposal.  In  recent  months  (since  the  entrance  of  America)  the 
Tokio  Government  has  adopted  a  different  attitude  than  formerly 
and  now  professes  no  objection  to  having  China  come  into  the  allied 
group.  Political  conditions  in  the  world  without  doubt  have  in- 
duced this  change  of  view  and  policy  at  Tokio;  but  has  the  Jap- 
anese Government  also  experienced  a  change  of  heart? 

It  is  not  with  the  thought  of  pecking  at  Japan  or  of  not  permit- 
ting the  world  to  forget  acts  of  Japan  which  Japan  herself  may 
now  regret,  that  we  bring  this  matter  into  view  now;  but  because 
it  is  a  fundamental  issue  of  the  proposition  that  cannot  be  ignored 
or  suppressed  in  any  discussion  that  is  not  altogether  superficial. 
It  is  necessary  to  reiterate  some  phases  of  this  question  again  and 
again  to  get  them  firmly  fixed  in  the  world's  public  opinion  out  of 
which  a  solution  of  the  war  must  come.  None  are  so  entirely  and 
supersensitive^  conscious  of  how  Japan's  international  position  is 
being  affected  by  passing  events  and  tendencies  as  are  the  Japanese 
themselves,  no  doubt.  The  intellectual  force  (or  the  force  of  the 
intellectuals)  which  will  or  ought  to  dictate  the  terms  of  peace  is 
considering  Japan,  is  sizing  her  up  and  ticketing  her  off,  just  as  it 
is  sizing  and  ticketing  off  all  the  other  big  and  little  nations,  to 
discover  how  they  line  up  for  or  against  the  principles  of  democracy 


134     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

which  the  major  part  of  the  allied  association  are  now  committed  to 
sustain  in  making  the  peace  and  after  the  peace. 

In  deciding  to  cast  her  lot  with  these  forces  that  are  now  getting 
concentrated  with  the  major  nations  in  the  allied  association,  China 
has  not  however  acted  wisely  or  cleverly  solely  on  the  ground  of  ex- 
pediency. She  has  taken  a  road  which  leads  toward  where  China 
ought  to  want  to  go — a  civilization  in  which  China  can  be  free  from 
fears  of  externa]  encroachments  incited  by  the  old  predatory  and 
narrowly  exploiting  spint,  free  safely  to  develop  her  own  nation- 
ality by  peaceful  process  into  a  firm  and  respected  position  in  the 
world.  And  having  chosen  this  course  China  should  never  lose 
sight  of  the  principles  to  which  she  must  cling  if  this  vision  is  to 
become  a  reality,  never  forget  how  easy  it  might  be  to  turn  the  cur- 
rent by  deflecting  some  important  element  to  the  other  side,  and 
should  commit  herself  wholeheartedly  to  doing  what  she  can  to  help 
the  common  cause.  For  it  will  make  a  great  deal  of  difference  to 
China  which  side  wins  this  war,  and  which  side  has  the  dominant 
saying  in  making  the  conditions  of  the  peace.  It  means  the  differ- 
ence between  two  diametrically  opposite  theorems  of  world  politics. 
It  means  (why  should  we  not  say  this1?)  the  difference  of  the  policy 
of  America  toward  China  in  the  past  twenty  years  and  the  policy 
of  some  of  her  nearer  neighbors  which  have  kept  her  in  almost  con- 
stant alarm  and  apprehension,  and  which  if  they  should  be  consum- 
mated would  reduce  China  to  a  vassal  state  or  extinguish  her  na- 
tional existence  altogether.  A  victory  for  the  reconstituted  allied 
association  means  a  China  at  liberty  to  indulge  her  desire  to  be- 
come a  democracy  in  administrative  forms  as  well  as  in  the  spirit 
(which  she  now  has),  and  that  she  will  not  be  driven  by  foreign 
militarism  to  develop  militarism  herself  as  the  only  alternative  to 
falling  under  the  dominion  of  military  nations.  It  means  the  differ- 
ence between  Group  V  and  a  Hay  Doctrine.  As  far  as  one  can  peer 
along  the  future  course  of  events,  this  is  the  choice  that  China  has 
made  by  declaring  war  on  Germany. 

"When  China  declared  war.  the  Japanese  Government  and 
the  Japanese  press  realized  the  expediency  of  changing  their 
attitude,  which  they  did  with  usual  celerity.  The  Japanese 
Government  promptly  issued  statements  approving  China's 
act  so  phrased  that  they  would  impress  any  who  were  not 
familiar  with  preceding  events  with  the  idea  that  Japan  was 
chiefly  responsible  for  adding  a  new  member  to  the  Allied 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  135 

consortium.  The  purpose  of  this  diplomatic  fiction  was  to 
preserve  the  outward  presumption  of  Japan's  paramount 
position  in  respect  to  China.  If  it  appeared  that  China  had 
taken  so  important  a  step  without  consulting  Japan,  or 
against  the  wishes  of  the  Tokio  Government,  then  Japan's  at- 
titude of  paramount  power  in  China  was  punctured.  But 
the  Japanese  press  could  not  dissemble  quite  so  readily.  The 
following  editorial  comment  of  the  Tokio  "Asahi"  fairly  re- 
flects the  feeling  of  the  Japanese  about  the  event: 

China  has  at  last  declared  war  against  Germany  and  Austria  on 
August  14.  Will  it  be  beneficial  to  China?  Will  it  be  advanta- 
geous to  the  Entente  Powers,  especially  to  Japan?  China  has  sev- 
ered relations  with  Germany  on  the  advice  of  America.  But  Amer- 
ice  told  China  that  participation  in  the  war  is  a  secondary  thing 
and  that  China  should  first  address  herself  to  secure  unity  at  home. 
That  was  very  kind  advice  indeed.  China  will  not  receive  any  very 
remarkable  benefit  from  participation  in  the  war.  She  will  only 
incite  internal  dissensions  thereby,  so  that  she  will  have  to  sacrifice 
money  and  lives  in  the  attempt  to  quell  the  discord  at  home.  The 
southern  leaders  are  opposed  to  participation  in  the  war.  But  if 
they  openly  say  so  they  are  liable  to  be  suspected  of  sympathizing 
with  Germany  and  to  win  the  disfavor  of  the  Entente  Powers.  .  .  . 
If  China  is  to  be  thrown  into  confusion,  because  of  participation  in 
the  war,  then  it  is  not  advantageous  to  the  Entente  Powers.  It  will 
not  be  advantageous  to  Japan,  which  has  close  relations  with  China. 

So  China  entered  the  war,  and  gave  to  the  far-Eastern 
situation  a  new  turn. 


CHAPTER  VI 

CHINA   AND   THE   WAR — CONTINUED 

Shift  of  Japan's  diplomatic  strategy — Efforts  to  establish  a  special  po- 
sition in  respect  to  China — Analysis  of  the  paramountcy  and  special 
position  doctrine — Purpose  of  the  Ishii  mission  to  America — China  dis- 
turbed by  factional  strife — The  abortive  monarchy  revival — Return  to 
power  of  Tuan  Chi-jui — Financed  by  Japan — The  loan  question — Obsta- 
cles to  American  loans — The  banking  group  method — Dangers  of  the  old 
system — Japan's  violation  of  the  group  agreement — China's  desire  to 
participate  in  the  war — Effort  to  obtain  funds  from  America — Opposi- 
tion of  Japan  to  China's  participation — Reasons  for  this  opposition — 
Japan  versus  the  Western  powers — A  delicate  question — Japan's  plan  to 
control  China's  military  organization — Some  confidential  despatches — 
The  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement — What  it  meant — Motives  of  the  parties 
to  it — Was  Japan  flirting  with  Germany? — Text  of  the  agreement. 

OF  Japan's  modern  policy  toward  China  it  may  be 
said  that  it  never  changes  its  fundamental  objec- 
tives, but  it  frequently  shifts  its  strategy  and 
tactics.  The  alteration  of  China's  international  position  by 
that  nation  declaring  war  on  the  Central  powers  caused  an 
immediate  adaptation  of  Japan's  policy  to  the  new  situation. 
One  of  the  first  moves  of  the  Tokio  Government  was  to  try 
to  obtain  the  recognition  and  confirmation  of  Japan's  para- 
mountcy, or  special  position  in  China.  Each  accession  to  the 
Allied  belligerent  consortium  created  new  complications  and 
modified  previous  trades  and  arrangements;  so  the  entrance 
of  America  and  China  made  it  necessary  for  Japan  to  obtain 
the  assent  of  another  power  to  her  program.  The  Ishii  mis- 
sion was  despatched  to  America  with  that  object,  and  Japanese 
propaganda  in  America  began  a  special  campaign  for  recog- 
nition of  Japan's  special  position  and  paramountcy  in  China, 
for  in  Japan's  propaganda  the  two  terms  are  frequently  used 

136 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  137 

as  synonyms.    I  wrote  on  this  topic  in  "Millard's  Review" 
of  August  25,  1917: 

It  is  a  rather  curious  development  of  opinion  in  America  about 
far  Eastern  affairs,  and  especially  about  Japan  and  her  policies, 
that  part  of  the  American  press  is  now  disposed  to  concede  to  Japan 
a  "special  position"  and  "paramountey"  in  relation  to  China  just 
at  a  time  when  Japanese  statesmen  and  the  Japanese  press  are  sup- 
pressing these  claims — or  at  least  are  putting  the  soft-pedal  on  them. 
One  follows  the  mental  process  of  some  writers  for  the  press  in 
America  with  not  a  little  speculation  as  to  its  well-springs  and  pur- 
pose. Take  for  instance  the  case  of  the  "San  Francisco  Chronicle." 
We  can  recall,  not  so  long  ago,  when  that  newspaper  had  a  general 
tone  that  might  (to  follow  the  shallow  terminology  of  the  propa- 
gandists) be  called  anti- Japanese.  That  was  when  the  Japanese 
questions  which  apply  locally  to  California  were  to  the  fore.  With 
the  gradual  suppression  of  those  issues  (a  suppression  not  due  to 
them  being  satisfactorily  adjusted,  but  to  other  and  wider  causes  of 
world  politics  that  have  altered  the  relative  positions  of  both  Japan 
and  America  in  international  affairs),  many  newspapers  in  America 
seemed  to  get  imbued  with  the  notion  that  Japan  had  to  be  placated, 
and  that  the  best  or  the  only  way  to  keep  Japan  from  being  trouble- 
some about  the  immigration  question  was  to  concede  to  her  whatever 
she  wanted  elsewhere.  Now  of  course  it  was  to  bring  about  this 
very  state  of  mind  in  American  political  thought  that  caused  Japa- 
nese diplomacy  to  raise  and  to  agitate  the  immigration  issue,  and 
it  is  perhaps  an  irony  of  fate  that  just  when  Japan  seemed  to  be 
"getting  away  with  it,"  a  world  war  and  its  unexpected  ramifications 
would  come  along  and  undermine  Japan's  China  policy  at  its  point 
of  first  contact. 

Among  some  editorial  comments  on  this  topic  by  the  press  in 
America  recently  compiled  by  the  "Literary  Digest"  (a  majority  of 
the  papers  oppose  Japan's  paramountcy  claims,  by  the  way)  is  the 
following  of  the  "San  Francisco  Chronicle" :  "We  might  as  well 
face  the  fact  now  that  Japan  does  occupy  a  special  position  with 
regard  to  the  neighboring  Empire  and  that  sooner  or  later  her  in- 
evitable mastery  of  that  country  [China]  will  be  definitely  estab- 
lished." This  goes  pretty  far — farther  indeed  than  most  of  Japan's 
regular  propagandists  have  ventured  to  state  openly.  Japanese 
diplomats  would  not  like  for  these  views  of  the  "Chronicle"  to  be 
widely  published  in  China,  for  they  will  not  be  at  all  acceptable 
to  Chinese,  however  they  may  sound  in  America  and  Japan.  A  point 
very  frequently  overlooked  by  newspapers  in  America,  in  casually 


138     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

as  a  matter  of  academic  argument  thus  disposing  of  the  Chinese 
Republic  and  the  political  future  of  the  Chinese  people,  is  how  such 
opinions  will  be  taken  by  Chinese,  and  how  Chinese  may  be  led  by 
them  to  reflect  about  America  and  Americans.  Putting  the  best 
motive  for  those  opinions  of  the  "San  Francisco  Chronicle"  that  can 
be  ascribed  to  them — that  they  spring  from  a  sincere  belief  not 
perhaps  in  the  justice  and  morality  of  Japan's  assumptions,  but 
that  because  of  her  military  power  and  economic  strength  it  will 
not  be  possible  to  prevent  her  from  absorbing  China — they  are  pub- 
lished just  at  the  moment  when  in  Japan  it  is  understood  that  this 
power  and  this  strength  has  diminished,  perhaps  forever,  as  compel- 
ling forces  to  accomplish  the  supervision  or  subjugation  of  China. 
Every  mail  bringing  the  Japanese  newspapers  carries  fresh  and  pro- 
gressive evidences  of  this  probably,  to  them,  unwelcome  eon  Wet  ion. 

Paramountcy  used  in  this  connection  is  fairly  definite.  "We  can 
understand  what  is  meant  by  it.  But  just  what  do  the  "San  Fran- 
cisco Chronicle"  and  other  publicists  who  use  the  term  mean  by  a 
nation  having  a  "special  position"  with  regard  to  China?  Do  they 
have  in  mind  intellectual  contacts,  or  moral  influence,  or  is  the  term 
merely  a  geographical  allusion?  Except  Russia,  which  has  a  land 
frontier  contiguous  with  China  for  something  like  six  thousand  miles, 
Japan  has  a  special  geographical  position  with  respect  to  China  in 
that  she  is  closer  to  China  than  any  other  of  the  greater  nations. 
But  is  distance  the  only  rule  of  calculation  applicable  to  this  idea  of 
special  position  as  between  different  nations?  If  it  comes  to  moral 
and  mental  influences,  surely  they  are  not  to  be  measured  by  a  yard- 
stick. One  hardly  will  believe  because  Japan  is  miles  nearer  to 
China  than  the  United  States  is,  that  thereby  Japanese  moral  and 
intellectual  influence  with  the  Chinese  must  be  in  proportion  to  the 
distances.  By  the  geographical  theory  of  measuring  influence  and 
special  position  as  among  nations,  then  the  United  States  has  a  right 
to  claim  a  superior  position  to  nations  in  Europe  with  regard  to 
China.  Some  one  ought  to  clarify  this  doctrine  of  special  position 
by  getting  up  a  graduated  scale,  so  that  each  and  every  nation  will 
know  by  arithmetical  method  just  what  its  special  position  is  to 
every  other  nation.  The  idea  has  interesting  possibilities.  Interna- 
tional contacts  might  be  marked  off  on  a  chart,  so  that  each  nation 
could  see  at  a  glance  how  much  moral  and  mental  influence  with  all 
other  nations  it  is  entitled  to  have.  The  plan  could  be  extended  to 
trade  among  nations;  this  could  be  pro-rated  on  the  international 
special  position  chart,  and  there  need  be  no  competition,  for  every 
nation  would  know  how  much  trade  it  could  have  in  proportion  with 
the  other  nations, 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  139 

But  the  bald  truth  is  that  this  special  position  theorem  in  inter- 
national affairs  and  world  politics  is  on  its  last  legs,  if  we  are  to 
believe  that  the  present  allied  association  id  playing  the  game  "on 
the  square";  and  that  it  will  win  this  war,  or  that  it  will  be  able  to 
dominate  the  thought  of  which  the  peace  v,  ill  be  born.  The  bald 
truth  is,  further,  that  the  special  position  theorem  as  applied  by  the 
"San  Francisco  Chronicle"  to  Japan  vs.  China  is  bluff  and  bun- 
combe. Its  only  basis  is  the  power  to  apply  military  intimidation. 
If  this  war  does  not  succeed  in  getting  world  politics  fairly  clear 
of  the  special  position  doctrine,  then  it  may  be  fought  in  vain — for 
it  is  in  that  doctrine  that  the  causes  for  this  war  sprouted;  and  no 
broad  political  conclusion  stands  now  more  nakedly  exposed  than 
that  a  continued  acceptance  in  international  law  and  practice  of  the 
special  position  doctrine  will  cause  frequent  wars  hereafter. 

While  the  Japanese  Government  was  making,  at  Tokio  and 
Washington,  a  strong  effort  to  induce  the  United  States  to 
recognize  some  kind  of  special  position  for  Japan  in  China, 
and,  as  was  subsequently  disclosed,  was  trying  to  induce  other 
Allied  powers  to  bring  persuasion  or  pressure  on  America 
for  the  same  purpose,  Japanese  policy  in  China  changed  its 
method.  This  shift  can  be  briefly  described  as  a  change  from 
militant  intimidation  to  financial  pressure  and  bribery  as 
means  to  get  results.  I  shall  illustrate  that  process  in  a  sub- 
sequent chapter,  and  will  here  follow  the  international  de- 
velopments. 

The  factions  in  Chinese  politics  continued  to  draw  apart 
notwithstanding  the  advice  of  the  American  Government,  and 
by  the  autumn  of  1917  there  were  indications  that  Japanese 
were  playing  the  old  game  of  giving  comfort  and  support  to 
both  sides.  The  monarchy  fiasco  in  the  summer  of  1917,  when 
General  Chang  Hsun  restored  the  young  emperor  for  a  week, 
had  given  Japan  an  opportunity  to  gain  an  influence  over 
Tuan  Chi-jui.  Tuan  had  resigned  as  premier  in  Li  Yuan 
Hung's  government  on  the  issue  of  dissolving  the  old  parlia- 
ment, and  had  gone  to  live  at  Tientsin.  He  was  there  when 
the  monarchy  was  restored,  and  he  succeeded  in  rallying  some 
generals  and  their  troops,  induced  them  to  march  to  Peking, 
retook  the  palaces,  and  restored  the  republic.    In  this  move 


140     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Tuan  was  financed  by  Japan,  obtaining  a  loan  through  the 
Yokohama  Specie  Bank  at  Tientsin.  Tuan's  success  in  over- 
turning Chang  Hsun's  coup  brought  him  into  office  again  as 
premier.  Li  Yuan  Hung  resigned  the  presidency,  and  was 
succeeded  by  Feng  Kuo-cheng,  who  had  been  governor  at 
Nanking. 

The  Chinese  Government  was  then  in  its  chronic  low  finan- 
cial state,  and  various  projects  to  raise  money  were  being  dis- 
cussed, bringing  up  the  general  question  of  foreign  loans.  A 
few  months  previously  an  American  group  of  bankers  had 
been  prevented  from  making  a  loan  to  China  by  the  lack  of  a 
responsible  Chinese  government  to  deal  with.  In  June,  1917, 
I  wrote  in  "Millard's  Review": 

Will  it  ever  occur,  I  wonder,  that  this  question  of  loans  to  China 
can  be  disassociated  from  Chinese  political  factional  squabbles?  At 
hardly  any  period,  since  the  first  revolution,  has  it  been  feasible  to 
conduct  loan  negotiations  at  Peking  without  running  foul  of  opposi- 
tion of  a  Chinese  party,  which  was  trying  to  prevent  its  opponents 
in  the  Government  from  obtaining  funds.  Thus  loans  sadly  needed 
for  useful  purposes  and  administrative  stability  have  been  made 
the  football  of  party  politics,  and  have  been  struggled  for,  or  op- 
posed, according  to  which  faction  would  have  the  spending  of  the 
money.  In  this  latest  instance,  the  American  bankers  had  no  course 
except  to  negotiate  with  the  Chinese  Government  which  is  recognized 
by  the  American  Government.  Before  the  transaction  could  be  con- 
cluded, this  internal  crisis  occurred;  and  thereafter  the  Kuoming- 
tang  protested  against  the  loan  on  the  ground  that  the  money, 
in  the  hands  of  the  Government,  would  be  used  to  crush  liberal 
institutions  in  China.  Telegrams  were  sent  to  the  American  press 
voicing  this  contention,  and  an  effort  was  made  to  show  that,  if  the 
American  government  aided  in  putting  the  loan  through,  it  would 
be  using  its  power  to  exterminate  republicanism  in  China.  One  can- 
not now  foretell  a  time  in  China  when  this  contention  cannot  be 
advanced  by  whatever  faction  is  not  in  control  of  the  Government; 
and  if  it  is  to  be  taken  as  a  valid  reason  against  foreign  loans, 
then  it  becomes  tolerably  clear  that  foreign  loans,  and  especially 
American  loans,  cannot  be  made.  Just  now  this  outcry  is  raised 
by  the  members  of  the  dissolved  Parliament  sojourning  in  Shang- 
hai, who  at  the  same  time  openly  announce  plans  for  raising  funds 
to  promote  a  rebellion.     The  lesson  of  these  circumstances  seems 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  141 

to  be  that,  after  the  war,  the  question  of  foreign  loans  in  China 
must  be  made  subject  to  an  international  formula  supported  by 
enough  powers  to  make  it  effective. 

The  condition  outlined  in  that  comment  of  mine  has  been 
an  effective  bar  to  several  projects  for  American  and  other 
foreign  loans  to  the  Chinese  Government.  American  bankers 
were  free  to  negotiate  loans  with  the  Chinese  Government, 
but  British,  Japanese,  French,  and  Russian  bankers  were 
bound  by  the  Reorganization  Loan  Agreement  not  to  make 
loans  to  China  independently  until  the  provisions  of  that 
agreement  had  been  fulfilled  or  abrogated.  Writing  in  ' '  Mil- 
lard's  Review"  just  before  China  declared  war,  August  11, 
1917,  I  commented  on  the  question  as  follows : 

Under  existing  conditions,  the  United  States  has  a  strong  interest 
in  this  matter  of  loans  to  China  both  for  business  and  political 
reasons.  The  withdrawal  of  the  American  bankers  from  the 
6-nation  consortium  was  at  that  time  conclusive  with  it;  but  the 
American  Government  made  it  clear  that,  by  declining  to  support 
those  bankers  in  the  reorganization  loan  because  of  some  of  its 
provisions  which  were  thought  to  infringe  on  China's  autonomous 
rights  and  which  the  American  Government  would  not  assent  to 
as  a  matter  of  principle,  it  in  no  way  was  qualifying  the  right  of 
American  bankers  to  deal  independently  with  China  or  the  right 
of  the  American  Government  to  support  such  independent  loans. 
With  conditions  as  they  have  developed  because  of  the  great  war, 
a  peculiar  situation  relating  to  international  finance  has  arisen 
whose  reactions  on  the  question  of  loans  to  China  must  be  con- 
sidered now.  Let  us  suppose  that,  as  is  reported,  the  residuary  of 
the  5-nation  banking  group  offers  a  loan  to  China  and  will  proceed 
with  the  negotiation  and  payment  of  such  a  loan.  Under  condi- 
tions that  exist,  British,  French  and  Russian  banks  have  no  money 
to  lend  actually,  and  any  such  loan  by  them  to  China  would  have 
the  character  of  a  transference  by  banking  process  to  this  use  of 
money  borrowed  largely  from  America.  America  is  now  financing 
Russia,  Great  Britain  and  France  to  the  extent  of  billions,  and 
probably  will  finance  them  for  tens  of  billions  more.  It  is  a  jug- 
gling of  figures  and  phrases  to  say  that  a  4-nation  loan  to  China 
now,  which  would  exclude  America  and  leave  America  out  of  con- 
sideration, would  be  an  actual  financing  of  China  by  the  4-nation 
banking  group.     Of  the  nations  in  that  residuary  group  only  Japan 


142     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

has  free  money  of  her  own  to  lend.  This  is  none  the  less  true  in 
principle  and  in  fact  because,  by  bookkeeping,  it  could  be  shown 
that  money  so  loaned  to  China  might  come  from  funds  raised  by 
domestic  loans  in  Russia,  England  and  France.  Unless  the  great 
amounts  now  being  supplied  to  those  nations  by  America  were 
derived  from  that  source,  then  the  supplies  which  that  money  is 
paying  for  would  have  either  to  be  paid  for  out  of  funds  raised 
by  domestic  loans,  or  be  gone  without;  and  therefore  money  would 
not  be  available  to  lend  to  China. 

Loans  to  China  during  the  continuation  of  this  war  therefore  are 
on  a  different  basis  than  formerly  in  both  the  financial  and  political 
aspects.  In  respect  to  American  participation  in  them,  such  partici- 
pation could  take  either  or  all  of  four  characters — (a)  money  first 
borrowed  from  America  by  the  British,  Russian  and  French  Gov- 
ernments which  might  turn  some  of  it  over  to  British,  Russian  and 
French  bankers  to  lend  to  China,  (b)  money  loaned  to  China  inde- 
pendently by  American  bankers,  (c)  monej'  loaned  to  China  by  the 
American  Government  out  of  the  public  funds,  as  is  being  done 
to  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  Italy,  Belgium  and  perhaps  other 
nations  in  the  allied  association,  (d)  for  American  bankers  to 
rejoin  the  4-nation  group.  Which  is  the  better  method  of  helping 
China  financially  at  this  time  is  a  serious  question.  For  the  Amer- 
ican Government,  in  case  China  joins  with  the  nations  arrayed 
against  Germany,  directly  to  advance  money  to  China  certainly  is 
the  easiest  and  shortest  way  to  get  China  out  of  financial  diffi- 
culties and  to  make  it  possible  for  her  to  be  of  material  help  to 
the  Allies.  This  method  at  once  obviates  any  complications  caused 
by  the  group  muddle:  for  such  action  of  course  would  be  taken 
with  the  knowledge  and  approval  of  other  powers  in  the  allied  asso- 
ciation. If  the  bankers  growled,  they  simply  would  be  told  to  mind 
their  business — and  they  would  have  to  do  that  too.  It  is  quite 
feasible,  if  the  American  Government  desires  it,  for  American 
bankers  independently  to  make  a  large  loan  to  China ;  and  if  other 
nations  and  the  bankers  of  other  nations  should  feel  dissatisfied 
with  that  course  they  would  have  to  make  the  best  of  it  because  of 
greater  things  involved.  I  think  it  can  be  safely  assumed  that  the 
American  Government  will  not  consent  to  have  the  method  desig- 
nated (a)  adopted;  and  that  method  cannot  be  carried  out  against 
the  opposition   of  America. 

By  some  ways  of  looking  at  this  matter,  something  can  be  said 
in  favor  of  carrying  on  by  means  of  the  group  organization.  But 
the  banking  group  would  have  in  that  case  to  include  American 
bankers,  as  formerly.  This  method  would  reduce  friction  and 
resentments  among  the  banking  interests  of  the  different  nations, 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  143 

and  perhaps  also  would  lessen  irritations  among  the  nations  that 
would  be  the  political  sustamers  of  the  financiers.  It  would  how- 
ever, at  least  during  the  war,  require  the  fiction  of  an  actual  par- 
ticipation of  Russian,  French  and  British  finance,  whereas  this  par- 
ticipation would  be  largely  relative.  By  preserving  the  group  sys- 
tem, with  the  inclusion  of  American  bankers,  there  would  perhaps 
be  less  difficulty  after  the  war  in  keeping  matters  straight  and  in 
going  on  easily  and  without  undue  international  competition;  al- 
though survival  of  the  group  carries  the  post-war  German  complica- 
tion. I  have  not  in  this  discussion  so  far  paid  much  attention  to 
one  very  important  phase  of  it — what  Chinese  may  think  about 
the  propositions.  Chinese  probably  will,  among  these  alternatives, 
have  their  opinion  and  preference  which  must  be  considered;  but 
one  can  see  that  because  of  broader  international  relations  it  may 
not  be  feasible  to  conform  to  Chinese  preference  entirely  in  those 
arrangements.  There  ought  to  be  give  and  take  on  all  sides,  having 
in  view  an  adjustment  conducive  to  China's  integrity  and  security 
and  to  smooth  international  relations  now  and  hereafter. 

If  the  banking  group  should  be  determined  as  the  means  of  help- 
ing China  financially,  care  must  be  taken  to  obviate  some  condi- 
tions within  the  group  and  inherent  with  its  old  organization  -which 
would  almost  surely  impair  its  usefulness  now  and  hereafter.  Ver- 
sus independent  action  by  one  power,  the  group  method  has  certain 
plain  disadvantages  derived  principally  (and  this  is  pertinent)  from 
previous  conceptions  of  international  policy  as  practiced  by  some 
of  the  powers  in  China.  These  disadvantages  reside  in  those  clauses 
which  make  it  possible  for  any  one  national  section  of  bankers,  on 
their  own  motion  or  by  instigation  from  their  Government,  merely 
by  objecting,  to  prevent  any  action  by  the  group  that  may  be  ap- 
proved by  the  majority.  In  the  comparatively  short  history  of  the 
group  this  has  happened  several  times.  We  need  not  cite  the  in- 
stances— they  will  at  once  come  to  mind  with  those  who  have  fol- 
lowed events  in  China  in  recent  times.  One  time  it  was  this  power 
which  obstructed,  another  time  it  was  that  power.  Of  several  cases 
that  have  occurred,  nearly  all  of  them  were  due  to  diplomatic  rea- 
sons of  Governments  which  were  not  directly  related  to  or  connected 
with  finance,  or  to  the  affair  with  which  the  group  was  immediately 
busy.  For  instance,  a  power  wants  something  let  us  say  in  Man- 
churia, so  to  obtain  that  it  has  its  banker  nationals  obstruct  some 
financial  matter  until,  by  diplomatic  indirection,  the  other  thing  is 
obtained.  The  game  often  in  the  past  has  been  played  this  way 
at  Peking.  If  the  group  is  permitted  to  survive,  this  defect  in  its 
organization  and  working  method  should  be  effectively  remedied, 


144     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Soon  after  the  shift  of  Japan's  policy  in  China  caused  by 
the  change  of  China 's  international  status,  it  became  apparent 
that  Japanese  would  not  be  bound  by  the  group  agreement. 
Beginning  with  the  advances  made  to  aid  in  the  suppression 
of  the  Chang  Hsun  revolution,  came  a  period  of  Japanese 
loans  to  China  independently  of  the  other  group  of  Allied 
powers.  When  President  Feng  Kuo-cheng  assumed  office,  his 
government  seemed  to  want  to  participate  in  the  war,  and 
tried  to  obtain  a  loan  from  America  to  finance  the  participa- 
tion. During  the  autumn  of  1917  there  were  negotiations 
through  the  Chinese  legation  at  Washington  to  obtain  finan- 
cial advances  from  the  United  States  treasury  under  the  same 
conditions  that  such  advances  were  being  made  to  other 
governments  in  the  Allied  belligerent  group.  I  believe  that 
the  state  department  favored  such  advances — they  were 
recommended  by  the  American  legation  at  Peking — but  diffi- 
culties were  made  by  the  treasury  department  for  budget 
reasons.  It  may  be  that  the  Ishii  mission,  then  in  America, 
had  an  influence  in  deterring  the  American  Government  from 
financing  China  as  a  war  measure.^  At  any  rate,  the  project 
for  an  American  loan  failed,  and  from  that  time  the  Tuan 
cabinet  began  to  lose  faith  in  America  and  turn  to  Japan. 
Speaking  to  me  a  year  afterward,  Dr.  Reinsch  said  that  if  he 
could  then  have  given  the  Chinese  Government  positive  as- 
surances of  American  financial  support,  China  could  have 
been  swung  into  an  active  war  participation  policy.  The 
diplomatic  representatives  of  Russia,  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Italy  at  Peking  all  encouraged  the  Chinese  Government 
to  participate  actively.  Japan  was  opposed,  and  Japan  car- 
ried the  day. 

The  Japanese  loan  policy  in  China  that  followed  after 
China  declared  war  on  Germany  and  Austria  was  distinctly 
opposed  to  the  policy  of  all  the  other  Allied  powers  there.  I 
shall  hereafter  attempt  to  elucidate  the  methods,  purposes, 
and  results  of  the  Japanese  loan  policy  in  this  period,  but  it 
is  necessary  at  this  point  to  explain  the  principal  conflict  of 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  145 

the  two  policies.  The  western  powers  (America,  Great 
Britain,  and  France)  were  in  favor  of  financing  the  Chinese 
Government  only  under  certain  conditions.  Under  the  act 
of  Congress  regulating  such  expenditures,  the  United  States 
Government  had  authority  to  make  financial  advances  to  help 
nations  in  the  Allied  group  in  prosecuting  the  war,  but  the 
act  was  not  interpreted  to  cover  loans  for  other  purposes, 
such  as  internal  administration,  unless  specifically  authorized 
by  Congress.  If  the  Chinese  Government  had  presented  a 
definite  plan  for  war  participation  under  the  supervision  of 
foreign  officers,  as  was  done  by  other  nations,  then  it  would 
have  been  feasible  for  the  United  States  Government  to  finance 
the  operations,  and  the  Allied  western  powers  would  have 
approved  it.  But  to  advance  funds  to  China  without  such  a 
definite  plan  and  without  the  necessary  supervision  and  direc- 
tion would  probably  mean  that  the  money  would  be  used  in 
connection  with  the  civil  disorder,  and  would  be  used  to 
prosecute  a  civil  war  instead  of  a  war  against  Germany. 
Such  procedure  would  immediately  array  perhaps  half  of 
the  Chinese  against  the  Allies.  By  common  consent,  then,  the 
western  allied  powers  moved  cautiously  in  China,  and  in  the 
circumstances  it  was  felt  that  was  the  only  safe  policy. 

Japan,  however,  played  a  lone  hand.  "While  her  diplomats 
at  Tokio  and  the  other  Allied  capitals  were  professing  agree- 
ment with  the  other  governments,  in  China  Japan  took  a 
course  directly  opposed  to  their  ideas  and  wishes,  and  one 
which,  moreover,  was  calculated  to  wreck  the  Allied  policy, 
and  which  did  wreck  it.  The  French  Government  sent  a 
military  mission  to  China,  which  prepared  a  plan  for  Chinese 
participation  in  the  war.  That  this  question  was  a  delicate 
one  was  recognized  by  experts  who  understood  the  real  situa- 
tion in  the  far  East.  It  is  interesting  at  this  point  to  quote 
from  a  report  of  an  experienced  military  expert  of  one  of  the 
western  Allied  powers  at  Peking,  dated  October  19,  1917: 

The  Allies  should  desist  from  urging  Japan  to  send  troops  to 
Europe^  as  if  pushed  too  far  her  agents  provocateur,  of  which 


146     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

there  are  many  on  both  sides  in  China,  will  undoubtedly  be  directed 
to  bring  about  hostilities  between  the  north  and  south,  which  will 
give  Japan  her  long  desired  opportunity  to  step  in  and  settle 
matters,  and  thus  justify  her  reiterated  statements  that  her  forces 
were  necessary  at  home  in  order  to  protect  the  interests  of  the 
powers  in  China,  and  to  maintain  and  preserve  the  peace  of  the  far 
East. 

The  Allies  should  at  once  take  a  definite  and  determined  stand 
against  Japan's  disloyal  and  perfidious  policy  vis-a-vis  China  and 
China's  political  integrity,  which  policy  is  being  given  the  active 
assistance  and  support  of  a  body  of  unscrupulous  venal,  and  traitor- 
ous Chinese  cabinet  ministers  and  highly  placed  officials. 

If  not  checked  at  once,  Japan  will  be  induced  to  go  the  limit, 
naturally  believing  that  the  longanimity  and  tolerance  of  the  Allies 
indicate  their  tacit  approval  or  else  fear,  and  eventually  Japan's 
actions  will  be  such  as  to  make  imperative  the  taking  of  stern  and 
drastic  measures,  with  the  probable  disastrous  result  of  forcing  her 
into  the  arms  of  the  Central  powers — a  situation  however  which 
would  probably  be  welcomed  by  the  Japanese  Government  and  cer- 
tainly by  a  large  majority  of  the  Japanese  people,  who  are  at 
heart  sympathetic  with  Germany  and  German  institutions  and 
methods  of  government. 

Japan  did  not  want  to  send  troops  to  aid  the  Allies  in 
Europe,  for  that  would  mean  an  enormous  expense  and  no 
adequate  compensation.  Still  less  did  the  Tokio  Government 
want  China  to  send  troops  to  aid  the  Allies  in  Europe,  for 
that  would  place  Japan  in  a  very  unfavorable  light  by  com- 
parison. At  that  time  most  military  experts  of  the  Allied 
governments  stationed  in  the  far  East  were  convinced  that 
the  Japanese  Government  wanted  Germany  to  win  the  war, 
and  that  it  was  seeking  a  good  opportunity  to  quit  the  Allies 
and  reach  an  understanding  with  Germany.  It  was  plain  to 
experts  on  the  politics  and  conditions  of  the  far  East  that  what 
Japan  wanted  out  of  the  war  was  more  likely  to  be  attained 
by  a  victory  of  Germany  than  by  a  victory  of  the  Allies.  I 
mention  this  belief  now  because  it  is  pertinent  to  a  phase  of 
important  events  then  developing.  The  Japanese  Govern- 
ment could  not  very  well  object  openly  to  China  aiding  the 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  147 

Allies  in  Europe,  for  that  would  put  too  severe  a  strain  on  its 
relations  with  the  other  powers,  but  such  participation  by 
China  might  be  prevented  by  intrigue.  Roughly,  the  plan 
was  to  involve  China  in  civil  war  and  internal  disorder,  and 
thus  make  it  impossible  for  the  Government  to  participate  in 
Europe.  To  this  end  the  Tokio  Government  devised  a  plan 
to  sell  the  Chinese  Government  arms  and  munitions  and  to 
finance  the  transaction.  Light  on  Japan's  diplomacy  at  that 
time  is  given  by  some  correspondence  of  the  Russian  ambas- 
sador at  Tokio  to  the  Russian  foreign  office,  published  after 
the  revolution  in  Russia: 

DISPATCH  FROM  THE  RUSSIAN  AMBASSADOR  AT  TOKIO,  DATED 
OCTOBER  16,   1917 

In  reply  to  my  question  as  to  the  credibility  of  the  rumors  alleg- 
ing that  Japan  is  prepared  to  sell  to  the  Chinese  Government  a 
considerable  quantity  of  arms  and  munitions,  Viscount  Motono 
confirmed  them,  and  added  that  the  Peking  Government  had  prom- 
ised not  to  use  the  arms  against  the  Southerners.  It  was  evident 
from  the  Minister's  words,  however,  that  this  promise  possessed 
only  the  value  of  a  formal  justification  of  this  sale,  infringing  as 
the  latter  does  the  principle  of  non-intervention  in  the  internal 
Chinese  feuds,  proclaimed  by  Japan  herself,  and  that  the  Japa- 
nese Government  was  in  this  instance  deliberately  assisting  the 
Tuan  Chi-jui  Cabinet  in  the  hope  of  receiving  from  it  in  return 
substantial  advantages.  It  is  most  likely  that  the  Japanese  are 
aiming  principally  at  obtaining  the  privilege  of  rearming  the  entire 
Chinese  army,  and  at  making  China  dependent  in  the  future  on 
Japanese  arsenals  and  the  supply  of  munitions  from  Japan.  The 
arms  to  be  supplied  to  China  are  estimated  at  30,000,000  yen.  At 
the  same  time,  Japan  intends  establishing  an  arsenal  in  China  for 
the  manufacture  of  war  material. 

We  come  now  to  an  event  of  immense  importance — the  sign- 
ing at  Washington  of  a  new  agreement  between  the  American 
and  Japanese  governments  relating  to  China,  known  as  the 
Lansing-Ishii  Agreement.  Although  nothing  was  known  at 
Washington,  except  to  those  of  the  inner  diplomatic  circle, 
that  such  an  agreement  was  even  being  discussed,  it  evidently 


148     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

was  known  at  other  capitals.  I  produce  here  an  official  letter 
from  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Tokio  to  the  Russian  foreign 
office  (the  italics  are  mine) : 

DESPATCH   FROM   THE  RUSSIAN   AMBASSADOR  AT  TOKIO,  DATED 
OCTOBER  22,  1917 

Referring  to  Bakhmetyeff's  [Russian  Ambassador  at  Washing- 
ton] N  598,  if  the  United  States  thinks,  as  it  appeared  to  our  Am- 
bassador [from  conversation  with  Lansing],  that  the  recognition  of 
Japan's  special  position  in  China  is  of  no  practical  consequence, 
such  a  view  will  inevitably  lead  in  the  future  to  serious  misunder- 
standings between  us  and  Japan.  The  Japanese  are  manifesting 
more  and  more  clearly  a  tendency  to  interpret  the  special  position 
of  Japan  in  China,  inter  alia,  in  the  sense  that  other  powers  must 
not  undertake  in  China  any  political  steps  without  previously  ex- 
changing views  with  Japan  on  the  subject — a  condition  that  would 
to  some  extent  establish  a  Japanese  control  over  the  foreign  affairs 
of  China.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Japanese  Government  does  not 
attach  great  importance  to  its  recognition  of  the  principle  of  the 
open  door  and  the  integrity  of  China,  regarding  it  as  merely  a 
repetition  of  the  assurances  repeatedly  given  by  it  earlier  to  other 
powers  and  implying  no  new  restrictions  for  the  Japanese  policy 
in  China.  It  is  therefore  quite  possible  that  in  some  future  time 
there  may  arise  in  this  connection  misunderstandings  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  again 
confirmed  to-day  in  conversation  with  me  that  in  the  negotiations  by 
Viscount  Ishii  the  question  at  issue  is  not  some  special  concession 
to  Japan  in  these  or  other  parts  of  China,  but  Japan's  special 
position  in  China  as  a  whole. 

A  large  volume  could  now  be  written  with  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  Agreement  as  a  text ;  indeed,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  many 
books  will  be  written  about  it  or  about  the  issue  it  raises, 
and  wars  may  be  fought  about  it.  This  agreement  has  three 
sides:  the  side  of  the  United  States,  the  side  of  Japan,  the 
side  of  China.  The  United  States  and  Japan  are  parties  to 
it;  China  is  the  subject  of  it,  but  not  a  party  to  it.  It  is 
easy  to  discover  Japan's  motives  in  the  wording  of  the  agree- 
ment. It  is  possible,  even  probable,  that  the  motive  of  the 
American  Government  is  not  mentioned  in  it. 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  149 

A  glimpse  of  Japan's  motive  is  given  in  a  confidential 
letter  of  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Tokio  to  the  Russian 
foreign  office  (the  italics  are  mine) : 

DESPATCH  FROM  THE  RUSSIAN  AMBASSADOR  AT  TOKIO,  DATED 
NOVEMBER    1,    1917 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  asked  me  to  call  on  him  to-day, 
and  communicated  to  me  confidentially,  but  quite  officially,  the  text 
of  the  notes  transmitted  in  my  telegram  No.  2,  which  are  to  be 
exchanged  at  Washington  on  November  2  or  3  between  the  Ameri- 
can State  Secretary  and  Viscount  Ishii.  A  similar  communication 
was  made  to-day  to  the  British  Ambassador  here.  The  French  and 
Italian  Ambassador  will  receive  the  text  of  the  Notes  in  a  day  or 
two,  privately,  for  their  information.  The  publication  of  the 
Notes  will  probably  take  place  on  November  7;  until  then  the 
Minister  asks  the  Powers  to  keep  his  communications  secret. 

When  handing  me  the  above-mentioned  text  of  the  Notes,  Vis- 
count Motono  added  that  he  had  only  received  it  in  final  form 
yesterday  by  wire  from  Washington;  and  since  Viscount  Ishii  was 
to  leave  [Washington]  the  night  after  next,  the  signature  of  the 
Notes  could  not  have  been  postponed,  in  spite  of  the  Japanese 
Government's  desire  to  ascertain  the  views  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment on  the  subject  prior  to  it.  The  Minister  hoped  that  he  would 
not  be  blamed  for  that  at  Petrograd — especially  as  the  present 
agreement  between  America  and  Japan  could  not  arouse  any  ob- 
jection on  our  part.  Viscount  Motono  mentioned  that  when  con- 
cluding [gap  in  the  original],  one  of  the  objects  was  to  put  an  end 
to  the  German  intrigue  intended  to  sow  discord  between  Japan  and 
the  United  States,  and  to  prove  thereby  to  the  Chinese  that  there 
was  between  the  two  powers  a  complete  agreement  of  view  with 
regard  to  China,  who,  therefore,  must  not  reckon  on  the  possibility 
of  extracting  any  profit  from  playing  off  one  against  the  other. 

To  my  question  whether  he  did  not  fear  that  in  the  future  mis- 
understandings might  arise  from  the  different  interpretations  by  Ja- 
pan and  the  United  States  of  the  meaning  of  the  terms:  "special  po- 
sition" and  "special  interests"  of  Japan  in  China,  Viscount  Motono 
replied  by  saying  that — [a  gap  in  the  original].  Nevertheless,  I 
gain  the  impression  from  the  words  of  the  Minister  that  he  is  con- 
scious of  the  possibility  of  misunderstandings  also  in  the  future, 
but  is  of  the  opinion  that  in  such  a  case  Japan  would  have  better 
means  at  her  disposal  for  carrying  into  effect  her  interpretation 
than  the  United  States. 


150     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

These  confidential  diplomatic  communications  were  not 
published  for  months  after  the  announcement  of  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  Agreement,  and  they  show  that  even  before  that  com- 
pact was  announced  by  the  American  and  Japanese  govern- 
ments its  content  had  been  officially  communicated  to  at  least 
one  government  in  the  Allied  group — Russia.  Were  the  other 
Allied  powers  also  apprised  of  what  was  going  on  at  Wash- 
ington and  Tokio?  This  constitutes  a  very  extraordinary 
and  in  some  phases  an  inexplicable  incident.  It  was  an  im- 
propriety for  two  nations  in  the  Allied  group  to  make  an 
agreement  which  affected  other  nations  in  the  same  group 
without  informing  them.  An  article  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance  says,  "The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  nei- 
ther of  them  will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter  into  a 
separate  agreement  with  another  power  to  the  prejudice  of 
the  objects  described  in  the  preamble  of  this  Agreement." 
Japan  had  violated  that  article  in  trying  to  force  the  twenty- 
one  demands  on  <"  na  without  informing  Great  Britain, 
^he  United  States  was  not  formally  an  ally  of  any  nation, 
I  it  its  spokesmen  had  publicly  condemned  the  practice  of 
staking  secret  and  separate  agreements  about  issues  relating 
to  the  war  while  it  was  going  on.  Yet  the  United  States  was 
the  first  nation,  after  it  became  a  belligerent,  to  evade  the 
principle  it  had  pronounced;  for  even  if,  as  is  probable,  the 
other  Allied  powers  were  privately  apprised  of  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  negotiations  and  their  purposes,  the  Chinese  Government 
was  not  informed  or  consulted.  In  publishing  the  agree- 
ment in  the  United  States  the  state  department  gave  a  long 
Statement  in  which  some  very  interesting  suggestions  were 
thrown  out.  I  quote  from  that  statement  ("The  New  York 
Times."): 

The  importance  and  far-reaching  character  of  this  agreement  are 
emphasized  by  a  statement  by  Secretary  Lansing  pointing  out  the 
application  of  the  pact  to  the  great  war.  It  not  only  sweeps  away 
the  mutual  suspicion  that  has  tended  to  produce  ill-feeling  between 
the  two  Governments,  but  embraces  an  understanding,  made  known 
through   Secretary  Lansing's   statement  accompanying  the  formal 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  151 

documents,  tnat  the  Japanese  Government  "desired  to  do  their  part 
in  the  suppression  of  Prussian  militarism,  and  were  eager  to  co- 
operate in  every  practical  way  to  that  end." 

One  of  the  questions  asked  since  the  arrival  in  this  country  of 
the  special  Japanese  Mission  headed  by  Viscount  Ishii  was  why 
Japan  had  not  taken  a  more  active  part  in  the  war.  The  Japanese 
Commissioners  have  answered  it  in  a  way  that  is  entirely  satisfac- 
tory to  the  United  States,  and  there  now  appears  to  be  no  doubt 
that  if  Japan  is  called  on  to  furnish  men  and  means  to  help  in 
German  defeat,  she  will  respond  readily. 

The  intimation  is  very  plainly  conveyed  that  to  induce 
Japan  to  take  a  more  effective  part  in  prosecuting  the  war  on 
the  side  of  the  Allies  was  among  the  objects  of  the  Lan- 
sing-Ishii  Agreement.  That  the  relations  of  Japan  to  the 
Allies,  or  vis-a-vis  Germany,  were  desiderata  of  the  agree- 
ment was  further  intimated  by  the  statement  of  the  state 
department.  The  misunderstandings  between  the  Japa- 
nese and  American  governments,  so  that  official  statement 
said,  had  been  due  to  "German  propaganda,"  and  it  was 
stated  that  Viscount  Ishii  had  laid  before  Secretary  Lansing 
the  evidence  of  efforts  of  the  German  Government  to  reach  a 
separate  understanding  with  Japan.  As  bearing  on  this 
point  I  insert  a  paragraph  taken  from  a  report  of  a  secret 
agent  in  Russia  of  one  of  the  Allied  governments,  dated 
October  18,  1917: 

I  have  reliable  information  that  two  Japanese  officials  who  are 
attached  to  the  Japanese  Embassy  at  Petrograd  have  returned  from 
a  visit  to  the  eastern  front,  where  they  went  about  one  month  ago. 
My  informant,  who  is  close  in  the  confidence  of  the  Russian  revo- 
lutionary part}',  told  me  that  these  Japanese  succeeded  in  having 
interviews  with  German  officers  at  a  town  near  the  front.  He  says 
that  the  German  officers  were  representatives  of  the  German  foreign 
office  and  were  not  military  officers.  The  Russian  revolutionary 
party  believes  that  if  Russia  makes  a  separate  peace  Japan  will 
make  an  alliance  with  Germany  in  order  to  protect  her  position  in 
the  far  East  and  China.  I  understand  that  the  Japanese  Ambassa- 
dor at  Petrograd  has  sounded  the  Russian  revolutionary  government 
on  this  matter.  These  matters  are  to  be  considered  in  connection 
with  the  operations  of  the  Japanese  agents  in  Switzerland. 


152     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Having  briefly  sketched  the  international  background  of 
the  agreement,  it  is  now  given  in  full : 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  Nov.  2,  1917. 

Excellency:  I  have  the  honor  to  communicate  herein  my  under- 
standing of  the  agreement  reached  by  us  in  our  recent  conversations 
touching  the  questions  of  mutual  interest  to  our  Governments  relat- 
ing to  the  Republic  of  China. 

In  order  to  silence  mischievous  reports  that  have  from  time  to 
time  been  circulated,  it  is  believed  by  us  that  a  public  announcement 
once  more  of  the  desires  and  intentions  shared  by  our  two  Govern- 
ments with  regard  to  China  is  advisable. 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Japan  recognize  that 
territorial  propinquity  creates  special  relations  between  countries, 
and,  consequently,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  recognizes 
that  Japan  has  special  interests  in  China,  particularly  in  that  part 
to  which  her  possessions  are  contiguous. 

The  territorial  sovereignty  of  China,  nevertheless,  remains  unim- 
paired, and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  every  confi- 
dence in  the  repeated  assurances  of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Govern- 
ment that,  while  geographical  position  gives  Japan  such  special 
interests,  they  have  no  desire  to  discriminate  against  the  trade  of 
other  nations  or  to  disregard  the  commercial  rights  heretofore 
granted  by  China  in  treaties  with  other  powers. 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Japan  deny  that  they 
have  any  purpose  to  infringe  in  any  way  the  independence  or 
territorial  integrity  of  China,  and  they  declare,  furthermore,  that 
they  always  adhere  to  the  principle  of  the  so-called  "open  door," 
or  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  in  China. 

Moreover,  they  mutually  declare  that  they  are  opposed  to  the 
acquisition  by  any  Government  of  any  special  rights  or  privileges 
that  would  affect  the  independence  or  territorial  integrity  of  China, 
or  that  would  deny  to  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  any  country  the 
full  enjoyment  of  equal  opportunity  in  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  China. 

I  shall  be  glad  to  have  your  Excellency  confirm  this  understanding 
of  the  agreement  reached  by  us. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurance  of  my  highest  con- 
sideration. 

Robert  Lansing. 
His  Excellency,  Viscount  Kikujiro  Ishii,  Ambassador  Extraordinary 
and  Plenipotentiary  of  Japan,  on  special  mission. 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  153 

The  Special  Mission  of  Japan, 
Washington,  Nov.  2,  1917. 
Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  note 
of  to-day,  conimunicating  to  me  your  understanding  of  the  agree- 
ment reached  by  us  in  our  recent  conversations  touching  the  ques- 
tions of  mutual  interest  to  our  Governments  relating  to  the  Re- 
public of  China. 

I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  confirm  to  you,  under  authorization  of 
my  Government,  the  understanding  in  question  set  forth  in  the 
following  terms: 

[Here  the  Special  Ambassador  repeats  the  language  of  the  agree- 
ment as  given  in  Secretary  Lansing's  note.] 

K.  Ishii. 
Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary  of  Japan,  on  spe- 
cial mission. 
Honorable  Robert  Lansing,  Secretary  of  State. 

This  text  of  the  exchange  of  notes  constituting  the  agree- 
ment is  taken  from  ' '  The  New  York  Times, ' '  and  is  the  same 
as  was  published  in  newspapers  throughout  the  world.  If 
there  are  any  reserved  or  secret  clauses,  which  qualify  or 
modify  the  agreement,  no  credible  intimation  of  their  exist- 
ence has  been  given. 


CHAPTER  VII 

CHINA   AND   THE   WAR—  CONCLUDED 

The  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement — Its  premature  publication  by  Japan — 
Uneasiness  caused  by  it — My  letter  to  Mr.  Lansing — Dangers  of  the 
incident — Might  alienate  both  China  and  Japan — Had  China  been  traded 
off? — Was  the  agreement  a  bribe  to  Japan? — Need  to  counteract  first 
impressions — Japan  violates  the  "gentlemen's  agreement" — Agreement 
given  publicity  at  Peking — Reasons  for  Japan's  procedure — A  difference 
of  translations — What  does  "special  interests"  mean? — The  American 
version — China  repudiates  the  agreement — Cryptic  character  of  the  in- 
strument— Its  effects  in  the  far  East — Japanese  propaganda  and  the 
agreement — Criticisms  of  a  Chinese — The  doctrine  of  territorial  pro- 
pinquity— Its  dangers — What  was  the  American  Government's  object? 
— Further  analysis  of  the  agreement — Its  legal  aspects — Which  is  the 
correct  interpretation? — American  interpretation  probably  the  best — 
International  psychology  of  the  agreement — Possible  motives  of  the 
United  States — Putting  world  pressure  on  Japan — Japan's  opportunity. 

THE  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  was  signed  at  Washing- 
ton on  November  2.  The  two  governments  had 
agreed  that  the  notes  were  to  be  published  simultane- 
ously at  Washington  and  Tokio  at  a  stated  hour  on  Novem- 
ber 7.  The  Japanese  Government,  however,  gave  the  agree- 
ment premature  publicity. 

Newspapers  in  the  United  States  and  Europe  printed  on 
the  morning  of  November  6  a  despatch  from  Peking  stating 
that  the  Japanese  legation  there  had  informed  the  Chinese 
foreign  office  of  the  agreement,  and  gave  a  brief  synopsis  of 
it.  The  news  was  not  prominently  displayed  by  the  Ameri- 
can press,  but  I,  being  in  New  York  at  the  time,  happened  to 
see  the  despatch,  and  immediately  sent  the  following  tele- 
gram: 

Robert  Lansing,  State  Department,  Washington. 

Publication  at  Peking  and  elsewhere  that  United  States  recog- 
nizes Japan's  special  position  in  China  with  interpretations  given 

154 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  155 

in  Far  East  will  cause  great  uneasiness  and  unless  immediately 
explained  will  damage  American  prestige  and  influence  in  China 
seriously.  If  understanding  as  reported  by  Japanese  legation  at 
Peking  is  true  China's  position  adversely  affected-  and  America's 
moral  position  with  Chinese  impaired.  If  not  correctly  stated  I 
earnestly  urge  that  you  will  telegraph  true  facts  to  American  Minis- 
ter at  Peking  authorize  him  publish  and  also  that  a  correct  version 
be  given  to  press  in  America. 

Thomas  F.  Millard. 

On  that  day,  November  6,  the  state  department  gave  out 
the  text  of  the  agreement,  accompanied  by  a  long  statement, 
from  which  I  have  previously  quoted.  It  also  communicated 
with  the  American  legation  at  Peking,  and  took  other  steps 
to  counteract  certain  effects  of  Japan's  premature  publica- 
tion. I  had  little  information  then  about  what  was  happening 
at  Peking,  but  I  was  able  to  gage  the  situation  from  my  gen- 
eral knowledge  of  conditions  and  what  I  could  learn  in  New 
York  and  "Washington.  My  opinion  of  the  matter  was  ex- 
pressed clearly  in  the  following  letter  to  Mr.  Lansing : 

New  York  City,  November  12th,  1917. 
Hon.  Robert  Lansing,  "Washington,  D.  C. 

Dear  Sir:  A  feeling  of  national  responsibility,  and  of  friend- 
ship for  China,  impels  me  to  address  you  in  regard  to  the  agreement 
relating  to  China  recently  made  by  the  American  and  Japanese 
governments.  In  the  introduction  to  the  statement  given  to  the 
press,  and  also  in  your  own  remarks  supplementing  the  text  of  the 
agreement,  the  state  department  plainly  draws  the  implication 
that  any  who  dissent  from  the  presumed  objects  and  purposes  or 
the  wisdom  of  this  agreement  are  to  be  regarded  as  either  conscious 
or  unwitting  agents  of  German  propaganda;  but  that  inference  will 
not  deter  me  from  privately  setting  before  you  some  matters  that 
I  regard  as  important,  and  which  apply  to  the  effects  of  the  action 
that  has  been  taken. 

You  doubtless  will  recognize  that  long  residence  in  the  far  East 
and  close  contact  with  conditions  there  afford  opportunities  to  get 
a  point  of  view  that  is  not  always  apparent  in  this  country.  To 
most  persons  who  comprehend  the  delicate  situation  of  China,  this 
action  in  its  first  impressions  is  almost  stupefying.  Ever  since  the 
publication  of  the  agreement  and  the  accompanying  explanation  of 
the  state  department,  I  have  been  cudgeling  my  brain  to  discover 


156     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

a  logical  and  reasonable  explanation  for  it  that  is  compatible  with 
the  honorable  requirements  of  our  nation  in  the  circumstances.  I 
visited  Washington  in  an  attempt  to  get  some  light,  and  while  there 
I  talked  with  some  officials  of  the  Department,  and  also  with  the 
Chinese  minister.     From  them  I  gathered  the  following: 

(a)  The  agreement  is  extremely  distasteful  to  the  Chinese  and 
was  made  without  consulting  their  wishes. 

(b)  The  state  department  (according  to  the  officials  with  whom 
I  talked)  does  not  intend  by  this  agreement  to  recognize  the  "spe- 
cial position"  of  Japan  in  China  except  in  the  sense  of  geographical 
proximity;  while  by  the  reiteration  of  the  guarantees  of  the  "open 
door"  and  of  the  "integrity  of  China,"  the  state  department  feels 
that  our  Government  commits  Japan  unreservedly  to  a  respect  for 
and  observation  of  these  principles,  and  perhaps  also  commits  the 
American  Government  affirmatively  to  give  direct  support  to  these 
principles  in  case  they  are  violated  or  threatened. 

However,  most  of  us  who  understand  actual  conditions  in  China 
perceive  ambiguities  in  this  announcement,  and  in  the  text  of  the 
notes  constituting  the  agreement,  which,  unless  steps  axe  taken  to 
prevent  it,  may  work  out  into  a  most  delicate  and  dangerous 
situation,  which  involves  both  American  interests  and  the  national 
honor. 

In  regard  to  the  recognition  of  Japan's  special  position  in  China, 
it  may  be  that  the  state  department  has  an  interpretation  of  this 
phrase  in  mind  which  is  very  different  from  how  Japan  under- 
stands it,  and  from  how  it  will  be  understood  in  China.  I  feel  that 
I  know  how  this  part  of  the  agreement  will  be  understood  in  China. 
It  will  be  interpreted  largely  in  the  light  of  the  meaning  which 
Japan's  propaganda  in  that  region  has  in  the  last  two  years  been 
giving  to  it,  and  according  to  the  practical  application  of  Japan's 
policy  in  China  as  this  is  known  there.  In  that  light,  Chinese  will 
believe  that  the  American  Government  has  abandoned  its  traditional 
policy  toward  China,  and  has  for  reasons  or  compensations  not 
appearing  in  the  agreement  consented  to  allow  Japan  a  free  hand 
in  China. 

Chinese  feeling  about  this  must  be  taken  in  conjunction  with 
recent  events,  and  the  circumstances  whereby  China  was  first  in- 
duced by  the  influence  of  America  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany,  and  later  to  declare  war  on  Germany.  China  was  induced 
to  take  these  steps  by  the  assurances  that  by  joining  the  allied 
consortium  she  would  be  protected  in  the  peace  terms.  In  taking 
this  step  China  had  no  thought  of  being  protected  against  Germany, 
for   Chinese  did  not   feel  that  their  nation  was  in   any  present 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  157 

danger  from  Germany.  China  did  feel,  and  still  does  feel,  that 
she  is  in  danger  from  Japan,  and  that  by  following  the  advice  of 
America  she  would  safeguard  herself  from  invidious  pressure  from 
Japan,  or  from  having  her  national  autonomy  and  economic  de- 
velopment subordinated  to  Japan's  control.  Our  minister  at  Peking, 
myself  as  a  publicist,  and  other  Americans  in  China  labored  to 
impress  the  Chinese  Government  with  the  importance  of  falling  in 
line  with  America,  arguing  that  America  is  China's  disinterested 
friend,  and  that  our  government  could  be  depended  on  to  help 
China  through  the  crisis.  The  signing  of  this  agreement,  with  the 
interpretations  that  at  first  will  be  given  to  it  in  China,  places  Amer- 
icans in  China  in  a  very  embarrassing  position — a  position  from 
which  only  some  action  of  our  Government  which  will  constructively 
aid  China  will  extricate  us. 

Without  doubt  the  immediate  effects  of  this  agreement  are  most 
unfortunate  in  respect  to  China,  and  to  American  prestige  and 
American  interests  in  China.  The  manner  of  first  giving  the  agree- 
ment publicity,  through  the  Japanese  legation  at  Peking,  also  was 
of  all  methods  the  most  likely  to  disseminate  an  impression  injuri- 
ous to  American  prestige.  I  have  read  carefully  the  agreement  and 
the  accompanying  explanations  in  the  hope  of  discovering  in  their 
phraseology  something  to  indicate  a  purpose  by  our  Government 
compatible  with  what  we  have  led  China  to  expect  of  us,  but  I 
cannot  find  it.  Only  two  theories  or  interpretations  of  the  agree- 
ment are  possible — (a)  that  we  have  really  consented  to  giving 
Japan  a  preferential  position  in  respect  to  China  that  amounts  to 
a  recognition  of  a  suzerainty  over  China,  protecting  only  our 
commercial  position  there,  or  (b)  that  we  limit  our  recognition  of 
Japan's  special  position  to  the  relation  of  geographical  proximity. 

If  the  first  hypothesis  is  correct,  then  we  have  greatly  offended 
China,  and  have  forfeited  the  confidence  of  Chinese;  in  short,  Chi- 
nese will  consider  that  we  have  betrayed  China. 

If  the  second  hypothesis  is  correct,  then  the  agreement  will  not, 
as  it  professes,  have  improved  the  relations  between  America  and 
Japan:  for  if  it  turns  out  that  we  do  not  intend  to  concede  the 
interpretation  of  "special  position"  that  undoubtedly  is  taken  by 
Japanese,  then  the  Japanese  will  regard  us  as  having  "buncoed" 
them,  and  will  feel  a  greater  resentment  against  us  than  formerly. 

Thus  it  appears  that  this  agreement  may  work  out  so  that  we  will 
lose  the  good  will  and  confidence  of  both  the  Chinese  and  the 
Japanese. 

In  your  statement  accompanying  publication  of  the  agreement, 
you  especially  emphasize  certain  alleged  effects  of  "German  propa- 


158     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

ganda"  in  China,  and  as  it  has  affected  the  relations  of  Japan  and 
America.  I  state  my  opinion  (based  on  tolerably  full  knowledge  of 
all  the  various  propagandas  operating  m  China  and  the  East)  that 
the  full  and  free  operation  of  German  propaganda  in  Clnna  for 
five  years  could  not  turn  Chinese  sentiment  against  America  and 
the  Allied  side  as  effectively  as  this  agreement  will,  unless  practical 
steps  are  taken  without  delay  to  demonstrate  to  Chinese  our  friend- 
ship, and  that  in  making  this  agreement  we  have  not  intended  to 
consign  them  to  a  fate  which  of  all  dangers  they  have  been  dreading 
as  the  most  imminent.  As  methods  that  can  be  used  to  extend 
practical  aid  to  China,  I  beg  to  refer  you  to  my  previous  letter 
of  October  23. 

If  it  turns  out  that  in  making  this  agreement  our  Government 
intended  to  recognize,  without  consulting  China's  wishes,  and  to 
concede  what  in  practice  will  amount  to  a  suzerainty  of  Japan 
over  China,  then  Chinese  will  regard  America  as  having  betrayed 
China  and  will  be  resentful  accordingly.  An  intelligent  Chinese 
said  to  me  since  the  publication  of  this  agreement :  "For  two  years 
we  have  suspected  that  Russia  and  Great  Britain  had  agreed  to 
recognize  Japan's  paramountey  in  China  to  secure  Japan's  aid 
in  the  war,  but  we  did  not  know  it.  If  they  did  that,  they  have 
kept  it  a  secret.  "We  never  suspected  that  America  would  do 
such  a  thing.  Now  she  has  done  it,  and  has  announced  it  to  the 
world.  Chinese  must  presume  that  America  in  doing  this  has  con- 
sulted with  her  principal  allies.  In  these  circumstances  China  must 
feel  that  she  has  been  betrayed  by  her  assumed  friends."  Un- 
fortunately, I  could  find  no  reply  to  make  to  this  indictment.  It 
remains  for  the  American  government  by  its  subsequent  acts  to 
confirm  or  refute  it.  Until  it  is  refuted,  American  interests  and 
prestige  in  China  are  subject  to  the  application  (as  without  doubt 
will  be  done)  by  competing  interests  of  all  the  suspicion  and 
odium  that  can  be  extracted  from  the  situation  as  it  stands. 

The  application  of  these  circumstances  in  their  relation  to  the 
general  allied  position  is  obvious.  The  reactions  in  Russia  and  in 
so-called  "weaker  nations"  that  are  now  wavering  in  the  position 
of  being  forced  to  take  one  side  or  the  other,  can  be  foreseen;  and 
the  uses  which  German  propaganda  can  make  of  this  incident  at  this 
juncture,  to  sow  suspicion  of  America's  purposes  and  motives,  and 
to  point  out  seeming  inconsistencies  of  our  acts  with  our  professions, 
are  plain.  These  apparent  inconsistencies  need  not  be  invented — 
they  actually  do  exist  in  certain  obvious  aspects  of  this  new  agree- 
ment with  Japan.  One  fears  that  our  Government  does  not  always 
understand  clearly  the  psychology  of  these  questions  as  it  applies 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  159 

to  different  nations.  It  need  not  be  assumed  that  in  other  nations 
and  with  other  peoples  the  acts  of  our  Government  will  be  under- 
stood as  it  means  them,  or  even  that  its  acts  always  will  work  out 
as  it  thinks  they  will,  or  as  intended.  Events  in  relation  to  the 
war  frequently  demonstrate  the  grave  errors  which  have  been  made 
by  the  allies  in  regard  to  the  psychology  of  different  peoples,  and 
their  effects  upon  the  fortunes  of  the  war.  It  is  not  improbable 
that,  before  this  war  is  ended,  the  friendly  sentiments  of  and  the 
active  aid  of  the  Chinese  may  be  needed. 

With  regard  to  the  effect  of  this  agreement  upon  American  com- 
mercial interests  and  development  in  China,  I  can  find  little  satis- 
faction. The  reiteration  of  the  guarantee  of  the  "open  door"  is  in 
itself  satisfactory  (although  a  supererogation,  for  this  is  assured 
by  previous  agreements  which  were  not  abrogated  formally) ;  but 
it  is  likely  to  be  the  reverse  of  assuring  to  American  interests  in 
China  by  reason  of  phrases  of  your  statement,  in  which  you  ex- 
press confidence  in  Japan's  observance  of  the  "open  door."  Are 
Americans  and  Chinese  to  infer  from  this  that  our  Government 
regards  the  way  in  which  Japan  has  observed  the  open  door  in 
China  during  the  last  ten  years  as  being  satisfactory?  If  this  is  a 
correct  interpretation  of  your  confidence  in  Japan's  observation 
of  the  open  door  in  China,  then  Americans  in  China  will  feel  the 
reverse  of  confidence  in  the  security  of  their  position  there;  for 
they  know  how  Japan's  idea  of  the  open  door  has  worked  in  practice. 

A  theory  of  course  is  applicable  to  this  agreement,  that  because  of 
exigencies  of  the  military  situation  in  Europe  it  has  been  necessary 
to  bribe  Japan  to  remain  with  the  allied  side  by  conceding  to  her 
a  free  hand  in  China.  This  hypothesis  would  cynically  repudiate 
the  avowed  principles  of  our  Government  in  entering  the  war: 
but  it  might  be  defended  on  the  "imperative  necessity''  theory  of 
international  affairs  provided  the  facts  would  bear  it  out.  In 
trying  to  find  for  myself  a  reasonable  explanation  of  the  Govern- 
ment's purposes  in  making  this  agreement,  I  have  considered  this 
hypothesis,  but  without  finding  in  it  a  reasonable  explanation.  It  of 
course  presumes  a  treacherous  intent  of  Japan,  and  a  willingness 
on  our  part  to  adopt  a  practice  which  we  so  strongly  condemn  in 
Germany.  Furthermore,  it  does  not  appear  that  Japan  can  at 
this  juncture  give  much  practical  help  to  the  allies  in  the  war. 
The  impracticability,  for  political  reasons,  of  using  Japanese  troops 
on  the  Russian  front,  is  obvious  to  any  who  understand  the  psy- 
chology of  the  Russians  in  relation  to  this  question.  The  imprac- 
ticability, for  material  reasons,  of  using  Japanese  troops  and  sup- 
plies on  the  western  European  front  also  is  apparent,  because  of 


160     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

the  difficulty  of  their  transport  and  supply  there  in  comparison  with 
reinforcements  sent  from  America. 

If  the  quid  pro  quo  of  this  agreement  is  only  the  supply  by 
Japan  of  some  ships  for  the  Allied  use,  then  I  believe  that  this  aid 
could  have  been  procured  by  only  giving  Japan  steel  and  cotton, 
and  by  other  processes  applicable  to  her. 

I  have  not  discussed  these  matters  without  a  purpose.  This  pur- 
pose is  that  the  Government  may  see  the  advisability  of  taking  steps 
to  counteract  the  first  impressions  given  by  this  agreement,  and  to 
take  measures  to  extend  practical  aid  to  China,  and  to  stabilize 
conditions  in  the  far  East  on  the  line  of  our  national  interests  and 
our  traditional  policy. 

With  regards  I  remain 

Yours  truly, 

Thomas  F.  Millard. 

When  I  wrote  that  letter  I  did  not  know  about  the  revela- 
tion of  the  Japanese  Government's  interpretation  of  the 
Lansing-Ishii  notes  plainly  given  in  the  secret  correspondence 
of  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Tokio  (see  previous  chapter), 
but  I  had  no  doubt  in  my  own  mind  of  what  the  Japanese 
interpretation  would  be.  Neither  did  I  know  then  that  Japa- 
nese diplomacy  had  prematurely  published  the  agreement  to 
gain  a  point  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States.  To  under- 
stand that  phase  of  the  matter  we  must  turn  to  events  at 
Peking. 

By  what  usually  is  called  a  "gentleman's  agreement"  be- 
tween Mr.  Lansing  and  Viscount  Ishii,  their  official  notes 
were  to  be  given  publicity  on  November  7.  This  would  give 
time  for  both  governments  to  communicate  the  text  of  the 
notes  to  their  representatives  at  Peking  and  other  capitals  and 
to  instruct  them  accordingly.  An  extraordinary  feature  of 
this  event  is  that  neither  the  American  legation  at  Peking 
nor  the  American  embassy  at  Tokio  was  apprised  of  what  was 
happening,  nor  was  consulted  in  any  way  regarding  the 
matter,  but  received  the  first  information  about  the  agree- 
ment from  the  Japanese  legation  at  Peking  and  the  Japanese 
foreign  office  at  Tokio.  Presumably  the  state  department  in- 
tended, between  the  day  of  signing  the  agreement  and  its 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  161 

date  of  publication,  to  inform  and  instruct  the  representatives 
at  Tokio  and  Peking,  but  before  it  did  that  the  Japanese 
Government  anticipated  it.  The  Japanese  foreign  office  com- 
municated the  notes  to  the  Allied  diplomatic  representatives 
in  Tokio  on  November  1,  the  day  before  it  was  signed.  The 
state  department,  on  the  other  hand,  kept  so  strictly  to  the 
"gentlemen's  agreement"  that  it  did  not  even  inform  its  own 
representatives  abroad. 

On  November  4  the  Japanese  legation  at  Peking  officially 
notified  the  Chinese  foreign  office  of  the  agreement  and  pre- 
sented it  with  copies  of  the  text  in  Chinese  and  Japanese. 
On  the  same  day  Baron  Hayashi,  the  Japanese  minister  at 
Peking,  called  at  the  American  legation  and  gave  the  Ameri- 
can minister,  Dr.  Reinsch,  a  copy  of  the  notes  in  English. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  this  procedure  was  deliberately  cal- 
culated to  impress  the  Chinese  Government  that  the  United 
States  Government  had  to  some  extent  conceded  Japan's  para- 
mountcy  in  China,  and  therefore  it  was  Japan's  prerogative 
officially  to  notify  both  the  Chinese  foreign  office  and  the 
American  legation  of  this  important  matter. 

A  very  significant  point  in  connection  with  the  communica- 
tion of  the  agreement  to  the  Wai  Chiao-Pu  by  the  Japanese 
minister  at  Peking  is  that  both  the  Japanese  and  Chinese 
texts  used  certain  characters  (li-i)  to  translate  the  "special 
interests"  of  Japan  that  are  recognized  by  the  United  States 
in  the  instrument.  In  the  translation  submitted  to  the  Wai 
Chiao-Pu  later  by  the  American  legation  as  the  official  text 
recognized  by  the  American  Government,  different  characters 
(kuan-hsi)  were  used  to  describe  the  "special  interests"  that 
were  recognized.  The  characters  mean  almost  the  same  thing, 
yet  with  a  distinction.  As  translated  by  the  Japanese  version, 
"special  interests"  indicate  vested  interests  or  proprietorship, 
something  tangible.  In  the  American  version,  "special  in- 
terests" means  merely  a  close  or  strong  general  interest  in 
the  welfare  of  China,  not  a  particular  or  vested  proprietary 
or  paramount  interest.     Having  gotten  the  "jump"  by  pre- 


162     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

maturely  giving  publicity  to  the  agreement,  Japan  was  en- 
abled by  the  extensive  Japanese  press  propaganda  in  China 
to  give  out  the  Japanese  version  for  publication  in  the  Chinese 
press,  and  thus  created  a  presumption  regarding  the  meaning 
of  the  agreement  that  accords  with  Japan's  interpretation  of 
it.  After  the  American  interpretation  had  been  given  out, 
and  published  in  the  Chinese  press,  the  Japanese  legation 
made  an  effort  to  induce  the  American  legation  to  accept 
the  Japanese  translation  and  amend  the  American  version, 
but  that  was  declined.  Nevertheless,  the  inspired  Chinese 
newspapers  under  Japanese  control  positively  refuted  the 
American  version,  and  denied  its  authenticity,  stating  that 
the  Japanese  version  was  the  correct  one,  as  only  Japan  had 
the  right  to  decide  upon  the  meaning  of  the  agreement. 

A  few  hours  after  having  been  notified  by  Baron  Hayashi 
of  the  agreement,  the  American  legation  received  by  telegraph 
from  the  state  department  the  text  in  English,  and  at  once 
made  a  correct  translation  into  Chinese.  (I  say  correct  trans- 
lation, because  after  the  controversy  about  the  two  transla- 
tions, many  sinologues  essayed  their  own  translations,  and 
without  exception  that  I  know  of  the  American  version  was 
taken  as  more  accurate.)  When  he  had  been  informed  by  his 
own  Government,  the  American  minister  sent  the  following 
letter  to  the  Wai  Chiao-Pu : 

LEGATION   OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES   OF  AMERICA 

Peking, 
No.  667.  November  8,  1917. 

Excellency : 

Referring  to  my  Note  of  to-day's  date,  enclosing  the  text  of  an 
exchange  of  Notes  between  the  Secretary  of  State  and  Viscount 
Ishii,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  I  am  in- 
structed by  my  Government  to  communicate  to  you  the  following 
message : 

"The  visit  of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Mission  to  the  United  States 
afforded  an  opportunity  for  free  and  friendly  discussion  of  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  and  Japan  in  the  Orient  by  openly  pro- 
claiming that  the  policy  of  Japan  as  regards  China  is  not  one  of 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  163 

aggression  and  by  declaring  that  there  is  no  intention  to  take  ad- 
vantage commercially  or  indirectly  of  ^he  special  relations  to  China 
created  by  geographical  position.  The  representatives  of  Japan 
have  cleared  the  diplomatic  atmosphere  of  the  suspicions  which 
had  been  so  carefully  spread  by  German  propaganda. 

"The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Japan  again  declare 
their  adherence  to  the  Open  Door  Policy  and  recommit  themselves, 
as  far  as  these  two  Governments  are  concerned,  to  the  maintenance 
of  equal  opportunity  for  the  full  enjoyment  by  the  subjects  or 
citizens  of  any  country  in  the  commerce  and  industry  of  China. 
Japanese  commercial  and  industrial  enterprises  in  China  manifestly 
have,  on  account  of  the  geographical  relation  of  the  two  countries, 
a  certain  advantage  over  similar  enterprises  on  the  part  of  the 
citizens  or  subjects  of  any  other  country. 

"The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Japan  have  taken  ad- 
vantage of  a  favorable  opportunity  to  make  an  exchange  of  ex- 
pressions with  respect  to  their  relations  with  China.  This  under- 
standing is  formally  set  forth  in  the  Notes  exchanged  and  now 
transmitted.  The  statements  in  the  Notes  require  no  explanation. 
They  not  only  contain  a  reaffirmation  of  the  Open  Door  Policy 
but  introduce  a  principle  of  non-interference  with  the  sovereignty 
and  territorial  integrity  of  China  which,  generally  applied,  is 
essential  to  perpetual  international  peace,  as  has  been  so  clearly 
declared  by  President  Wilson." 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Your  Excellency 

the  assurance  of  my  highest  consideration. 

(signed)     Paul  S.  Reinsch, 

T-r-    t,      „  American  Minister. 

His  Excellency, 

Wang  Ta-hsieh, 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

The  Chinese  Government  was  dumfounded,  as  well  it  might 
be,  by  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement,  and  especially  by  the 
fact  that  it  had  been  concluded  without  previously  informing 
or  consulting  the  Chinese  Government  or  any  of  its  officials. 
The  Chinese  legation  at  Washington,  where  the  negotiations 
between  the  American  and  Japanese  governments  were  carried 
on,  was  easily  accessible ;  but  Dr.  Wellington  Koo,  the  Chinese 
minister,  first  learned  of  the  agreement  by  the  despatches 
from  Peking  to  the  American  newspapers.  This  of  course 
placed  him  in  a  very  embarrassing  position  with  his  own  Gov- 


164     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

ernment  because  he  had  not  informed  it  of  what  was  con- 
templated. The  Chinese  Government  also  was  humiliated  that 
it  should  be  ignored  in  the  negotiation  and  in  signing  of  an 
agreement  which  related  exclusively  to  its  territory  and  pre- 
rogatives. In  a  few  days  after  publication  of  the  agreement 
the  Chinese  Government  issued  the  following  statement  con- 
cerning it: 

DECLARATION  OP  THE  CHINESE  GOVERNMENT  CONCERNING  THE  NOTES 
EXCHANGED  BETWEEN  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AND  JAPAN  DATED  NOVEMBER  2,  1917. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Government  of 
Japan  have  recently,  in  order  to  silence  mischievous  reports,  effected 
an  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  concerning  their  desires  and 
intentions  with  regard  to  China.  Copies  of  the  said  notes  have 
been  communicated  to  the  Chinese  Government  by  the  Japanese 
Minister  at  Peking;  and  the  Chinese  Government,  in  order  to  avoid 
misunderstanding,  hastens  to  make  the  following  declaration  so  as 
to  make  known  the  views  of  the  Government. 

The  principle  adopted  by  the  Chinese  Government  towards  the 
friendly  nations  has  always  been  one  of  justice  and  equality;  and 
consequently  the  rights  enjoyed  by  the  friendly  nations  derived 
from  the  treaties  have  been  consistently  respected,  and  so,  even  with 
the  special  relations  between  countries  created  by  the  fact  of  terri- 
torial contiguity,  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  they  have  already  been  pro- 
vided for  in  her  existing  treaties.  Hereafter  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment will  still  adhere  to  the  principle  hitherto  adopted,  and  hereby 
it  is  again  declared  that  the  Chinese  Government  will  not  allow  her- 
self to  be  bound  by  any  agreement  entered  into  by  other  nations. 

Chinese  Legation,  Washington. 

November  12th,  1917. 

The  Chinese  Government  scarcely  could  have  remained 
silent  about  the  agreement,  for  silence  might  have  been  con- 
strued as  tantamount  to  acquiescence  with  the  Japanese  in- 
terpretation. It  took  occasion  to  announce  that  the  position 
of  China  as  a  sovereign  state,  and  her  treaty  arrangements 
with  other  friendly  nations,  were  not  subject  to  revision  or 
amendment  by  any  outside  nations  without  consulting  China. 

In  explaining  the  agreement  to  the  public  and  to  the  world, 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  165 

the  Japanese  propaganda  in  China  was  forehanded  because 
it  was  advised  officially  and  could  discuss  the  matter  with  a 
purpose.  The  press  in  Japan,  however,  left  more  to  their  own 
devices,  were  a  good  deal  puzzled  by  the  notes.  The  editors 
were  doubtful  whether  Japan  had  gained  or  had  been  worsted 
in  the  agreement.  Read  one  way,  the  document  was  innocu- 
ous, and  left  the  issues  just  where  they  had  been  before. 
Read  another  way,  Japan  had  gained  what  she  wanted.  Read 
still  another  way,  the  United  States  had  scored  a  point.  Many 
Japanese  editors  argued  that  the  reaffirmation  of  the  open 
door  and  integrity  of  China  should  have  been  omitted.  Some 
Japanese  newspapers  attacked  the  American  minister  at 
Peking  because  he  issued  an  explanation.  Publication  of  the 
notes  in  the  United  States  was  accompanied  by  an  utterance 
of  the  state  department,  and  also  by  private  admonitions, 
plainly  intimating  to  the  press  that  criticism  of  the  agreement 
would  better  be  repressed,  and  to  any  writers  who  might  dis- 
regard this  injunction  was  conveyed  the  imputation  of  aiding 
German  propaganda.  Foreign  diplomats  at  Peking  were 
deeply  interested,  and  accepted  the  incident  as  an  obscure 
diplomatic  finesse.  As  for  myself,  the  comment  in  this  book 
is  the  tirst  that  I  have  published  on  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agree- 
ment, although,  as  inclusions  in  this  book  show,  I  discussed  it 
extensively  in  private  memoranda  and  correspondence.  As 
indicating  how  the  agreement  was  regarded  by  Americans  in 
China,  I  will  give  extracts  from  reports  of  an  official  who 
was  in  China  then : 

Dated  Nov.  19,  1917. 

Under  date  of  Nov.  8  I  cabled  to  the  effect  that  the  Lansing-Ishii 
agreement  would  without  question  result  in  immediate  and  marked 
increase  of  Japanese  aggression  against  China,  and  such  has  been 
borne  out  most  plainly  as  indicated  by  the  events  of  the  last  few 
days. 

Unless  checked,  Japan's  aggressive  policy  in  the  far  East  will 
bring  war  either  with  us  or  the  British  (or  perhaps  both)  sooner 
or  later,  and  it  is  with  the  object  of  doing  all  in  our  power  to  pre- 


166     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

vent  this  deplorable  event  that  I  suggest  our  using  every  effort  to 
obtain  publication  of  the  truth. 

I  am  unaware  what  the  situation  was  that  necessitated  or  made 
desirable  the  signing  of  such  an  agreement,  but  if  its  purpose  was 
to  assist  in  bringing  about  harmonious  relations  between  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  United  States  and  Japan,  I  can  assuredly  state 
that  the  ambiguous  wording  has  had  just  the  opposite  effect,  and 
the  situation  is  intensified  as  far  as  ill  feeling  is  concerned. 

A  News  Agency  conducted  by  Japanese  in  Peking,  presumed  to  be 
inspired  by  the  Japanese  Legation,  issued  a  general  notice  to  the 
Peking  press  on  November  18  to  the  effect  that  the  American  in- 
terpretation of  the  Note  was  not  correct,  and  that  the  meaning  of 
the  agreement  was  the  recognition  of  "political  superiority"  of 
Japan  in  China — in  other  words,  "suzerainty." 

I  wish  to  emphasize  most  emphatically  the  point  that  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement  has  but  resulted  in  the  pouring  of  oil  on  the  fire 
and  we  should  be  prepared  for  the  worst.  Japan  and  the  govern- 
ment and  people  of  that  country  have  lost  their  heads  completely 
over  the  China  situation,  and  their  desire  to  consolidate  tbeir  po- 
sition here  while  the  powers  are  occupied  elsewhere  is  leading  them 
along  a  dangerous  path. 

Don't  misunderstand  me — I  am  not  so  lacking  in  common  sense 
as  not  to  realize  that  the  signing  of  the  agreement  probably  was 
forced  upon  the  United  States,  but  I  feel  it  my  duty  to  let  you 
know  what  its  effect  here  is  now  and  what  it  probably  will  be. 

Japan  now  has  thrown  all  restraint  to  the  winds  and  is  bent  on 
a  course  of  seeing  just  how  far  she  can  go,  and  where  it  is  to  end 
except  in  trouble  I  fail  to  see. 

The  suggestion  that  Germany  has  been  back  of  the  ill  feeling 
between  Japan  and  the  United  States  is  about  as  weak  and  puerile 
an  argument  as  has  been  put  out  in  a  long  time,  and  although  there 
may  have  been  detached  instances  of  such  action,  yet  the  backbone 
of  ill-feeling  has  been  due  to  Japan's  lack  of  straightforwardness 
and  nothing  else.    Japan  has  a  bad  case  of  guilty  conscience  .  .  . 

Notwithstanding  the  explanations  of  the  American  Gov- 
ernment and  the  disposition  of  Chinese  to  credit  it  with  only 
honest  intentions  in  signing  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement, 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  167 

that  event  continued  to  cause  serious  misgivings  in  China.  I 
quote  from  a  letter  that  I  received  from  a  foreign  resident  in 
China,  dated  November  24,  1917 : 

We  are  exceedingly  anxious  to  get  something  more  definite  re- 
garding the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  for  everybody  out  here  seems 
to  be  entirely  at  sea  about  it.  Instead  of  "clearing  up  misunder- 
standings," I  am  of  the  opinion  that  it  muddles  the  question  still 
more.     Chinese   feel   that   America    has    thrown    them    over.     Dr. 

,  editor  of  one  of  the  leading  missionary  organs  in  China, 

and  who  is  one  of  the  closest  foreign  students  of  political  move- 
ments in  China,  told  me  the  other  day  that  the  Japanese  propaganda 
press  [Chinese  papers  controlled  by  Japan]  circulated  a  report 
throughout  China  three  weeks  before  the  agreement  became  public 
at  Peking,  that  Viscount  Ishii  had  shaken  his  fist  in  the  faces  of 
Mr.  Wilson  and  Mr.  Lansing  and  had  forced  them  to  recognize 
Japan's  paramountcy  in  China. 

It  need  not  be  presumed  because  the  report  mentioned  in 
that  letter  as  being  circulated  in  the  Chinese  language  press 
is  ridiculous  to  Americans  that  it  is  equally  preposterous  to 
the  Chinese  masses.  Those  people,  like  the  masses  in  Russia 
and  other  countries,  believe  what  they  see,  and  information 
that  jibes  with  what  they  know.  The  phrase  "shook  his  fist" 
used  in  this  connection  probably  was  taken  metaphorically  in 
the  sense  of  political  intimidation.  There  is  no  doubt  what- 
ever that  Chinese  readily  will  believe  that  the  United  States 
was  under  intimidation  from  Japan  in  that  matter,  for  this 
view  coincides  with  much  that  is  common  knowledge  in  China 
and  with  a  logical  interpretation  of  the  situation  as  it  is  com- 
prehended there.  Therefore  the  explanations  of  the  American 
Government  of  its  purpose  in  making  the  agreement,  while  it 
did  lessen  the  resentment  of  Chinese  and  partly  relieve  their 
suspicions  as  to  the  motive  of  the  United  States,  by  no  means 
allayed  their  fears.  The  view  of  the  Russian  ambassador  at 
Tokio,  as  quoted  previously,  that  Japan  will  interpret  the 
agreement  in  one  sense,  and  the  American  Government  will 
interpret  it  in  another  sense,  but  that  Japan,  while  realizing 
this  diversity  of  interpretation,  still  expects  to  put  her  inter- 


168     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

pretation  into  practice  and  to  make  it  prevail  eventually  as 
the  accepted  interpretation,  coincided  with  the  opinions  of 
Chinese.  The  more  intelligent  Chinese  were  the  most  mysti- 
fied by  the  agreement.  I  quote  from  a  letter  1  received  from 
a  prominent  Chinese  who  was  educated  in  America,  dated 
December  1,  1917: 

I  cannot  understand  why,  if  the  American  and  Japanese  govern- 
ments had  only  the  common  purpose  of  joining  together  to  protect 
China's  political  autonomy  and  territorial  integrity,  based  on  their 
territorial  propinquity  to  China,  reference  was  not  made  to  the 
Philippines,  an  American  possession  or  dependency.  As  the  agree- 
ment reads,  it  is  only  the  special  interests  of  Japan  exclusively 
which  are  mentioned  as  being  based  on  the  principle  of  territorial 
propinquity,  while  the  special  interests  of  the  United  States  on  the 
same  basis  are  not  mentioned.  This  omission  logically  can  be  con- 
strued as  intentional,  and  as  indicating  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment meant  to  grant  to  Japan  special  interests  in  China  that  are 
paramount  to  American  interests  here  and  also  are  superior  to  the 
interests  of  other  foreign  nations. 

China  theoretically  is  an  independent  and  sovereign  State.  In 
such  an  agreement  there  would  have  been  an  equal  diplomatic  pro- 
priety if  Japan  also  had  recognized  the  special  interests  of  the 
United  States  in  Canada,  although  Canada  is  a  part  of  the  British 
Empire.  Chinese  feel  that  the  signing  of  this  agreement  relating 
especially  and  solely  to  China,  made  by  two  other  governments,  and 
without  previously  informing  or  consulting  the  Chinese  Government, 
constitutes  the  same  kind  of  a  diplomatic  impropriety  as  if  Japan 
and  America  would  make  an  agreement  about  Canada  and  Aus- 
tralia without  consulting  or  previously  informing  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. 

As  the  parts  of  this  agreement  containing  mutual  guarantees  of 
the  integrity  of  China  and  of  the  commercial  open  door  in  China 
are  also  contained  in  several  other  agreements  which  were  in  exist- 
ence, it  therefore  must  be  presumed  that  the  real  gist  of  this  new 
agreement  is  the  recognition  of  Japan's  special  interests  in  China. 
Thus  thrown  into  relief,  the  words  "special  interests"  become  the 
only  original  departure  of  the  agreement,  and  logically  must  be 
taken  to  indicate  a  meaning  to  concede  to  Japan  some  form  of  spe- 
cial position  or  relation  to  China  politically  which  differs  from  and 
is  in  excess  of  the  relations  of  China  with  nations  under  the  existing 
treaties.     As  China  denies  that  Japan  has  any  especial  position  or 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  169 

relation  to  her  politically  or  commercially,  any  reasonable  deduc- 
tion from  the  use  of  this  phrase  in  the  agreement  is  offensive  and 
alarming  to  China. 

The  state  of  the  world  at  this  time  causes  wonder  at  the  American 
Government's  action  in  thus  reviving  the  doctrine  of  territorial  pro- 
pinquity now.  This  doctrine,  in  the  sense  of  political  influence, 
logically  was  in  process  of  being  relegated  as  opposed  to  the  newer 
and  broader  and  more  liberal  principle  of  the  right  of  nations  to 
decide  and  determine  without  outside  interference  or  coercion  their 
own  affairs.  It  moreover  is  apparent  that  the  acceptance  in  this 
manner  by  the  United  States  of  this  doctrine  may  become  em- 
barrassing before  the  issues  of  the  great  war  are  adjusted.  Its 
cogent  application  to  the  situation  of  Germany  and  Austria  in 
respect  to  Russia,  Poland  and  the  Balkan  nations,  is  obvious.  Its 
application  to  various  other  international  juxtapositions  that  are 
affected  by  the  war  and  which  must  be  adjusted  by  the  peace  terms 
is  equally  apparent :  viz.,  Japan's  propinquity  to  Russia's  far  East- 
ern territory.  This  doctrine  seems  to  make  international  rights 
and  responsibilities,  and  proportions  of  international  influence,  de- 
pendent on  relative  propinquity.  It  is  clear  that  this  doctrine  of 
territorial  propinquity  is  susceptible  of  being  made  to  support  the 
most  iniquitous  ambitions  and  designs  of  nations. 

I  replied  to  that  letter,  in  part,  as  follows: 

These  considerations  lead  to  an  analysis  of  the  elements  which  will 
determine  which  of  these  diverse  interpretations  will  prevail.  In 
the  last  analysis,  if  there  is  a  divergence  of  views  between  Japan 
and  American  about  the  meaning  of  this  agreement,  the  view  that 
will  prevail  will  be  the  one  which  can  array  to  support  it  the  pre- 
ponderance of  power.  There  can  be  little  doubt,  taking  probabili- 
ties into  account,  that  the  preponderance  of  power  will  rest  with 
the  United  States,  or  will  be  susceptible  to  its  influence  rather  than 
to  the  influence  of  Japan.  However,  in  this  connection  it  must  be 
remembered  that  power,  as  applied  in  such  a  case,  does  not  depend 
solely  on  a  control  over  material  elements,  but  also*  depends  on  the 
will  and  resolution  to  use  those  elements  so  as  to  affect  international 
affairs.  At  this  time  I  know  that  many  Chinese  incline  to  believe 
that  America  is  fundamentally  more  powerful  than  Japan;  but  oven 
Chinese  who  hold  that  opinion  are  very  doubtful  that  the  American 
Government  will  exert  its  power  upon  the  situation  of  China  as 
opposed  to  Japan.  I  realize  that  China  is  confronted  with  a  condi- 
tion, not  a  theory. 


170     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

A  scrutiny  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement  indicates  that  the 
American  Government  has  laid  in  the  phraseology  of  the  notes  a 
better  case  for  supporting  what  is  now  presumed  to  be  the  American 
interpretation  of  the  notes.  If  one  presumes  that  after  the  war 
an  International  Court  is  established,  and  that  questions  like  this 
will  be  submitted  to  that  court  for  adjudication,  and  that  by  a 
League  of  Nations  the  decisions  of  such  a  court  can  be  enforced,  it 
is  an  interesting  speculation  to  consider  the  legal  aspects  of  this 
agreement. 

A  principle  of  contract  applicable  to  this  Agreement  is  the  rule 
that  parts  and  articles  of  a  contract  are  to  be  construed  to  har- 
monize with  the  whole  intent  and  object  of  the  instrument.  Any 
other  method  of  construing  a  contract  disrupts  the  contract  by  in- 
jecting an  element  of  dissent  in  motive  and  purpose,  while  the 
legal  presumption  is  that  the  purposes  and  motives  of  the  contract- 
ing parties  were  to  agree  in  all  the  matters  dealt  with  in  the  con- 
tract. To  put  one  clause  in  a  contract  which  negatives  another 
clause  of  it  of  cdurse  is  destructive  of  the  very  essence  of  a  con- 
tract, and  consequently  clauses  and  articles  of  a  contract  which  may 
seem,  when  afterward  applied,  to  diverge  in  some  ways  from  other 
equally  important  clauses  or  articles,  usually  will  be  construed  by 
courts  with  a  view  to  making  their  meanings  harmonize,  instead  of 
construing  them  as  dissonant. 

By  applying  this  principle  of  contract  to  those  clauses  of  the 
Lansing-Ishii  agreement  which,  first,  recognize  the  "special  inter- 
ests" of  Japan  in  China  based  on  territorial  propinquity,  and,  sec- 
ond, which  positively  and  affirmatively  commit  both  nations  to  a  full 
recognition  and  support  of  China's  territorial  integrity  and  of  the 
commercial  open  door  in  China,  then  the  ''special  interests"  clause 
would  logically  be  construed  to  harmonize  with  the  subsequent  arti- 
cles. A  different  construction  would  invalidate  the  whole  contract, 
for  then  the  articles  assuring  and  guaranteeing  the  integrity  of 
China  and  the  open  door  would  be  antagonistic  to  the  "special  in- 
terests" clause.  On  the  other  hand,  by  construing  the  "special  in- 
terests" clause  as  not  giving  Japan  any  political  of  economic  pri- 
ority in  China,  the  "special  interests"  clause  harmonizes  with  all 
the  succeeding  articles. 

Courts  often  take  into  consideration,  when  construing  contracts, 
moral  aspects  of  the  matters  which  are  in  dispute.  A  construction 
of  a  contract  which  in  practice  works  out  into  an  offense  to  morals 
frequently  is  enough  to  invalidate  that  construction.  There  hardly 
can  be  any  doubt  that  a  construction  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement 
which  allows  Japan,  under  the  "special  interests"  clause,  to  negative 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  171 

the  clauses  which  guarantee  the  integrity  of  China  and  the  open 
door,  would  be  a  violation  of  international  morals.  Such  a  con- 
struction reduces  the  agreement  to  the  status  of  a  piece  of  diplo- 
matic trickery,  which  intended  to  do  exactly  what  it  professed  not 
to  do,  or  which  professed  objects  which  the  contracting  parties  did 
not  wish  nor  intend  to  carry  out;  in  short,  such  a  contract  connives 
at  fraud,  and  has  no  standing  in  a  court  of  justice. 

The  only  decent  construction  that  can  be  placed  on  the  American 
Government's  interpretation  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement  is  that 
it  regards  the  "special  interests"  clause  as  being  in  harmony  with 
the  subsequent  articles.  Therefore  it  can  be  presumed  that  the 
American  Government  has  in  view  a  policy  and  means  that  will 
make  it  feasible  to  sustain  that  theory  of  the  agreement. 

It  is  a  fair  presumption  that  the  Japanese  Government,  at  the 
time  this  agreement  was  made,  understood  the  probable  legal  con- 
struction that  a  court  will  give  the  instrument,  favoring  the  Amer- 
ican interpretation.  Since  it  is  probable  that  Japan  will  try  to  give 
a  practical,  and  later  a  theoretical  construction  to  the  agreement 
that  is  contrary  to  the  American  theory,  it  follows  that  Japan  ex- 
pects that  practical  considerations  will  supersede  and  overrule  the 
American  interpretation,  which  will  lapse  into  the  position  of  an 
academic  contention  without  material  substance,  which  time  will 
obliterate.  This  perhaps  is  what  the  high  Japanese  official  at  Tokio 
meant  by  stating  (as  alleged)  to  the  Russian  ambassador  that  Japan 
has  better  means  of  insisting  on  her  interpretation  of  the  agree- 
ment. Or  it  may  be  that  Japanese  statesmen  believe  that,  after  the 
war,  the  American  Government  will  lack  the  will  and  the  resolution 
to  take  a  firm  stand  on  this  question,  which  would  leave  the  way 
open  for  Japan  by  a  process  of  steady  pressure  to  make  her  inter- 
pretation practically  in  effect. 

It  of  course  is  true  that  this  agreement  has  not  the  binding  effect 
of  a  Treaty,  for  on  the  part  of  the  American  Government  it  has 
not  been  ratified  by  the  Senate.  It  is  of  the  nature  of  a  "gentle- 
man's agreement,"  which  can  be  changed  or  discarded  on  due  notice. 
It  is  apparent  that  both  the  contracting  Governments  regard  it  as 
of  the  character  of  a  diplomatic  expedient. 

Reason  rejects  a  theory  that  the  American  Government  would 
enter  into  such  an  agreement  as  this,  which  undoubtedly  will  for 
some  time  embarrass  and  hinder  American  business  interests  in 
China,  and  American  popularity  and  prestige  there,  merely  for  some 
temporary  expediency  of  Japanese- American  relations,  or  (as  some 
have  it)  of  sustaining  the  present  Japanese  Government  in  power. 


172     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

To  attempt  to  solve  the  question  of  Japanese  in  America  by  trading 
off  American  interests  in  China  (and  at  the  same  time  trading  off 
China's  interests  too)  is  as  immoral  as  it  is  futile;  for  the  question 
of  Asiatic  immigration  to  the  United  States  and  the  fate  of  China 
vis-a-vis  Japan  are  entirely  different  propositions.  One  therefore 
is  driven  to  search  for  another  theory  for  the  motive  of  the  Amer- 
ican Government.  (Japan's  motive  is  perfectly  obvious.)  Such  a 
motive  might  be  found  in  a  device  to  apply  to  Japan  a  pressure 
of  world  psychology  upon  her  policy  in  China.  The  American 
Government  may  calculate  that,  after  thus  getting  Japan's  positive 
reaffirmation  of  the  integrity  of  China  and  the  commercial  open  door 
and  giving  public  attention  a  focus  on  far  Eastern  events  in  rela- 
tion to  the  war,  if  Japan  hereafter  takes  a  course  which  in  practice 
negatives  the  principles  of  these  commitments  as  Americans  and 
other  western  peoples  will  understand  them,  then  Japan  without 
doubt  will  acquire  the  distrust  of  western  civilization.  This  will  be 
a  gradual  process  induced  by  Japan's  own  acts — just  as  Japan's 
course  during  the  war,  and  its  complete  selfishness,  has  in  time  begun 
to  sink  into  popular  consciousness  in  Europe  and  America.  By 
this  device,  therefore,  it  is  ''put  up"  to  Japan,  by  her  own  acts, 
to  restore  herself  in  western  good  opinion,  or  to  make  herself  wholly 
distrusted. 

If  by  the  time  the  peace  conference  is  assembled,  Japan  has  by 
her  acts  made  herself  even  more  offensive  to  China  and  to  other 
nations  than  she  is  now  (a  probable  contingency),  then  it  will  be 
easier  for  the  American  Government  and  other  powers  that  wish  to 
preserve  the  rights  and  the  integrity  of  China  to  put  a  pressure  on 
Japan  that  will  be  backed  by  an  accumulative  world  psychology  op- 
posed to  Japan's  adaptation  of  Prussianism.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  Japan  really  "plays  the  game"  in  China,  and  also  gives  help  in 
the  war  that  requires  some  sacrifices  and  that  is  not  patently  ani- 
mated by  self-interest,  a  genuine  betterment  of  the  Eastern  situa- 
tion, and  of  China,  will  be  worked  out. 

It  is  apparent  that,  by  a  combination  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  (and  the  moral  assent  of  other  nations  in  the  Allies' 
group),  an  economic  pressure  can  at  any  time  now  be  applied  to 
Japan  that  will  put  great  compulsion  on  her.  Japan's  modern 
industrialism  and  even  her  naval  and  military  power  depend  on 
three  major  elements — iron,  steel  and  cotton.  Japan  depends  on 
China  for  iron  principally,  and  also  for  a  little  raw  cotton.  America 
is  the  only  place  in  the  world  now  where  steel  can  be  obtained  in 
quantit}7.  Great  Britain  (India  and  Egypt)  and  the  United  States 
practically  control  the  world's  production  of  raw  cotton.    Further- 


CHINA  AND  THE  WAR  173 

more,  America  is  the  principal  market  for  many  of  Japan's  prod- 
ucts. The  next  best  market  is  China.  Thus  it  is  possible  to  draw 
an  economic  ring  about  Japan,  during  the  war,  and  after  the  war  in 
case  she  offends  the  moral  and  political  ideals  of  the  leading  west- 
ern powers.  As  off-setting  that  thesis  (which  is  understood  by 
Japanese  statesmen,  no  douht),  Japan  may  expect  by  her  propa- 
ganda in  Asia  to  establish  herself  in  a  firm  leadership  of  a  Pan- 
Asian  doctrine;  and  to  be  able  to  hold  her  own,  or  preserve  a  bal- 
ance with  the  West,  by  trading  with  Germany  after  the  war  in  both 
the  political  and  economic  meanings. 

More  than  one  year  has  passed  since  I  wrote  that  brief 
analysis  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  as  it  probably  was 
conceived  by  the  American  Government,  and  I  have  almost 
nothing  to  change  in  it  or  add  to  it  now.  The  American 
Government,  acting  under  what  pressure  from  its  co-belliger- 
ents I  do  not  know,  was  willing  to  go  that  far  to  placate  Japan 
temporarily,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  temporary  loss  of  prestige 
and  confidence  in  China.  The  immediate  practical  effect  of 
the  agreement  was  that  it  gave  Japan  comparatively  a  free 
hand  in  China  for  the  remainder  of  the  war  or  until  its  crisis 
had  passed.    What  did  Japan  do  with  her  opportunity? 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  COBRUPTION   OF   A  NATION 

Increase  of  Japan's  influence  in  China — The  revised  Japanese  policy — 
Its  motives  and  methods — China's  wish  to  participate  in  the  war — How 
it  was  defeated — American  loan  refused — Effects  of  this  refusal — Cor- 
ruption of  Chinese  officials — Getting  control  of  the  Government — The 
War  Participation  Board — The  military  agreement — Advent  of  Nishi- 
hara — The  orgy  of  loans — Japan's  two-faced  policy — Attitude  of  other 
powers — The  rake's  progress — Sowing  seeds  of  internal  dissension — 
Japan  in  Shantung — Establishment  of  civil  administration  there — Pro- 
tests of  the  Chinese  inhabitants — The  question  analysed — Japan's  objects 
revealed — Forced  sale  of  Chinese  lands — Fraudulent  seizure  of  mines — 
Survey  of  Japanese  "penetration"  of  Tsinan-fu — Brothels  and  drug-shops 
— Where  the  money  came  from — Refastening  the  opium  trade  on  China — 
Japan's  illicit  trade  in  morphia — How  the  trade  is  conducted — Explana- 
tions of  the  Japanese  Government — Exploiting  the  Chinese  bandits. 

AN  immediate  effect  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement 
in  China,  where  its  beneficial  purposes  were  pre- 
sumed to  apply  solely,  was  to  raise  Japanese  influ- 
ence at  Peking  to  an  unprecedented  degree.  The  strongest 
man  in  the  existing  Government,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  premier  and 
leader  of  the  military  party,  already  was  obligated  financially 
to  Japanese  banks  for  help  in  regaining  his  position.  There 
had  for  some  time  been  a  pro- Japan  group  in  Chinese  politics 
composed  partly  of  men  who  honestly  believed  that  China's 
best  policy  was  to  follow  Japan,  and  partly  of  men  who  had 
taken  that  side  for  financial  inducements.  "When  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  notes  were  published,  the  pro-Japan  element  in  Chinese 
official  circles  went  about  saying:  "I  told  you  so.  We  al- 
ways said  that  no  dependence  could  be  placed  in  America." 
After  China  had  planned  active  participation  in  the  war  on 
the  expectation  of  a  loan  from  the  American  Government, 

m 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  175 

and  that  loan  was  refused,  the  pro-Japan  group  again  scored 
heavily. 

The  Government's  position  was  precarious,  and  it  needed 
money  constantly  to  pay  its  troops  and  to  hold  the  Tuchuns, 
or  military  governors  of  the  provinces,  in  line.  There  are 
reasons  to  believe  that  up  to  that  time  Tuan  Chi-jui  had  been 
loyal  to  China,  and  had  hoped  to  work  out  a  solution  without 
having  to  accept  important  assistance  from  Japan.  But  after 
the  publication  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  his  attitude 
changed,  and  he  became  completely  entangled  in  the  Japanese 
mesh.  Among  Tuan's  close  supporters  and  followers  were  a 
number  of  Chinese  of  exceeding  cleverness  in  politics,  but,  as 
events  proved,  of  no  moral  stamina,  and  they  became  ready 
instruments  and  accessories  of  Japan's  corruption  policy. 

Japan's  revised  China  policy  (1917-18)  can  be  summarized 
as  follows: 

(a)  To  prevent  China  from  taking  any  creditable  part  in 
the  war. 

(b)  To  get  control  of  China's  military  organization. 

(c)  To  control  China's  representation  at  the  peace  confer- 
ence. 

(d)  To  get  control  of  China's  natural  resources,  which  are 
essential  to  modern  economic  and  military  strength. 

(e)  To  control  all  future  development  of  China's  transpor- 
tation systems. 

(f)  To  take  advantage  of  the  preoccupation  of  "Western 
nations  in  the  war  further  to  undermine  their  economic  status 
in  China. 

It  may  be  remarked  that  only  in  the  first  three  articles  of 
this  summary  does  Japan's  policy  show  any  change,  for  the 
objects  designated  (d),  (e),  and  (f)  had  animated  it  for 
years  previously.  But  China's  entrance  into  the  war  had 
created  new  conditions  which  might  qualify  or  undo  much  that 
Japan  had  accomplished  toward  attaining  her  major  objec- 
tives. The  revision  of  Japanese  policy  was  therefore  not  a 
revision  as  to  objectives  and  purposes,  but  only  a  revision 


176     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

of  methods  to  meet  the  new  conditions.  The  motives  and 
reasons  of  the  Japanese  Government  in  this  period  can  be 
explained  briefly. 

Although  nominally  an  Allied  belligerent  since  early  in  the 
war,  Japan's  course  had  been  so  purely  selfish  that  the  other 
Allied  powers  were  feeling  disgruntled  at  and  distrustful 
of  her,  a  sentiment  that  might  seriously  compromise  Japan's 
position  at  the  peace  conference  if  the  Allies  won  the  war. 
If  China  would  now  give  substantial  help  to  the  Allies  (even 
when  a  neutral  China  had  helped  by  sending  laborers  to 
Europe),  Japan's  attitude  would  be  thrown  into  strong  and 
unfavorable  contrast.  A  military  participation  by  China  in 
Europe  would  have  important  internal  and  external  effects 
upon  China's  situation.  It  would  place  nations  in  Europe 
under  a  sympathetic  obligation  to  China,  and  it  would  extend 
the  horizon  of  the  Chinese  people  and  widen  their  friendly 
contacts.  At  home  it  would  tend  to  lessen  internal  friction 
by  arousing  a  spirit  of  national  unity  and  purpose.  United 
and  orderly  at  home,  and  having  made  a  respectable  contri- 
bution toward  winning  the  war,  China's  favorable  position 
at  the  peace  conference  would  be  assured. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  China  failed  to  give  any  assistance 
in  the  war,  if  she  fell  into  serious  internal  disorder,  if  she 
failed  to  suppress  German  propaganda  and  economic  activi- 
ties in  her  territories,  if  she  continued  academically  pro- 
German  in  sentiment,  if  she  continued  to  demonstrate  her 
inability  to  conduct  her  own  affairs  or  to  meet  her  foreign 
obligations,  then  her  position  at  the  peace  conference  would 
be  precarious,  and  the  nation  would  have  qualified  for  a 
place  among  those  that  require  a  strong  neighbor  to  oversee 
and  manage  them. 

From  China's  declaration  of  war  to  the  present,  Japan's 
policy  has  been  to  keep  China  alienated  from  and  suspicious 
of  the  western  powers  in  the  Allied  consortium,  so  as  to 
drive  a  wedge  between  China  and  the  important  western 
nations  and  isolate  China.    Then,  with  a  group  of  private 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  177 

agreements  made  with  the  leading  powers,  giving  to  Japan 
a  special  position  in  respect  to  China,  Japanese  diplomats 
could  argue  to  the  Chinese  Government  that  China's  only 
hope  at  the  peace  conference  was  to  entrust  her  interests  to 
Japan,  and  to  delegate  to  Japan  the  right  to  represent  China 
there. 

The  Japanese  method  was  comparatively  simple.  For  years 
China  has  been  thoroughly  studied  by  hundreds  of  special 
agents  of  the  Japanese  Government  who  have  gathered  and 
classified  complete  data  showing  the  personnel  and  charac- 
teristics of  all  Chinese  officials,  military  men,  and  political 
possibilities;  the  resources  of  the  country,  both  natural  and 
improved ;  the  private  and  public  debts  of  every  official,  mili- 
tary commandant,  province,  city,  and  industrial  enterprise; 
the  revenues  of  all  officials,  generals,  provinces,  cities,  and 
industrial  enterprises.  The  plan  would  be  to  select  an  offi- 
cial or  general  who  needed  or  wanted  money — and  nearly  all 
of  them  did — then  propose  to  make  a  loan  to  him  or  his 
province  or  city,  with  some  local  industrial  plant  or  revenues 
or  undeveloped  resources  as  security,  or  for  a  concession  or 
monopoly  of  possible  future  value.  Sometimes  a  so-called 
Sino-Japanese  corporation  would  be  formed  to  construct  and 
operate  an  enterprise  or  utility,  and  positions  and  shares 
would  be  judiciously  distributed  among  Chinese  officials  and 
their  friends.  The  conditions  of  most  of  these  loans  were  such 
that  Chinese  officials  could  deflect  all  or  a  large  part  of  the 
residue  of  the  funds  to  their  private  uses  and  to  pay  their 
satellites.  Of  Japanese  loans  in  China  during  this  period 
there  were  few  instances  when  the  money  was  applied  to  the 
purposes  for  which  it  nominally  was  borrowed.  Usually  only 
a  part  of  the  loan  would  be  advanced,  and  the  advance  rarely 
would  be  used  for  the  purpose  designated.  "Whatever  Japan 
wanted  in  China  or  that  was  worth  tying  up,  the  Japanese 
set  out  to  get  by  this  indirect  process  of  bribery.  When,  as 
frequently  happened,  a  Chinese  official  could  not  be  handled 
by  this  method,  then  Japan's  agents  were  put  to  work  to  stir 


178     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

up  trouble  for  him,  and  he  soon  felt  the  pressure  from  all 
sides  of  Japan's  organized  influence;  while  Chinese  who  were 
amenable  to  Japan's  projects  and  suggestions  were  supported 
by  that  influence,  and  also  given  opportunities  to  make  money 
easily.  There  are  people  in  every  country  who  can  be  cor- 
rupted into  downright  treason,  even  men  in  high  official  posi- 
tions, and  the  percentage  of  Chinese  who  are  thus  susceptible 
is  no  greater  than  elsewhere.  In  most  of  these  instances 
there  was  nothing  in  the  proposals  on  their  face  to  stamp 
them  as  invidious  to  China;  indeed,  for  some  time  after  the 
Lansing-Ishii  notes  were  published  a  great  many  intelligent 
Chinese  believed  that  the  western  Allied  powers  had  thrown 
China  over,  that  her  only  hope  was  to  make  the  best  possible 
terms  with  Japan,  and  that  further  to  resist  Japan's  penetra- 
tion of  their  country  was  futile.  Also,  as  time  passed  it 
became  increasingly  evident  that  Japan's  opposition  consti- 
tuted a  powerful  bar  to  political  advancement  for  any 
Chinese. 

With  this  outline  of  Japan's  motives  and  methods,  I  will 
narrate  some  outstanding  events  and  conditions  that  demon- 
strate the  practical  working  of  the  policy.  While  in  every 
province  and  district  of  China,  Japan,  through  her  consuls, 
agents,  propaganda  press,  commercial  and  financial  organiza- 
tions, played  a  distinct  and  often  a  separate  game  as  dictated 
by  expediency,  her  principal  effort  was  directed  to  gain  con- 
trol of  the  Peking  Government.  Control  of  the  purse  and 
the  army  of  any  nation  means  control  of  all  its  functions 
ultimately,  and  Japan  first  set  to  work  to  make  her  influence 
decisive  in  the  ministries  of  war,  finance,  and  communications. 
Tuan  Chi-jui,  the  premier,  also  was  minister  of  war.  The 
character  of  the  ministry  of  finance  is  clearly  indicated  by 
its  name.  In  China  the  ministry  of  communications  directs 
the  railways  and  other  public  utilities,  giving  it  control  of 
transportation  and  also  of  considerable  revenues.  Virtually 
all  of  the  revenues  of  the  central  Government  pass  through 
the  ministries  of  finance  and  communications. 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  179 

Had  the  American  Government  given  financial  support  to 
the  plan  for  Chinese  military  participation  in  Europe,  which 
was  carefully  worked  out  by  a  French  military  expert  who 
went  to  Peking  for  the  purpose,  the  course  of  events  in  China 
during  this  period  could  have  been  changed.  But  when  the 
American  Government  did  not  support  the  plan,  it  fell  flat. 
A  suggestion  that  Japan  might  finance  China  for  that  pur- 
pose was  advanced,  but  of  course  it  had  not  the  slightest 
chance  of  success.  Japan  had  no  difficulty  in  finding  millions 
to  play  her  own  game  in  the  far  East,  but  had  no  money  for 
genuine  war  activities. 

I  will  not  trace  here  the  machinations  of  Chinese  politics 
whereby  men  under  Japan's  influence  gained  control  of  the 
ministries  of  finance  and  communications  in  the  Peking  Gov- 
ernment. Suffice  that  Chinese  who  became  tools  of  Japan  did 
get  those  positions,  or  the  men  who  held  them  gradually  were 
swung  to  fall  in  with  Japan's  plans.  The  first  flower  of 
this  combination  was  the  War  Participation  Board.  This 
board  was  ostensibly  organized  to  manage  China's  partici- 
pation in  the  war;  in  fact,  it  was  organized  to  prevent  any 
effective  participation  ©f  China  in  the  war.  and  did  prevent 
it.  Tuan  Chi-jui  was  head  of  the  board,  and  it  was  com- 
posed of  his  henchmen.  This  board  became  notorious  because 
of  its  acts  in  trying  to  commit  China's  military  organization 
and  policy  into  Japan's  hands.  General  Chin  Ying-Pang 
and  General  Hsu  Cheng,  both  lieutenants  of  the  premier,  were 
co-directors  of  the  board.  .  From  its  inception  the  board  was 
completely  under  Japanese  control.  General  Saito  of  the 
Japanese  Army,  a  military  attache  of  the  Japanese  legation 
at  Peking,  had  an  office  in  the  War  Participation  Board  and 
advised  it  on  all  questions. 

The  principal  act  of  the  War  Participation  Board  was  to 
negotiate  and  sign  the  so-called  "military  agreement"  be- 
tween Japan  and  China  in  the  spring  of  1918.  During  the 
time  when  this  agreement  was  being  negotiated,  and  even 
after  it  had  been  signed,  the  Japanese  Government  and  the 


180     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

War  Participation  Board  denied  that  it  was  contemplated. 
Opposition  in  China,  based  on  rumors,  became  so  strong  that 
the  negotiations  were  transferred  to  Tokio.  General  Chin 
went  to  Tokio  and  signed  the  agreement  there,  and  was 
decorated  by  the  Japanese  Government. 

The  circumstances  of  signing  this  agreement  are  most  ex- 
traordinary. At  first  it  was  kept  a  close  secret,  and  the 
Japanese  legation  at  Peking  denied  officially  that  it  had 
any  knowledge  of  the  matter.  When  the  rumors  persisted, 
and  a  few  facts  about  the  proposal  leaked  out,  the  Chinese 
foreign  office  demanded  that  it  be  informed  of  what  was 
going  on.  The  War  Participation  Board  then  consented  to 
admit  a  representative  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  the  discus- 
sions, and  when  opposition  developed  from  that  quarter,  the 
negotiations  were  secretly  and  suddenly  transferred  to  Tokio. 
After  the  agreement  was  signed,  both  the  Japanese  and 
Chinese  governments  for  some  time  denied  its  existence;  and 
to  this  day,  unless  it  was  privately  revealed  at  Paris,  no  au- 
thentic copy  of  the  treaty  has  been  communicated  to  the  other 
Allied  governments.  Here  were  two  nations  in  the  Allied 
group,  while  the  war  was  at  a  critical  stage,  making  a  secret 
military  agreement  relating  to  the  conduct  of  the  war.  When 
officially  questioned,  the  Japanese  Government  finally  admitted 
that  such  an  agreement  had  been  signed,  and  stated  that  it 
was  for  the  purpose  of  mutual  cooperation  of  China  and 
Japan  in  the  East  solely.  The  Chinese  Government,  through 
the  Foreign  Office,  could  only  state  to  inquiries  of  other  na- 
tions that  it  believed  that  some  kind  of  agreement  was  signed, 
but  that  it  was  without  complete  knowledge  of  its  scope  and 
meaning.  The  military  agreement  never  was  ratified  by  the 
Chinese  cabinet,  nor  the  Council;  and  it  was  protested  and 
repudiated  by  the  southern  parliament.  The  real  purpose  of 
this  agreement,  as  was  demonstrated  subsequently  in  Siberia 
and  Manchuria,  was  to  tie  China  to  Japan,  and  make  it  impos- 
sible for  her  to  act  in  the  war  without  first  consulting  Japan, 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  181 

and  under  Japan's  dictation.  The  quid  pro  quo  to  the  Chinese 
officials  who  signed  the  agreement  was,  of  course,  money :  loans 
supposed  to  be  used  to  equip  for  participation  in  the  war,  but 
which  really  were  used  to  finance  Premier  Tuan  's  fight  to  keep 
the  Chinese  military  party  in  power. 

One  act  of  the  War  Participation  Board  that  very  well 
illustrates  its  character  was  with  reference  to  the  German 
and  Austrian  ships  that  had  been  interned  in  Chinese  waters 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  When  China  declared  war, 
the  Allied  governments  wanted  to  obtain  these  ships  for 
transport  work,  for  ships  were  badly  needed.  It  was  pro- 
posed to  charter  them  from  China  after  China  had  taken 
possession.  In  due  course  the  Chinese  navy  department  took 
the  ships  over.  A  Sino-Japanese  company  was  formed,  com- 
posed of  Japanese  and  certain  Chinese  officials  in  the  War 
Participation  Board  and  the  ministry  of  communications,  to 
purchase  these  ships  and  then  charter  them.  A  Japanese 
bank  was  to  finance  this  deal,  and  the  necessary  repairs  were 
to  be  done  in  Japan.  The  plan  was  to  sell  the  ships  to  this 
company  at  a  very  low  price,  and  a  large  profit  would  be 
made  in  repairing  and  chartering  or  reselling  them.  This 
plan  was  blocked  by  a  vigorous  protest  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, which  represented  that  war  needs  of  the  Allies 
should  be  first  considered;  but  by  a  trick  in  which  the  char- 
ters were  based  on  dead  weight  instead  of  registered  tonnage, 
a  bit  of  sharp  practice  was  made  to  yield  an  illegitimate  profit 
to  schemers  in  the  War  Participation  Board. 

When  the  way  had  been  paved  by  firmly  planting  Japanese 
influence  in  the  Peking  Government,  Japan's  plan  developed 
another  phase.  In  the  spring  of  1918  Nishihara  Kamezo,  a 
Japanese  financial  and  diplomatic  agent,  came  to  Peking. 
Mr.  Nishihara  is  a  director  of  the  Bank  of  Chosen  (Korea), 
one  of  the  group  of  banks  closely  connected  with  the  Japanese 
Government.  He  had  not  previously  been  prominent  in  Japa- 
nese finance,  but  it  soon  developed  that  he  had  powerful 


182     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

financial  and  official  backing.  The  activities  of  Nishihara  in 
China  soon  created  a  scandal  of  such  proportions  that  it 
created  uneasiness  even  in  Japan.  How  it  was  viewed  in 
China  is  indicated  by  some  editorial  comment  of  "Millard's 
Review"  (written  by  Prof.  J.  B.  Powell)  in  the  issue  of  July 
20,  1918: 

Baron  Hayashi  is  Japan's  official  representative  in  Peking  whilst 
Mr.  Nishihara,  the  secret  agent  of  the  Japanese  Prime  Minister,  is 
her  unofficial  representative.  Kecent  events  indicate  that  the  latter 
has  done  more  for  his  own  country  and  people  and  is  commanding 
greater  influence.  Much  of  his  work  in  China,  which  has  neces- 
sarily to  be  sub  rosa,  is  said  to  be  unknown  to  Baron  Hayashi,  the 
Japanese  Minister  to  Peking,  and  many  a  Chinese  journalist  is  bet- 
ter informed  of  it  than  the  Baron.  It  has  happened  a  number  of 
times  that  Baron  Hayashi  would  issue  an  official  denial  of  certain 
Chinese-Japanese  negotiations  which  later  turned  out  to  be  true. 
It  seems  Nishihara  had  undertaken  them  without  Baron  Hayashi's 
knowledge.  It  is  bruited  about  Peking  that  the  Japanese  Minister 
has  repeatedly  protested  to  Tokio  against  this  unprecedented  prac- 
tice^— all  in  vain.  This  is  quite  within  expectations.  Nishihara  is 
the  confidential  secret  agent  of  the  present  Japanese  Prime  Minister, 
who  is  greatly  interested  in  the  Chosen  Bank  and  the  Taiwan  Bank. 
He  was  purposely  sent  to  China  to  secure  concessions  and  make 
loans  in  opposition  to  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  which  is  under- 
stood to  have  been  receiving  the  support  of  Baron  Hayashi  and 
other  Japanese  officials,  except  Count  Terauchi.  This  situation 
results  in  the  adoption  of  conflicting  financial  policies  by  Japan  in 
China.  Count  Terauchi  and  Mr.  Nishihara,  representing  the  Chosen 
Bank  and  the  Taiwan  Bank,  are  dealing  with  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment in  all  money  matters  through  Mr.  Tsao  Ju-lin,  Minister  of 
Finance,  and  Mr.  Lu  Chung-yu,  Director  of  the  Chinese-Japanese 
Exchange  Bank,  whilst  other  high  Japanese  officials  advocate  that 
all  the  Japanese  financiers  should  transact  business  with  men  like 
Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi,  who  is  more  substantial  and  who  they  believe 
can  command  greater  influence  in  official  circles,  and  that  the  Yoko- 
hama Specie  Bank  should  represent  the  Japanese  in  such  transac- 
tions. In  consequence,  the  Chosen  Bank  and  the  Taiwan  Bank  are 
obtaining  all  the  business  they  desire  from  China,  with  the  Yoko- 
hama Specie  Bank  being  left  out  in  the  cold.  The  explanation  for 
this  state  of  affairs  is  «imple  enough.    Messrs.  Tsao  and  Lu  are  in 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  183 

I 
a  position  to  conclude  loans  as  they  are  closely  connected  with  the 
Government,  and  in  the  meantime  Mr.  Liang  is  not. 

And  on  July  27,  1918,  Prof.  Powell  wrote  further  in  ''Mil- 
lard 's  Review ' ' : 

Between  January  1,  1909,  and  June  30,  1918,  Japanese  bankers 
have  advanced  to  China  Yen  178,770,000  and,  in  addition,  three 
other  loans  to  the  amount  of  Yen  106,000,000  have  practically  been 
agreed  upon,  and  probably  will  be  signed  before  the  end  of  July. 
Of  the  Yen  178,770,000  already  advanced,  Yen  164,100,000  has  been 
advanced  since  May  1,  1915,  showing  that  Japanese  activity  in  the 
Chinese  field  really  did  not  begin  until  eight  months  after  the  opening 
of  hostilities  in  Europe.  Outside  of  a  comparatively  small  part  of 
the  Yen  164,100,000  which  was  used  for  purposes  of  flood  relief 
and  to  combat  the  plague  last  winter,  most  of  the  money  has  been 
used  in  internal  warfare  in  China.  About  twelve  million  Yen  has 
been  advanced  to  the  Southern  Chinese  provinces,  presumably  for 
military  use  on  the  Southern  side,  and  the  rest  has  been  used  by  the 
Northern  or  Peking  Government  for  similar  purposes.  To  pay  for 
these  loans  China  has  mortgaged  railway  lines,  gold,  coal,  antimony 
and  iron  mines.  She  has  mortgaged  the  Government  printing  office 
at  Peking,  the  Hankow  electric  light  and  waterworks,  and  native 
forests  in  various  parts  of  the  country.  There  is  a  clause  in  each 
of  these  loan  agreements  to  the  effect  that  the  Chinese  authorities 
shall  not  obtain  additional  funds  upon  these  securities  unless  the 
consent  of  the  Japanese  bankers  first  has  been  obtained.  As  to  the 
expenditure  of  this  money,  so  far  as  is  known  the  Japanese  bankers 
have  placed  no  restrictions  whatever  upon  the  uses  to  which  the 
money  was  to  be  put.  For  example,  the  Chinese  authorities  make  a 
loan  agreement  with  the  Japanese  bankers  to  extend  a  railroad, 
develop  a  coal  or  iron  mine,  or  to  construct  telegraph  lines.  After 
the  money  has  been  obtained  and  the  bankers  and  negotiators  receive 
their  commissions,  the  rest  of  the  loan  is  apportioned  out  among 
various  military  governors  who  use  it  to  pay  their  soldiers  and  keep 
them  loyal. 

In  the  past,  loans  to  China  which  have  been  made  through  the 
Consortium  of  foreign  banks  have  been  made  for  administrative  pur- 
poses only,  on  condition  that  the  expenditure  of  the  loans  shall  be 
supervised  and  that  the  security  shall  be  under  control.  To  use  the 
words  of  Mr.  David  Frazer,  Peking  Correspondent  of  the  "London 
Times"  and  "North  China  Daily  News":     "This  policy  has  been 


184     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

adopted  by  the  powers  interested  with  the  definite  object  of  saving 
China  from  herself,  in  short  with  the  object  of  ensuring  that  money 
lent  shall  be  properly  spent,  and  security  created  by  means  of  which 
China  shall  have  no  difficulty  in  repaying  principal  and  interest." 
Since  Japan  is  a  member  of  the  Consortium,  the  question  naturally 
arises:  How  can  Japan,  who  is  committed  by  an  agreement  with 
the  powers  covering  financial  advances  to  China,  make  these  present 
loans  without  following  out  the  understanding  regarding  restrictions 
upon  the  expenditure  of  the  money  by  China?  The  answer  to  this 
question  is  also  given  by  Mr.  Frazer  to  the  effect  that  the  new 
loans  are  made  through  another  group  of  Japanese  bankers  who  are 
not  bound  by  the  Consortium  agreement.     His  statement  follows* 

The  mystery  is  partly  explained  by  a  paragraph  in  a  recent  Japa- 
nese newspaper.  The  Industrial  Bank  of  Japan,  a  component  part 
of  the  so-called  Korean  Group  of  which  Mr.  Nishihara  is  the  impres- 
sario,  is  announced  as  placing  Yen  50,000,000  of  new  debentures 
upon  the  market.  The  paragraph  says  that  part  of  this  money  has 
already  been  advanced  to  China  as  an  instalment  of  the  Kirin- 
Hueining  Railway  Agreement  Loan,  and  that  the  remainder  of  the 
loan  will  come  out  of  the  money  to  be  provided  by  the  new  deben- 
tures. It  is  also  stated  that  the  balance  of  the  debenture  proceeds 
will  be  lent  to  China,  and  that  the  Industrial  Bank  eventually  intends 
to  finance  China  up  to  Yen  100,000,000.  This  is  pretty  bad  news 
for  China,  if  the  Industrial  Bank  is  to  continue  to  lend  to  the  Chi- 
nese Government  upon  conditions  that  admit  of  heavy  advances  for 
military  expenditure.  The  most  interesting  feature  of  this  deben- 
ture flotation  in  Japan,  however,  is  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment is  behind  it  and  has  given  "a  promise,  made  legal  by  legis- 
lation in  the  last  session  of  the  Diet,  to  guarantee  the  payment  of 
principal  and  interest  of  this  and  later  loans  by  the  bank."  At  any 
rate,  the  "Japan  Advertiser,"  from  which  I  quote,  is  of  the  opinion 
that  the  new  debentures  are  practically  public  bonds,  and  states  that 
the  Government  Post  Offices  are  being  used  to  assist  in  the  flotation. 
From  the  paragraph  in  question,  which  appeared  in  the  "Japan 
Advertiser"  of  June  30,  it  seems  plain  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment is  making  itself  responsible  for  the  repayment  of  money  being 
borrowed  to  finance  specified  and  unspecified  transactions  in  China. 
Mr.  Nishihara,  representing  the  Korean  Group,  of  which  the  Indus- 
trial Bank  of  Japan  is  a  principal,  is  under  no  restrictions,  and  can 
lend  money  to  China  upon  any  terms  acceptable  to  the  group  he  rep- 
resents. When  the  Korean  Group  lends  money  to  China  uncondi- 
tionally the  assumption  is  that  the  Japanese  Government  disapproves 
of  the  transaction  and  would  stop  it  if  they  could,  as  the  British 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  185 

Government  tried  to  stop  the  Crisp  Loan.  Now  the  Kirin-Hueining 
Railway  Loan  Agreement  provides  for  Yen  10,000,000  to  be  paid 
over  to  China  without  any  conditions,  to  be  spent  exactly  as  the 
Chinese  like.  Such  a  transaction  is  positively  subversive  of  the 
policy  of  the  powers  behind  the  Consortium,  of  which  Japan  is  one. 
Therefore  the  Kirm-Hueining  Loan  agreement,  in  so  far  as  the 
advance  of  Yen  10,000,000  is  concerned,  is  opposed  to  the  declared 
policy  of  the  Japanese  Government,  and  presumably  is  disapproved 
of  by  that  Government. 

Yet  we  find  the  Japanese  Government  guaranteeing  the  Industrial 
Bank's  debenture  issue,  the  proceeds  of  which  are  to  be  used,  it  is 
specifically  stated,  to  make  the  advance  of  Yen  10,000,000  against 
the  Kirin  agreement.  In  other  words,  the  Japanese  Government  is 
pursuing  one  policy  with  the  right  hand,  in  agreement  with  the  asso- 
ciated powers,  and  with  the  left  hand  is  helping  the  Industrial  Bank 
to  raise  money  to  make  loans  to  China  on  conditions  subversive  of 
the  official  policy,  and  in  violation  of  Japan's  own  understanding 
with  the  powers.  This  is  what  is  called  in  polite  English,  "hunting 
with  the  hounds  and  running  with  the  hare."  It  is  no  secret  that 
the  Japanese  Government  warmly  supports  Mr.  Nishihara  in  many 
transactions  that  would  never  be  countenanced  by  any  of  the  other 
Governments  because  they  are  incompatible  with  their  engagement 
to  pursue  a  particular  financial  policy.  But  Japan  gaily  and  quite 
openly  does  what  other  powers  will  not  do. 

Here  was  revealed  one  phase  of  Japan's  policy  quite 
clearly.  Officially,  the  Japanese  Government  was  inhibited 
from  pursuing  an  independent  financial  course  in  China,  for 
it  and  its  fiscal  agent,  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  were  parties 
to  the  international  banking  group  which  were  signatories, 
with  the  approval  of  the  governments,  of  the  reorganization 
loan  agreement.  So  that  obstacle  was  evaded  by  conducting 
these  negotiations  through  different  Japanese  banks,  and  pre- 
sumably without  the  official  knowledge  or  countenance  of  the 
Japanese  foreign  office.  However,  few  in  China  or  Japan 
were  deceived  by  this  subterfuge.  In  its  issue  of  August  3, 
1918,  the  "Herald  of  Asia"  (Tokio),  a  Japanese-owned  and 
-edited  newspaper,  said: 

The  loan  activities  of  Nishihara  Kamezo  we  are  informed,  have 
come,  or  will  shortly  come,  to  an  end.    We  are  not  sorry  to  hear 


186     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

it.  It  is  too  early  to  venture  an  impartial  assessment  of  the  serv- 
ives  and  disservices  rendered  by  this  mysterious  personage  during 
his  meteoric  career  of  a  year  and  a  half.  He  has  shown  a  remark- 
able resourcefulness  in  engineering  financial  deals  of  no  inconsid- 
erable magnitude.  Whatever  may  happen  to  the  parties  on  whom 
he  has  heaped  obligations  or  claims,  he  emerges  a  successful  man, 
with  a  reputation  newly  made.  He  is  reported  to  be  a  disinterested 
man  in  money  matters,  so  he  may  not  have  made  a  fortune  out  of 
the  large  transactions  he  has  taken  part  in.  Fifteen  months  ago 
nobody  knew  him,  except  a  small  circle  of  acquaintances  in  Chosen. 
Now  he  is  one  of  the  best  known  Japanese  in  the  far  East.  That 
is  probably  what  he  was  after,  and  well  may  he  rest  contented  with 
his  success.  Whatever  advantages  Mr.  Nishihara  may  have  derived 
personally  from  his  activities  in  Peking,  it  may  be  doubted  if  this 
country  has  been  benefited  more  than  it  has  been  injured.  His 
negotiations  have  made  so  much  noise  that  the  outside  public  has 
got  the  impression  that  he  has  secured  a  large  number  of  very 
important  concessions,  whereas  as  a  matter  of  fact  very  little  mate- 
rial advantages  will  accrue  to  Japan  from  the  loans  arranged 
through  him.  .  .  .  Then  again  the  spectacle  of  a  private  Japanese 
agent  known  to  be  closely  connected  with  a  section  of  the  Tokio 
Cabinet  negotiating  with  the  Chinese  Government  behind  the  back 
of  our  accredited  representative  and  against  his  wishes,  has  not 
tended  to  enhance  either  the  prestige  or  credit  of  the  Empire  in 
the  eyes  of  the  world.  If  the  Cabinet  should  happen,  by  some  un- 
foreseen luck,  to  drag  on  its  existence  until  the  winter,  it  will  have 
a  lot  to  explain  to  the  Diet  on  this  subject. 

No  complete  and  authentic  list  of  Japanese  loans  in  China 
is  available  for  publication.  Many  of  these  transactions, 
especially  during  the  war,  have  been  kept  as  secret  as  could 
be,  and  even  when  disclosed  inadvertently,  it  often  happens 
that  they  will  still  be  denied  by  those  officials  who  made  them. 
I  have  a  list,  however,  which  represents  what  the  combined 
efforts  of  American  and  other  foreign  commercial  attaches 
and  agents  in  China  have  been  able  to  compile  of  loans  which 
Japanese  banks  and  large  commercial  firms  have  made  to 
China  and  which  are  now  outstanding.     The  list  follows: 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  187 

LIST  OF  CHINA'S  LOANS  MADE  BY  JAPANESE 

From  January  1,  1909,  to  October  25,  1918 
No.  Yen 

1.  1909;  From   Yokohama   Specie  Bank  to   Imperial 

Railway  Administration  representing  part 
payment  of  that  part  of  the  Hsinmintun- 
Mukden  Railway  lying  east  of  the  Liao 
River  320,000 

For  18  years  at  5%,  issue  price  93 ;  secured  by 
revenues  of  road. 

2.  1909;  From   Yokohama   Specie  Bank  to  Imperial 

Railway  Administration  for  construction  of 
Kirin-Changchun  Railway  2,150,000 

For  25  years  at  5^,  issue  price  93;  secured  by 
revenues  of  road. 

3.  1910;  Yokohama  Specie  Bank  to  Imperial  Railway 

Administration  for  redemption  of  Peking- 
Hankow  Railway  2,200,000 
For  10  years  at  7%,  issue  price  97.50 

4.  1911;  Yokohama  Specie  Bank  to  Imperial  Railway 

Administration  for  same  as  above  and  for 
running  expenses  pending  redemption  10,000,000 

For  25  years  at  5%,  issue  price  95 

5.  1912;  Mitsui   Bussan   Kaisha   to   Hankow   Water- 

works &  Electric  Light  Co.,  for  construc- 
tion purposes  1,000,000 
Repayable  in  ten  annual  instalments,  Int.  7%. 
Guaranteed    by    Ministry    of    Communica- 
tions. 

6.  ?     ;  To  Provincial  Bank  of  Hunan  and  Hupeh, 

on  security  of  Hsiang  Pi  Shan  Iron  Mines 
(unconfirmed,  but  reported  by  good  author- 
ity) 2,000,000 


Pre-War Yen  17,670,000 

LOANS  TO  HANYEHPING  COAL  AND  IRON  COMPANY 

7.  1903;  Industrial  Bank  of  Japan,  30  years  at  6%  3,000,000 

8.  1906;  Mitsui  Mining  Co.  Semi-annual  repayments, 

7%*  1,000,000 

9.  1906;  Okura  &  Company,  7  years  at  7%%  2,000,000 
10.  1908;  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  10  years  at  1%%  1,500,000 


188     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

No.  Yen 

11.  1908;  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  10  years  at  7%*  500,000 

12.  1909 ;  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  10  years  at  7%*  6,000,000 

13.  1910;  Mitsui  Mining  Company,  2  years  at  7*  1,000,000 

14.  1912;  Mitsui  Mining  Company,  2  years  at  7*  2,000,000 

15.  1913;  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  40  years  at  7%  to 

7th  year  thereafter  6%  15,000,000 


Han  Yeh  Ping.... Yen  32,000,000 
Total.... Yen  49,670,000 

16.  1915;  Yokohama  Specie  Bank  to  Ministry  of  Com- 

munications    for     construction     Supinkai- 
Chengchiatun  Railway  5,000,000 

17.  May    Okura  Co.  Advance,  $1,000,000  1,000,000 
1915    Security  Feng  Huang  Shan  Iron  Mines. 

18.  May  1,  Asiatic  Development  Co.  Loan  to  Central 

1915  Government  for  general  purposes  5,000,000 
For  3  years  at  6%,  issue  price  94 ;  secured  by 

uncertain  mining  concessions  in  Hunan  and 
Anhui  and  by  profits  of  brass  cash  smelt- 
ing scheme. 
(This  loan  was  advanced,  but  the  security  was 
not  settled;  the  Japanese  stood  out  for  the 
Shui-Kou-Shan  and  Tai-Ping-Shan  mines) 

19.  Sept.  To  Province  of  Shantung,  for  military  pur- 

1916  poses  1,500,000 

20.  Dec.  To   Kwangtung    Provincial    Government;    the 

1916  Provincial  Government  gave  as  security  the 
monthly  instalments  of  $50,000  paid  to 
them  by  the  Central  Government  through 

the  Salt  Commissioners  1,500,000 

21.  Jan.  Japanese   banking   group   to   Bank  of   Com- 

1917  munications,   for   redemption   of  notes   of 

Bank  5,000,000 

For  three  years  at  7%%,  no  discount,  secured 
by  $1,500,000  shares  of  bank  stock  and 
$4,000,000  Treasury  bonds,  Japan  obtain- 
ing privilege  of  appointing  adviser  to  Bank 
and  option  on  future  loans. 

22.  Jan.  30,  Bank  of  Chosen  to  Fengtien  Province  for 
1917       relief  of   Chinese  banks  in  Mukden,  half 

payable  in  one  year,  half  in  three  2,000,000 

Interest  6V&%,  issue  price  95. 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  189 

I 

No.  Yen 

23.  Feb.  7,  Yokohama    Specie    Bank,    second    loan    to 
1917       Ministry  of  Communications  for  construc- 
tion of  Supinkai-Chenchiatung  Railway  2,600,000 

For  1  year  at  7%,  secured  by  revenues  of  road. 

24.  Feb.    Japanese     Syndicate     to     Kwangtung    Pro- 
1917       vincial  Government,  1,300,000  for  advance 

to  Provincial  Government  and  1,700,000  for 
construction  of  Canton  cement  factory,  en- 
tire loan  secured  on  revenues  and  property 
of  cement  factory  and  customs  lands  at 
Tashatou,  and  guaranteed  by  Provincial 
Government  3,000,000 

25.  Aug.    Japanese   Syndicate  to  Bank  of  China,  for 
1917       redemption  of  bank  notes,  secured  by  $15,- 

000,000   Bank   of   China  notes    (repaid)          5,000,000 
For  6  months  at  7%. 

26.  Aug.  28,  Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  advance  on  Sec- 
1917       ond    Reorganization    Loan    for   reimburse- 
ment of  advances  made  by  Bank  of  China 

to    Central   Government  10,000,000 

Repayable  out  of  Second  reorganization  loan 

if  made,  otherwise  to  be  repaid  in  cash  in 

one  year. 
Interest  7%  discount  1%.     Secured  by  surplus 

salt   revenues. 

27.  Oct.  17,  Sino-Japanese  Industrial  Co.  and  10  Jap- 

1917  anese   Banks   to    Central   Government   for 

relief  of  Chihli  flood  sufferers  5,000,000 

One  year  at  7%,  secured  by  revenues  of  three 
native  customs  houses,  including  Dolnor. 

28.  Oct.    Loan  on  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  by  South 

1918  Manchuria  Railway  Company    *  6,500,000 
For  30  years  at  5%,  issue  price  91.50,  secured 

by  revenues  and  property  of  road. 

29.  Nov.    Grand    Canal    Loan    (part    of    Siems-Carey 

1917  loan)  of  total  $6,000,000  gold.  Americans 
take  $3,500,000  and  Japanese  $2,000,000 
equivalent  to  5,000,000 

30.  Jan.    Yokohama    Specie    Bank's    share  of    Group 

1918  Bank  advance  for  Flood  Relief;   Security 

Salt  $100,000,  say  2,00,000 


190     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

No.  Yen 

31.  Jan.   Mitsui    Bussan    Kaisha   to    Central    Govern- 

1918       ment  on  Bureau  of  Engraving  &  Printing        2,000,000 
For  three  years  8%,  issue  price  98.     Agree- 
ment provides  that   all  material   shall   be 
bought  from  M.  B.  K.,  if  prices  are  not 
higher  than  competitors'. 

32.  Jan.    Supplement  loan  for  Kirin-Changchun  Rail- 

1918       way  630,000 

33.  Jan.  Mitsui  Bussan  Kaisha  to  Tsao  Kun,  Tuchun 
1918       of  Chihli,  for  military  purposes,  secured  by 

Chinese  shares  in  Lanchow  Coal  Company, 
which  forms  part  of  Kailan  Mining  Ad- 
ministration 1,000,000 

34.  Jan.  6,  Yokohama  Specie  Bank  second  advance  on 
1918       second  reorganization  loan,  repayable  out 

of  reorganization  loan,  if  made,  otherwise  a 
one  year  Japanese  loan,  Int.  7%.  Secured 
by  surplus  salt  revenues  10,000,000 

35.  Jan.   Japanese  syndicate,  for  use  of  Hunan  Pro- 
1918       vincial  Government.     Said  to  be  secured  by 

right  to  cooperation  in  working  iron  mines 
at  Taipingshan,  Anhui,  and  antimony  mines 
at  Shuikoushan,  Hunan,  for  5  years  at  7%, 
issue  price  94  (see  loan  of  May  1,  1915, 
No.  18)  J  2,500,000 

36.  Jan.    Loan  to  province  of  Fukien,  for  general  pur- 

1918       poses  1,000,000 

Secured  by  sundry  taxes.     (Unconfirmed,  but 
from  good  authority). 

37.  Jan.   Mitsui  Bussan  Kaisha  to  Chihli  province  for 
1918       purchase  of  cotton  yarns  for  Chihli  spin- 
ners, repayment  guaranteed  by  Ministry  of 

Finance  1,000,000 

38.  Jan.  20,  Tai-hei  Kumei  syndicate  to  Central  Gov- 
1918       ernment  for  purchase  of  arms — interest  7%, 

issue  price  95,  additional  commission  of  5% 

for  unspecified  purpose  14,000,000 

39.  Jan.  20,  Second  Loan  to  Bank  of  Communications      20,000,000 
1918   Three  years  at  7V2%,  secured  by  $25,000,000 

in  Treasury  bonds,  money  advanced  by 
Bank  of  Chosen,  Bank  of  Taiwan,  Indus- 
trial Bank  of  Japan. 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  191 

i 

No.  Yen 

40.  1918    Chosen  Group  of  Banks  to  Telegraph  Admin- 

istration, for  extension  of  land  lines,  in- 
terest ly^j  discount  1%%,  secured  by  all 
telegraph  property  not  previously  pledged      20,000,000 

41.  1918   Wireless  loan,  amount  not  known  but  prob- 

ably Yen  3,000,000  for  construction  of 
wireless  stations,  materials  to  be  purchased 
from  Mitsui  Bussan  Kaisha  3,000,000 

42.  June  To  Ministry  of  Communications,  for  continu- 
1918       ance  of  Kirin-Changchun  line  to  Korean 

border  20,000,000 

For  40  years  at  5%. 

43.  June  Bank   of   Chosen   to   Fengtien   Province   for 
1918       Redemption  of  small  coin  notes,  one  half  to 

be  repaid  in  two  years,  one  half  in  three, 
Int.  6%%,  issue  price  95,  secured  by  stock 
in  Penhsihsu  collieries  owned  by  Fengtien 
Province  3,000,000 

44.  1918   Yokohama  Specie  Bank  to  Province  of  Hu- 

peh,  Security  provincial  revenues.  (Un- 
confirmed, but  from  official  sources.)  1,000,000 

45.  1918    Okura  Group  to  Province  of  Shensi  1,000,000 

Secured    by    Provincial    revenues.     (Uncon- 
firmed,  but  from  official  sources.) 

46.  1918    Okura  Group  to  Central  Government  for  mili- 

tary advance  against  Canton.  Security, 
mines  of  Canton  province  2,000,000 

(Unconfirmed,    but    reported    from    well-in- 
formed source.) 

47.  July  3,  Industrial    Bank    of    Japan    and    Chosen 

1918       Group  of  Banks  30,000,000 

Security,  all  forests  of  Kirin   and  Heilung- 
kiang;  interest  7%%;  5  years 

48.  July  5,  Second    Reorganization    Loan,    Third    Ad- 

1918       vance.     Terms  as  in  Nos.  26  and  34  10,000,000 

49.  1918    To  Yunnan  Government.     Security — Govern- 

ment revenues  from  Ko  Chiu  Tin  Mines  3,000,000 

50.  1918    The  Industrial  Bank  of  Japan  to  the  Ministry 

of     War.     Terms     not     stated.     Security, 

treasury  notes.     Interest  6%  4,000,000 

51.  1918   Industrial  Bank  of  Japan  to  the  Central  Gov- 


192     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

No.  Yen 

ernment.  Terms  not  stated.  Security, 
wine  and  tobacco  taxes.    Interest  T/o  2,000,000 

52.  1918   To  Central  Government,  advance  loan  for  the 

construction  of  four  railways  in  Manchuria, 
total  cost  estimated  at  Yen  150,000,000. 
Terms  not  stated  20,000,000 

53.  1918    To  the  Central  Government,  advance  loan  for 

the  construction  of  the  Tsinan-fu  and  Ka- 
omi  railways.  Total  cost  estimated  at  Yen 
70,000,000.     Terms   not   stated  20,000,000 

54.  1918    To    Central   Government.     Loan   for   admin- 

istrative purposes  and  to  reconstruct  the 
iron  industries  of  China.  Security,  mon- 
opoly of  iron  and  other  mines  in  Yangtze 
provinces.     Terms  not  stated  100,000,000 

55.  1918    To  the  Ministry  of  War.     Loan  for  military 

purposes.  Security  said  to  be  Chinese 
Government  arsenals  and  docks  47,000,000 


Total:     Yen  441,100.000 
Pre-War,  including  Han  Yeh  Peh  49,670,000 

Since  August,  1914  391,430,000 

Only  a  complete  investigation  by  an  international  financial 
commission  will  establish  the  number  and  character  of  Japa- 
nese loans  made  in  China  during  the  years  1917  and  1918,  and 
it  may  never  be  possible  to  establish  positively  the  amount  of 
payments  made  on  the  loans  negotiated  or  how  the  money 
was  disposed  of. 

The  reasons  why  the  other  powers  in  the  Allied  group  stood 
aside  and  tolerated  Japan'  financial  escapades  in  China  during 
this  time  were  twofold.  One  reason  was  because  of  the  gen- 
eral war  situation,  which  made  it  inexpedient  to  irritate 
Japan.  That  reason  probably  accounts  for  the  failure  of  the 
western  Allied  powers  to  protest  strongly  and  officially  at 
Japan's  course.  But  why  did  not  those  of  the  Allies  (Amer- 
ica and  Great  Britain)  who  were  financially  able  to  advance 
funds  to  China  take  that  method  of  preventing  what  was 
happening  ?    I  can  give  no  conclusive  answer  to  this  question. 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  193 

It  may  be  that  Great  Britain  could  not  act  because  of  private 
agreements  with  Japan.  The  United  States  had  no  private 
agreements, — at  least,  one  presumes  that — yet  it  took  no 
steps  to  aid  China  financially,  although  repeatedly  requested 
and  urged  to  do  so.  Failure  of  America  and  Great  Britain 
to  act,  perhaps,  was  due  only  to  lack  of  a  definite  policy.  The 
truth  seems  to  be  that  America  and  Great  Britain  were  try- 
ing to  play  the  game  in  China  legitimately.  Owing  to 
China's  internal  division,  there  was  a  probability  that  funds 
advanced  to  the  Government  would  be  used  to  suppress  the 
southern  faction  by  force,  and  be  frittered  away  uselessly. 
(This  is  what  was  done  with  proceeeds  from  most  of  the 
Japanese  loans.)  The  powers  therefore  may  have  agreed  not 
to  make  financial  advances  to  China  unless  assured  exactly 
how  the  money  would  be  spent.  In  short,  a  ' '  starve-the-civil- 
war-out"  policy  was  followed.  Officially,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment agreed  to  act  with  the  other  powers;  and  this  ex- 
plains why,  during  the  period  of  the  Nishihara  operations, 
the  Japanese  legation  at  Peking  alwaj^s  professed  ignorance 
of  and  disassociation  from  his  schemes.  By  the  time  the 
Japanese  duplicity  was  fully  revealed,  the  war  had  taken  a 
decisive  turn  favorable  to  the  Allies.  The  Nishihara  opera- 
tions then  were  blamed  by  the  Japanese  press  on  the  Terauchi 
Government,  and  a  new  ministry  was  formed  at  Tokio  which 
disclaimed  responsibility  for  what  had  been  done. 

After  the  Hara  ministry  had  taken  office,  the  Japanese 
Government  outwardly  reversed  its  loan  policy  in  China  and 
Siberia,  and  through  the  Foreign  Office  it  issued  two  state- 
ments, as  follows  (The  "Japan  Advertiser,"  December, 
1918)  : 

"Mischievous  reports  of  Japanese  activities  in  China,  more  par- 
ticularly with  regard  to  the  granting  of  loans,  have  for  some  time 
past  heen  in  circulation  and  have  imputed  to  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment intentions  which  are  entirely  foreign  to  them.  For  obvious 
reasons,  the  Japanese  Government  cannot  undertake  to  discourage 


194     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

financial  and  economic  enterprises  of  their  nationals  in  China,  so 
long  as  those  enterprises  are  the  natural  and  legitimate  outgrowth  of 
special  relations  between  the  two  neighbouring  and  friendly  nations. 
Nor  is  the  Japanese  Government  at  all  receding  from  its  readiness  to 
render  needed  financial  assistance  to  China,  consistently  with  the 
terms  of  all  the  declarations  and  engagements  to  which  it  is  a  party, 
should  the  general  security  and  welfare  of  China  call  for  such  assist- 
ance. 

"At  the  same  time,  it  fully  realizes  that  loans  supplied  to  China, 
under  the  existing  conditions  of  domestic  strife  in  that  country,  are 
liable  to  create  misunderstandings  on  the  part  of  either  of  the  con- 
tending factions,  and  to  interfere  with  the  re-establishment  of  peace 
and  unity  in  China,  so  essential  to  her  own  interests  as  well  as  to  the 
interests  of  foreign  powers. 

"Accordingly,  the  Japanese  Government  has  decided  to  withhold 
such  financial  assistance  to  China,  as  is  likely,  in  its  opinion,  to  add 
to  the  complications  of  her  internal  situation,  believing  that  this 
policy  will  be  cordially  participated  in  by  all  the  powers  interested  in 
China." 

The  second  statement  was  issued  in  Japanese  only,  of  which  the 
following  is  a  translation : 

"In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  investment  of  Japanese  capital  in 
China  and  Siberia  affect  to  a  great  extent  the  diplomatic  and  finan- 
cial policy  of  the  state,  the  Japanese  Government  has  determined  to 
establish  definite  principles  regarding  the  investment  of  Japanese 
capital  in  those  regions  which  are  to  be  strictly  enforced  here- 
after : 

"1.  Whenever  any  Japanese  capitalist  opens  negotiations  with  a 
government,  central  or  local,  in  China  or  Siberia,  regarding  loans 
which  are  to  be  utilized  for  political  purposes,  he  is  requested  to 
consult  with  the  Foreign  Office,  Japanese  Embassies  or  Legations, 
or  with  the  Japanese  Consulates.  When  consulted,  the  Foreign 
Office  will  at  once  refer  the  matter  to  the  Department  of  Finance  or 
other  governmental  offices  concerned  and  will  give  necessary  instruc- 
tions to  the  capitalist  concerned. 

"2.  If  any  capitalist  opens  negotiations  without  awaiting  govern- 
mental instructions  or  acts  against  them,  the  Japanese  Government 
may  refrain  from  giving  any  necessary  protection  for  the  capital 
thus  invested. 

"3.  In  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  loans,  the  Foreign  Office 
may  arrange  for  the  convenience  of  the  capitalists  to  the  effect  that 
they  will  be  able  to  consult  directly  with  the  Department  of  Finance 
er  any  other  offices  concerned." 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  195 

Foreign  opinion  of  the  Japanese  loan  policy  in  China  is 
very  well  expressed  in  an  editorial  of  the  "Japan  Chronicle," 
on  August  8,  1918: 

The  political  situation  in  China  grows  more  and  more  compli- 
cated and  the  economic  situation  less  and  less  secure,  so  that  foreign 
observers  who  were  wont  to  hold  rather  optimistic  opinions  as  to 
the  future  are  now  inclined  to  abandon  them  and  regard  China — 
or  rather  those  who  have  the  nominal  control  of  the  country — as 
engaged  in  a  national  rake's  progress,  the  end  of  which  will  be  the 
bankruptcy  and  dissolution  of  the  rake  and  the  handing  over  of 
his  property  to  others.  Is  this  consummation  to  be  wished!  Ap- 
parently there  is  some  difference  of  view  on  this  point,  for  while 
there  are  some  who  desire  that  China  should  pull  herself  up  and  try 
to  establish  some  sort  of  order  in  her  economics  and  finances, 
there  are  others  who  seem  to  be  doing  their  best  to  accelerate 
China's  pace  along  the  road  to  ruin.  China  may  be  said  to  be 
running  a  race  with  the  war  to  see  which  can  finish  first.  If  the 
war  were  to  end  to-morrow  there  might  be  some  chance  of  saving 
China;  if  the  war  continues  for  a  period  to  be  reckoned  in  years, 
then  China  seems  to  be  doomed.  At  the  peace  conference  she  will 
appear  with  a  few  draggled  plumes  representing  all  that  is  left  of 
her  former  fine  feathers,  and  the  victorious  powers  will  shrug  their 
shoulders  and  protest  that  if  China  cannot  rule  her  own  country 
and  people  there  is  nothing  to  be  done.  China  may  be  quite  certain 
that  another  war  is  not  going  to  be  fought  on  her  behalf  and  that 
those  who  have  acquired  part  or  all  of  her  property  have  only  to 
sit  tight  and  smile  blandly  to  secure  themselves  in  their  own.  The 
war  may  be  one  that  is  being  fought  in  preservation  of  the  right 
of  national  self-determination,  but  the  weak  nation  planted  by  the 
side  of  the  strong  one  will  be  in  much  the  same  position  after  as 
before  the  war.  Germany's  blundering  policy  has  shown  which 
is  the  wrong  road  to  follow,  but  there  are  others  less  antagonistic 
and  equally  effectual.  Before  the  weak  nation  can  be  at  rest  in 
spite  of  a  strong  neighbour  a  change  of  heart  must  obtain,  and  war 
hardly  seems  the  best  way  to  bring  this  about.  A  peace  by  exhaus- 
tion is  another  matter  altogether. 

Japan  has  plunged  deeply  into  Chinese  economics  since  the  war 
started  and  the  pace  is  now  growing  fast  and  furious.  Loan  fol- 
lows loan  with  almost  indecent  haste  and  provided  sufficient  security 
is  forthcoming  almost  any  sort  of  guarantee  seems  to  be  accepted. 
Local  loans,  national  loans,  private  loans — all  seems  fish  that  comes 
into  the  net  of  the  Japanese  capitalist.     The  fortunes  of  the  mor- 


196     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

row  do  not  trouble  him.  Probably  he  bases  his  optimism  on  the 
belief  that  even  if  all  law  and  order  were  dissolved  in  China,  if 
government  were  overthrown  and  his  guarantees  so  much  waste 
paper,  still  the  strong  arm  of  his  country  would  uphold  him.  It 
would  not  be  the  first  time  that  warships  had  been  used  to  collect 
foreign  loans,  and  if  the  hard  cash  and  interest  were  not  forth- 
coming, the  security  would  always  remain  to  fall  back  upon.  It 
might  even  be  better  to  have  the  security  than  the  amount  of  the 
original  loan  itself.  Japan  is  not  altogether  to  be  blamed  if  she 
regards  the  present  opportunity  to  invest  money  in  China  as  the 
chance  of  her  life.  After  all,  she  did  not  invent  this  process  of 
peaceful  penetration.  She  has  had  many  opportunities  of  watching 
it  at  work  all  over  the  world,  and  for  years  she  fretted  at  her  own 
poverty  when  she  saw  other  nations  placing  their  savings  in  China's 
lap.  She  even  made  endeavours  to  take  part  in  the  game  by  herself 
appearing  as  a  borrower  in  order  to  be  one  of  China's  creditors. 
Now  that  the  war  has  changed  her  condition,  her  eagerness  to  be- 
come a  bona-fide  creditor  of  China  has  been  given  full  play — per- 
haps too  much  play,  for  it  cannot  be  denied  that  her  policy  shows 
a  certain  amount  of  rougliness  about  the  edges, — a  want  of  savoir 
faire  which  has  jarred  upon  her  friends  and  set  their  teeth  on  edge, 
so  that  they  too  have  felt  called  upon  to  utter  sharp  remarks.  After 
all,  these  things  require  to  be  done  with  a  certain  amount  of  polite- 
ness. To  snatch  a  man's  purse  in  the  street  is  mere  vulgar  robbery7. 
The  contents  may  be  caused  to  change  hands  without  a  cry  of 
"stop  thief"  being  raised. 

It  is  on  these  grounds  that  even  moderate  British  papers  in  China 
have  lately  seen  fit  to  criticise  Japan's  policy,  even  in  face  of  the 
fact  that  Japan  is  one  of  the  Allies  in  the  great  war,  the  winning 
of  which  is  of  primary  importance  if  we  are  not  all  to  be  plunged 
into  an  era  of  barbarism.  Such  criticism  is  really  most  serious, 
the  more  especially  as  no  man  can  tell  when  the  war  will  finish, — 
when  Germany  will  undergo  that  disintegration  which  now  seems 
the  most  probable  end  to  the  war.  Such  disintegration  will  come 
suddenly  when  it  does  come,  and  if  it  finds  Japan  still  engaged  in 
financing  China  by  methods  which  the  best  authorities  regard  as  not 
in  the  interests  of  that  country,  the  criticism  may  be  turned  into 
action.  A  financial  polity  based  upon  the  somewhat  sinister  per- 
sonality of  Mr.  Nishihara  hardly  seems  one  that  the  powers  can 
support  as  in  the  best  interests  of  China. 

The  Japanese  loan  policy  was  not  confined  to  the  Chinese 
Government  (Peking)  recognized  by  the  Allied  nations,  and 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  197 

the  territories  and  officials  under  its  authority.  It  was  active 
in  a  minor  way  also  in  the  southern  provinces  that  were  in 
revolt  against  the  Peking  Government,  and  loans  were  made 
not  to  the  so-called  Southern  Government  at  Canton,  but  to 
some  Tuchuns  and  lesser  local  officials  in  the  Southern  prov- 
inces. Of  course  this  process  amounted  to  aiding  and  fo- 
menting rebellion  against  the  recognized  Government  of 
China,  which  was  an  ally  of  Japan  in  the  war.  It  is  expected, 
when  the  differences  between  the  Northern  and  Southern  Chi- 
nese political  factions  are  compromised,  if  this  happens,  that 
many  Japanese  loans  and  concessions  given  during  the  civil 
disorder  will  be  disclosed,  as  was  the  case  after  the  revolution 
of  1911  and  the  rebellion  of  1913. 

While  the  corruption  policy  by  means  of  loans  and  bribery 
was  being  used  to  extend  Japanese  influence  and  control  over 
all  of  China's  territory  that  was  not  included  in  Japan's 
spheres  of  occupation,  Japan  was  proceeding  with  a  high  hand 
in  those  spheres.  Manchuria  provides  probably  the  most 
complete  example  of  this  process  of  administrative  penetra- 
tion, but  in  some  respects  Shantung  Province  gives  even  a 
better  illustration  of  what  Japan's  peaceful  penetration  and 
her  "enlightened  administration"  of  non- Japanese  regions 
means.  Shantung  provides  almost  a  complete  exposition  of 
the  Japanese  system  as  it  works  in  Korea,  Formosa,  and 
China,  although  in  Formosa  and  Korea  there  are  no  interna- 
tional complications  to  restrain  the  system. 

For  the  first  three  years  of  her  occupation  of  Shantung 
Province  Japan  moved  with  a  certain  caution,  but  by  the 
autumn  of  1917  it  evidently  was  felt  at  Tokio  that  it  was 
safe  to  extend  the  measures  for  putting  Japan  in  complete 
control  there. 

Japanese  occupation  and  gradual  usurpation  of  admin- 
istrative functions  had  been  excused  on  the  ground  of  mil- 
itary necessity  and  that  they  were  temporary.  Now  Japan 
began  to  substitute  Japanese  civil  administration  for  military 
occupation.     The  process  is  very  well  described  in  a  memorial 


198     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

of  the  Shantung  People's  Association,  published  November 
9,1917: 

1.  After  the  occupation  of  the  German  leased  territory  of  Tsing- 
tau  by  the  Japanese  in  the  winter  of  1914,  they  at  once  established 
the  so-called  railway  zone  along  the  Tsinan-Kiaochou  line  which 
was  not  in  existence  during  the  last  seventeen  years  when  the 
Germans  were  in  Shantung.  On  account  of  the  establishment  of 
this  zone  with  or  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Peking  govern- 
ment, Japanese  subjects  have  seized  all  mining  areas,  in  addition 
to  those  already  granted  to  the  Germans,  by  the  so-called  Sino- 
Japanese  cooperation.  When  once  any  Chinese  comes  into  an  agree- 
ment with  the  Japanese,  he  cannot  free  himself  because  there  is 
usually  the  clause  that  "in  future  loans  or  other  requirements  in 
which  foreign  assistance  is  needed,  that  Chinese  must  first  approach 
the  Japanese" — that  is  to  say,  the  Japanese  enjoy  preferential 
rights  anywhere  and  everywhere  they  go,  either  in  their  dealings 
with  the  Chinese  government  or  people.  The  Hanyehping  Corpora- 
tion and  the  Bank  of  Communications  were  lost  to  China  on  account 
of  this  clause. 

2.  After  their  occupation  of  Tsingtau,  the  Japanese  then  seized 
the  Tsinan-Kiaochou  railway  and  then  pushed  their  influence  to 
the  capital  of  Shantung.  In  the  districts  along  the  Tsinan-Kiao- 
chou line,  the  Japanese  selected  wealthy  natives  to  act  as  elders 
for  them  in  every  village  and  these  men  are  held  responsible  for 
any  loss  of  rails  or  sleepers.  The  Japanese  usually  take  away  the 
headmen  as  a  penalty  without  the  knowledge  of  the  local  Chinese 
officials  simply  because  they  say  that  there  are  rails  or  sleepers 
missing  in  certain  villages,  and  all  protests  or  requests  from  the 
Chinese  civil  Governor  at  Tsinan  or  district  magistrates  are  ignored 
by  the  arrogant  and  haughty  Japanese.  After  a  trial  at  Tsingtau 
by  the  Japanese  Court,  the  headmen  are  usually  fined  many  times 
the  worth  of  the  rails,  etc.,  said  to  have  been  lost  or  stolen  by  the 
natives. 

3.  Now  after  three  years  of  their  occupation  of  Tsingtau,  the 
Japanese  have  established  civil  offices  at  Tsinan,  Fangtzu  and 
Changfang,  along  the  Tsinan-Kiaochou  line,  under  the  excuse  that 
they  are  only  intended  for  the  control  of  Japanese  in  Chinese  ter- 
ritory, despite  the  fact  that  there  are  Japanese  Consulates  which 
enjoy  the  right  of  extraterritoriality.  If  the  Chinese  Government 
will  allow  this  to  pass  unnoticed  without  protest,  the  crafty  Japanese 
will  surely  extend  this  system  finally  to  all  parts  of  China.  The  so- 
called  Lansing-Ishii  agreement  will  not  bind  the  Japanese  and  will 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  199 

merely  encourage  them  to  utilize  the  words  "special  interests"  to 
encroach  upon  Chinese  sovereign  rights,  as  it  is  exceedingly  hard 
to  give  a  proper  explanation  to  the  words  "special  interests." 

4.  In  reply  to  the  petition  of  the  Shantung  People's  Association 
General  Chang  Huai-tze,  Tuchun  and  civil  governor  of  Shantung, 
says  that  Baron  Hayasbi,  Japanese  minister  to  China,  does  not  re- 
gard the  establishment  of  this  sort  of  civil  office  in  Chinese  territory 
as  necessary  or  lawful,  while  the  Chinese  minister  at  Tokio,  Mr. 
Chang  Chung-hsiang,  has  reported  to  the  Wai  Chiao-pu  that  he 
has  been  informed  by  a  delegate  from  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office 
that  the  matter  is  under  the  careful  consideration  of  the  Japanese 
Government  and  that  it  is  not  true  that  the  Japanese  Government 
has  refused  to  withdraw  same.  As  Japanese  official  statements  are 
generally  unreliable,  it  is  our  duty  as  representatives  of  the  thirty 
millions  of  the  Shantung  people  to  stay  in  the  Capital  and  wait  for 
a  definite  result. 

Getting  no  satisfaction  from  the  Peking  Government  in 
response  to  their  memorials,  the  inhabitants  of  Shantung 
started  a  popular  agitation  against  the  recognition  of  the 
Japanese  civil  administrations  in  the  province.  On  Novem- 
ber 22,  1917,  Wang  Chao-chuan,  a  member  of  the  Shan- 
tung Provincial  Assembly,  delivered  an  address  before  the 
Shantung  guild  at  Peking,  in  which  he  said: 

I  desire  to  give  you  a  short  report  of  what  I  have  seen  and 
experienced  in  my  native  land.  Since  the  taking  over  of  the  Tsinan- 
Kiaochou  railway  from  the  Germans  by  Japan,  the  activities  of 
the  Japanese  have  been  strongly  felt  by  us.  The  Japanese  now 
desire  to  make  our  province  their  colony,  and  the  means  employed 
by  them  to  achieve  their  ends  are  far  from  being  honest.  Besides 
taking  over  all  mines  operated  by  the  Germans,  they  have  now 
started  the  operation  of  mines  in  more  than  ten  other  places  where 
no  sanction  has  been  obtained  from  the  Chinese  government.  They 
engage  Chinese  to  apply  for  license  to  work  on  the  mines,  and  when' 
any  investigation  is  instituted  by  local  officials  they  would  produce 
counterfeit  deeds  and  contracts  to  prove  that  the  property  had  been 
transferred  to  them  by  some  Chinese  whose  whereabouts  could  not 
be  found. 

Now  they  have  gone  a  step  further,  and  are  usurping  our  civil 
rights.  In  the  villages  within  the  railway  zone,  the  Japanese  have 
made  elders  responsible  for  the  protection  of  certain  sections  of 


200     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

the  road;  and  sometimes  the  Japanese  railway  policemen  come  to 
these  villages  to  make  investigations.  When  they  find  coal  or  iron 
in  any  house,  they  arrest  the  owner  and  inflict  large  fines  on  the 
ground  that  he  has  offered  refuge  to  bad  characters  and  "tufei." 
The  district  magistrates  are  helpless  in  the  face  of  such  outrages. 
We  cannot  help  shedding  tears  as  we  witness  the  oppression  of 
poor  and  innocent  inhabitants  along  the  railway  zone.  With  the 
introduction  of  Japanese  Civil  Offices  into  these  places,  the  condi- 
tion of  the  people  will  become  even  more  deplorable. 

On  November  30,  1917,  a  people's  conference  was  held  at 
Tsinan-fu,  the  capital  of  Shantung  Province,  and  delegates 
were  appointed  to  proceed  to  Peking  and  protest  to  the 
Government.  Wang  No  and  Wang  Chia-su  accepted  the  office, 
and  on  their  arrival  at  Peking  they  presented  a  petition,  in 
part  as  follows : 

Some  time  ago  the  Japanese  authorities  established  in  Tsingtau 
the  Office  of  Civil  Administration,  and  now  they  have  established 
branches  of  this  office  in  Fangtzu,  Tsinan  and  other  places.  When 
the  Provincial  Assembly,  Educational  Association  and  other  local 
authorities  telegraphed  to  the  central  government  requesting  that 
protests  be  lodged  with  the  Japanese  Legation  at  Peking,  we  de- 
cided to  await  the  result;  but  we  have  now  reached  the  limit  of  our 
patience  and  endurance,  and  if  no  measures  be  immediately  taken  to 
prevent  such  gross  violation  of  our  sovereign  rights,  the  final  de- 
struction or  dismemberment  of  the  country  will  soon  take  place. 

In  May,  3915.  when  a  Sino-Japanese  Treaty  was  signed  in  connec- 
tion with  the  affairs  of  Shantung  (21  demands  and  supplementary), 
it  was  provided  that  China  should  in  future  acknowledge  the  transfer 
of  privileges  and  concessions  in  Shantung  which  might  be  made  by 
Germany  to  Japan.  Thus  Japan  can  only  enjoy  the  concessions 
after  the  war  when  they  are  arranged  between  them  (Japan  and 
Germany).  Besides  enjoying  all  privileges  and  concessions  formerly 
granted  to  Germany  by  China,  Japan  has  now  attempted  to  usurp 
our  civil  rights  by  establishing  civil  offices  in  our  territory. 

In  Article  4  of  Chapter  2  of  the  Lease  of  Kiaochou-wan,  it  is 
provided  that  German  merchants  are  allowed  to  work  or  to  co- 
operate with  Chinese  merchants  in  working  coal  mines  which  are 
situated  within  a  distance  of  30  li  from  the  railway  zone.  During 
the  period  of  German  occupation,  no  attempt  whatever  was  made 
to  interfere  with  the  civil  administration  of  this  country  even  within 
the  districts  marked  as  "railway  zone."     But  the   Japanese  have 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  201 

now  established  civil  administration  offices  in  Tsinan  and  Fang- 
tzu,  despite  our  protests. 

The  German  authorities  at  Tsingtau  have  hitherto  done  their  best 
to  respect  our  civil  rights,  and  they  did  not  interfere  with  our 
police  administration.  They  recalled  the  troops  at  Kaomi  and 
Kiaochou,  who  were  sent  there  to  protect  the  railway,  and  allowed 
us  to  exercise  police  authority  in  the  railway  zone.  But  the  Jap- 
anese have  refused  to  recall  their  gendarmes  under  the  pretext 
that  their  country  is  still  in  a  state  of  war  with  Germany.  They 
have  consuls  in  our  country,  and  indeed  there  is  not  the  least  neces- 
sity for  them  to  establish  civil  offices  to  interfere  with  our  admin- 
istration. 

It  is  evident  that  by  their  aggressive  actions  the  Japanese  are 
only  enforcing  their  policy  as  implied  in  the  new  Japanese- Amer- 
ican Alliance  [Lansing-Ishii  agreement]. 

Other  foreign  governments  were  not  oblivious  to  what  was 
happening  in  Shantung,  and  Japan's  moves  were  closely  ob- 
served. I  quote  from  a  report  of  an  official  of  the  American 
Government  who  investigated  conditions  in  Shantung,  dated 
November  30,  1917 : 

...  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  this  action  has  aroused 
great  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  in  the  province  of 
Shantung  and  elsewhere.  I  learn  that  the  Chinese  Government  in 
October  presented  a  formal  protest  against  not  only  the  Civil 
Administration  itself,  but  also  against  the  stationing  of  troops 
and  the  extension  of  Japanese  administrative  functions  outside  the 
leased  territory.  The  Chinese  plainly  fear  that  the  comparatively 
trivial  military  operations  against  the  Germans  are  to  make  the 
basis  of  Japanese  permanent  domination  of  Shantung,  and  they 
are  bitterly  opposing  every  manifestation  of  what  they  feel  are 
hostile  and  sinister  usurpations  of  their  fundamental  rights. 

The  Japanese,  on  the  other  hand,  starting  with  the  assumption 
that  the  Shantung  Railway,  as  well  as  the  leased  territory,  are 
conquered  areas,  assert  that  it  is  both  their  right  and  their  duty 
to  provide  for  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  this  region,  and  that 
the  new  Department  of  Civil  Administration  and  its  branches  out- 
side the  leased  territory  have  been  created  with  only  that  laudable 
object  in  view. 

The  report  cited  in  detail  various  matters  in  connection 
with  the  Chinese  agitation  against  the  extension  of  Japanese 


202     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

administration,  and  quoted  from  numerous  Chinese  memorials 
and  protests.  The  report  also  cited  the  Japanese  moves  to 
counteract  this  Chinese  popular  indignation.  One  method 
was  for  the  Japanese  press  in  Japan,  China  and  America  to 
accuse  German  propaganda  of  having  instigated  the  agitation 
among  the  Chinese.  Of  that  the  report  remarks  that  "there 
is  no  tangible  evidence  that  German  propaganda  or  influence 
played  any  serious  part  in  the  matter.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Japanese  and  Germans  seem  very  friendly."  Efforts 
were  made  to  placate  Chinese  opinion  by  "pretending  to 
withdraw  somewhat."  The  Japanese  consul-general  made  a 
special  trip  to  the  tomb  of  Confucius  and  laid  wreaths  on  it. 
The  Japanese  military  governor  of  Tsingtau  made  a  trip 
along  the  railway  and  to  Tsinan-fu,  accompanied  by  Dr.  M. 
Akiyama,  the  Japanese  civil  administrator  who  had  been  ap- 
pointed. The  latter  was  very  coolly  received  by  the  Chinese. 
At  an  after-dinner  speech,  on  November  15,  the  Japanese 
commanding  general  (governor)  said,  as  quoted  in  the 
"Shantung  Jih  Pao,"  that  the  Chinese  should  not  permit 
themselves  any  suspicion  about  the  establishment  of  civil 
administration,  as  it  was  an  established  international  cus- 
tom to  create  such  forms  of  government  in  conquered  and 
colonized  areas.  The  newspaper  stated  that  these  remarks 
displeased  the  Chinese  guests  so  much  that  they  remained 
silent,  and  soon  afterward  left  the  dinner. 

In  trying  to  placate  the  Chinese  population, — foreign  ag- 
gressors in  China  always  have  the  weapon  of  commercial  boy- 
cott to  fear — the  Japanese  officials  indirectly  made  use  here 
again  of  the  "white  peril"  argument.     This  report  says: 

"In  connection  with  this  visit  of  General  Hongo,  a  Japanese 
press  organ  (Seitou  Shimpo,  Tsingtau)  stated  that  a  Chinese  mili- 
tary officer,  in  toasting  the  Japanese  general  at  a  dinner,  remarked 
that  it  was  necessary  for  Japan  and  China  to  combine  to  resist  the 
advance  of  the  white  races  in  the  East  after  the  war.  In  replying, 
General  Hongo  tactfully  avoided  the  comparison,  and  said  that  the 
establishment  of  civil  administration  was  a  step  toward  closer  rela- 
tions between  Japan  and  China," 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  203 

The  railway  and  harbor  administration  at  Tsingtau  were 
placed  under  the  Japanese  civil  administration,  thus  indicat- 
ing a  purpose  to  make  Japanese  occupation  permanent.  The 
report  makes  an  analysis  of  Chinese  opposition  to  extension 
of  Japanese  administration.  It  gives  the  number  of  Japa- 
nese in  Shantung  (official  census)  at  more  than  20,000,  of 
whom  about  6,000  are  outside  the  leased  territory  and  the 
railway  zone.  ( Chinese  assert  that  there  are  more  than  15,000 
Japanese  in  Shantung  outside  of  Tsingtau  and  exclusive  of 
the  troops  and  gendarmes.)  The  report  quotes  parts  of  an 
article  by  Professor  J.  Shiga,  a  Japanese,  published  on  March 
1,  1917,  in  the  ' '  Santo  Koron, ' '  the  principal  Japanese  organ 
printed  at  Tsinan-f u,  as  follows : 

I  ascribed  [in  a  previous  article]  the  strength  of  Germany  to 
(1)  a  high  degree  of  Imperialism  (from  which  their  stamina  and 
momentum  come),  (2)  scientific  brains  (which  bring  about  a  sys- 
tematic development  of  the  country),  (3)  body  to  overcome  the  odd* 
of  environment    (requisite  to  thrive  in  work  abroad). 

For  your  information  the  following  parallel  facts  are  cited: 

Germany  Japan 

Area:     87,500  square  miles.  Japan  proper:     75,000  sq.  m. 

Population:     67,000,000.  Korea:     35,000  sq.  m. 

Ratio  of  increase:    1.5.  Population:     67,000,000. 

Ratio  of  increase:    1.5. 

Past  and  present:  Past  and  present: 

German    people    2000    years  Japan  2600  years  old,  changed 

old,  united  50  years  ago  by  the  herself  50  years  ago  by  the  vir- 

wise  policy  of  the  old  Emperor,  tue      of     the      late      Emperor. 

She  fought  thrice  with  foreign  Fought   with    foreign    countries 

countries  and  won  thrice  to  the  thrice    and    won    thrice    to    the 

glory  of  the  nation.  glory  of  the  nation. 

Future :  Future : 

India,  Australia,  Canada  and  If    one    possesses    even    the 

South     Africa     all     belong     to  crust  of  bread  of  the  world,  well 

Great  Britain,  which  helps  her-  and  good.     Far  from  crust,  our 


204     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

self  to  the  main  portion  of  the  new  gains  in  the  war  are  a  dust 

bread  of  the  world.  of  dust  (Marianne,  Caroline  and 

Germany's  portion  is  nothing  Marshall    islands    are   what    we 

but  its  crust  or  its  dust.     How  picked  up).     How  should  Japan 

should  Germany  provide  for  her-  provide  for  herself  in  the  fu- 

self  in  the  future? — (Words  of  ture? 
Treitschke,    the    cause    of    the 
present  war.) 

Such  briefly  is  the  condition  in  which  we  are.  We  Japanese 
should  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  we  must  not  lose  an  inch  of  what 
we  have  acquired  on  the  continent.  We  never  can  tell  how  the  polit- 
ical clouds  of  Europe  may  shift  even  for  the  next  moment.  Re- 
member, Tsingtau  is  the  landing  place  to  the  continent,  which  we 
have  newly  acquired  with  sacrifice.  All  the  Japanese  in  Shantung, 
particularly  at  this  juncture,  should  rouse  themselves  once,  nay,  one 
hundred  times,  to  brace  up  our  authorities  and  watch  over  the 
steps  they  take. 

With  Japanese  organs  and  Japanese  leaders  publishing  such 
views  in  the  capital  of  a  Chinese  province,  there  is  little  to 
wonder  at  that  Chinese  were  uneasy.  The  report  considers 
the  technical  status  of  Japan's  position  in  Shantung.  Chi- 
nese had  raised  the  question  of  the  leased  territory,  of  which 
the  report  says :  ' '  Without  going  into  the  dispute  regarding 
China's  declaration  and  attempt  at  abolition  of  the  'War 
Zone,'  the  above  considerations  [terms  of  the  original  Kiao- 
chou  convention]  would  seem  to  support  the  contention  that 
only  Kiaochou  leased  territory  and  the  50  kilos  zone  may 
rightfully  be  regarded  as  'occupied  territory,'  Japanese  con- 
tentions with  regard  to  the  railway  notwithstanding."  In 
regard  to  the  establishment  of  Japanese  civil  administration 
outside  the  leased  territory,  the  report  says: 

The  establishment  of  Civil  Administration  outside  of  the  Leased 
Territory  is  therefore  quite  a  different  question.  The  establishment 
of  such  offices  at  Fangtze  and  Tsinanfu  was  undoubtedly  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Japanese  Government.  Simultaneously  with  the  publi- 
cation of  the  Imperial  Ordinance  and  the  local  Military  Ordinance 
referred  to  in  the  first  paragraph  of  this  report,  Military  Notifica- 
tion No.  93,  of  October  1,  1917,  was  issued  by  the  commanding  gen- 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  205 

eral  in  Tsingtau.  This  notification  gave  the  jurisdictional  areas  of 
the  local  Administrations  at  Tsingtau  Litsum  (10  miles  from  Tsing- 
tau, within  the  Leased  Territory).  Military  Ordinance  No.  21  also 
made  its  appearance,  promulgating  the  scheme  of  organization  of 
the  local  administration.  (Copies  herewith.)  The  location  of  the 
first  railway  local  administration  office  at  Fangtze  was  probably 
determined  by  the  presence  there  of  the  new  barracks  already  re- 
ferred to. 

During  the  course  of  the  Chinese  opposition  to  the  Civil  Admin- 
istration this  office  was  informally  informed  by  an  official  of  the 
Administration  that  the  necessity  for  the  offices  outside  the  Leased 
Territory  arose  from  the  presence  along  the  railway  of  great  num- 
bers of  Japanese  residents.  The  annexed  census  shows  that  almost 
6000  Japanese  reside  in  the  designated  area.  But  even  granting 
these  facts,  it  is  logical  to  inquire  by  what  right  they  are  there? 
When  foreign  right  of  residence  in  the  interior  of  China  is  so  care- 
fully circumscribed  by  treaty,  to  the  Chinese  it  must  appear  that 
Japan  is  proceeding  on  the  assumption  that  the  rights  of  residence 
granted  to  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  by  Article  3  of 
the  treaty  of  May  25,  1915,  have  been  extended  to  Shantung,  an 
assumption  that  is,  so  far  as  this  office  is  informed,  contrary  to 
fact.  But  even  granting,  again,  that  this  great  body  of  Japanese 
are  residing  in  the  interior  in  conformity  with  treaty  stipulations, 
they  are  nevertheless  amenable  to  their  consular  authorities,  and  the 
creation  of  other  Japanese  governmental  agencies  would  appear  to  be 
clearly  ultra  vires. 

Before  it  was  announced  that  Japan  would  establish  civil 
administrations  in  Shantung  outside  of  the  former  German 
leased  territory,  the  Japanese  military  government  at  Tsing- 
tau had  taken  steps  to  establish  an  extensive  Japanese-owned 
land  area  there  by  the  forcible  purchase  of  lands  from  Chinese 
owners.  The  area  and  the  manner  of  acquiring  it  are  de- 
scribed in  an  official  report  of  the  agent  of  a  foreign  govern- 
ment, dated  May,  1918,  as  follows: 

This  land  includes  the  shore  of  Kiaochou  Bay,  extending  from 
the  Great  Harbor  northward  along  the  railway  for  several  miles, 
'and  from  the  Bay  right  across  the  peninsula  on  which  Tsingtau  is 
situated.  Not  only  will  every  possible  land  approach  to  Tsingtau 
in  the  future,  therefore,  be  Japanese-owned  property,  but  every 
vestige  of  waterfront  anywhere  near  the  railway  will  be  theirs  as 


206     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

well.  The  area  affected  is  roughly  twelve  square  miles  in  area,  and 
this  Consulate  has  no  doubt  but  that  it  will  ultimately  be  extended 
to  Litsun,  eight  miles  from  Tsingtau,  in  order  to  include  the  source 
of  the  city's  water  supply. 


It  is  the  opinion  of  this  Office,  respectfully  offered,  that  the  Jap- 
anese army  of  occupation  is  far  over-stepping  the  privileges  allowed 
such  organizations  by  the  rules  of  war,  and  is  arrogating  to  itself 
the  civil  rights  secured  to  the  former  German  lessees  through  con- 
ventional agreement. 

Chinese  owners  of  this  land  were  not  allowed  the  option  of 
selling  or  retaining  their  property,  but  were  compelled  to  sell 
by  pressure  of  the  Japanese  military  authorities  acting  under 
martial  law.  Yet  Dr.  M.  Akiyama,  the  newly  appointed  Japa- 
nese civil  administrator  in  Shantung,  in  a  speech  made  at 
Tsingtau  on  October  11,  1917,  said:  "Twenty  years  ago  Ger- 
many treacherously  occupied  Tsingtau,  and  not  only  estab- 
lished a  far  Eastern  naval  base  here,  but  also  made  it  a  com- 
mercial center  vis-a-vis  China."  Thus  an  official  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government  denounced  the  method  by  which  Germany 
acquired  the  leasehold  of  Kiaochou,  yet  Japan  rests  her  claim 
to  a  position  there  on  the  validity  of  Germany's  status.  The 
statement  was  made  in  an  address  explaining  Japan's  (official) 
position  in  Shantung,  and  was  read  from  a  manuscript.  Dr. 
Akiyama  is  supposed  to  be  an  authority  on  international  law. 

In  a  petition  presented  to  the  cabinet  at  Peking  on  January 
4,  1918,  by  representatives  of  the  Shantung  Provincial  As- 
sembly, this  paragraph  occurs: 

1.  Not  only  within  the  once  German  leased  territory  of  Tsingtau, 
but  also  at  Poshan  and  some  other  districts,  the  Japanese  have  seized 
all  mining  properties  by  peaceful  or  forceful  means.  Japanese 
outlaws  went  so  far  as  to  tie  up  the  hands  and  feet  of  those  owners 
of  mining  hills  who  refused  to  sell  their  properties  and  beat  them 
fiercely.  In  one  case,  oil  was  poured  on  the  man's  clothes  in  order 
to  frighten  him  to  accept  the  demands  of  the  Japanese,  and  sign  a 
lease  to  his  property.  Thus  after  the  solution  of  the  question  con- 
cerning the  illegal  establishment  of  Japanese  sub-civil  administra- 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  207 

tions  in  Shantung,  the  mining  question  -will  be  the  most  difficult 
one  for  the  government  to  settle  with  Japan. 

In  the  autumn  of  1918  a  survey  of  results  of  the  Japanese 
activities  in  Tsinan-fu,  the  capital  of  Shantung,  was  made 
by  an  American  educator  (Upton  Close),  who  summarized 
what  he  learned  in  an  article  published  in  "Millard's  Review" 
of  January  18,  1919.  I  will  include  here  portions  of  that 
article : 

Japanese  political  influence  in  Tsinan  and  Shantung  has  its  hub 
in  the  Provincial  Waiehiaopu,  and  its  Foreign  Commissioner,  Tang 
Ko-san.  This  man,  schooled  in  Japan,  married  to  a  Japanese  wife, 
and  indebted  for  his  entire  political  career  to  Japanese  influence  and 
aid,  has  been  reduced  to  a  condition  of  absolute  subservience  and 
helpless  vassalage  to  his  patrons.  His  administration  is  inefficient, 
pusillanimous,  and  accused  of  nepotism  by  his  fellow  officials,  espe- 
cially on  the  score  of  his  giving  too  many  positions  to  his  relatives — 
the  cardinal  sin  of  Chinese  officialdom.  It  is  evident  that  he  could 
not  retain  his  position  a  day  without  his  powerful  Japanese  backing. 

With  these  men  in  their  control,  Japanese  have  a  strangle  hold 
on  the  political  life  of  the  Shantung  capital.  It  is  now  publicly 
announced  that  Commissioner  Tang  is  an  aspirant  for  the  governor- 
ship of  the  province,  and  Japanese  interests,  including  their  local 
daily  vernacular  paper,  are  supporting  him  with  might  and  main. 
Twice  Chinese  merchants  have  endeavored  to  combine  for  a  boycott 
of  Japanese  goods;  once,  upon  the  occasion  of  the  establishment  of 
the  Japanese  Civil  Government  Department  their  meeting  was  broken 
up  and  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  sealed  by  order  of  General  Ma; 
once,  in  September,  1916,  their  plans  were  brought  abruptly  to  an 
end  by  the  despatch  of  a  letter  by  courier  direct  to  the  president 
of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  while  sitting  in  discussion  of  the 
question,  from  the  Japanese  Consulate,  giving  that  body,  as  I  am 
informed,  fifteen  minutes  to  change  the  subject,  under  threat  of 
forcible  dispersion. 

Let  us  turn  to  the  actual  Japanese  occupation  of  and  enterprise 
in  the  city,  which,  however,  as  we  shall  see  further,  can  hardly  be 
called  commercial.  I  was  going  to  use  the  word  "penetration"  rather 
than  "occupation,"  but  it  is  too  much  an  accomplished  fact  for  that 
expression.  The  first  three  years  of  the  war,  the  Japanese  popula- 
tion  segregated  itself  near  the  railway  station  under  their  administra- 


208     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

tion,  and  in  residences  and  buildings  taken  away  from  the  Germans. 
The  past  year,  however,  their  policy  has  been  to  decentralize  over 
the  entire  settlement,  and  even  into  the  principal  sections  of  the  old 
walled  city.  It  is  evident  that  when  they  get  ready  to  map  out 
their  "settlement"  here,  as  in  Tsingtao,  they  will  rebuild  the  "whole 
thing."  Besides  the  large  number  of  Chinese  firms  financed  by  Jap- 
anese money,  there  are,  situated  on  every  length-wise  and  cross  street 
of  the  settlement  and  in  three  principal  sections  of  the  city  under  the 
direct  operation  of  Japanese,  194  enterprises  classified  as  follows: 
(This  list  is  not  guaranteed  against  omissions  or  mistakes,  but  was 
compiled  with  great  care  for  accuracy  and  thoroughness.) 

SUMMARY 

Drug    Shops 63 

Houses  of  Prostitution 22 

Notions  (Miscellaneous  small  goods)    38 

Hotels  and  Inns  13 

Banks — Actual  Banking  Business 3 

"Banks" 3 

Hospitals 3 

"Yang  Hang,"  etc 3 

Railroad  offices,  aside  from  station 2 

Barracks  and  Gendarme  Station 3 

Schools 3 

Residences 26 

Flour  Mill 

Dessicated  Egg  Factory   

Cinema  Theater 

Postal  and  Telegraph  Office 

Railway  Station 

Wireless  Station  

Railway  Coal  Syndicate   

Consulate 

Total,  Japanese.  Enterprises  194 

Without  Residences   168 

Percentage  of  total  without  residences:  Drug 

Shops  and  Houses  of  Prostitution 50% 

Percentage  of  Small,  Miscellaneous  Shops  and 

Enterprises 32  % 

Percentage  of  Military,  Government  and  Rail- 
way       7* 

Percentage  of  Actual  Commercial  Enterprises    8% 
Remaining  Percentage Z% 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  209 

It  should  be  noticed  what  a  small  percentage  of  the  whole  can  be 
classed  as  actual  commercial  enterprises  of  any  standing. 

The  overwhelming  percentage  of  Japanese  enterprises  in  Tsinan 
are  the  small  drug  shops,  miscellaneous  and  notion  shops,  and 
"touehing-up  stations'' — as  their  Japanese  designation  might  be 
translated — the  houses  of  prostitution.  Not  discussing  the  latter, 
which  need  no  explanation  to  those  familiar  with  Nipponese  cus- 
tom, it  is  evident  that,  with  the  hundreds  of  Chinese  shops  selling 
Japanese  patent-medicines,  notions  and  small  goods,  there  is  no 
market  in  a  city  the  size  of  Tsinan  to  support  107  Japanese  shops, 
in  many  cases  with  apparently  several  families  dependent  on  them, 
also  handling  these  lines  of  small  goods.  It  is  charged  by  Chinese 
that  Japanese  "business"  here  is  not  commercial.  A  percentage 
is  engaged  in  morphia  and  other  lucrative  traffic,  as  I  shall  show. 
But  there  remains  nevertheless  a  large  percentage  which  it  is  certain 
are  not  dealing  in  these  illegitimate  lines,  which,  however,  are  just 
as  certainly  not  dependent  on  their  turn-over  of  merchandise  for 
support.  One  may  enter  these  shops  and  ask  for  a  common  article 
in  their  line,  and  find  that  the  shopkeeper  does  not  know  whether 
he  has  it  in  stock  or  not,  and  does  not  care  whether  he  makes  a 
sale  or  not.  He  does  not  appear  in  the  least  offended  or  disheart- 
ened when  the  prospective  customer  turns  away  without  purchasing. 
In  some  of  the  drug  shops  the  bottles  are  covered  with  dust,  and 
apparently  are  never  disturbed.  Some  proprietors  of  these  shops 
are  evidently  of  the  lower  class  and  very  poor;  others  appear  very 
comfortably  situated,  and  many  have  a  decided  military  bearing. 
The  inference  is  that  these  people  are  an  artificial  population  sup- 
ported or  subsidized  by  their  government  to  give  it  prestige,  hold, 
and  a  right  to  participate  in  affairs.  Or,  it  may  be  that  they  are 
a  small  army  of  emergency  which  their  government  finds  most 
convenient  to  quarter  in  this  way.  The  recent  purchasers  of  the 
large  number  of  German  residences  likely  come  in  this  same  class, 
as  there  are  no  commercial  establishments  here  sufficient  to  support 
men  of  the  station  in  society  who  would  seek  such  residences. 

We  have  now  to  consider  the  morphia  trade  which,  although 
not  confined  exclusively  to  Japanese,  is  inseparable  from  their  pene- 
tration and  occupation.  It  may  well  be  questioned  what  reasons  for 
official  Japan  allowing  its  nationals  to  institute  this  traffic  are  suffi- 
ciently weighty  to  justify  their  running  the  gauntlet  of  the  public 
opinion  of  the  world.  The  writer  would  suggest  the  following 
three  reasons: 

1.     The  profit  which,  in  the  absence  of  real  commercial  enterprise, 


210     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

finances  "peaceful  penetration."  It  is  a  matter  of  public  knowledge 
in  Tsingtao  that  the  profit  from  the  drug  traffic  has  supplied  the 
funds  for  the  campaign  of  wholesale  buying  of  everything  purchas- 
able, the  immense  building  program,  and  the  support  of  the  artificial 
population. 

2.  The  poisoning  and  weakening  of  the  Chinese  nation  from  its 
official  classes  down,  making  it  an  easy  prey  to  the  aggressor. 

3.  The  unbreakable  hold  gained  on  the  official  class  through  the 
narcotic,  who  become  bound  by  a  slavery  stronger  than  steel  fetters 
to  their  Japanese  drug-providers,  and  can  be  swayed  or  induced 
to  give  up  secrets.  These  fetters  are  fastened  by  two  locks,  first, 
the  habit-slavery  of  the  narcotic  itself;  second,  the  fear  of  the  poor 
user  of  scandal  and  loss  of  his  position  and  all  that  he  has  should 
he  break  with  those  providing  him  or  displease  their  friends  or 
officials.     Many  concrete  examples  could  be  given. 

The  writer  has  reliable  evidence  that  two  of  the  large  Japanese 
commercial  firms  have  in  the  past  imported  through  Tsingtao  and 
delivered  shipments  of  arms,  consisting  principally  of  small  arms, 
to  individuals  connected  with  the  Chinese  military.  It  appears  that 
small  shops  cannot  deal  in  this  trade,  as  they  would  be  more  acces- 
sible to  surveillance  by  the  Chinese  authorities,  and  could  not  com- 
mand the  confidence  of  the  individual  for  whom  they  were  purchasing 
to  the  extent  of  inducing  him  to  put  down  the  cash  at  time  of 
order,  which  is  alwajrs  demanded.  The  goods  are  ordered  from  and 
paid  for  at  these  companies,  and  later  delivered  direct  from  Tsing- 
tao in  some  secret  way  to  the  purchaser. 

The  Chinese  Police  Headquarters  when  referred  to  on  this  sub- 
ject stated  that  it  finds  itself  unable  to  take  a  census  of  the  Jap- 
anese population,  and  is  forced  to  content  itself  with  what  statistics 
are  sent  to  it  by  the  Japanese  Consulate  here,  which  in  November, 
1917,  reported  200  males  and  150  females,  totalling  450,  and  has 
made  no  report  since.  The  most  conservative  estimate  would  place 
this  figure  as  a  tithe  of  the  present  Japanese  population.  There 
is,  in  addition,  a  continual  floating  population  passing  in  and  out 
of  the  Republic  through  Tsinan  and  Tsingtao,  which  reaches  at 
times  at  least  as  high  as  two  thousand. 

The  above  is  a  brief,  but  comprehensive,  summary  of  the  enter- 
prises which  the  activities  of  the  Japanese  officials  and  nationals 
have  been  directed  to  building  up  during  their  unparalleled  oppor- 
tunity of  the  past  four  years.  They  have  had  absolutely  a  free 
hand.  What  they  have  done  must  be  taken  to  represent  what  they 
aimed  to  accomplish. 


THE  CORRUPTION  OP  A  NATION  211 

China's  long  struggle  against  the  opium  traffic  and  habit 
is  familiar  to  the  world.  When  the  Great  War  began  the 
traffic  was  on  its  last  legs  apparently.  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment and  the  Chinese  people  were  in  a  way  to  accomplish 
what  had  seemed  to  be  impossible,  and  completely  to  stamp 
out  the  cultivation,  trade  in,  and  use  of  the  drug  in  the  whole 
of  China.  All  the  principal  powers,  including  Japan,  were 
nominally  cooperating  with  China  in  this  effort,  and  had 
made  agreements  accordingly.  Then  the  war  came,  disturbed 
and  unsettled  the  administration  of  China,  and  let  down  all 
bars  to  Japanese  "penetration."  How  Japanese,  with  the 
connivance  and  often  with  the  actual  help  of  the  Japanese 
Government,  took  advantage  of  these  circumstances  to  intro- 
duce and  fasten  another  drug  habit  on  the  Chinese,  constitutes 
as  black  an  action  as  has  been  charged  to  any  nation  in  recent 
times. 

Recently  the  "North-China  Daily  News,"  of  Shang- 
hai, the  oldest  and  leading  British  organ  published  in  China, 
threw  off  the  restraint  upon  criticism  of  Japan  which  the  war 
had  enforced  upon  British  publications  and  gave  an  expose 
of  the  Japanese  morphia  traffic  in  China.  A  report  and  an- 
alysis of  this  traffic  revealed  that  for  the  last  two  years  it 
has  been  one  of  the  most  profitable  items  of  Japan's  foreign 
trade;  the  profits  from  it  in  1913  were  $8,400,000,  and  they 
have  increased  enormously  during  the  war.  Extracts  from 
the  report  of  the  correspondent  of  the  "North-China  Daily 
News,"  published  in  December,  1918,  follow: 

It  is  a  larger  trade  now  than  it  was  in  1913.  Morphia,  however, 
can  no  longer  be  purchased  in  Europe.  The  seat  of  industry  has 
been  transferred  to  Japan  and  morphia  is  now  manufactured  by 
the  Japanese  themselves.  Although  Japan  is  a  signatory  to  the 
Agreement  which  forbids  the  import  into  China  of  morphia  or  of 
any  appliances  used  in  its  manufacture  or  in  its  use,  the  traffic, 
inasmuch  as  it  has  the  financial  support  of  the  Bank  of  Japan, 
is  carried  on  with  the  direct  approval  and  encouragement  of  the 
Japanese  government.  In  no  other  country  in  the  world  has  there 
ever  been  known  such  a  wholesale  contraband  traffic.    Literally  tens 


212     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

of  millions  of  yen  axe  transferred  annually  from  China  to  Japan 
for  the  payment  of  Japanese  morphia. 

The  chief  agency  in  the  distribution  of  morphia  in  China  is  the 
Japanese  postoffice.  Morphia  is  imported  by  parcels  post.  No  in- 
spection of  parcels  in  the  Japanese  postoffices  in  China  is  permitted 
to  the  China  Customs  Service.  The  Service  is  only  allowed  to  know 
what  are  the  alleged  contents  of  the  postal  packages  as  stated  in 
the  Japanese  invoices,  and  yet  morphia  enters  China  by  this  channel 
by  the  ton.  A  conservative  estimate  would  place  the  amount  of 
morphia  imported  by  the  Japanese  into  China  in  the  course  of  this 
year  as  high  as  18  tons  and  there  is  evidence  that  the  amount  is 
steadily  increasing.  Wherever  Japanese  are  predominant  there  the 
trade  flourishes.  Through  Tairen  morphia  circulates  throughout 
Manchuria  and  the  provinces  adjoining;  through  Tsingtao  morphia 
is  showered  over  Shantung  province,  Anhui  and  Kiangsu;  while 
from  Formosa,  so  favored  by  geographical  propinquity,  morphia 
is  carried  along  with  opium  and  other  contraband  by  motor-driven 
"fishing"  boats  to  some  point  on  the  mainland,  from  which  it  is 
distributed  throughout  the  province  of  Fukien  and  the  north  of 
Kwangtung.  Everywhere  it  is  sold  by  Japanese  under  exterritorial 
protection.  How  efficient  is  that  protection  may  be  gauged  by  the 
fact  that  no  Japanese  has  ever  yet  been  punished  for  dealing  in 
contraband  in  China.  When  Chinese  police  raid  the  morphia  shops 
along  the  Tsinanfu  railway  in  Shantung,  as  they  have  a  right  to 
do,  for  the  traffic  is  illegal,  Japanese  gendarmerie  rescue  the  ar- 
rested and  exact  a  fine,  not  from  the  guilty  be  it  understood,  but 
from  those  who  attempted  to  uphold  the  law.  In  recorded  instances 
known  to  American  investigators  the  Chinese  magistrate  himself  has 
been  compelled  to  pay  an  indemnity. 

In  South  China  morphia  is  sold  also  by  Chinese  peddlers,  each  of 
whom  carries  a  passport  certifying  that  he  is  a  native  of  the  island 
of  Formosa  and  therefore  entitled  to  Japanese  protection.  Japanese 
drug  stores  throughout  China  carry  large  stocks  of  morphia.  Jap- 
anese medicine  vendors  look  to  morphia  for  their  largest  profits. 
Everywhere  Japanese  female  prostitution,  the  systematic  extension 
of  which  from  Yunnan  city  even  to  Urga  is  such  an  inspiring  evi- 
dence of  the  business  activities  of  our  Asiatic  Allies,  goes  hand  in 
hand  with  the  sale  of  morphia.  Morphia,  no  longer  purchasable  in 
Europe,  is  manufactured  now  in  well-equipped  laboratories  in  Japan 
and  in  Formosa.  During  recent  years  the  bulk  of  the  Persian 
opium  coming  into  the  market  has  been  purchased  by  Japan  for 
conversion  into  morphia,  for  Persian  opium  yields  a  larger  per- 
centage of  morphia  than  Indian  opium.     Opium  grown  in  Korea, 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  213 

the  cultivation  of  which  it  is  interesting  to  note  followed  immedi- 
ately upon  the  closing  of  the  opium  shops  in  Shanghai,  Japanese 
officials  providing  the  seeds;  and  opium  grown  under  Japanese  pro- 
tection in  Manchuria,  is  an  ever  expanding  source  of  the  supply 
of  morphia,  and,  it  may  be  added,  of  opium  required  by  the  ad- 
ministration of  Formosa.  One  must  emphasize  that  this  opium  is 
not  imported  into  Japan.  It  is  transhipped  in  Kobe  harbor  to 
Tsingtao,  from  which  point  of  vantage,  assisted  by  the  Japanese- 
controlled  railway  to  Tsinanfu,  it  is  smuggled  through  Shantung 
into  Shanghai  and  the  Yangtze  Valley.  Opium  purchased  in  Cal- 
cutta for  Rs.  3,500  per  chest — about  Tls.  1,000 — costs,  delivered  in 
Kobe  harbor,  all  told,  well  under  Tls.  1,200  per  chest.  This  opium — 
Tsingtao  opium — is  sold  in  Shanghai  at  $500  a  ball  of  40  balls  to  the 
chest — a  total  of  20,000  per  chest.  China's  failure  to  sell  "for  me- 
dicinal purposes"  her  opium  at  $27,000  per  chest,  the  price  asked 
by  the  opium  ring,  is  thus  explained.  The  price  is  undercut  by  the 
Japanese. 

The  dimensions  that  the  traffic  has  already  assumed  are  note- 
worthy. There  is  reason  to  believe  that  between  January  1  and 
September  30  of  this  year,  1918,  not  less  than  2,000  chests  of  opium 
purchased  in  India  were  imported  into  Tsingtao  via  Kobe.  Upon 
this  amount  the  Japanese  authorities  levy  a  tax,  which  does  not  ap- 
pear in  the  estimates,  equivalent  to  Tls.  4,000  per  chest,  a  total  for 
the  2,000  chests  at  the  present  rate  of  exchange  of  two  million  pounds 
sterling.  The  acquisition  of  this  immense  profit  from  a  contraband 
traffic  would  explain  the  origin  of  those  immense  sums  now  being 
lavished  upon  the  development  of  Tsingtao  and  the  establishment 
there  of  Japanese  commercial  supremacy. 

It  may  be  asked  how  it  is  possible  that  at  Dairen,  where  the 
morphia  traffic  is  greatest,  and  at  Tsingtao,  which  is  the  chief  center 
of  the  Japanese  opium  trade,  the  importation  of  this  contraband 
continues  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Chinese  Maritime  Customs. 
But  at  both  Dalny  and  Tsingtao,  the  Chinese  Maritime  Customs 
are  wholly  under  the  control  of  the  Japanese  and  wholly  manned 
by  them.1  Japanese  military  domination  would  forbid  in  both  ports 
any  interference  with  a  traffic  in  which  the  Japanese  authorities 
were  interested,  either  officially  or  unofficially.  In  Dalny  the  highest 
civic  dignity  has  been  conferred  upon  the  chief  dealer  in  morphia 
and  opium.  Moreover  in  the  case  of  Tsingtao,  by  the  agreement 
which  relinquished  to  Japanese  the  exclusive  charge  of  the  Chinese 

i  The  predominance  of  Japanese  officials  in  the  Chinese  customs  offices 
at  Antung,  Dairen  (Dalny),  and  Tsingtau,  was  among  the  concessions 
forced  from  China  by  the  "agreement"  of  1915,  and  other  agreements. 


214     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Maritime  Customs  there,  any  trade  in  which  the  government  is  inter- 
ested, contraband  or  not,  can  be  carried  on  without  the  official  knowl- 
edge of  the  Customs.  Article  3  of  the  Agreement  of  December 
2,  1905,  perpetuated  in  the  Agreement  of  August  6,  1915,  provides 
that  any  goods  landed  in  Tsingtao  under  "certificates  of  govern- 
ment" shall  be  free  from  Customs  examination.  The  way  has  thus 
been  opened,  not  only  for  the  illegal  import  of  opium,  but  of  con- 
traband in  arms,  by  which  the  bandits  of  Shantung  province  are 
provided  with  the  means  of  harrying  and  looting  and  murdering 
the  peaceful  peasants  of  the  most  sacred  province  of  China.  The 
China  Maritime  Customs  returns  of  1917  show  that  45  piculs  of 
boiled  opium  were  admitted  into  Tsingtao  in  1917.  The  actual 
amount  was  probably  50  times  greater.  The  balance  enters  in  cases 
stamped  "Chun  pung  p'in"  (military  stores),  and  boxes  so  stamped 
are  to  be  seen  commonly  in  the  Japanese  drug  stores  along  the 
Shantung  railway.  In  1917  morphia  to  the  amount  of  nearly  two 
tons  is  recorded  as  having  entered  Dairen  for  use  in  the  Leased 
Territory,  but  no  morphia  is  recorded  as  having  entered  Manchuria 
from  the  leased  territory  during  the  year,  nor  does  any  entry  of 
morphia  appear  in  the  Tsingtao  Customs  returns  for  1917.  Yet  a 
competent  witness,  Dr.  Wu  Lien-teh,  states  that  "Almost  every  Jap- 
anese drug  dealer  or  peddler  in  Manchuria  (and  Shantung  he  might 
have  added)  sells  morphia  in  one  form  or  another,  and  does  so  with 
impunity,  because  no  Japanese  can  be  arrested  without  first  inform- 
ing the  Consul." 

In  an  official  report  to  the  American  Government  made  in 
September,  1918,  on  the  subject  of  the  demand  by  the  Japa- 
nese administration  at  Tsingtau  for  the  removal  of  American 
and  other  foreign  mercantile  property  from  certain  areas, 
the  question  of  the  extensive  improvements  made  by  the  Japa- 
nese at  that  place  was  discussed  as  follows: 

The  secondary  question  as  to  where  the  Japanese  military  head- 
quarters obtains  the  money  now  being  spent  in  large  sums  for  the 
purchase  of  property,  erection  of  schools,  residences  and  public 
buildings,  for  the  laying  out  of  streets,  for  harbor  improvements, 
and  other  public  works,  is  an  interesting  one,  but  difficult  of  exact 
answer.  Known  sources  of  revenue  are:  (1)  20%  of  the  duty 
collected;  (2)  land  taxes;  (3)  business  and  vehicle  taxes;  (4)  income 
from  public  utilities,  i.e.,  railways,  mines,  electric  light,  water 
works,  etc.     A  source  of  income,  whose  amount  has  been  variously 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  215 

estimated  at  from  $700,000  to  several  millions  per  annum,  is  the  im- 
portation under  Japanese  government  license  of  opium. 

Regarding  the  Japanese  morphia  trade  in  Manchuria,  where 
Japan  controls  the  situation  to  an  even  greater  degree  than  in 
Shantung,  I  will  quote  from  an  American  official  report  on 
the  subject,  dated  July,  1918 : 

I  have  the  honor  to  report  that,  notwithstanding  the  stringent 
orders  issued  by  the  Japanese  consular  authorities  at  Mukden  re- 
cently, forbidding  their  nationals  to  trade  in  illicit  drugs,  a  con- 
siderable number  of  Japanese  continue  to  dispense  morphia  and 
various  other  narcotics  to  Chinese  who  are  disposed  to  buy.  I  may 
state  that  in  order  to  obtain  actual  proof,  I  sent  a  Chinese  member 
of  the  consular  staff  to  brothels  holding  Japanese  licenses  and  sit- 
uated in  the  Japanese  railway  area.  The  charge  for  5  smokes  is 
$1.00  small  coin  and  the  opium  thus  obtained  is  mostly  provided 
through  Japanese.  The  tolerance  by  the  Japanese  consular  author- 
ities of  this  practice  attracts  more  Japanese  to  Manchuria,  and  in- 
duces Chinese  to  settle  in  territory  under  Japanese  jurisdiction  and 
to  contribute  directly  or  indirectly  to  the  Japanese. 

Since  the  Indian  supply  of  opium  has  been  cut  off  the  votaries  of 
this  drug  have  been  dependent  upon  the  supply  coming  from  the 
north,  principally  from  the  districts  about  Harbin.  The  drug  is 
brought  into  Chinese  territory  via  Changchun,  and  into  Mukden 
through  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  station,  where  the  Chinese 
authorities  have  no  power  to  search  incoming  passengers.  The 
only  way  to  purchase  opium  in  Mukden  is  through  middlemen,  who 
conduct  business  in  the  district  immediately  surrounding  the  South 
Manchuria  Railway  station.  Some  of  the  dealers  are  Japanese  and 
some  are  Chinese.  The  latter  are  principally  from  Chili  province, 
a  few  coming  from  Shanghai. 

Opium  arrives  here  in  a  semi-prepared  condition  and  is  known 
as  red  opium,  and  is  quoted  as  $10  small  coin  (about  $5.00  gold) 
per  ounce.  This  price,  of  course,  is  subject  to  sudden  fluctuations. 
Many  people  carrying  on  this  illicit  traffic  have  gained  enormous 
profits  at  the  expense  of  the  ignorant  classes. 

Regarding  morphia  and  its  by-products,  it  is  always  possible  for 
the  lowest  class  of  Chinese  laborers  to  purchase  an  injection  from 
any  so-called  Japanese  drug  store  at  a  price  from  3  to  5  copper 
cents,  say  from  IV2  to  21/£  American  cents.  In  this  way  the  Jap- 
anese have  accentuated  the  scarcity  of  copper  coins,  and  at  the 


216     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

same  time  have  ruined  many  of  the  lowest  class  mentally,  morally 
and  physically. 

From  the  stringent  orders  issued  by  the  Japanese  consular  author- 
ities regarding  the  sale  of  illicit  drugs  by  Japanese  subjects,  as 
cited  above,  it  would  seem  that  the  authorities  in  question  are  not 
desirous  of  complying  with  the  wishes  of  the  Chinese  authorities 
in  eradicating  the  opium  evil,  but  their  desire  is  simply  to  hood- 
wink the  world  and  to  go  through  the  motions  of  suppressing  the 
evil.  The  fact  that  opiates  are  sold  openly  on  Japanese  premises 
which  are  not  under  Chinese  jurisdiction  proves  conclusively  that 
the  Japanese  authorities  are  not  at  all  anxious  to  cooperate  with 
China  and  Great  Britain  in  eliminating  the  drug  evil.  Customs 
statistics  regarding  the  importation  of  morphia  into  Manchuria 
cannot  be  relied  upon,  owing  to  the  enormous  quantities  brought  into 
the  country  illicitly  from  Japanese  sources. 

In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  quote  an  item  from  the 
"Japan  Chronicle,"  printed  in  November,  1918: 

SMUGGLING  TO  CHINA 

OPIUM,  FIREARMS,  FORGED  NOTES,  AND  GIRLS 

The  police  authorities  of  Kyoto  are  examining  a  number  of  men 
in  Kyoto,  Osaka,  and  Kobe  in  connection  with  smuggling  of  opium 
and  arms  to  China.  It  is  stated  that  a  man  named  Shibutani  Yosh- 
isaburo,  living  at  Yamato-oji,  Shito,  Kyoto,  working  in  collusion 
with  three  other  men,  bought  a  large  quantity  of  poppies  and  secretly 
manufactured  opium.  The  drug  was  smuggled  to  China,  the  quan- 
tity shipped  between  January  and  April  last  amounting  to  16  kwan, 
valued  at  Y12,000.  The  smugglers  were  making  arrangements  to 
make  another  70  kwan,  valued  at  Y50,000,  when  certain  informa- 
tion came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  police  and  they  were  arrested. 

It  is  also  alleged  that  Shibutani,  with  the  help  of  certain  dealers 
in  Osaka  and  Kobe,  smuggled  some  thousands  of  revolvers  and 
rifles  to  the  Chinese  Revolutionists.  Another  charge  laid  against 
some  of  the  men  under  examination  is  that  of  being  implicated  in  the 
kidnapping  of  girls  from  Japan  to  China  and  in  the  forgery  of 
Chinese  bank-notes.  It  is  stated  that  the  men  arrested  have  many 
accomplices  in  the  South  Sea  Islands,  Harbin,  Shanghai,  and 
Hongkong. 

After  the  exposures  about  the  Japanese  drug  traffic  in 
China,  the  Japanese  Government  issued  a  long  explanation  of 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  217 

its  position  and  connection  with  the  matter,  which  is  very 
well  summed  up  editorially  by  the  "Japan  Chronicle,"  on 
January  30,  1919,  as  follows: 

The  Japan  Advertiser  contains  a  long  explanation  from  official 
sources  of  the  position  of  Japan  in  regard  to  the  opium  and  morphia 
trade  in  China,  which  is  in  the  familiar  style.  The  chief  crime 
seems  to  be  that  committed  by  the  foreign  Press  in  China  which 
made  the  disclosures.  Incidentally  it  makes  Japan's  case  all  the 
worse,  because  it  describes  how  perfectly  adequate  the  Japanese  ma- 
chinery is  for  preventing  the  trade,  and  with  this  statement  it  is 
content  to  leave  the  matter,  not  venturing  on  the  question  whether 
the  machinery  is  properly  worked.  It  is  also  content  "specifically 
to  deny"  the  use  of  the  post  office  as  a  means  of  distribution,  and 
attempts  to  put  the  whole  blame  on  smugglers  who  run  their  own 
cargoes  into  ports  where  Japan  has  no  control.  Then  comes  this 
ingenuous  confession:  "It  was  learnt  yesterday  that  the  trade  in 
drugs  flourishes  in  Manchuria,  where  large  profits  are  reaped.  Op- 
ium there  is  under  monopolistic  control  of  the  Kwantung  Govern- 
ment-General, which  deals  out  the  drugs  to  the  Japanese  and  the 
Chinese  dealers  in  Manchuria  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Govern- 
ment-general. Certainly,  as  some  of  the  foreign  journals  state,  the 
enormous  profits  thus  gained  by  the  monopoly  are  paying  for  a 
large  part  of  the  expenses  of  the  Government-generals  (sic)  in  main- 
taining schools  and  other  branches  of  its  administration."  Surely 
it  must  have  been  known  before  yesterday.  But  the  only  official 
criticism  on  this  is,  "However,  it  is  an  international  question,"  which 
means,  presumably,  that  nothing  will  be  done  until  an  international 
commission  makes  up  its  deliberate  mind  on  the  subject.  The  official 
apologist  further  says  that  all  nationalities  are  involved  and  that  the 
amount  of  such  drugs  handled  by  Japanese  cannot  be  compared 
with  the  British  share.  It  is  demanding  a  very  large  credulity  when 
we  are  asked  to  believe  that  there  is  a  greater  British  trade  which 
is  passed  over  in  complete  silence  in  these  exposures.  Are  we  to 
believe  that  the  foreign  Press  in  China  is  anxious  only  to  deprive 
Japan  of  the  profits  so  that  those  of  its  own  nationals  may  be  the 
greater? 

One  of  the  nefarious  methods  employed  by  the  Japanese  to 
keep  China  constantly  in  a  state  of  internal  turbulence,  and 
to  make  it  appear  that  the  Chinese  Government  is  unable  to 
maintain  order  and  protect  foreign  interests,  is  the  use  of 


218     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

the  banditry  who  are  one  of  China's  hereditary  institutions. 
Evidence  is  accumulating  to  prove  that  Japan's  agents  be- 
come members  of  the  Chinese  bandit  bands,  and  that  the  bands 
are  armed  and  otherwise  supplied  from  Japanese  sources.  In 
the  autumn  of  1918  the  bandits  and  lawless  unpaid  Chinese 
soldiery  in  Shantung  Province  began  to  stop  and  board  the 
express-trains  on  the  Tientsin-Pukou  Railway,  causing  much 
annoyance  to  passengers.  The  relation  between  Japanese  in 
Shantung  and  the  Chinese  bandits  has  been  pretty  well  estab- 
lished, and  Japan's  reasons  for  giving  out  an  impression  that 
China  cannot  maintain  order  in  that  province  are  obvious. 
It  is  the  same  in  other  parts  of  China,  especially  in  those 
regions  where  the  Japanese  predominate.  I  quote  from  an 
American  official  report  about  conditions  in  Manchuria,  dated 
in  September,  1918 : 

On  August  31  there  was  a  raid  of  about  200  bandits  on  several 
towns  and  villages  on  the  China  side  of  the  Yalu  river.  The  vil- 
lages were  looted  and  many  of  the  houses  were  burned.  Circum- 
stances indicate  that  many  of  the  bandits  were  Japanese  soldiers  in 
disguise.  Other  similar  cases  have  occurred  and  the  matter  is  be- 
coming serious. 

As  has  repeatedly  been  pointed  out  in  reporting  such  instances, 
the  only  possible  method  of  preventing  trouble  of  this  kind  would 
be  the  effectual  prevention  of  the  import  of  arms,  and  this  measure 
is  rendered  impractical  by  the  facility  with  which  lawless  characters 
can  at  all  times  secure  ample  supplies  of  arms  and  ammunition  from 
Japanese  smugglers.  Since  this  smuggling  can  easily  be  stopped 
by  the  Japanese  authorities  in  Korea,  their  failure  to  take  any 
effective  steps  indicates  that  they  are  not  averse  to  the  occurrence 
of  disturbances  along  the  border  that  may  possibly  give  them  ex- 
cuses for  interference  in  Chinese  jurisdiction. 

I  quote  another  official  report  on  the  same  subject,  dated 
May  3,  1917 : 

Information  received  directly  from  two  Americans,  two  English- 
men and  one  Dane — all  having  first-hand  knowledge  of  the  question 
— proves  conclusively  that  the  Japanese  have  been  conniving  with 


THE  CORRUPTION  OF  A  NATION  219 

the  bandits  and  actively  supporting  them  (specific  instances  given) 
.  .  .  "The  first  object  of  the  Japanese  is  to  foment  trouble  and 
create  serious  disturbances  in  Manchuria  so  as  to  demonstrate  to  the 
world  China's  inability  to  preserve  order  and  to  maintain  peace 
within  her  own  dominions.  Japanese  cooperation  with  the  Chinese 
rebels  no  doubt  had  a  similar  purpose  and  their  encouragement  of 
the  monarchist  party  at  the  present  time  is  directly  in  line  with  this 
policy.  Anything  to  create  dissension  and  disorder  and  to  weaken 
the  Chinese  Government  will  receive  their  assiduous  attention.  The 
motive  is  two-fold.  An  excuse  is  provided  for  active  intervention 
and  control  and  even  occupation,  while  the  Chinese  are  weakened 
and  divided,  and  the  cost  of  sustaining  a  large  armed  force  and  pre- 
paring for  incursions  and  insurrections  keeps  the  treasury  not  only 
empty  but  in  debt.  A  state  of  indebtedness  not  only  enables  the 
Japanese  to  make  loans  to  China  upon  valuable  concessions,  but 
prevents  the  liquidation  of  old  obligations  and  makes  it  easy  for  the 
Japanese  to  foreclose.  .  .  . 

The  disorder  throughout  China  caused  by  the  lax  adminis- 
tration and  internal  strife  naturally  increases  the  opportuni- 
ties for  outlaws,  and  between  the  demands  of  political  fac- 
tions, exactions  of  officials,  and  the  depredations  of  brigands, 
the  peaceable  Chinese  citizenry  know  not  what  way  to  turn  to 
protect  their  lives  and  property.  They  see  everywhere  Japan- 
ese going  about  their  business  freely  and  enjoying  complete 
immunity  from  all  those  difficulties.  So  a  somewhat  remark- 
able condition  has  come  about,  which  is  described  in  a  report 
of  a  foreign  official,  dated  November,  1918,  as  follows: 

The  Japanese,  always  alert  to  take  advantage  of  conditions  due 
to  the  disordered  state  of  the  country,  have  now  organized  a  new 
business  in  many  of  the  provinces,  especially  in  central  and  southern 
China.  For  a  money  consideration,  Japanese  residents  will  store 
Chinese  property  on  their  premises,  under  the  protection  of  a  Jap- 
anese flag  raised  over  the  houses.  This  has  developed  into  a  large 
business  in  the  disturbed  areas,  and  many  Japanese  are  amassing 
small  fortunes  in  this  way.  It  is  curious  to  note  that  these  Jap- 
anese who  are  able  by  the  protection  given  them  by  the  Japanese 
consulates  and  government,  and  who  outside  of  the  treaty  ports  have 
no  legal  right  of  residence,  are  nevertheless  far  more  secure  than  the 
native  citizens  of  the  country,  and  are  able  to  sell  "protection"  to 


220     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

them  merely  by  running  up  a  Japanese  flag  over  Chinese  property. 
The  local  Chinese  officials  frequently  have  protested  at  the  practice, 
but  dare  not  interfere  with  the  Japanese,  who  evidently  have  the 
backing  of  their  consular  officers. 

A  rough  and  of  necessity  an  incomplete  computation  of 
Japanese  financial  and  trade  activities  in  China  during  the 
Great  War  indicates  that  the  profits  of  the  illicit  drug  traffic 
and  other  contraband  operations  of  Japanese  there  will 
nearly  equal  the  total  amount  actually  advanced  to  China  in 
the  same  period.  Among  the  Japanese  schemes  in  this  period, 
the  so-called  "gold  brick"  proposal  (a  plan  for  China  to 
create  a  "credit"  in  Japan  for  Japanese  currency  notes, 
which  would  be  circulated  in  China  as  legal  tender),  the  so- 
called  ' '  arms ' '  deal,  the  draining  of  China  of  copper  cash,  the 
Japanese  evasions  of  the  Salt  duties,  and  others,  might  well  be 
entitled  to  elucidation ;  but  the  citations  given  should  suffice. 

As  a  deliberate  and  persistent  attempt  to  debauch  and  ruin  a 
weak  and  friendly  (part  of  the  time  an  ally)  nation,  Japan's 
course  in  China  has  few  parallels  in  history. 


CHAPTER  IX 

CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM 

Definition  of  economic  imperialism — Its  relation  to  international  af- 
fairs— Its  working  method — War-causing  elements  of  the  system — Its 
application  to  China — Beginning  of  foreign  trade  with  China — Develop- 
ment of  strategical  phases — The  "sphere  of  influence"  idea — Dangerous 
phases — Prevision  of  John  Hay — The  Hay  Doctrine — Its  outward  ac- 
ceptance by  the  powers — Private  agreements  based  on  the  "sphere" 
thesis — Recrudescence  of  the  "sphere  of  influence"  practice — Due  to 
Japan's  policy — War  provided  Japan's  opportunity — Japan's  fear  of 
American  influence — A  flank  movement — The  Shibusawa  plan — The  "co- 
operation" idea — Its  real  purpose  exposed — How  it  was  contrary  to 
traditional  American  policy — How  it  was  invidious  to  China — China's 
situation — Dangers  inherent  with  the  cooperation  plan. 

MODERN  political  scientists  almost  without  exception 
evince  a  growing  realization  of  how  international 
trade  and  economic  relationships  are  interlocked 
with  the  causes  of  international  hostilities  and  war.  A  new 
terminology  for  certain  phases  of  these  combined  economic  and 
political  relationships  is  coming  into  use.  "Economic  Im- 
perialism" is  now  generally  accepted  as  describing  an  inter- 
national relation  which  frequently  is  given  first  rank  among 
war-making  elements;  with  "peaceful  penetration,"  "spheres 
of  influence,"  "special  position,"  " paramountcy, "  and  other 
phrases  invented  by  diplomacy  as  euphemisms  for  the  schemes 
and  methods  by  which  economic  imperialism  is  applied.  Of 
the  numerous  volumes  on  this  topic  that  have  been  published 
recently,  the  authors  usually  take  Germany's  pre-war  trade 
policy  as  a  text  to  demonstrate  the  iniquities  and  dangers  of 
the  system.  I  quote  Professor  Alvin  Johnson  ("The  Passing 
of  Economic  Nationalism,"  in  "Harper's  Magazine") : 

221 


222     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Because  political  and  military  concepts  have  assumed  definite 
shape,  have  organized  themselves  in  well-wrought  systems  in  our 
minds,  we  find  it  natural  to  interpret  in  purely  political  and  mili- 
tary terms  the  struggle  in  Europe.  The  democratic  world  is  striv- 
ing to  pull  down  the  German  autocracy,  that  political  freedom  may 
be  saved  to  the  earth.  The  struggle  is  one  of  the  naturally  pacific 
peoples  against  a  system  of  military  aggression.  These  are  indeed 
interpretations  that  are  essentially  valid.  But  they  do  not  include 
the  whole  truth.  German  autocracy  and  militarism  have  had  their 
counterpart  in  an  aggressive  system  of  economic  nationalism.  It  is 
a  system  by  which  the  whole  economic  life  of  a  people,  more  espe- 
cially its  foreign  trade,  is  subordinated  to  a  national  purpose  of 
domination.  The  economic  nationalism  of  Germany  does  not  aim 
merely  to  create  trading  relations  of  mutual  advantage  with  for- 
eign states.  It  seeks  so  to  entrench  itself  in  weaker  states  that 
these  may  be  compelled  to  exclude  relations  with  other  states.  It 
seeks  to  stifle  development  of  industry  in  the  weaker  states,  in  order 
that  their  dependence  may  be  permanent.  Economic  nationalism  is, 
in  short,  the  principle  of  monopoly  to  the  plane  of  statecraft. 
The  destruction  of  the  system  may  not,  indeed,  be  an  avowed  object 
to  the  allied  policy,  but  it  will  be  no  less  certainly  doomed  by  the 
defeat  of  Germany  than  aggressive  militarism  and  intriguing 
autocracy. 

Economic  nationalism  of  the  German  type,  I  hasten  to  qualify, 
has  not  been  confined  to  Germany.  It  has  influenced  commercial 
policy  throughout  the  world,  just  as  German  military  organization 
has  been  widely  envied  and  copied,  and  as  even  German  autocracy 
has  excited  exaggerated  admiration  and  has  wrought  modifications 
for  evil  in  political  systems  that  would  naturally  have  developed 
in  a  more  liberal  direction.  But  just  as  the  autocratic  and  mili- 
taristic ideas  have  been  seized  upon  by  the  consciousness  of  the 
people  as  the  essential  spiritual  content  of  the  world-scourge  of 
Germanism,  and  hence  are  certain  to  be  discredited  everywhere,  so 
the  policy  of  economic  nationalism,  no  less  characteristic  of  Ger- 
manism, is  bound  to  encounter  a  rude  shock  when  quiet  is  restored 
to  earth  and  the  shattered  commercial  relations  of  the  nations  come 
to  be  reconstructed.  .  .  . 

The  poverty  of  the  weaker  nations  will  survive  the  war,  to  be 
sure.  And  a  poor  nation  will  still  be  subject  to  the  seductions  of  a 
trading  organization  that  scours  the  country  with  engaging  agents, 
studying  the  people's  wants  and  having  goods  made  up  to  suit  any 
taste,  to  be  paid  for  in  nine  months  or  twelve  months — so  far  in 
the  future  to  those  who  are  poor!     And  if  then  the  customer  can't 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        223 

pay,  the  same  trading  organization  has  a  bank  which  will  arrange 
extensions  of  credit,  and  which  is  also  at  hand  to  do  other  business. 
Perhaps  there  is  a  railway  project  in  abeyance  for  want  of  funds; 
the  bank  will  arrange  for  its  promotion  in  the  country  to  which 
the  bank  owes  allegiance;  it  will  also  procure  there  rails  and  loco- 
motives, and  engineers  to  construct  the  track.  As  good  engineers 
might  be  had  locally,  and  rails  and  equipment  might  be  had  cheaper 
in  other  countries.  But  then  there  would  be  difficulties  about  the 
promotion,  and,  besides,  it  would  not  be  easy  to  arrange  for  the 
transportation  of  freight  by  the  organization's  ships,  perhaps  the 
only  ones  touching  at  the  port.  All  manner  of  enterprises  would 
have  to  be  set  up  along  the  railway,  and  in  these  the  organization 
would  take  stock.  This  is  "peaceful  penetration,"  as  it  was  ap- 
plied by  Germany  to  Italy,  Turkey,  Brazil,  Venezuela,  and  what- 
ever other  countries  were  poor  and  ambitious  for  development. 
Such  countries  there  still  will  be.  Will  not  the  same  kind  of  oper- 
ations be  resuscitated?  Yes,  if  the  industrial  nations  become 
again  as  blind  or  supine  as  they  were.  But  this  is  hardly  conceiv- 
able. It  is  now  coming  to  be  understood  that  the  supplying  of  the 
legitimate  capital  requirements  of  a  poor  country  is  a  common  con- 
cern of  the  advanced  nations.  They  will  not  so  soon  be  ready  to 
consign  a  backward  country  to  the  mercies  of  Germany,  or  any 
other  single  state,  to  barter  its  independence  for  petty  loans. 

David  Jayne  Hill  ("Economic  Imperialism"  in  "The  Cen- 
tury Magazine")  states  his  opinion  positively:  "Beyond  dis- 
pute it  was  economic  imperialism  that  caused  the  present  war, 
and  plunged  Europe  into  it."  He  compares  the  two  op- 
posite theories  of  the  state  and  nationalism  as  follows : 

To  those  who  accept  the  absolutist  theory  of  the  state  there  is 
nothing  reprehensible  in  the  spirit  of  conquest  by  imperial  domina- 
tion. Why  should  any  nation  holding  this  theory  refrain  from  ex- 
tending its  power  as  far  as  possible?  It  is,  in  truth,  certain  that 
it  will  not  do  so;  but  it  follows  with  logical  necessity  that  as  long 
as  this  theory  is  held  the  conflict  of  nations  will  continue.  .  .  . 

The  whole  future  of  civilization  turns  upon  the  decision  whether 
the  state  is  to  be  henceforth  a  creation  of  force  or  a  creation  of 
law.  If  it  is  to  be  considered  merely  a  creation  of  force,  then 
preparation  for  war  is  the  only  wisdom;  for  only  the  strong  state 
can  survive,  and  it  must  be  at  all  times  ready  to  fight  for  its  exist- 
ence. But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  state  is  rightly  conceived  as  a 
creation  of  law,  then  all  states  accepting  this  theory  are  menaced 


224     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

by  the  existence  of  strong  embodiments  of  power  which  refuse  to  be 
governed  by  the  rules  of  law.  As  long  as  they  exist,  as  long  as 
they  arm  themselves  for  aggression,  as  long  as  they  devise  and  en- 
tertain schemes  of  conquest,  so  long  the  truly  constitutional  states 
must  be  prepared  to  defend  themselves,  and  even  to  defend  one 
another. 

The  application  of  the  arguments  quoted  to  the  situation  of 
China  and  to  the  trade  of  all  nations  with  China  is  very 
pointed.  In  the  sense  apparently  meant  by  Professor  John- 
son and  Dr.  Hill,  China  is  one  of  the  most  complete  examples 
of  the  effects  of  economic  imperialism  and  the  pass  to  which 
it  will  bring  a  weak  nation.  China  affords  an  equally  good 
example  of  that  other  phase  of  economic  imperialism — its 
potency  for  frictions  among  the  strong  nations  that  employ 
it.  In  its  early  beginnings  and  for  many  years  thereafter, 
China's  commercial  intercourse  with  foreigners  resulted  al- 
most exclusively  from  the  individual  or  corporate  efforts  of 
foreign  merchants.  As  a  nation  China  was  indifferent  to  the 
expansion  of  this  trade,  from  having  slight  comprehension  of 
its  benefits  and  possibilities,  and  when  its  contacts  began  to 
cause  complications  with  foreign  governments,  the  Chinese 
Government  grew  uneasy  and  tried  to  discourage  it.  Thus 
almost  from  its  inception  foreign  trade  with  the  Chinese  de- 
veloped tendencies  of  economic  imperialism  from  force  of  cir- 
cumstances, and  with  the  frequent  application  of  external 
pressure  on  China;  but  it  was  not  until  the  closing  years  of 
the  nineteenth  century  that  dangerous  and  invidious  phases  of 
the  system  palpably  began  to  appear  there.  This  period 
marked  the  strategical  development  of  economic  competitions 
among  the  leading  powers  in  China.  It  was  the  time  when 
China's  military  impotency  was  conclusively  revealed  by  her 
defeat  by  Japan,  whose  aspirations  for  a  foothold  on  the  con- 
tinent were  obstructed  then  by  a  combination  of  European 
powers ;  when  Germany  secured  by  intimidation  a  position  at 
Kiaochou,  Russia  obtained  one  at  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny, 
Great    Britain    at    Weihaiwei,    France    at    Kwangchowwan. 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        225 

It  was  the  period  when  the  "sphere  of  influence"  idea  took 
root  there,  and  the  powers  began  to  divide  China  into  sec- 
tions specially  reserved  for  their  own  exclusive  exploitation. 
Of  the  so-called  powers,  only  the  United  States  claimed  no 
"sphere."  Japan,  too,  was  not  included  in  the  tentative 
partition  of  China  at  that  period,  but  she  was  planning  to 
secure  a  place  there,  as  the  war  against  Russia  soon  was  to 
reveal. 

At  that  juncture  John  Hay,  then  secretary  of  state,  with 
remarkable  prevision  recognized  the  fundamental  importance 
of  the  issue  to  the  United  States  and  to  civilization,  and  de- 
vised a  plan  to  check  the  progress  of  economic  imperialism 
in  China.  In  view  of  the  fact  that,  subsequently,  it  was  the 
concept  of  economic  nationalism  as  practised  by  Germany  that 
disturbed  the  world,  it  is  interesting  to  recall  that  the  particu- 
lar action  which  was  the  occasion  of  Mr.  Hay's  diplomacy  was 
an  action  of  Germany  in  procuring  a  lease  on  Chinese  terri- 
tory at  Kiaochou  Bay  and  certain  railway  and  mining  con- 
cessions in  Shantung  province.  His  efforts  resulted  ulti- 
mately in  securing  the  acceptance  by  all  the  major  powers  of 
the  principles  of  the  commercial  "open  door"  in  China  and 
preservation  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  China.1  These 
principles  are  habitually  termed  the  Hay  Doctrine,  and  the 
doctrine  embodies  now,  as  it  did  then,  the  true  bases  for  any 
solution  of  the  Eastern  problem. 

The  Hay  Doctrine  can  be  said  to  date  from  the  time  of  the 
Hay-Buelow  correspondence  and  the  coincident  acquiescence 
of  the  other  powers,  given  through  the  usual  diplomatic  chan- 
nels, in  1899.  It  therefrom  constituted  the  public  policy  of 
all  the  powers  on  these  questions,  and  still  does.  It  was  re- 
affirmed in  the  course  of  the  next  few  years  by  several  sep- 
arate agreements  between  the  powers:  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance,  the  treaty  of  peace  between  Russia  and  Japan,  a 
further  special  agreement  between  Russia  and  Japan,  an 
agreement  between  France  and  Japan,  and  the  special  treaty 

i  Appendix  A. 


226     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

between  the  United  States  and  Japan  known  as  the  Root- 
Takahira  agreement.  Those  agreements  were  signed  during 
the  years  1889-1907. 

Yet  in  this  same  period,  most  of  the  signatories  to  those 
agreements  reaffirming  the  principles  of  the  Hay  Doctrine 
also  concluded  other  agreements  separately  among  themselves, 
outlining  and  defining  their  particular  "spheres,"  actions 
which  were  subversive  of  the  Hay  Doctrine  in  their  prin- 
ciple, and,  without  doubt  in  the  case  of  some  powers,  with 
intent  to  evade  it.  There  were  instances  where  clauses  af- 
firming the  Hay  Doctrine  and  clauses  based  on  the  "sphere 
of  influence"  principle  were  incorporated  in  the  same  agree- 
ment, notwithstanding  their  contradictory  nature.  For  a 
few  years  after  the  acceptance  of  the  Hay  Doctrine  by  the 
powers,  some  of  them  apparently  tried  to  reshape  their  poli- 
cies in  China  to  conform  to  it.  The  result  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  and  the  manifestations  of  Japan's  policy 
which  followed  it,  brought  an  immediate  recrudescence  of  the 
"sphere"  policy,  and  from  then  the  Hay  Doctrine  has  been 
rapidly  undermined.  The  nation  primarily  responsible  for 
this  relegation  of  the  Hay  Doctrine  is  Japan. 

The  Great  War  gave  Japan  an  unusual  opportunity  for 
commercial  penetration  of  China.  Her  principal  competitor 
there  for  the  cheaper  manufactured  articles,  Germany,  was 
virtually  out  of  business  for  the  time;  and  war  conditions 
greatly  disorganized  the  foreign  trade  of  all  European  na- 
tions. For  the  first  three  years  of  the  war,  however,  the 
United  States  shared  with  Japan  the  advantage  of  being  com- 
paratively free  of  access  to  China,  and  conditions  there  were 
developing  in  a  way  very  favorable  for  the  expansion  of 
American  interests.  There  was  much  talk  of  American  loans, 
and  a  Chicago  banking  group  did  make  a  small  loan  to  the 
Chinese  Government  with  a  view  to  further  business.  En- 
couraged by  the  American  Government,  a  firm  of  American 
constructors  (the  Siems-Carey  Company)  approached  the 
Chinese  Government  about  the  building  of  railways,  and.  after 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM       227 

meeting  the  usual  objections  of  other  powers  on  the  ground 
of  alleged  encroachment  on  rights  and  privileges  previously- 
granted  to  them  (in  this  case,  Russia  and  Great  Britain  were 
the  objectors),  signed  in  1916  preliminary  agreements  for 
the  construction  of  several  railway  lines  and  for  the  recon- 
struction of  the  Grand  Canal. 

These  projects  are  not  in  themselves  of  transcendent  im- 
portance, but  the  circumstances  which  attended  their  negotia- 
tion very  importantly  illustrate  conditions  relating  to  Ameri- 
can commercial  and  financial  development  in  the  East,  and 
the  application  of  Japan's  theory  of  economic  penetration  of 
China.  The  Chinese  Government  at  that  time  was  particu- 
larly anxious  to  induce  the  investment  of  American  capital  in 
China  for  political  reasons,  as  an  offset  to  the  impending  Jap- 
anese domination,  and  was  willing  to  grant  more  favorable 
conditions  to  Americans  than  to  any  other  foreigners.  China 
needed  money,  and  needed  the  improvements  contemplated  by 
these  undertakings.  Japan  was  strongly  urging  upon  the 
Chinese  Government  that  she  should  be  allowed  to  finance 
and  construct  them,  but  so  great  was  the  Chinese  fear  and 
suspicion  of  Japan  that  the  people,  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment then,  preferred  that  nothing  should  be  done  rather  than 
extend  Japan's  vested  interests  in  the  country.  During  the 
course  of  these  negotiations,  which  lasted  for  months,  Japan's 
diplomacy  at  Peking  was  privately  trying  to  obstruct  the 
American  projects,  but  without  much  success  until  their  ef- 
forts to  sow  distrust  of  America  received  the  tacit  assistance 
of  Americans. 

This  came  about  by  way  of  a  flank  movement  by  Japan, 
under  cover  of  a  plan  for  Americans  to  "cooperate"  with 
Japanese  in  developing  enterprises  in  China.  A  propaganda 
of  unusual  proportions  was  begun  in  favor  of  such  coopera- 
tion. Baron  Shibusawa,  Japan's  leading  financier,  visited 
America  to  promote  it,  and  in  the  course  of  the  years  1915, 
1916,  and  1917  other  Japanese  special  missions  to  America, 
and   Japan's   well   organized   publicity   propaganda  in   the 


228     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

United  States  and  in  Japan,  took  occasion  to  advocate  this 
idea.  In  "Millard's  Review"  for  June  23,  1917,  I  discussed 
the  so-called  Shibusawa  plan  under  the  title,  "Should  Amer- 
ica Cooperate  with  Japan  in  China?",  as  follows: 

It  is  almost  two  years  since  Baron  Shibusawa,  then  on  a  spe- 
cially timed  visit  to  the  United  States,  first  began  to  lay  the  foun- 
dations for  the  so-called  "cooperation"  of  America  with  Japan  in 
China.  I  should  say,  perhaps,  that  he  put  it  as  asking  Americans 
to  cooperate,  rather  than  the  American  Government;  for  Baron 
Shibusawa  then  pretended  to  be  talking  to  American  business  men 
as  a  representative  of  Japanese  big  business  interests.  But  Baron 
Shibusawa  really  was  aiming  at  the  American  Government  through 
the  American  business  world,  with  a  view  to  influencing  its  policy 
toward  China;  he  really  was  a  spokesman  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, for  Japanese  big  business  never  does,  and  could  not  if  it 
wanted  to,  operate  independently  of  the  Japanese  Government  in 
matters  which  touch  foreign  affairs  and  international  policy.  With 
that  beginning,  Japan's  publicity  propaganda  has  sedulously  pushed 
the  "cooperation"  idea,  until  it  seems  to  have  taken  root  in  some  in- 
fluential quarters  in  America  outside  the  Government,  with  a  result 
that  its  effects  have  been  strongly  felt  upon  American  interests  in 
China,  and  give  signs  of  having  greater  effects  hereafter. 

The  gravity  of  this  question  hardly  can  be  exaggerated,  and  the 
time  has  come  when  it  seems  necessary,  in  the  fundamental  interest 
of  not  only  China  and  America,  but  also  of  the  world,  to  clarify  it 
by  examining  its  bases  and  principles.  Since  China  is  the  point 
d'appui  of  this  "cooperation"  idea,  then  it  must  or  ought  to  turn 
on  the  situation  of  China,  and  an  elucidation  of  China's  present 
condition  would  give  the  idea  definition. 

A  calm  study  of  the  situation  of  China  as  it  exists  today  dis- 
closes, with  some  qualifying  influences,  that  her  immediate  (I  mean 
the  next  decade)  future  narrows  down  to  two  alternatives: — 

A.  A  period  during  which  she  will  tolerate  a  benevolent  assist- 
ance in  some  of  her  fiscal  affairs,  which  will  necessarily  carry  with 
it  some  limitations  of  administrative  autonomy. 

B.  A  period  during  which  she  will  be  forcibly  subjected  to  an 
unbenevolent  and  much  more  stringent  supervision  of  her  fiscal  af- 
fairs, and  a  much  more  severe  and  extensive  limitation  of  her  ad- 
ministrative autonomy,  amounting  to  foreign  suzerainty. 

The  first  alternative  would  carry  with  it  a  promising  possibility 
of  a  complete  recovery  by  China  of  her  administrative  and  fiscal 
autonomy  in  a  comparatively  short  time — perhaps  ten  years.     The 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        229 

second  alternative  would  carry  with  it  almost  the  certainty  of  China 
being  a  vassal  State  for  an  indefinite  period.  In  this  connection,  it 
should  be  understood  that  in  case  alternative  B  prevails,  the  nations 
which  promote  and  enforce  it  will  of  course  pretend  that  it  is  alter- 
native A,  and  in  their  initial  stages  these  alternatives  will  present 
great  similarities,  making  it  possible  to  confuse  them  superficially. 

Unfortunately,  it  does  not  rest  with  China  exclusively  to  choose 
between  these  two  alternatives,  or  to  reject  them  altogether.  China 
can  now  influence  the  decision  only  indirectly.  The  real  decision 
rests  with  foreign  powers.  Whether  the  first  alternative  (A)  is 
possible  to  bring  about  depends  on  whether  the  international  agree- 
ments known  as  the  Hay  Doctrine,  or  those  principles  in  new 
agreements,  can  be  resuscitated.  The  Hay  Doctrine  cannot,  in  my 
opinion,  be  resuscitated  and  maintained  hereafter  except  by  the 
active  participation  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  supporting 
it.  If  the  United  States  does  not  take  an  active  part  in  restoring 
and  thereafter  maintaining  the  doctrine,  then  it  is  practically  cer- 
tain that  alternative  B  will  prevail.  Therefore,  the  application  to 
China  of  these  alternatives  depends  to  a  great  extent  on  the  course 
and  policy  of  the  United  States. 

It  should  be  taken  as  axiomatic,  after  events  of  the  last  three 
years,  that  it  will  not  be  feasible  for  the  United  States  to  take  an 
active  part  in  sustaining  the  Hay  Doctrine  (or  its  equivalent)  un- 
less the  following  things  occur  in  conjunction  and  coordination : 

1.  A  resolution  of  the  United  States  Government  so  to  act. 

2.  A  world  diplomacy  based  on  that  resolution. 

3.  Armaments,  or  their  equivalents,  sufficient  to  make  this  diplo- 
macy effective. 

4.  The  cooperation  of  American  finance  and  commerce. 
Whether  the  American   Government  will  have  the  first  three  of 

these  elements  depends  largely  on  how  the  American  people  inter- 
pret the  meaning  to  them  of  the  great  war,  and  the  world  position 
of  the  nation  at  the  end  of  the  war.  Whether  American  financiers 
and  merchants  will  operate  extensively  in  China  depends  on  their 
Government  having  the  first  three  of  the  elements  I  have  enumer- 
ated. Given  that  resolution  and  diplomacy  and  armaments,  it  will 
be  possible  for  the  United  States  to  align  enough  powers  with  it  to 
sustain  the  Hay  or  a  similar  doctrine.  With  the  United  States 
indifferent  or  inactive,  other  powers  probably  will  be  so  situated, 
and  so  influenced  that  they  will  fall  in  with  a  policy  embraced  in 
alternative  B.  The  importance  to  China  of  the  course  of  the 
United  States  is  obvious,  and  this  gives  great  interest  to  moves  that 
are  designed  to  influence  the  policy  of  the  American  Government 


230     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

at  this  juncture.     The  "cooperation"  plan  is  in  that  category,  and 
therefore  ought  to  be  scrutinized  closely. 

To  give  point  to  academic  argument,  practical  illustrations  are 
useful,  even  necessary;  and  I  therefore  will  point  my  views  of  this 
"cooperation"  idea  by  showing  how  it  already  has  worked  in  some 
instances.  To  do  this  requires  me  to  publish  matters  concerning 
American  projects  about  which  I  would  prefer  to  be  silent  at  this 
time.  My  desire  is  to  assist  and  promote  in  all  legitimate  ways 
these  and  similar  projects;  but  I  can  see  a  serious  danger  to  Amer- 
ican interests  in  some  tendencies  and  developments,  that  ought  to 
be  threshed  out  while  there  is  yet  time  to  correct  mistakes,  or  to 
prevent  them  from  being  repeated  in  subsequent  enterprises.  And 
besides,  Samuel  G.  Blythe,  who  recently  visited  China,  in  a  striking 
article  in  the  "Saturday  Evening  Post"  of  May  26,  already  has 
given  wide  publicity  to  these  same  matters;  in  fact,  I  perhaps  can- 
not do  better  than  to  quote  something  from  Mr.  Blythe's  article. 
After  he  has  developed  a  political  argument  along  certain  lines,  he 
goes  on  to  say,  apropos  this  same  cooperation  idea,  as  follows: 

"Furthermore,  the  Japanese  know  what  the  investment  of  Amer- 
ican money  in  China  means,  and  they  are  frantically  trying  to  pre- 
vent that  investment,  and  even  more  frantically  trying  to  join  with 
investment  they  cannot  prevent  in  order  that  its  effect  may  be  les- 
sened to  a  degree.  If  there  is  any  person  in  the  United  States  who 
pretends  to  know  anything  of  the  politics  and  policies  of  the  Far 
East,  and  especially ' of  Japan,  who  thinks  that  Japan  is  making 
this  present  determined  effort  to  join  with  American  investment  in 
China — cooperate — with  any  other  idea  than  to  nullify,  so  far  as 
possible,  the  effect  that  investment  will  have  in  the  way  of  lessen- 
ing Japanese  influence  and  power  in  China,  that  person  is  sadly — 
altruistically,  mayhap,  but  sadly,  none  the  less — in  error. 

"Another  reason  for  this  change  of  official  attitude  in  Japan  to- 
ward the  United  States  was  a  rather  tardy  but  none  the  less  acute 
awakening  by  Japan  to  the  fact  that  she  cannot  yet  arbitrarily  con- 
trol the  financial  and  trade  and  commercial  destinies  of  China.  With- 
in the  past  eighteen  months  the  evidences  in  China  of  a  determination 
by  the  American  International  Corporation,  and  its  subsidiary,  the 
Siems-Carey  Company,  to  operate  in  China,  and  the  project  of  a 
large  loan  by  Chicago  financiers,  as  well  as  other  American  demon- 
strations, caused  the  adaptable  Japanese,  who  realized  that  they  are 
not  yet  strong  enough  in  China  to  protest  or  disregard  their  paper 
adherence  to  the  Open-Door  policy,  to  about-face  and  make  clever 
and,  it  may  be,  successful  efforts  to  assume  the  attitude  of  tradi- 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        231 

tional  friendship,  in  order  to  hold  and  to  consolidate  as  much  as 
they  may  of  their  already  won  advantage.  Any  portion  of  a  loaf 
is  better  than  no  bread  to  the  Japanese  mind.  If  they  can't  control 
they  hope  to  cooperate,  and  thus  half  control  at  any  rate. 

"I  do  not  know  the  details  of  the  American  end  of  this  cooperation 
project,  for  I  was  in  China  during  its  inception  and  its  original 
discussion;  but  I  do  know  the  Chinese  end  of  it  and  the  Japanese 
end  of  it,  and  I  shall  set  down  those  phases  of  the  plan  as  a  part 
of  this  argument,  basing  what  I  have  to  say  on  five  premises: 

"First:  The  only  reason  the  Japanese  desire  to  cooperate  with 
the  United  States  in  China  is  because  the  Japanese  have  concluded 
they  are  not,  as  yet,  strong  enough  to  combat  well-supported  Ameri- 
can business  enterprise  in  China,  with  the  idea  of  diminishing  that 
American  business  enterprise  so  far  as  they  may  be  able,  in  order 
that  they  may  retain  as  much  economic  and  political  dominion  over 
China  as  possible;  and  not  for  any  other  reason. 

"Second:  Any  business  cooperation  with  the  Japanese  in  China 
that  is  based  upon  or  recognizes  any  special  or  preferential  political 
rights  of  the  position  of  Japan  in  China  will  be  suicidal. 

"Third:  It  is  the  diplomacy  of  Japan  to  join  with  America  as  a 
protection  to  themselves  for  their  Closed-Door  policy;  for,  if  Amer- 
ica goes  into  partnership  with  Japan,  America  must,  if  the  partner- 
ship is  to  be  continued,  accept  what  Japan  does. 

"Fourth:  Every  proposition  Japan  makes  to  the  United  States 
for  a  cooperative  investment  in  the  development  of  China  must 
necessarily  be  amended  by  Americans  to  include  cooperation  in  the 
development  of  Southern  Manchuria,  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  and 
Shantung.  Otherwise  it  becomes  merely  an  extension  of  Japan's 
influence  elsewhere.  There  is  plenty  of  opportunity  for  develop- 
ment in  Southern  Manchuria,  for  example. 

"Fifth — and  most  important:  American  capitalists  must  realize 
that  when  they  form  any  partnership,  or  enter  into  any  cooperation 
in  such  enterprises,  they  are  taking  part  as  Americans  simply,  as 
citizens,  as  a  corporation  or  company,  while  the  Japanese  are  taking 
part  as  a  government — that  is  to  say,  the  Americans  are  going  into 
partnership,  as  individuals,  with  the  Japanese  Government,  not- 
withstanding what  the  Japanese  proponents,  as  individuals,  may  say. 

"It  is  not  my  intention  to  decry  the  good  faith  or  excellent  inten- 
tions of  the  American  capitalists  who  are  imbued  with  the  coopera- 
tion idea ;  but  there  are  certain  elements  of  the  situation  that  are 
perhaps  not  so  well  known  to  the  bulk  of  Americans  as  they  might 
be,  and  the  purpose  of  this  article  is  purely  informative.  It  would 
be  vain  to  endeavor  to  impress  on  American  capitalists  the  fact  that 


232     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

money  cannot  do  everything,  or  that  the  decision  of  money  is  not 
the  great  and  wise  decision.  Millions  can  do  no  wrong.  That  is 
their  creed.  So,  if  American  capitalists  have  decided  to  cooperate 
with  Japan  in  China,  what  they  have  decided  upon  must  neces- 
sarily he  the  part  of  ultimate  wisdom." 

I  concur  with  Mr.  Blythe  in  crediting  the  honorable  motives  and 
sincere  purposes  of  Americans  who  have  been  misled  by  the  super- 
ficial appeal  of  the  Shibusawa  ''cooperation"  scheme;  but  I  do  not 
agree  when  he  says,  "It  would  be  vain  to  endeavor  to  impress  on 
American  capitalists  the  fact  that  money  cannot  do  everything." 
With  such  grave  possibilities  in  this  question,  surely  our  men  in 
the  statesman-financier  class  will  give  it  sound  study  before  even 
tentatively  committing  our  financial  world  to  it,  or  permitting  this 
to  be  done  by  implication.  There  is  nothing  which  the  National 
Foreign  Trade  Council  can  do  that  is  of  more  importance  to  the 
development  of  our  trade  with  the  East  than  to  elucidate  this 
proposition  in  all  its  bearings.  More  than  trade  is  involved;  our 
national  honor  and  security  are  closely  linked  with  the  decision  of 
this  issue. 

The  most  pertinent  recent  instance  (which  Mr.  Blythe  alludes  to) 
exemplifying  the  practical  working  of  this  "cooperation"  idea  is 
given  by  some  things  that  have  happened  with  relation  to  contracts 
undertaken  in  China  by  the  Siems-Carey  construction  company,  an 
American  firm  operating  in  conjunction  with  the  American  Inter- 
national Corporation.  From  their  inception,  the  Siems-Carey  un- 
dertakings in  China  have  sought  and  have  obtained  the  support  of 
the  American  Government,  which  seemed  anxious  to  demonstrate 
that  it  wants  to  extend  all  legitimate  aid  to  American  enterprises 
in  this  country.  About  the  time  when  Baron  Shibusawa  visited 
America  as  the  protagonist  of  the  "cooperation"  plan,  negotiations 
were  commenced  at  Peking  for  the  Siems-Carey  contracts.  Japan's 
attitude  toward  such  American  enterprises  is  substantially  as  fol- 
lows: First,  prevent  them  from  getting  a  contract  if  possible,  by 
oblique  obstruction  if  it  is  not  expedient  to  interpose  open  diplo- 
matic opposal;  Second,  if  the  contracts  are  secured,  then  try  to 
prevent  them  from  being  carried  out:  Third,  if  both  the  two  first 
methods  fail,  then  try  to  become  parties  to  the  contracts. 

All  these  methods  were,  in  this  instance,  used  in  turn,  and  the 
manner  of  employing  them  was  very  interesting  in  some  of  their 
phases.  On  returning  to  Japan  after  his  visit  to  America,  Baron 
Shibusawa  gave  interviews  which  made  an  impression,  and  which 
were  subtly  intrepreted  to  give  the  impression,  that  his  mission  had 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        233 

been  successful,  and  that  the  American  financial  world  had  agreed 
to  "cooperate"  with  Japan  in  China.  This  interpretation  was  at 
once  disseminated  throughout  China  by  Japan's  press  propaganda 
here,  and  almost  succeeded  in  preventing  the  Siems-Carey  contracts 
from  going  through.  A  sine  qua  non  of  this  transaction,  from 
China's  standpoint,  was  a  desire  to  avoid  the  use  of  Japanese  capi- 
tal and  supervision  in  the  further  extension  of  China's  internal 
transportation  system;  and  especially  in  regard  to  the  Grand  Canal 
improvement,  which  runs  partly  through  Shantung  province,  where 
Japan  is  now  claiming,  as  an  evictor  of  Germany,  an  exclusive  posi- 
tion under  the  old  "sphere"  theorem.  So  when  the  news  was  sent 
broadcast  in  China  that  American  financiers  had  decided  to  cooper- 
ate with  Japanese  (out  here  everyone  knows  this  means  the  Jap- 
anese Government)  in  these  and  other  schemes,  it  at  once  aroused 
such  suspicion  of  the  American  proposals  among  Chinese  that  it 
came  near  to  defeating  them.  It  was  thought  necessary  to  commu- 
nicate this  phase  of  the  situation  officially  to  "Washington,  and  thus 
to  elicit  an  unequivocal  denial  from  the  Americans  who  were  to 
finance  the  Siems-Carey  work.  In  that  case,  the  deep-rooted  sus- 
picion of  Japan's  motives  which  now  is  entertained  by  a  great  ma- 
jority of  Chinese  was  cleverly  used  by  Japan  to  sow  suspicions  of 
America,  by  ostensibly  placing  these  American  projects  in  Japan's 
shadow.  However,  that  device  was  frustrated,  and  the  contracts 
were  signed. 

Next  came  the  effort  to  prevent  the  contracts,  and  particularly 
the  canal  improvement,  (which  lies  partly  in  Japan's  so-called 
"sphere")  from  being  carried  out:  and  in  this  the  "cooperation" 
idea  was  used  even  more  cleverly.  The  effort  was  transferred  from 
Peking  to  New  York;  and  the  American  Legation,  and  American 
representatives  of  these  interests  then  in  China,  were  astounded  one 
day  to  hear,  via  Japanese  news  services,  that  an  agreement  had 
been  made  in  New  York  whereby  Japanese  were  admitted  to  par- 
ticipation in  the  canal  improvement.  This  was  coupled  by  com- 
ments, in  Japanese  newspapers  in  China  and  in  the  press  of  Japan, 
plainly  intimating  that  the  Americans  had  been  forced  to  admit 
Japanese  because  of  diplomatic  representations,  thus  demonstrating 
that  America  was  not  strong  enough  to  do  anything  in  China  with- 
out Japan's  consent  and  help.  Behind  these  considerations  (in 
themselves  sufficiently  damaging  to  American  prestige)  lurked  the 
further  presumption,  that  with  American  concessions  in  China  runs 
the  possibility  and  the  (to  China)  danger  of  them  being  obtained 
by  representing  them  as  purely  American  enterprises,  and  being 
then  sold  into  other  national  control  which  is  considered  invidious 


234     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

to  China.  And  still  behind  that,  was  the  presumption  that  the 
American  Government  would  lend  itself  to  such  oblique  political 
machinations. 

That  is  how  American  national  honor  comes  into  such  transac- 
tions. A  good  deal  has  been  raid,  in  recent  years,  [I  have  done 
some  of  the  saying  myself]  about  the  duty  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment strongly  to  support  its  nationals  in  China,  and  to  lend  official 
countenance  to  financial  and  commercial  enterprises.  I  think  this 
must  be  done  if  we  ever  are  to  make  headway  here,  and  if  we  are 
to  be  of  any  effective  aid  to  China.  But  the  assumption  of  such 
official  action  by  the  American  Government  must  include  the  as- 
sumption that  American  financial  and  commercial  enterprises  so 
supported  will  harmonize  with  the  broad  national  interest,  as  con- 
ceived and  practiced  by  the  national  foreign  policy. 

Even  before  the  world  war  had  given  a  new  meaning  and  a  new 
tendency  to  both  national  and  international  commerce,  we  who  re- 
side in  China  had  come  to  perceive  that  a  very  close  relation  exists 
between  American  commercial  efforts  in  China  and  the  foreign  pol- 
icy of  the  American  Government;  and  that  only  by  the  consonance 
of  these  two  elements  can  a  really  worth-while  advance  be  made. 
Formerly  we  thought  of  this  question  principally,  or  altogether,  in 
terms  of  the  far  East;  but  we  now  see  that  the  principle  is  of 
world  wide  application — that  American  trade-  in  China,  and  with 
China,  may  hinge  on  events  in  Europe,  or  anywhere  in  the  world, 
which  may  by  indirection  affect  political  and  economic  conditions 
here.  By  this  process  we  reach  the  conclusion  that  American  Gov- 
ernment policy  in  China  cannot  be  detached  from  American  policy 
in  other  parts  of  the  world,  but  must  be  coordinated  with  our  na- 
tion's foreign  policy  as  a  whole.  The  same  principle,  it  seems  to 
me,  also  applies  to  American  economic  policy  in  China. 

In  formulating  and  practicing  their  foreign  policies  Govern- 
ments are  forced,  or  consider  it  expedient,  at  times  to  take  courses 
that  impede  and  obstruct — or  seem  to,  and  at  least  do  discourage 
some  business  efforts  of  their  nationals:  and  which  bring,  or  seem 
to  brine  a  Government  into  opposition  to  business  interests.  When 
these  frictions  occur,  some  basis  of  compromise  usually  is  worked 
out;  but  if  business  interests,  however  important  and  powerful, 
become  definitely  committed  to  opposition  to  a  fundamental  canon 
of  national  policy,  then  inevitably  the  business  interests  have  to 
yield.  This  principle  always  has  held  true;  and  every  day  that 
passes  witnesses  some  new  accession  of  the  power  of  States  to 
dominate  the  activities  and  affairs  of  their  citizenry.  Therefore  if, 
by  any  mischance  or  miscalculation,  American  financial  and  com- 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        235 

mercial  interests  in  China  should  get  at  cross-purposes  with  a  funda- 
mental issue  of  broad  American  national  policy,  it  certainly  would 
retard  the  development  of  our  trade  here,  and  might  react  disas- 
trously upon  our  nation  as  a  whole.  Also,  if  American  business 
policy  in  China  would  permit  itself,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
to  be  placed  in  an  attitude  unsympathetic  or  detrimental  to  the 
legitimate  aspirations  and  national  rights  of  the  Chinese  people,  a 
sound  and  extensive  expansion  of  American  trade  here  will  become 
impossible. 

If  the  policy  of  Japan  toward  China  is  predicated  on  a  hypoth- 
esis expressed  by  the  formula  I  have  designated  previously  as  Al- 
ternative B,  and  American  policy  toward  China  is  expressed  by 
Alternative  A,  then  if  American  commercial  policy  here  would 
"cooperate"  with  Japan  in  China  on  Japan's  own  conception  of  a 
policy  and  on  Japan's  terms,  it  would  be  placed  in  distinct  opposi- 
tion to  the  broader  interest  of  the  American  nation  and  to  the1 
foreign  policy  of  the  American  Government.  Does  the  American 
financial  and  commercial  world  want  to  get  into  this  position?  And 
if  it  should,  wittingly  or  unwittingly,  get  into  this  position,  how  can 
it  expect  to  be  listened  to  if  it  asks  the  support  of  the  American 
Government  (which  to  be  effective  must  carry  with  it  the  idea  that 
the  national  power  goes  with  it,  which  in  turn  means  that  the  Amer- 
ican people  may  become  involved  in  war  by  such  issues)  in  pro- 
moting its  efforts  in  China? 

Those  are  the  major  aspects  of  this  question.  I  have  studied, 
from  such  information  that  I  have,  to  discover  what  motives  those 
Americans  who  incline  to  the  "cooperation"  idea,  and  who  seem  to 
have  committed  themselves  partly  to  it  by  giving  Japanese  a  posi- 
tion of  some  kind  in  the  canal  improvement,  have  been  governed 
by  in  accepting  that  theorem  for  the  expansion  of  American  eco- 
nomic interests  in  China.  Of  course,  it  is  denied  that  political  con- 
siderations induced  the  admission  of  Japanese;  but  that  explana- 
tion will  not  bear  analysis.  Surely,  New  York  financiers  would 
not  have  us  believe  that  they,  after  entering  on  these  engagements, 
could  not  finance  them  without  Japanese  help,  or  could  not  carry 
out  the  construction  without  Japanese  expert  advice*? 

What  was  the  reason,  then,  if  not  politics?  The  fact  seems  to 
be  that  American  financiers,  up  to  very  recently,  and  perhaps  now, 
have  not  believed  that  the  United  States  Government  would  de- 
velop the  elements  that  I  have  mentioned  as  being  essential  for  the 
restoration  and  enforcement  of  the  Hay  "open-door"  doctrine.  It 
looks  like  they  got  "cold  feet"  as  to  whether  the  United  States  really 
is  or  ever  will  become  a  real  power  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  thought 


236     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

it  better  to  go  on  under  the  aegis  of  Japan  rather  than  stand  pat 
and  run  the  risk  of  being  turned  back.  For  the  moment,  the  na- 
tional honor  and  prestige  do  not  seem  to  have  had  much  place  in 
their  calculations;  present  expediency  was  the  apparent  considera- 
tion. 

There  is  another  phase  to  this  question  that  has  an  influence  on 
the  attitude  of  American  finance  and  commerce.  Within  the  last 
ten  years  there  has  been  a  shift  of  conditions  which  has  tended  to 
array  a  considerable  fraction  of  American  trade  in  the  far  East  to 
favor  Japan  rather  than  China.  As  American  trade  with  China 
has  lost  ground  (a  loss  in  which  Japan's  policy  has  played  a  part), 
the  trade  of  many  American  firms  with  Japan  has  become  more  im- 
portant proportionately,  until  a  condition  exists  whereby  their  in- 
terests connected  with  Japan  are  more  extensive  and  important 
than  similar  interests  in  China.  Therefore,  while  these  firms  would 
like  to  have  the  door  kept  open  in  China,  and  sympathize  with 
efforts  to  that  end,  commercial  expediency  deters  them  from  being 
very  active  in  promoting  such  a  policy  to  an  extent  that  will  impair 
their  connections  with  Japan.  One  can  plainly  see  this  motive  in 
the  present  psychology  of  American  finance  and  commerce  toward 
the  "cooperation"  idea.  Now  trade  with  Japan  is  one  thing;  trade 
with  China  is  another.  Both  America  and  Japan  are  good  cus- 
tomers of  each  other,  and  I  hope  they  always  will  be;  but  this 
simple  fact,  which  applies  to  our  commercial  relations  with  all 
countries,  should  not  lure  our  business  interests  off  on  a  false  eco- 
nomic trail.  In  commerce,  Japan  is  Japan  and  China  is  China; 
just  as  France  is  France,  Russia  is  Russia,  and  so  forth.  Japan 
doesn't  trade  with  us  because  she  loves  us,  but  because  of  the  opera- 
tion of  economic  and  commercial  processes  that  are  of  general  ap- 
plication to  all  international  trade,  and  which  are  moreover  con- 
stantly shifting,  and  subject  to  political  influences.  Moreover,  this 
particular  "cooperation"  scheme  carries  a  distinct  possibility  of 
setting  American  interests  in  China  into  political  antagonism  with 
British,  French  and  other  foreign  interests. 

I  want  to  quote  Samuel  G.  Blythe  again,  for  a  moment.  He 
describes,  in  the  "Saturday  Evening  Post"  article  previously  quoted, 
how,  when  the  Japanese  Government  tried  to  impose  its  notion  of 
a  right  to  participation  with  Americans  in  enterprises  in  Shantung, 
the  American  Legation  at  Peking  politely  mentioned  some  Japanese 
projects  in  Manchuria,  and  suggested  that  Americans  might  like  to 
participate  there,  to  which  Baron  Hayashi,  after  taking  some  time 
to  think  it  ever,  responded  that  such  American  participation  in 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        237 

Manchuria  did  not  come  within  the  "cooperation"  idea.    Mr.  Blythe 
remarks : 

"Well,  there  it  was  and  there  it  is.  Japan  seeks  to  cooperate  with 
the  United  States  only  in  such  places  in  China  as  Japan  does  not 
dominate  at  the  present  time.  Japan  brooks  no  cooperation  or  in- 
terference in  places  where  Japan  has  nailed  herself  down,  but  will 
cooperate  in  places  picked  by  Japan — and  not  by  America — where 
Japan  thinks  Japan  can  be  advantaged  in  her  plans  by  such  co- 
operation, and  American  profits  and  influence  diminished." 

That  really  about  gets  at  the  heart  of  this  "cooperation"  idea  as 
far  as  it  has  developed  in  China.  I  do  not  want  to  be  understood 
as  being  opposed  to  any  and  all  American-Japanese  cooperation, 
in  China  or  elsewhere.  What  I  insist  on  is  that  in  China  Amer- 
ican cooperation  with  any  other  nation  will  be  on  lines  that  con- 
form with  traditional  American  policy,  with  the  sound  develop- 
ment of  American  interests,  and  with  the  national  integrity  of 
China, 


CHAPTER  X 

CHINA   AND   ECONOMIC   IMPERIALISM — CONCLUDED 

Blindness  of  Americana  to  certain  conditions — Applying  lessons  of  the 
Great  War — Relation  of  militarism  to  economic  imperialism — Some  as- 
pects of  American  trade  in  China — Effects  of  the  "hyphen"  in  foreign 
trade — Fallacy  of  the  Shibusawa  plan — A  remarkable  letter — Why  Amer- 
icans in  China  are  anti-Japan — Japan  and  China  contrasted — First  and 
later  impressions — Coordination  of  Japanese  political  and  commercial 
methods — A  strong  arraignment  of  Japan — Her  recent  course  in  China 
indicted — How  the  Chinese  are  impressed — Seeming  inconsistency  of 
Allied  professions  and  policy — Implication  of  America's  weakness — 
Japan's  anti-Allied  propaganda — The  coming  reaction — Japan's  unpopu- 
larity with  the  Chinese — How  it  may  affect  post-war  business — Japan's 
capital  in  China  is  force — The  moral  issue — Effects  of  the  cooperation 
idea  on  American  trade  in  China — Its  military  aspect. 

ONE  of  the  most  remarkable  political  phenomena  of 
modern  times  has  been  the  singular  blindness  of 
Americans  regarding  certain  conditions  in  the  world, 
and  their  no  less  singular  disinclination  to  take  any  steps  to 
protect  their  own  national  life  and  interests  from  the  opera- 
tion of  some  forces  born  of  and  reared  by  those  conditions. 
For  instance,  the  attitude  of  Americans  toward  armaments. 
Nothing  but  being  dragged  into  war  by  the  scruff  could  make 
the  American  people,  and  the  Government,  realize  the  neces- 
sity of  increasing  their  armaments  and  military  efficiency. 
They  were  slow  to  read  the  lesson,  in  an  armed  world  be  not 
unarmed.  The  reluctance  with  which  Americans  have  ac- 
cepted and  acted  on  this  lesson  can  be  scarcely  comprehended 
by  any  except  Americans,  for  few  other  peoples  had  such  a 
naive  frame  of  mind  about  world  affairs  and  tendencies. 
But  having  at  last,  perforce,  accepted  it,  and  being  in  the 
way  of  acting  on  it  by  developing  a  military  and  naval  power 

238 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        239 

commensurate  with  the  national  strength  and  position,  Amer- 
icans will  not  be  apt  to  unlearn  it  when  peace  comes.  The 
lesson  will  be  too  costly  to  be  easily  forgotten.  If  the  peace 
that  Americans  in  their  own  minds  fought  for  does  not  suc- 
ceed in  suppressing  militarism, — and  militarism  will  not  nec- 
essarily be  suppressed  merely  by  defeating  Germany,  as 
many  loosely  think, — then  without  doubt  American  military 
and  naval  power  should  be  maintained  at  a  degree  that  is  re- 
quired by  circumstances.  On  the  other  hand,  if  peace  results 
in  a  genuine  suppression  of  militarism,  not  just  a  transfer  of 
military  ascendency  from  one  power  or  group  of  powers  to 
another  power  or  group,  then  there  is  the  other  question  to 
deal  with — the  moderation  or  suppression  of  war-causing 
phases  of  economic  competitions. 

Militarism  and  economic  imperialism  go  hand  in  hand. 
They  are  interdependent.  Each  breeds  the  other,  and  each 
sustains  the  other.  Plainly,  economic  imperialism  is  not  pos- 
sible without  imperial  militarism  to  back  it  up  with  force  or 
with  the  threat  of  using  force.  Also,  without  the  increments 
by  economic  reflex  resulting  from  this  use  of  militarism,  or 
promised  by  governments  as  a  result  from  it,  peoples  almost 
surely  could  not  be  induced  to  bear  the  fiscal  burden  of  exces- 
sive armaments.  Applying,  now,  these  principles  to  condi- 
tions in  the  far  East,  it  is  evident  that,  if  the  peace  brings  a 
suppression  of  militarism,  and  also  a  suppression  of  the  use 
of  force  through  militarism  to  promote  policies  of  economic 
imperialism,  China's  foreign  commerce  can  pursue  a  normal 
and  unintimidated  course.  On  the  other  hand,  if  militar- 
ism is  not  suppressed  or  if  it  is  only  slightly  moderated, 
then  we  may  look  to  see  the  idea  of  economic  imperialism 
persist  for  a  time  in  respect  to  the  economic  development 
of  China.  This  is  a  possibility  that  American  commercial  and 
financial  interests  having  thought  of  China  must  not  ignore. 
The  reaction  on  British  and  French  economic  policies  of  Ger- 
man military  efficiency  and  its  meanings  is  shown  by  events 
and  tendencies.     As  for  Japan,  both  her  military  and  eco- 


240     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

uomic  policies  were  long  before  the  war  frankly  modeled 
after  Germany;  and  since  the  war  began  they  have  steadily 
been  applied  on  the  German  system  until  very  recently,  when 
changes  of  conditions  have  begun  to  circumscribe  this  method 
in  its  application  to  China. 

In  respect  to  American  trade  in  China,  it  has  followed  an 
unusual  course  since  the  war  began.  By  the  gradual  cutting- 
off  of  Great  Britain  and  Europe  as  sources  of  supply  for 
manufactured  articles  and  also  as  markets  for  the  products  of 
China,  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  obtain  such  commodities 
from  America  and  also  to  send  raw  and  other  products  of 
China  to  America.  In  many  manufacturing  lines  the  war 
made  America  the  manufacturer  for  the  world,  for  that  coun- 
try was  the  only  place  where  many  staple  commodities  could 
be  obtained  quickly.  But  this  trade  expansion  has  phases 
that  demand  attention  of  the  American  business  and  manu- 
facturing world  and  also  of  the  United  States  Government. 
A  considerable  volume  of  this  new  trade  has  passed  through 
non-American  hands,  being  handled  in  China  by  British,  Ger- 
man (before  America  and  China  became  belligerents),  Jap- 
anese, and  other  foreign  firms.  Almost  without  exception 
these  foreign  firms  are  also  agents  of  similar  British,  German, 
or  Japanese  commodities,  as  the  case  may  be.  Rather  than 
lose  business,  they  will  sell  American  goods  for  the  time,  and 
probably  will  sell  them  hereafter  if  their  customers  insist  on 
having  the  American  goods  and  no  other.  But  after  the  war, 
when  similar  commodities  can  again  be  obtained  from  Eng- 
land, Europe,  or  anywhere,  what  is  likely  to  happen  to  this 
new  and  expanding  American  trade  if  it  is  left  in  non-Ameri- 
can hands,  and  subject  to  conditions  of  transport  and  market 
dominated  by  other  nations? 

I  do  not  believe  in  or  advocate  a  narrow  intensively  national 
system  of  economic  development.  I  would  prefer  to  have 
those  conditions  that  helped  to  cause  the  war  eliminated  as 
far  as  possible.  In  my  opinion  too  strict  and  close  applica- 
tion of  nationalism  in  trade,  as  in  social  relations,  is  not  con- 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        241 

dueive  to  amicable  international  sentiment.  The  spirit  of  it 
is  wrong.  In  our  small  dealings  it  is  unpleasantly  restrictive 
and  narrow  to  have  to  stop  and  think,  whenever  anything  is  to 
be  bought  or  sold,  of  the  nationality  of  those  whom  we  may  cas- 
ually like  to  deal  with ;  when  buying  a  hat  or  when  selecting 
the  materials  for  our  shirts.  Americans  never  have  followed 
that  policy.  We  feel  inclined  to  resent  any  tendency  of  na- 
tionalism which  invokes  us  to  adopt  it.  But  we  also  should 
resent  its  application  by  other  nations  to  ourselves.  Ameri- 
cans have  felt  the  same  way  and  thought  much  the  same  way 
about  militarism  among  nations.  Therefore,  if  other  power- 
ful industrial  and  commercial  nations  that  are  the  competitors 
of  America  pursue  the  imperialistic  theory  of  trade  expan- 
sion, or  if  they  shape  their  economic  policies  on  that  line, 
then  American  industry  and  trade  without  doubt  will  have  to 
meet  that  condition  by  adopting  similar  or  contravening 
methods.  If  we  are  hereafter,  or  for  a  considerable  time,  to 
live  in  an  armed  world,  then  America  must  be  armed  as  pow- 
erfully as  any  nation  is.  If  after  the  war  there  is  a  possibility 
that  the  intensive  nationalistic  thesis  is  to  direct  international 
trade,  then  Americans  should  be  forewarned,  and  should  pre- 
pare to  meet  this  condition  by  a  closer  economic  organization 
within  their  own  nationality.  It  will  not  suffice  in  such  a 
world  to  get  rid  of  the  hyphen  in  respect  to  our  political  and 
military  organisms  if  we  continue  to  retain  the  hyphen  in  the 
ramifications  of  our  foreign  trade  development. 

From  the  time  when  Japan's  propaganda  first  advanced 
the  idea  of  a  Japanese- American  financial  and  commercial  co- 
operation in  China,  American  business  men  and  organizations 
in  China  showed  a  strong,  even  a  bitter  antagonism  to  the. 
plan.  They  regarded  it  as  a  subtle  scheme  to  undermine 
America's  moral  position  in  China  and  to  hinder  and  limit 
the  progress  of  American  trade  and  enterprises.  Writing  in 
"Millard's  Review,"  September  1,  1917,  I  commented  as  fol- 
lows: 

/ 


242     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Very  astute  and  persistent  efforts  are  being  made  to  tack  hyhens 
of  a  subtle  and  objectionable  character  to  the  development  of 
American  interests  and  trade  relations  with  China.  Prominent 
among  them  was  the  so-called  Shibusawa  plan  for  the  "coopera- 
tion" of  Japanese  and  Americans  (or  Japan  and  the  United 
States)  in  China.  That  plan  is  gasping  for  breath  now,  if  it  is 
not  already  dead.  The  only  sound  basis  it  ever  had  was  a  pre- 
sumption founded  on  Japan's  dominating  military  power  in  this 
region,  and  the  use  of  that  power  to  push  a  policy  of  economic 
imperialism.  One  understands  why,  if  Americans  should  see  a 
good  business  or  industrial  opportunity  in  Japan,  that  it  would 
perhaps  be  desirable  and  it  might  be  necessary  (as  without  doubt 
it  is)  to  cooperate  with  Japanese.  One  understands  also  that,  in 
such  a  case  in  China,  it  would  perhaps  be  desirable  (although, 
since  China  has  not  developed  militarism  nor  economic  imperialism, 
yet,  this  is  not  necessary)  to  cooperate  with  Chinese.  But  the 
Shibusawa  plan  insists  that  for  Americans  successfully  to  enter- 
prise in  China,  Japanese  cooperation  (which  means  the  consent  of 
Japanese  militarism)  is  essential,  while  by  that  plan  Chinese  co- 
operation (or  feeling)  is  regarded  is  negligible.  If  the  Shibusawa 
plan,  as  it  was  originally  conceived  and  advanced,  is  not  dead,  it 
ought  to  be.  It  is  a  piece  of  economic  and  diplomatic  fustian 
whose  roots  are  planted  deeply  in  the  ''militarism-economic  im- 
perialism" doctrine,  and  whose  political  concepts  lie  in  "special 
position"  and  "paramountcy"  phrases  in  the  mouths  of  diplomats 
and  propagandists. 

It  ought  not  to  be  needed  to  say  (yet  one  feels  that  it  has  to  be 
said)  that  in  this  criticism  of  Japan's  previous  policies  toward 
China,  with  their  effects  and  consequences  to  other  foreign  inter- 
ests here  and  to  China,  there  is  not  meant  any  feeling  of  opposi- 
tion to  whatever  Japanese  trade  expansion  in  this  region  or  in  the 
world  can  be  accomplished  without  exerting  in  its  behalf  a  com- 
bined militarism  and  economic  imperialism.  This  is  an  issue  as 
between  two  absolutely  hostile  theses  of  international  polity;  an 
iscue  which,  forced  on  by  Germany,  probably  was  the  principal 
cause  of  the  great  war.  Yet  it  is  necessary  to  state  these  matters 
clearly,  and  to  reiterate  them  frequently  and  in  various  aspects 
in  order  to  drive  them  in,  because  without  doubt  the  American 
commercial  world  is  not  fully  wakened  to  these  conditions;  and 
also  because  American  commercial  interests  in  China  have  scarcely 
yet  grasped  more  than  the  outside  of  the  meaning  of  events,  and 
still  are  under  the  influence  and  the  shadow  of  the  economic  im- 
perialism  of   Japan   and   other  nations.     This   influence  and   this 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        243 

shadow  are  falling  away,  but  they  persist  with  astonishing 
psychological  vitality  with  a  considerable  part  of  the  American 
business  world.  Until  they  are  completely  thrown  off,  or  reduced 
to  just  proportions,  American  foreign  trade  and  financial  enter- 
prise will  not  be  standing  on  its  own  foundations;  it  cannot  take 
its  proper  part  in  building  up  the  national  wealth,  power  and 
prestige. 

As  giving  a  remarkably  accurate  and  comprehensive  epito- 
mization  of  the  sentiment  of  Americans  and  other  foreigners 
living  in  China  toward  this  Japanese-American  cooperation 
idea,  I  here  include  a  letter  which  is  self-explanatory.  I 
omit  the  writer's  name,  not  that  I  think  he  would  object  to 
its  being  used,  but  because  it  is  not  feasible  (he  having  gone 
into  the  interior  of  Asia)  to  ask  his  permission.  When  I  left 
China  late  in  1918,  American  organizations  in  China  were 
preparing  to  issue  this  letter  for  the  purpose  of  advising 
chambers  of  commerce  in  America  of  certain  conditions,  and 
I  gladly  give  it  this  additional  publicity.  The  writer  goes 
beyond  the  so-called  cooperation  plan  in  the  scope  of  his 
comments,  but  a  just  analysis  will  reveal  that  the  cooperation 
plan  comprehends  all  of  those  matters  in  its  true  significance. 

Shanghai,  July  10,  1918. 
Dear : 

You  will  remember  that  when  you  were  in  Peking  in  January 
of  this  year  you  attended  the  annual  dinner  of  the  American  As- 
sociation, and  that  you  were  somewhat  shocked  and  disconcerted 
to  find  the  majority  of  us  intolerantly  critical  of  Japan  and  Japa- 
nese policy,  and  incidentally  of  the  magazine  [name  omitted,]  upon 
which  some  of  the  discussion  turned.  I  remember  that  during  the 
dinner  you  urged  upon  the  members  of  the  association  the  necessity 
of  seeing  both  sides  of  the  Japanese  question  before  pronouncing 
upon  it  dogmatically,  and  that  you  also  urged  us  to  become  mem- 
bers of  the  Asiatic  Society,  the  publishers  of  [name  omitted],  so 
that  we  could  make  whatever  criticisms  we  had  to  make  as  mem- 
bers from  the  inside,  as  it  were,  and  not  as  an  antagonistic  organ- 
ization. The  members  of  the  association  had  however  framed  its 
own  conception  of  [name  omitted]  and  of  the  policy  of  the  interests 
supporting  that  paper,  and  would  consider  no  such  suggestion. 


244     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

After  the  meeting,  in  a  personal  conversation  which  you  had 
with  me,  you  again  emphasized  the  need  of  putting  both  sides  of 
any  argument  upon  Sino-Japanese  or  Japanese-American  relations 
before  all  interested  parties,  and  you  asked  me  to  enter  into  cor- 
respondence with  the  secretary  of  the  American  Association  of 
Yokohama  as  the  first  step  in  an  interchange  of  views  between 
American  residents  in  China  and  Japan.  As  you  know,  I  left 
Peking  within  a  few  days  of  your  return  to  Japan,  which  caused 
my  resignation  from  the  secretaryship  of  the  American  Associa- 
tion, and  I  doubt  very  much  whether  my  successor,  who  is  a  new- 
comer in  China  and  not  so  familiar  with  the  trend  of  opinion 
among  Americans  in  this  country,  was  in  a  position  to  take  up  the 
correspondence  suggested.  Until  our  recent  meeting  in  Shanghai 
it  did  not  again  occur  to  me  that  a  presentation  of  the  case  of 
those  of  us  in  China  who  are  credited  with  being  unreasonably 
anti-Japanese  would  be  of  any  particular  value,  but  you  have 
persuaded  me  this  time  that  so  little  is  known  of  political  and 
economic  conditions  in  this  country,  or  of  Japan's  influence  upon 
Chinese  affairs,  that  a  clear  statement  of  the  views  of  Americans 
in  China  and  of  the  reasons  for  these  opinions  should  be  prepared 
for  the  benefit  of  Amei'icans  both  in  Japan  and  at  home  who  are 
interested  in  doing  business  in  the  Orient  or  in  promoting  friendly 
relations  between  the  American  people  and  the  various  Oriental 
peoples.  Of  course  there  will  be  nothing  official  or  final  about 
my  ideas,  but  I  shall  try  to  present  the  opinions  which  I  know 
are  held  by  the  majority  of  Americans  and  Britishers  here,  and 
I  shall  finally  submit  this  letter  to  several  persons  in  whose  judg- 
ment you  have  faith  and  let  them  delete  anything  with  which  they 
do  not  agree. 

The  matter  which  we  discussed  during  our  last  talk  at  the  Carl- 
ton Restaurant  was  of  course  the  question  of  American-Japanese 
cooperation  in  the  development  of  the  trade,  industries,  conces- 
sions, etc.,  in  China.  This  cooperation  scheme,  which  is  now  sup- 
ported by  many  big  American  interests  and  by  some  of  the  most 
reputable  business  men  in  Japan,  has  aroused  the  bitterest  pos- 
sible antagonism  among  Americans  in  China,  as  you  have  probably 
discovered,  apparently  for  the  sole  reason  that  we  are  prejudiced 
against  Japan  and  that  we  are  therefore  opposed  to  having  our 
judgment  upon  Japan  reversed  by  Americans  at  home  through  a 
Japanese-American  trade  alliance.  The  average  American  casual 
traveler  in  this  country  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  we  oppose 
the  cooperation  scheme  because  it  discredits  what  appears  to  be 
an  unreasonable  and  unreasoning  dislike  for  the   Japanese,   and 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM       245 

that  our  opinions  can  therefore  be  safely  ignored  by  the  practical 
business  folk  who  want  to  see  American  business  expand  in  this 
part  of  the  world. 

In  the  eyes  of  the  tourist  Japan  is  clean,  comfortable,  progres- 
sive, and  prosperous,  while  China  is  dirty,  corrupt,  uncomfortable, 
backward  and  squalidly  poor.  In  Japan  the  distinguished  guest 
is  motored  up  to  modern  buildings  through  arches  bearing  lauda- 
tory inscriptions,  is  received  by  intelligent  officials  who  discuss 
everything  that  interests  him  intelligently,  and  who  are  solicitous 
for  his  comfort  and  entertainment  while  in  the  country.  In  China 
the  same  man  wades  ankle-deep  in  mud,  gets  pockets  full  of  bad 
money,  finds  Chinese  persons  whom  he  wishes  to  see  only  after 
diligent  search  through  gloomy  and  crumbling  buildings,  and  may 
then  be  indifferently  treated  by  an  opium-smoking  idler  who  owes 
his  place  to  political  corruption  and  who  is  interested  in  nothing 
so  much  as  in  ending  the  conversation  and  in  getting  his  visitor 
off  the  premises.  Naturally  the  visitor  cannot  understand  why  or 
how  any  reasonable  person  could  ever  object  to  Japan,  who  alone 
seems  to  be  successful  in  getting  things  done  in  China,  taking 
China  over  bodily,  and  cleaning  it  up  in  the  interests  of  America 
and  all  other  nations  which  hope  to  do  business  in  this  country. 

We  have  all  had  the  same  experiences  and  have  gathered  the 
same  impressions  upon  our  arrival  in  the  East.  We  have  all 
admired  Japan  and  have  cultivated  a  huge  contempt  for  China 
during  the  first  few  weeks  of  our  sojourn  in  the  Orient.  But  in- 
controvertible the  fact  remains  that,  of  those  who  have  lived  three 
years  or  more  in  the  country,  fully  ninety-five  per  cent  have  ac- 
quired not  only  a  sentimental  liking  for  the  Chinese,  but  a  great 
faith  in  the  capabilities  and  future  of  the  Chinese  people,  which 
seems  blind  and  fatuous  to  the  visitor,  and  also  a  cordial  dislike 
for  the  Japanese,  which  the  new-comer  can  explain  only  as  a 
malicious  prejudice.  The  reasons  for  this  would  fill  many  volumes 
if  fully  stated.  The  personality  of  the  Japanese  whom  most  of 
us  meet  here  is  of  course  objectionable,  but  we  all  realize  that  the 
commercial  and  political  adventurers  who  come  to  China  are  not 
representative,  and  we  are  not  unreasonable  enough  to  condemn 
the  whole  people  on  these  grounds.  The  extracts  from  Japanese 
papers  which  appear  in  the  English  press  are  often  anti-American, 
imperialistic,  extremely  egotistical,  and  complacent,  and  almost  in- 
variably opposed  to  the  democratic  standards  which  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  peoples  support.  The  Japanese  press  naturally  fans  prej- 
udice and  antagonism,  just  as  the  Japanese  whom  we  meet  con- 
firm prejudice;  but  the  essential  reason  for  our  consistent  damn- 


246     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

ing  of  the  Japanese  is  the  unscrupulous  and  immoral  China  policy 
of  the  Japanese  Government,  and  the  confirmed  tendency  of  Jap- 
anese commercial  interests  to  occupy  and  hold  every  vantage- 
point  which  the  Japanese  Government  gains  in  this  country  through 
coercion  or  corruption.  No  one  ever  hears  a  word  of  criticism 
in  China  of  legitimate  Japanese  enterprises  which  are  legitimately 
established  and  which  enter  into  legitimate  competition  with  the 
interests  of  other  nations.  If  Japanese  trade  and  Japanese  im- 
perial policy  were  entering  this  country  through  separate  channels 
and  through  independent  tactics,  there  would  not  be  the  slightest 
opposition  to  Japanese  commercial  expansion  here  or  to  an  Amer- 
ican trade  alliance  with  Japanese  commercial  people  on  any  scale. 
Unfortunately,  however,  nearly  every  Japanese  commercial  move 
brings  in  its  wake  a  political  invasion  of  some  sort,  and  every 
political  imposition  upon  China  or  upon  the  interests  of  others 
in  China  is  complacently  regarded  by  the  Japanese  traders  as  a 
legitimate  opening  for  their  expansion. 

Japan's  political  policy  in  China  is  now  no  less  objectionable 
than  it  was  in  1915.  Then  it  was  one  of  coercion,  of  frank  jingo- 
ism; now  it  is  one  of  corruption  through  alliance  with  purchasable 
Chinese  officials  who  are  put  in  office  and  kept  there  by  Japanese 
influence.  The  latter  is  certainly  a  much  more  insidious  policy 
than  the  former,  and  more  dangerous  because  it  does  not  attract 
the  attention  abroad  which  it  deserves.  You  have  been  in  Peking 
recently,  so  there  is  no  need  to  remind  you  of  the  loans  which 
Japan  is  negotiating  with  the  official  clique  in  the  capital,  or  to 
dwell  upon  the  character  of  these  loans.  You  know  as  much  about 
the  Sino-Japanese  military  alliance  of  recent  date  as  we  do  here, 
and  you  know  that  the  sole  purpose  of  that  agreement,  apart  from 
the  incidental  advantage  which  it  gives  Japan  of  controlling 
China's  military  resources,  was  to  make  China's  declaration  of 
war  against.  Germany  somewhat  more  ineffectual  than  it  already 
was  and  to  obviate  the  last  possibility  of  China  being  of  service 
to  the  Allies  and  of  thereby  gaining  any  prestige  which  would  stand 
her  in  good  stead  in  the  course  of  a  hypothetical  post-bellum  set- 
tlement of  Sino-Japanese  disputes. 

You  know  quite  well  from  what  you  have  seen  for  yourself  in 
China  on  your  various  visits  and  from  what  your  numerous  well- 
informed  friends  in  China  have  told  you  at  various  times,  that 
Japan  has  taken  every  possible  step  during  the  four  years  of  this 
war  to  ruin  China  by  creating  and  sustaining  trouble,  by  financing 
the  most  objectionable  elements  in  every  community  in  which  she 
has   been  interested,  by   the   employment   of  agents  provocateurs, 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        247 

by  the  encouragement  of  the  use  of  morphine  over  large  areas, 
by  the  use  of  Japanese  immoral  women  in  Chinese  official  house- 
holds, by  the  protection  given  to  bandits  and  other  outlaws,  by  the 
wrecking  of  native  banks,  as  in  the  recent  Mukden  case,  by  the  cor- 
ruption of  officials  through  loans,  bribes,  and  threats;  and  by  the 
wholesale  misrepresentation  of  Allied  war  aims  and  the  most  vigor- 
ous efforts  to  prevent  China  from  coming  into  war  and  then  later 
to  discredit  the  country  by  preventing  China  from  being  of  any 
use  or  service  to  the  Allies.  You  also  know  that  during  these  four 
years,  which  have  been  publicly  heralded  as  Japan's  years  of  op- 
portunity, it  has  been  the  distinct  object  of  the  Japanese  to  gain 
a  monopoly  upon  political  influence  in  China,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  make  openings  for  Japanese  trade  which  would  give  the 
Japanese  commercial  folk  as  strong  a  commercial  monopoly  as  pos- 
sible. And  in  every  instance  in  which  the  Government  has  created 
an  opening  through  political  maneuvering,  seldom  creditable,  the 
Japanese  business  man,  said  by  his  defenders  to  be  opposed  to 
the  truculent  and  unscrupulous  policy  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, has  been  only  too  ready  to  take  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tunities offered  to  drive  in  the  trade  wedge,  whether  the  trade  was 
in  legitimate  imports  and  exports  or  in  morphine  or  cocaine  or 
women  or  Chinese  cash  or  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  Chinese 
people. 

Not  only*  has  Japan  been  working  against  the  present  interests 
and  future  good  of  the  Chinese  people,  but  her  policy  in  China 
has  been  deliberately  shaped  to  undermine  the  trade,  influence, 
and  prestige  of  the  Occidental  peoples,  nominally  her  Allies, 
throughout  the  East.  Every  ideal  which  tee  have  developed  and 
announced  as  participants  in  the  present  European  War  is  dis- 
owned or  discounted  in  the  Japanese  press  and  by  Japanese  prop- 
agandists among  the  Chinese;  and  in  actual  diplomatic  practice 
Japanese  officials  in  China  have  practised  every  subterfuge  and 
committed  every  diplomatic  crime  with  which  we  credit  the  Ger- 
mans, and  have  invariably  been  supported  by  the  home  Govern- 
ment and  encouraged  by  their  commercial  representatives  in  China. 

It  is  our  business  in  the  East  as  Americans  or  Britishers  to  make 
the  Chinese  believe  in  our  announced  war  aims  and  purposes  and 
to  convince  them  that  we  are  sincere  and  are  therefore  entitled 
to  their  loyalty  and  support  against  Prussianism.  The  Chinese  do 
not  understand  what  Prussianism  is,  but  they  do  understand  Nip- 
ponism,  and  it  is  very  difficult  to  persuade  them  to  give  us  their 
whole-hearted  moral  support  when  we  give  countenance  by  com- 
mercial   and   diplomatic   alliances   in   this   hemisphere    to    policies 


248     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

which  are  identical  with  those  which  we  condemn  under  another 
name  and  which  we  are  eradicating  from  another  hemisphere,  re- 
mote from  Chinese  interests,  by  the  expenditure  of  so  much  treas- 
ure and  blood.  The  Chinese  have  seen  the  most  unscrupulous 
policies  succeed  in  their  country,  carried  out  to  their  shame  and 
humiliation  without  a  murmur  or  a  whimper  from  the  Allies. 
They  see  the  Japanese  brand  of  Prussianism  succeed  in  this  part 
of  the  world  without  palpable  opposition,  and  they  have  nothing 
more  than  our  word  for  it  that  it  is  not  succeeding  elsewhere. 
They  have  heard  and  have  digested  all  the  statements  of  our  high 
ideas  about  the  protection  of  weak  nations  from  alien  interfer- 
ence, and  they  have  waited  for  us  to  prove  our  consistency  by 
bringing  our  Japanese  ally  in  line  with  these  ideals,  until  they 
are  convinced  that  we  are  either  afraid  of  Japan  or  that  we  place 
no  value  upon  consistency.  In  Chinese  eyes  and  the  eyes  of  all 
other  Orientals,  including  the  Japanese,  we  either  are  too  weak 
to  make  our  announced  international  policy  effective,  or  we  are 
satisfied  to  make  it  effective  where  it  is  expedient  and  to  close  our 
eyes  to  violations  of  our  political  ethics,  perpetrated  by  a  recognized 
ally,  whenever  it  is  inexpedient  to  interfere. 

Although  the  notorious  Japanese  twenty-one  demands  have  now 
receded  into  history  and  although  much  of  the  rancor  which  they 
aroused  has  been  softened  by  time,  this  conspicuous  Japanese  at- 
tempt to  take  advantage  of  the  preoccupation  of  the  Allies  and 
of  America  is  one  which  we  cannot  and  must  not  forget.  The 
principle  of  the  protection  of  the  weaker  nations  to  which  Japan 
is  supposed  to  have  subscribed  was  never  more  flagrantly  violated, 
nor  could  the  Allies  who  had  put  their  faith  in  Japan  as  their 
far-Eastern  agent  have  been  more  insidiously  betrayed.  Japan 
has  pretended  to  regret  this  incident  and  to  have  had  a  change  of 
heart  but  you  will  note  that  Japan  has  not  renounced  any  of  the 
special  privileges  acquired,  nor  has  she  canceled  the  clause  in  the 
treaty  in  which  she  reserves  the  right  to  revive  at  a  future  date 
the  particularly  offensive  "Group  V."  If  Japan  were  to  renounce 
the  spoils  while  she  deplores  the  methods  of  a  former  ministry,  we 
might  have  some  faith  in  the  alleged  change  of  heart.  As  it  is 
we  must  continue  to  keep  alive  the  memory  of  the  twenty-one 
demands,  and  call  Japan  to  account,  when  the  opportunity  arrives, 
for  flagrant  violation  of  past  treaties  and  of  present  international 
ethics.  Whenever  we  think  of  allying  ourselves  in  any  enterprise 
with  the  Japanese  we  must  remember  that  they  still  hold,  and  in- 
sist upon  holding,  the  fruits  of  the  diplomatic  move  that  was  so 
treacherous  that  the  highest  statesmen  in  Japan  were  ashamed  to 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        249 

own  it,  and  adopted  the  unprecedented  expedient  of  lying  to  the 
whole  world. 

To  come  back  to  the  question  of  Japanese-American  cooperation, 
a  commercial  alliance  with  Japan  would  now  emphasize  our  incon- 
sistencies, would  prove  us  willing  to  overlook  all  the  outrages  which 
Japan  has  perpetrated  against  China  and  against  us  during  these 
four  years,  and  would  be  tangible  evidence  of  an  American  sanction 
of  Japanese  political  and  commercial  methods  and  of  a  willing- 
ness to  participate  in  Japanese  spoils.  I  do  not  believe  that  if  the 
American  people  saw  the  cooperation  proposition  in  this  light 
which  is  the  light  in  which  we  all  see  it  out  here,  they  would  sanc- 
tion such  cooperation;  for  I  believe  that  the  American  people  have 
too  high  a  standard  of  both  commercial  and  of  international  honor 
and  are  too  sincere  in  their  present  war  aims. 

These  arguments  are,  however,  based  purely  on  moral  grounds, 
and  the  appeal  is  not  strictly  practical.  I  know  that  to  prove  to 
the  business  man  that  Japanese-American  cooperation  is  bad  busi- 
ness one  has  to  demonstrate  that  it  is  not  only  immoral,  but  in- 
expedient and  unprofitable  as  well.  When  [name  omitted]  first 
arrived  here  as  a  representative  of  [name  omitted]  he  argued  that 
while  it  would  be  no  credit  to  us  to  enter  into  commercial  relations 
with  the  Japanese,  it  was  essential,  because  America  either  would 
not  or  could  not  afford  sufficient  protection  to  business  in  a  coun- 
try like  China,  where  investments  were  precarious,  to  warrant 
the  investor  in  putting  up  his  money,  while  Japan  always  took 
care  of  the  interest  of  her  subjects  and  would  protect  American 
interests  as  well  as  if  they  came  in  under  the  Japanese  standard. 

Now,  such  an  argument  as  this  should  be  sufficient  to  shame  most 
of  us  into  disclaiming  all  connection  with  the  cooperation  scheme, 
but  since  [name  omitted]  came  out  here  with  that  idea,  and  since 
the  representatives  of  several  big  American  corporations  in  this 
country  have  been  known  to  make  similar  statements,  it  must 
be  assumed  that  there  are  great  interests  at  home  controlled  by 
men  who  are  either  ignorant  enough  or  shameless  enough  to  make 
such  statements  and  to  believe  them,  and  who  are  willing  to  do 
business  under  such  auspices  as  the  Japanese  would  provide  in 
China,  if  there  was  any  profit  in  it. 

Obviously  the  thing  to  impress  upon  these  people,  to  whom  one 
cannot  plead  justice  or  morality,  is  that  Japan's  power  to  get 
business  and  protect  it  in  this  country  is  a  power  which  cannot 
possibly  survive  the  war  if  the  East  is  again  thrown  open  to  free 
competition,  because  the  methods  and  policies  by  which  her  in- 
fluence is  acquired  will  not  be  tolerated  for  a  day  by  any  other 


250     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

nation  when  Europe  is  at  liberty  to  think  of  something  other 
than  the  war  in  France.  Japan's  prestige  among  the  Chinese  has 
been  acquired  by  force  and  corruption,  and  is  not  founded  upon 
superior  knowledge  of  the  country  or  of  the  people,  as  the 
Japanese  are  fond  of  telling  the  American  business  world.  While 
Japan  is  using  her  purchased  official  puppets  in  Peking  to  ac- 
quire control  over  Chinese  liberties  and  national  properties,  she 
is  arousing  among  the  Chinese  people  a  bitter  antagonism  which 
will  not  be  forgotten  in  generations.  Kemove  the  coercive  power 
behind  Japanese  enterprises  and  the  element  of  corruption  from 
Sino-Japanese  official  relations  in  Peking,  and  Japan's  good-will 
in  this  country  will  not  only  be  worthless,  but  a  tide  of  reaction 
against  the  Japanese  will  set  in  which  would  not  only  hamper 
Japanese  trade  in  China,  but  will  handicap  every  line  of  enter- 
prise allied  with  Japanese  business  men  at  a  time  when  the  latter 
are  earning  as  much  opprobrium  as  profit.  America  would  cer- 
tainly share  in  the  opprobrium,  whether  or  not  the  Japanese  see 
fit  to  make  any  division  of  the  spoils;  and  when  the  time  comes 
after  the  war  for  putting  an  end  to  the  Japanese  practices  which 
are  so  inconsistent  with  our  war  policies  and  with  our  Anglo-Saxon 
conception  of  fair  dealing  that  we  must  make  war  upon  them  in 
one  way  or  another  to  prove  our  consistency,  American  commerce 
will  and  should  be  involved  in  the  collapse  of  Japanese  trade  and 
will  be  equally  discredited  throughout  the  Orient.  Our  only  asset 
in  this  country  in  the  past  has  been  Chinese  good-will.  We  could 
always  get  nearly  as  much  from  the  Chinese  by  asking  for  it  as 
the  Japanese  could  get  by  force  or  bribery,  and  if  a  check  is  put 
upon  Japan's  present  policy  in  Peking,  this  Chinese  good-will  will 
still  be  a  most  valuable  asset,  unless  at  that  time  we  have  sacrificed 
it  by  becoming  implicated  with  Japan. 

Nearly  every  military  and  naval  authority  who  has  been  in  the 
East  recently  has  assured  us  that  Japan  is  no  longer  a  military 
menace,  that  her  military  resources  in  a  modern  war  would  be  ex- 
hausted in  six  months,  and  that  she  has  not  the  wealth  or  the  de- 
veloped industries  to  maintain  an  army  in  the  field  for  long  even 
if  she  were  given  ample  time  for  preparation.  We  are  told  that 
the  European  and  American  governments  no  longer  entertain  any 
fear  of  Japan's  possible  movements,  and  that  any  false  step  on 
her  part  could  be  checked  with  very  little  effort  and  expenditure 
at  almost  any  juncture. 

This  means  that  we  have  no  reason  to  fear  Japan,  as  both  Japa- 
nese and  Chinese  seem  to  believe  we  have,  and  that  when  the  vast 
Occidental  armies  now  in  Europe  are  at  liberty  to  set  elsewhere, 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        251 

there  will  be  no  difficulty  in  impressing  upon  Japan,  if  it  is  neces- 
sary, our  disapproval  of  her  policy  on  the  continent  of  Asia,  or 
of  the  advantage  which  she  takes  of  our  preoccupation  in  these 
four  years.  Consistency  and  honor  demand  that  we  must  have  some 
settlement,  that  Japan  must  be  checked  and  corrected  in  some  way. 
Those  who  have  been  storing  up  data  in  the  various  foreign  offices, 
who  have  been  keeping  elaborate  records  and  tiles,  and  have  also 
been  storing  up  indignation  for  four  years,  are  going  to  insist 
upon  some  sort  of  a  settlement,  and  the  enormous  growth  of  the 
military  power  of  America  and  Great  Britain  insures  that  it  will 
be  possible  to  dictate  to  Japan  where  and  how  her  reform  shall 
begin.  There  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  it  will  begin  in  China, 
and  that  the  end  of  the  war  will  mark  the  end  of  the  present 
Japanese  tactics,  and  at  the  same  time  the  end  of  the  peculiar  trade 
advantages  dependent  upon  them  which  Japan  is  offering  to  Amer- 
ica as  her  share  of  the  capital  in  a  cooperation  scheme. 

The  advantages  which  Japan's  partners  would  enjoy  for  the 
period  of  the  war  would  then  disappear,  and  the  disadvantage  of 
having  been  allied  with  an  unscrupulous  bully  would  begin  to  ap- 
pear. I  cannot  see  how  any  one  familiar  with  the  trend  of  opinion 
in  the  East  and  in  the  various  foreign  offices  at  home,  unless  he 
is  either  extremely  short-sighted  or  content  with  a  brief  period 
of  exploitation,  can  hope  for  any  advantage  or  profit  from  an 
alliance  with  an  unscrupulous  nation  whose  Nemesis  is  fairly  upon 
it. 

The  only  reason  that  Japanese  policy  in  China  is  not  now  as 
well  advertised  and  as  cordially  denounced  as  German  policy  in 
Europe  is  that  those  who  have  not  yet  realized  Japan's  power- 
lessness  to  do  us  any  harm  consider  it  expedient  to  reserve  judg- 
ment until  after  the  war.  Any  one  who  would  now  propose  a  com- 
mercial alliance  with  the  Germans  in  Belgium  or  Poland  would 
have  short  shrift;  but  there  is  no  reason  in  the  minds  of  most  of 
us  out  here  who  have  a  daily  opportunity  to  read  denunciations 
of  German  policy  and  to  consider  with  what  remarkable  fitness 
could  we  substitute  "Japanese"  for  "German"  wherever  the  latter 
word  occurs,  for  showing  any  more  consideration  for  those  who 
suggest  a  commercial  alliance  with  Japan  for  the  exploitation  of 
China;  and  we  do  not  believe  that  much  more  consideration  will 
be  shoAvn  when  the  war  is  over  and  the  Allies  are  free  to  put  into 
practice  here  the  theories  and  ideals  which  have  been  evolved  from 
their  experience  with  the  Germans. 

The  suggestion  which  you  made  of  allying  ourselves  with  the 
Japanese  in  order  to  correct  them,  of  taking  them  into  partner- 


252     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

ship  so  as  to  educate  them  up  to  our  standard  of  international 
decency  and  fair  play,  is  also  subject  to  an  odious  comparison  with 
a  similar  hypothetical  proposition  to  take  the  Germans  into  a 
close  alliance  in  the  development  of  much  abused  European  states 
for  the  benevolent  purpose  of  humanizing  and  educating  the  Ger- 
mans. It  is  not  our  Western  practice  to  join  bandit  forces  in 
order  to  show  the  bandits  the  errors  of  their  ways,  nor  do  we 
take  our  outlaws  into  our  armies  and  make  officers  of  them,  as  the 
Chinese  sometimes  do,  in  order  to  avoid  the  painful  duty  of  set- 
tling with  them.  If  the  sins  of  the  Japanese,  political  and  com- 
mercial, were  due  entirely  to  folly  and  ignorance,  and  if  they  were 
in  a  sufficiently  modest  state  of  mind  to  accept  tuition,  some  such 
suggestion  as  yours  might  seem  a  particularly  charitable  and  kindly 
one;  but,  as  you  know,  the  egotism  of  the  Japanese  military  party, 
which  now  controls  the  nation's  policy,  is  rivaled  only  by  the  am- 
bitious scope  and  brutality  of  that  policy,  and  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment will  never  accept  teaching  or  improve  its  international 
manners  voluntarily  until  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  better 
behavior  can  be  forced  from  it.  The  Japanese  are  a  people,  or 
rather  the  Japanese  Government  is  a  Government,  which  we  can- 
not take  into  our  arms,  but  must  take  by  the  ear.  When  the  time 
comes  for  such  treatment  to  be  administered,  as  it  must  come  if 
our  present  war  apostles  are  not  hypocrites,  we  do  not  want  to 
see  our  American  business  men  taken  by  the  ear  also  for  being 
caught  in  bad  company,  and  I  do  not  believe  that  if  our  American 
business  men  fully  realized  what  they  were  in  for,  they  would  want 
to  be  caught  under  any  such  circumstances. 

After  this  war  is  over,  we  are  going  to  be  in  as  good  a  position 
to  command  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  respect  for  our  vested  in- 
terests in  the  Orient  as  any  nation  on  earth,  and  if  we  are  then  tied 
up  with  a  chastened  and  disgraced  Japan,  we  shall  be  carrying  a 
discreditable  burden  instead  of  working  with  an  ally.  We  do  not 
want  any  monopoly  or  any  unusual  privileges  in  this  part  of  the 
world.  We  shall  be  amply  satisfied  with  equal  opportunity,  and 
we  shall  be  in  the  best  possible  position  to  insist  upon  equal  op- 
portunity both  in  our  dealing  with  China  and  in  our  relations 
with  the  other  powers  if  we  do  not  besmirch  our  reputation  now 
by  joining  Japan  in  her  filching  exploits  behind  the  world's  back. 

China  as  a  nation  is  now  chaotic.  The  people  of  this  country, 
who  have  given  the  whole  East  their  civilization  and  whose  indus- 
try has  been  the  foundation  of  much  wealth  and  power  through 
many  ages,  have  just  emerged  from  a  long  period  of  darkness  and 
have  not  yet   found   themselves.     They   are  working  very   slowly 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        253 

toward  a  realization  of  democracy,  of  which  they  have  just  sufficient 
conception  to  keep  them  groping  ahead,  and  while  they  are  reach- 
ing out  they  are  being  devoured  by  a  parasitical  official  class, 
totally  lacking  in  all  sense  of  responsibility,  ambitious  only  for  the 
wealth  which  they  can  strip  from  the  awakened  slumberer  before 
he  rubs  his  eyes,  and  now  sold,  body  and  soul,  to  the  Japanese 
expansionists,  who  are  interested  in  keeping  the  befuddled  giant 
tormented  and  distracted  while  they  get  the  pickings  from  his 
pockets  away  from  the  official  pilferers. 

Toward  such  a  people  the  Americans  and  the  British,  who  have 
been  educated  for  a  good  many  centuries  in  the  morality  of  fair 
play  and  of  giving  every  one  a  chance,  should  be  particularly  sym- 
pathetic and  helpful,  and  should  at  least  use  what  power  and  in- 
fluence they  may  have  over  the  tormentors  to  restrain  them.  All 
that  China  wants  is  that  time  to  come  to  herself  and  a  chance  to 
work  and  fight  out  her  problems  in  her  own  way,  the  right  of  a 
weak  nation  to  develop  her  strength  and  her  national  character 
without  malicious  interference.  If  the  Japanese  hand  were  with- 
drawn from  the  support  of  the  evils  which  are  dragging  China 
into  deeper  and  deeper  humiliation  every  day,  the  Chinese  people 
would  be  free  and  able  to  fight  them  and  eventually  to  conquer 
them,  and  to  set  up  a  clean  and  substantial  government  under 
which  all  the  protection  that  any  of  us  need  would  be  afforded 
without  the  necessity  for  disgraceful  and  compromising  alliances. 

This  very  long  letter  does  not  exhaust  any  of  the  questions 
with  which  it  deals,  of  course;  and,  because  the  subject  is  so  big, 
it  is  almost  impossible  to  cite  illustrations  and  proofs  for  every 
statement;  but  if  there  is  anything  in  it  which  you  feel  inclined  to 
challenge,  I  suggest  that  you  call  upon  [names  omitted]  to  supply 
you  with  illustrative  cases,  citing  places,  dates,  etc.,  and  I  am  sure 
they  will  swamp  you  with  evidence.  I  trust  that  you  will  have  a 
pleasant  trip  in  America  and  that  you  will  find  opportunity  to 
tell  a  few  people  at  home  just  how  we  look  at  things  out  here.  You 
might  always  add  with  truth  and  accuracy  that  these  opinions  are 
not  held  by  Americans  alone,  but  are  shared  by  Britishers  in  par- 
ticular, and  by  virtually  all  other  Occidentals  in  general. 

Yours  very  truly, 

As  an  example  of  how  other  foreign  business  in  China  felt 
regarding  the  Japanese-American  cooperation  scheme,  may 
be  quoted  some  comment  of  the  "Peking  and  Tientsin  Times" 
(British),  in  its  issue  of  January  9,  1918: 


254     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Now  most  of  us  in  the  Orient  would  rather  not  do  business  than 
to  do  it  on  these  terms.  The  rest  of  us  might  be  willing  to  shelve 
our  scruples  and  turn  our  trade  over  to  Japanese  agents  if  we 
thought  that  the  benefits  to  be  gained  would  be  permanent.  None 
of  us  in  the  Orient  believes  now  that  Japanese  methods  or  Japa- 
nese prestige  are  going  to  outlive  this  European  war.  As  long  as 
we  believe  that  the  Allied  and  American  governments  are  sincere 
in  the  announced  principles  for  which  they  are  fighting,  and  as  long 
as  we  believe  in  their  ultimate  victory,  we  must  believe  that  both 
Japanese  influence  and  Japanese  methods  in  this  country  are  going 
to  be  effectually  checked  after  the  war.  While  we  have  this  faith 
we  must  also  believe  that  any  American  interest  allied  with  Jap- 
anese interests  and  established  by  Japanese  methods  will  be  sub- 
ject to  the  same  check.  If  we  had  not  this  faith  we  should  still 
be  loth  to  believe  that  American  interests  entrusted  to  the  Japanese 
would  be  handled  to  the  ultimate  profit  of  anyone  but  the  Japanese. 
American  money  will  be  used  to  establish  a  Japanese  trade  mo- 
nopoly in  China.  If  the  post-bellum  readjustments  do  not  make 
an  end  of  Japanese  commercial  policy  in  China,  as  we  believe, 
then  American  money  will  have  helped  Japan  to  establish  a  system 
which  will  put  independent  American,  British  and  French  trade 
in  this  country  at  the  mercy  of  Japan,  and  will  leave  the  Japanese 
free  to  crowd  their  American  partners  out  of  the  cooperative 
scheme  at  their  earliest  pleasure.  It  must  be  clearly  manifest 
to  every  American  in  the  East  that  the  cooperative  scheme  is  com- 
mercially immoral  in  the  first  place,  and  that  apart  from  all  moral 
issues  it  is  fatally  shortsighted,  no  matter  how  conditions  are 
adjusted  after  the  war. 

The  cooperation  plan  has  also  strategical  military  aspects. 
I  quote  from  a  report  made  by  a  military  expert  in  1917 : 

The  example  set  them  by  the  previous  attempts  at  business  coopera- 
tion (in  China)  between  the  British  and  Germans,  and  its  attendant 
dangers,  seems  to  have  had  little  or  no  effect  upon  American 
business  men,  for  they  are  falling  into  the  same  trap  set  by  the 
Japanese.  Let  alone  the  utter  foolishness  of  the  arrangement 
viewed  from  a  business  standpoint,  considering  that  big  business 
of  all  kinds  in  Japan  is  under  the  dictation  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment to  a  greater  degree  than  it  is  in  Prussia,  there  is  the  ad- 
ditional point  of  assisting  financially  what  we  may  assume  to  be 
a  potential,  if  not  a  certain  enemy.  From  the  military  standpoint, 
everything  possible  ahould  be  done  to  discourage  such  cooperation. 


CHINA  AND  ECONOMIC  IMPERIALISM        255 

While  I  agree  with  the  estimate  of  Japan's  policy  toward 
China  given  in  the  letter  previously  quoted,  I  feel  that  the 
writer's  justifiable  aspersions  of  corrupt  Chinese  officials  who 
have  for  their  own  pecuniary  gain  been  willing  and  conscious 
agents  of  Japan's  schemes  may  create  a  wrong  impression. 
The  writer  of  the  letter  omits  (he  could  not  be  ignorant  of  the 
facts)  to  mention  that  class  of  Chinese  officials  outnumbering 
the  venal  ones,  who  through  all  this  period  have  resisted  at- 
tempts to  corrupt  and  intimidate  them,  and  who  never  have 
relaxed  their  efforts  to  protect  their  country. 

As  to  the  purely  business  aspect  of  the  cooperation  plan, 
I  never  have  met  an  American  business  man  who  had  five 
years'  experience  in  the  far  East  (I  don't  mean  a  long-range 
connection)  who  did  not  believe  that  cooperation  with  Jap- 
anese in  China  will  be  as  detrimental  to  the  balance-sheet  of 
American  business,  as  it  plainly  is  inimical  to  any  just,  inter- 
pretation of  American  political  purposes  and  commitments 
there. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   OPEN-DOOR   POLICY 

Definition  of  the  open  door — Talk  with  Viscount  Motono — China, 
Japan,  and  America — Monroe  Doctrine  and  Hay  Doctrine  compared — 
Their  principles  identical — The  Japanese  Monroe  Doctrine  for  China 
— False  analogies — Causes  for  failure  of  the  Hay  Doctrine — Nullified  by 
private  agreements — Japan  and  the  open  door — Manchuria  a  test  case 
— Japan's  discriminations  there — Spy  and  police  systems — Making  it 
unpleasant  for  other  foreigners — Influence  over  Chinese  officials — Reac- 
tions from  the  Lansing-Ishii  agreement — Japanese  interpretation  ac- 
cepted— Special  antagonism  to  Americans — Incidents  showing  Japanese 
contempt  for  Europeans — Case  of  British  woman  missionary — Japan 
exercising  sovereign  authority — Summary  of  methods  handicapping 
American  trade  in  Manchuria  and  Shantung — The  mail  and  shipping 
matters — Views  of  American  organizations. 

WHAT  is  the  open-door  in  China?  Broadly  speak- 
ing, it  is  a  political  principle  designed  to  apply  to 
international  commerce;  and  like  a  contract,  it 
must  be  construed  by  the  adjustment  of  particular  instances 
to  the  basic  principle  of  the  agreement.  I  have  not  seen  any 
really  authoritative  or  official  definition  of  the  open  door,  but 
I  have  my  own  idea  of  what  it  is  or  should  be  in  its  applica- 
tion in  China.  In  September,  1917,  I  passed  through  Japan 
en  route  to  America,  and  I  had  a  talk  with  Viscount  Motono, 
then  Japanese  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  at  Tokio.  It  was 
understood,  at  Viscount  Motono 's  request,  that  the  conversa- 
tion was  private  and  that  I  would  not  publish  what  he  said, 
which  I  have  not,  although,  as  a  Japanese  diplomat  who  was 
present  afterward  remarked,  there  was  nothing  said  that 
might  not  have  been  published  without  any  impropriety. 
However,  I  did  make  a  confidential  memorandum  of  the  con- 
versation, and  it  may  be  interesting  now  to  quote  a  few  para- 
graphs from  it. 

256 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  257 

I  said  that,  by  way  of  opening  the  conversation,  it  would  be 
well  to  find  out  where  we  were  in  agreement  and  where  we 
disagreed,  and  to  that  end  I  would  beg  to  state  some  of  my 
own  opinions.  I  said  that  in  my  opinion  it  was  of  little  use 
to  try  to  bring  a  genuine  improvement  of  the  situation  em- 
braced in  the  triangle  of  Japan,  China,  and  the  United  States, 
with  the  questions  arising  from  that  juxtaposition,  until 
these  nations  were  fully  agreed  on  the  definition  of  treaties; 
and  definition  of  treaties  means  a  definition  of  terms.  I  felt 
that  there  could  be  no  real  understanding  until  all  the  na- 
tions that  have  subscribed  to  the  open-door  and  integrity  of 
China  principles  were  agreed  as  to  what  these  phrases  mean 
in  practice.  There  cannot  be  any  real  sympathy  between 
Japanese  and  American  policies  toward  China  as  long  as,  for 
instance,  Japan  understands  the  open  door  to  mean  one  thing 
and  the  United  States  understands  it  to  mean  something  else, 
or  while  Japan  places  a  construction  on  the  integrity  of  China 
that  works  out  diametrically  opposite  to  the  American  theory. 

Viscount  Motono  replied  that  he  agreed  with  that  state- 
ment, and  he  asked  me  to  give  my  definition  of  the  open  door 
as  it  should  be  practised. 

I  then  stated  that  I  understood  the  open  door  to  relate 
particularly,  perhaps  exclusively,  to  commerce  in  China  and 
with  China,  commerce  to  include,  of  course,  all  financial  and 
industrial  enterprises  which  are  directly  or  indirectly  a  part 
of  general  commercial  operations.  My  idea  of  the  open  door 
in  commerce  would  be,  to  give  a  concrete  example,  if  British, 
German,  Japanese,  and  American  firms  were  competing  in 
China,  trying  to  sell  railway  supplies  or  machinery  for  a  fac- 
tory, this  competition  should  be  confined  strictly  to  legitimate 
business  methods  and  should  be  determined  on  that  basis. 
If,  for  instance,  a  Japanese  firm  found  itself  defeated  by  one 
of  its  competitors,  it  should  not  be  able  to  invoke  the  further 
support  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Japanese  Government,  ap- 
plied by  means  of  pressure  backed  by  force  or  by  the  implied 
or  actual  threat  of  force,  or  of  any  diplomatic  reprisal  against 


258     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

China.  My  idea  of  a  real  open  door  in  China  would  inhibit 
the  method  that  is  coming  to  be  called  economic  imperialism. 
I  said  that  it  had  not  been  the  practice  of  the  United  States 
Government,  even  in  regions  where  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
held  to  apply,  to  sustain  the  commercial  efforts  of  its  nationals 
beyond  the  point  of  legitimate  and  open  aid  of  the  depart- 
ments organized  for  this  work  (consular  and  commerce),  and 
consequently  such  extra  methods  by  other  governments  in 
China  or  elsewhere  placed  American  enterprises  at  a  disad- 
vantage which  could  not  fail  to  cause  irritations,  and  to  be 
provocative  of  a  similar  diplomatic  policy  by  the  United 
States,  a  situation  containing  serious  possibilities  for  war, 
and  which  had  caused  a  good  deal  of  irritation  in  the  relations 
of  Japan  and  America. 

Viscount  Motono  replied  that  he  agreed  with  this  definition 
of  the  open  door,  which  has  accorded  with  the  policjr  of  the 
Japanese  Government. 

I  said  that  I  could  not  feel  that  the  relations  of  Japan  and 
America  vis-a-vis  China  could  proceed  harmoniously  as  long 
as  Japan  was  disposed  to  pursue  a  policy  of  economic  impe- 
rialism in  China  and  was  disposed  to  assert  or  to  claim  a  spe- 
cial position  toward  China  or  any  kind  of  paramountcy  in 
China  in  a  political  and  economic  sense.  Of  course  it  would 
follow  naturally  that  the  development  of  international  trade 
with  and  in  China  would  proceed  unevenly  as  among  com- 
peting nations;  that  some  nations,  having  special  advantages 
of  location  or  otherwise,  would  gain  over  other  nations  by 
legitimate  process.  Americans  could  not  object  if  for  those 
reasons  they  were  unable  to  be  the  first  in  helping  to  develop 
China.  What  they  do  want,  and  should  demand,  is  equal 
opportunity  as  to  the  conditions  of  international  trade  with 
and  in  China,  subject  to  no  discrimination  or  preference  ex- 
cept such  as  might  be  voluntarily  instituted  by  the  Chinese 
Government  by  formal  treaties  and  for  sufficient  reasons  re- 
lating to  China's  own  just  requirements.  I  further  said  that 
as  a  resident  of  and  a  friend  of  China  I  must  regard  as  being 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  259 

invidious  to  China,  and  also  injurious  to  the  status  and  de- 
velopment of  American  interests  there,  any  policy  of  "peace- 
ful penetration"  there  by  any  foreign  nation  which  aimed  at, 
and  would  have  the  effect  of  subordinating,  the  economic  de- 
velopment of  China  to  the  control  of  foreign  nations,  and  I 
must  sympathize  with  the  natural  objections  of  Chinese  to 
such  a  process  and  aid  them  in  resisting  it. 

Viscount  Motono  replied  that  he  recognized  that  the  com- 
mercial theory  known  as  economic  imperialism  is  doomed  by 
the  defeat  of  Germany,  and  Japan  is  prepared  to  abandon  it 
if  the  other  principal  nations  will.  He  remarked,  as  ex- 
plaining Japan's  seeming  adoption  of  that  policy,  that  Japan 
had  done  this  in  self-defense,  as  a  precautionary  measure. 
He  felt  that  such  a  policy  would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
status  of  international  relations  that  was  being  aimed  at  by 
the  Allied  nations  opposed  to  Germany,  and  Japan  was  ready 
to  do  her  part  in  bringing  a  better  state  of  affairs. 

I  said  that  in  respect  to  the  integrity  of  China  I  could  not 
regard  any  assertion  or  claim  by  Japan  of  a  special  position 
or  paramountcy  in  China  as  compatible  with  a  genuine  in- 
tegrity of  China.  I  asked  if  the  Ishii  mission  to  America  had 
any  purpose  to  urge  such  a  claim  for  Japan  or  to  induce  the 
United  States  to  acquiesce  with  it. 

Viscount  Motono  replied  that  the  Ishii  mission  was  not 
ended,  and  consequently  it  would  not  be  discreet  to  speak  of 
it  too  definitely  before  its  results  were  known. 

Although  Viscount  Motono  has  since  died,  I  feel  that  no 
confidence  is  violated  now  in  making  public  my  recollection  of 
his  comments  about  the  open  door  made  less  than  eighteen, 
months  ago ;  indeed,  after  the  interview — I  sailed  for  America 
an  hour  after  the  talk  ended — a  Japanese  diplomat  told  an- 
other man  that  the  caution  about  privacy  was  not  necessary, 
as  nothing  was  said  by  Viscount  Motono  that  could  not  be 
published. 

In  speaking  to  Viscount  Motono  on  that  occasion,  I  men- 


260     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

tioned  the  Monroe  Doctrine  with  a  purpose.  For  several 
years  past,  and  until  very  recently,  Japan's  propaganda  has 
striven  to  compare  Japan's  attitude  toward  China  with  the 
objects,  purposes,  and  results  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  A 
falser  comparison  hardly  could  be  imagined.  In  one  of  my 
previous  books,  "Our  Eastern  Question,"  published  in  1916, 
I  discussed  the  so-called  "Japanese  Monroe  Doctrine  for 
China ' '  at  considerable  length,  and  wrote : 

Thus  we  see  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  intended  to  accom- 
plish two  principal  things — (a)  To  preserve  the  territorial  integrity 
and  political  autonomy  of  the  weak  American  republics;  (b)  To 
secure  and  preserve  in  those  countries  the  commercial  principle  of 
the  Open-Boor  for  all  nations.  And  when  we  look  back  at  the 
record  of  history,  from  the  enunciation  of  the  doctrine  to  the  pres- 
ent day,  we  see  clearly  that  it  has  worked  out  that  way. 

Suppose  that  the  United  States  had  used,  or  would  hereafter 
use,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  apply  in  South  America  a  commercial 
and  financial  policy  like  Japan  has  practised  in  Korea  and  Man- 
churia, and  which  is  embodied  in  her  demands  on  China  in  1915. 
Suppose  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  be  construed  to  mean 
that  no  railway  could  be  built  in  South  America  except  under  con- 
ditions dictated  by  the  United  States;  that  no  mines  or  other  natural 
resources  could  be  exploited  there  without  the  United  States  being 
first  consulted ;  that  no  foreign  loan  could  be  made  to  any  South 
American  nation  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States  being 
first  obtained,  and  except  with  American  participation  (whether 
Americans  had  the  money  to  lend  or  not)  :  that  the  United  States 
must  be  consulted  in  all  important  industrial  enterprises  requiring 
foreign  capital;  that  Americans  must  be  employed  as  political, 
financial,  and  military  advisers  to  South  American  Governments; 
that  South  American  Governments  must  consult  the  United  States 
when  they  want  to  purchase  armaments,  and  must  purchase  a  ma- 
jority of  such  supplies  from  the  United  States;  that  when  foreign 
capital  is  used  to  build  railways  in  those  countries,  American  man- 
agers must  be  employed,  and  the  traffic  rates  be  fixed  so  as  to  give 
American  commodities  an  advantage  over  other  foreign  goods; 
that  supplies  xised  in  railways  and  other  utilities  in  those  countries 
must  be  purchased  in  the  United  States,  or  be  purchased  through 
American  firms;  that  American  goods  entering  those  countries  will 
be  given  preferential  customs  rates;  that  Americans  shall  have  a 
right  to  own  lands  and  reside  in  all  parts  of  South  America,  and 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  261 

not  be  subject  to  the  laws  of  those  countries;  that  Americans  must 
be  heads  of  police  in  important  South  American  cities;  that  South 
American  Governments  could  not  lease  any  of  their  own  territories 
without  first  consulting  the  United  States;  that  no  contracts  to  build 
naval  bases  or  harbor  works  in  those  countries  would  be  permitted 
without  first  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  United  States;  that  the 
United  States  would  have  to  be  consulted  when  South  American 
countries  desired  to  change  their  fiscal  systems. 

Every  condition  I  have  enumerated,  Japan  already  has  put  into 
effect  in  Manchuria,  and  wherever  she  has  succeeded  in  establish- 
ing a  sphere  of  influence.  If  the  United  States  placed  such  a  con- 
struction on  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  how  long  would  other  Powers 
accept  the  doctrine  without  protest? 

Is  that  how  a  Jap-ized  Monroe  Doctrine  for  China,  and  the 
Orient,  will  work  out?  Is  what  Japan  is  trying  to  do  in  China 
today  rightly  comparable  to  President  Monroe's  purposes  when 
he  formulated  his  famous  doctrine?  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  de- 
signed to  protect  the  political  autonomy  of  the  countries  it  covers, 
and  to  preserve  the  "open  door"  there,  and  has  done  it.  In  short, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  its  theory,  and  also  in  its  practical  ap- 
plication, is  almost  exactly  what  the  territorial  integrity  and  open 
door  doctrines  in  respect  to  China  are,  as  they  were  originally  ad- 
vocated by  Great  Britain,  and  afterwards  formulated  by  the  United 
States.  So  there  is  already  one  Monroe  Doctrine  that  applies  to 
China — a  doctrine  which  all  the  Powers  interested  in  the  fate  of 
China  have  subscribed  to,  and  which  presumably  is  still  binding 
upon  them,  since  none  of  them  has  openly  repudiated  it. 

Japanese  have  a  completely  different  idea  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  than  Americans  usually  have.  In  a  recent  editorial 
(February  13,  1919)  on  "The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  Japan," 
the  "Japan  Chronicle"  said: 

There  are  few  political  phrases  which  have  been  subjected  to  such 
contradictory  interpretations  as  the  Monroe  doctrine  To  one  group 
it  represents  a  check  on  imperialistic  aggression  and  a  protection 
of  democracy,  to  the  other  the  predominance  of  a  strong  and  power- 
ful State  over  the  others  within  its  immediate  influence.  The  Japa- 
nese invariably  interpret  the  Monroe  doctrine  in  the  latter  sense. 

Analysis  of  the  causes  for  the  failure  of  the  Hay  Doctrine 
to  solve  the  question  of  international  political  and  trade  riv- 
alries in  China  shows  that  its  weakness,  or  what  made  it  in- 


262     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

effective,  was  that  the  powers  that  were  parties  to  it,  except 
America,  also  had  other  agreements  with  one  another  based 
on  the  sphere  of  influence  thesis,  and  when  a  practical  issue 
would  arise,  they  invariably  would  give  weight  and  authority 
to  the  private  agreements  rather  than  to  the  open  interna- 
national  doctrine.1  In  short,  a  majority  of  the  powers  did 
not  want  the  Hay  Doctrine  to  work  in  practice,  apparently 
believing  that  their  own  advantage  lay  in  protecting  by  pri- 
vate agreements  their  own  spheres  and  special  concessions. 

The  history  of  the  open-door  doctrine  may  be  divided  into 
three  periods :  first,  from  its  acceptance  in  1889  to  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War ;  second,  from  the  conclusion  of  the  Russo-Jap- 
anese War  in  1905  to  the  great  World  War ;  third,  from  the 
beginning  of  the  World  War  in  1914  to  the  present.  The 
first  period  was  marked  by  an  apparent  effort  of  several  pow- 
ers to  readjust  their  policies  in  China  in  accordance  with  a 
genuine  acceptance  of  the  principle.  The  second  period 
marked  the  appearance  of  Japan  on  the  continent  and  the  re- 
vival of  the  sphere  of  influence  idea  by  all  the  powers  except- 
ing America.  In  the  third  period  Japan  played  practically 
a  lone  hand. 

Japan's  policy  in  its  relation  to  the  open  door  in  the  years 
following  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  which  gave  Japan  control 
of  Korea  and  a  strong  foothold  in  Manchuria,  is  extensively 
reviewed  by  me  in  previous  books  ("America  and  the  Far 
Eastern  Question,"  1909;  and  "Our  Eastern  Question," 
1916) ;  but  it  was  not  until  the  Great  War  that  Japan's  pol- 
icy was  fully  displayed.  Prior  to  that  time  all  the  powers 
were  jealous  of  their  interests  and  positions  in  China,  and 
were  able  to  support  them  effectively.  During  the  war,  un- 
til near  its  end,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  were 
forced,  or  felt  compelled,  to  subordinate  their  interests  in 

i  A  good  example  of  this  process  is  the  defeat  of  the  Knox  proposal 
to  neutralize  railways  in  Manchuria,  a  full  account  of  which  is  given, 
with  the  diplomatic  notes,  in  Chapter  I  of  "Our  Eastern  Question." 
Also  see  Appendix  A. 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  263 

China  to  more  pressing  exigencies,  and  the  United  States  was 
disinclined  to  strong  action  in  the  East.  In  these  circum- 
stances Japan's  policy  came  out  in  its  true  colors. 

In  a  conversation  I  had  at  Peking  soon  after  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  with  the  late  W.  W.  Rockwell,  then  American 
minister  to  China  and  later  ambassador  to  Russia  and  Turkey, 
we  were  discussing  the  situation  in  Manchuria,  where  I  had 
just  been,  and  he  remarked:  "Manchuria  will  provide  the 
real  test  of  the  open-door  policy."  I  have  traveled  in  Man- 
churia frequently  in  the  course  of  the  last  fifteen  years  and 
have  considerable  firsthand  knowledge  of  conditions  which 
in  that  period  have  existed  there,  and  one  is  tempted  to  re- 
view them.  But  perhaps  the  best,  and  also  the  more  credible, 
picture  of  recent  events  there  as  they  touch  the  open  door  is 
found  in  the  numerous  reports  of  official  agents  of  foreign 
governments  who  have  investigated,  and  who  have  resided  in 
the  country.  I  shall  quote  from  some  of  these  recent  reports, 
without  stating  how  they  came  into  my  possession,  except 
that  in  no  case  did  I  obtain  them  from  the  men  who  prepared 
them. 

Dated,  January  16,  1918. 

Subject,  Japanese  Ways  of  Hampering  Foreign  Trade  in 
Manchuria 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria  not 
only  contrive  special  advantages  for  themselves  in  contravention  of 
the  open  door  principle — as  reported  from  time  to  time — but  they 
manage  in  various  ways  to  hamper  the  commercial  operations  of 
Europeans  and  Americans  through  their  control  of  public  and 
quasi-public  utilities,  and  through  the  questionable  methods  which 
they  are  willing  to  adopt  in  fighting  foreign  competitors.  Their 
spy  and  police  systems  are  very  highly  developed  in  this  region 
and  the  movements  of  all  foreigners  are  closely  watched  and  re- 
ported to  police  headquarters.  The  information  is  given  to  the 
Japanese  who  are  able  to  use  it  to  the  best  advantage.  Between 
the  Japanese  secret  service  men  who  pester  travelers  with  ques- 
tions and  surveillance,  hotels  which  pry  into  one's  private  affairs 
as  well  as  baggage,  telephone  operators  who  report  conversations, 
telegraph  clerks  who  work  similarly,  the  post  office  which  opens 


264     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

the  correspondence,  and  railway  employes  who  cooperate  with  the 
rest,  there  is  not  much  about  the  foreign  business  man  which  is  not 
known  to  the  Japanese  authorities. 

The  most  recent  and  interesting  case  in  point  is  that  of  Mr.  W. 
F.  Thomas,  agent  of  the  Geo.  A.  Watson  Tobacco  Company  of 
Danville,  Virginia.  He  came  to  Manchuria  last  year  to  sell  to- 
bacco. Upon  his  arrival  he  remarked  to  an  American  that  he 
had  been  followed  by  Japanese  who  were  evidently  bent  on  know- 
ing all  about  his  business  and  he  expressed  the  hope  that  they 
would  not  pry  into  his  trunks  containing  samples.  The  American 
replied  that  Mr.  Thomas  could  consider  himself  fortunate  if  the 
Japanese  did  nothing  more  than  examine  his  trunks;  that  they 
would  not  hesitate  to  steal  them  if  they  thought  that  this  would 
hamper  his  business.  Two  days  later  Mr.  Thomas  reported  that 
the  trunk  with  all  of  his  samples  had  been  stolen  while  it  was 
in  charge  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway.  In  a  letter  of  Octo- 
ber 18,  1917,  the  Geo.  A.  Watson  Tobacco  Company  described  the 
incident  as  follows:  "In  August  we  sent  our  representative,  Mr. 
W.  F.  Thomas,  to  the  East  to  solicit  business.  In  passing  through 
Japan  his  sample  trunk  was  robbed  and  every  sample  taken,  the 
trunk  being  afterward  returned  to  him  empty.  This  happened 
between  Mukden  and  Antung  on  or  about  August  21  on  the  South 
Manchurian  Railway.  Mr.  Thomas  seems  to  think  that  the  rob- 
bery was  committed  by  the  people  in  authority  for  the  purpose 
of  discouraging  American  business  houses  seeking  to  develop  to- 
bacco business  in  Manchuria  and  China."  This  is  by  no  means 
the  first  time  that  trunks  or  their  contents  have  disappeared  in 
this  way,  but  the  circumstances  of  this  ease  are  striking  and  sug- 
gestive. 

Japanese  hotels  in  Manchuria  because  of  the  large  subsidies 
which  they  receive  and  their  special  railway  privileges  have  driven 
most  other  hotels  out  of  business.  The  foreign  commercial  traveler 
therefore  is  in  some  Japanese  hotel  during  most  of  his  stay  in 
Manchuria  and  is  obliged  to  depend  on  them  almost  entirely. 
Some  of  these  Japanese  hotels  have  lately  shown  an  open  and 
decided  hostility  to  Americans.  An  agent  of  the  Standard  Oil 
Company  of  New  York  went  to  Supingkai  recently — since  the  Ishii 
mission  was  accomplished,  in  fact — and  was  met  at  the  train  by 
a  runner  from  the  Japanese  hotel  who  asked  him  to  stop  there. 
He  went  along  with  the  runner  and  when  he  arrived  at  the  hotel 
there  was  some  inquiry  as  to  his  nationality.  He  told  the  hotel 
people  that  he  was  an  American.  The  hotel  people  replied:  "Oh, 
we  thought  that  you  were  English;  we  are  very  sorry,  but  we  have 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  265 

no  room  for  you."  He  told  them  that  any  kind  of  a  room  would 
do,  but  they  refused  absolutely  to  give  him  any  accommodation 
and  turned  him  away.  He  related  this  incident  to  an  American 
traveler  for  the  British-American  Tobacco  Company  who  moves 
about  a  great  deal  in  this  region.  The  latter  stated  that  he  has 
been  treated  with  so  much  contempt  and  discourtesy  and  rudeness 
as  an  American  at  the  Japanese  hotels  in  Manchuria  that  he  had 
got  the  habit  of  registering  as  an  Englishman,  and  was  thus  able 
to  obtain  accommodations  and  good  service. 

The  attitude  of  the  Japanese  telephone  company  here  is  in  keep- 
ing with  the  policy  above  described.  The  manager  of  the  Stand- 
ard Oil  Company  has  been  trying  for  more  than  six  months  to 
have  a  telephone  installed.  Two  months  ago  the  workmen  went 
to  the  company's  native  agency,  where  oil  is  also  stored,  and  an- 
nounced their  intention  of  putting  in  the  telephone.  They  began 
the  work  shortly  before  lunch  time  and  said  that  they  wanted  to 
cook  their  food  on  the  premises.  The  Chinese  agent  refused  to 
let  them  cook  it  where  they  wanted  to  because  he  was  afraid  that 
the  oil  might  become  ignited.  The  Japanese  thereupon  became 
highly  indignant  and  went  away,  and  refuse  now  to  put  the  tele- 
phone in  at  all.  This  is  not  the  only  Japanese  difficulty  which  the 
agent  has  had  however.  At  another  place  he  called  for  the  long 
distance  service  in  order  to  talk  with  the  Tiehling  agent,  etc. 

In  a  report  from  Antung  some  years  ago,  entitled :  "Japanese 
Fraud,  as  it  affects  the  open  door,"  I  mentioned  the  case  of  a 
British  sawmill  which  was  placed  at  a  disadvantage  in  competition 
with  the  Japanese  mills  on  account  of  certain  Japanese  fraudulent 
practices.  Not  long  afterward  the  British  sawmill  was  destroyed 
by  fire  under  very  mysterious  circumstances.  While  nothing  posi- 
tive could  be  proven  against  the  Japanese,  there  was  excellent  rea- 
son to  believe  that  they  were  instrumental  in  causing  the  destruc- 
tion. The  same  may  be  said  of  the  fire  here  which  destroyed  the 
factory  of  the  British-American  Tobacco  Company.  Like  the  fires 
which  are  occurring  now  along  the  waterfronts  of  America,  the 
fires  above  mentioned  are  difficult  to  trace,  but  the  peculiar  com- 
bination of  circumstances  just  at  the  time  of  the  conflagration  are 
very  suggestive  to  say  the  least,  and  the  occurrence  of  these  fires 
in  Manchuria  do  not  encourage  the  investment  of  foreign  capital 
in  enterprises  here.      [Other  instances  given] 

"While  the  blandishments  of  Viscount  Ishii  were  calculated  to 
show  how  carefully  the  Japanese  keep  the  "open  door"  ajar,  there 
is  much  evidence  tending  to  prove  that  the  fraudulent  and  cunning 
practices  of  the  Japanese  in  this  region  destroy  the  "equality  of 


266     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

commercial  opportunity"  which  is  supposed  to  exist,  and  make 
the  "open  door"  more  fictitious  than  real.  Several  reports  in  this 
regard  have  already  been  submitted  and  more  are  now  in  the 
course  of  preparation.  Material  in  this  connection  is  being  con- 
stantly gathered  and  will  be  submitted  from  time  to  time  in  re- 
ports of  this  nature  so  that  some  adequate  opinion  may  be  formed 
as  to  just  what  extent  the  ''open  door"  is  really  open  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Japanese  in  a  region  where  their  "special  interests" 
have  now  been  formally  recognized  by  the  American  Government. 

Extracts  from  Report  dated  June  27,  1918 

Referring  to  my  despatches  to  the  Department  Nos.  113,  125 
and  127,  all  sent  through  the  Legation,  I  have  the  honor  to  further 
state  that  the  Japanese  enjoy  special  financial  and  commercial  ad- 
vantages (in  Manchuria)  not  only  according  to  the  local  Chinese 
practice,  but  according  to  theory  as  well.  In  a  recent  conversa- 
tion with  the  (Chinese)  Governor  General  concerning  the  failure 
of  (Chinese)  officials  in  this  province  to  give  Americans  and 
Europeans  the  rights  which  are  enjoyed  by  the  Japanese,  he  prac- 
tically said  that  Americans  should  be  the  last  to  complain,  as  we 
formally  and  officially  recognized  Japan's  special  interests  in  this 
region  and  that  we  cannot  be  surprised  when  they  take  advantage 
of  such  a  declaration  and  demand  special  treatment  and  get  it. 
I  tried,  of  course,  to  give  the  Governor  General  the  view  of  our 
recognition  of  special  interests  which  our  Government  tried  to  offer, 
but  he,  like  most  Chinese,  did  not  take  the  explanation  as  any- 
thing which  really  explained,  and  said  that  such  a  recognition  of 
special  interests  must  have  meant  something  special  and  it  implied 
that  the  Japanese  had  something  which  others  could  not  expect 
to  have,  and  therefore,  why  do  we  now  expect  it?  I  feel  certain 
now,  as  I  wrote  officially  long  before  we  recognized  Japanese 
"special  interests,"  that  such  a  formal  recognition  will  prove  to 
be  extremely  embarrassing  when  we  come  to  demand  equal  treat- 
ment with  the  Japanese,  and  the  conversation  above  mentioned 
indicates  the  effect  upon  the  Chinese  official  mind  which  the  recogni- 
tion has  had  and  which  it  is  likely  to  have  after  the  Japanese  care- 
fully foster  such  a  belief  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese.  While  the 
American  government  carefully  sought  to  safeguard  our  interests 
by  emphasizing  the  equal  rights  which  are  enjoyed  according  to 
the  "open  door"  theory,  the  reiteration  of  this  oft-repeated  state- 
ment did  not  impress  the  Chinese  1/100  as  much  as  the  startling 
recognition  of  Japanese  special  interests  which  they  take  to  mean 
something  very  special  that  somehow   places  the   Japanese   on  a 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  267 

higher  political  and  commercial  plane  in  the  region  to  which  this 
theory  applies. 

Enclosed  is  a  copy  of  a  letter  about  the  special  treatment  of 
the  Japanese  as  regards  the  financial  situation  here  and  a  copy 
of  the  reply  received  from  the  Special  Delegate  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs (Chinese).  It  will  be  seen  from  the  latter  that  the  Special 
Delegate  shares  the  view  of  the  Governor  General  that  the  Jap- 
anese are  entitled  to  special  treatment — probably  because  of  their 
"special  interests,"  although  he  does  not  expressly  say  so.  He 
does  say,  however: 

"The  general  conditions  relating  to  the  merchants  and  citizens 
of  your  nation  (America)  are  not  the  same  as  those  affecting  the 
Japanese;  therefore,  they  can  be  treated  only  in  accordance  with 
arrangements  made  for  the  Chinese.  The  method  adopted  is  dif- 
ferent, but  there  is  nothing  in  contravention  of  the  existing 
treaties." 

That  the  Delegate  for  Foreign  Affairs  here  should  have  the 
effrontery  probably  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Governor  General 
(for  he  seldom  acts  in  such  matters  alone)  to  maintain  in  writing 
that  American  citizens  are  not  entitled  to  the  same  treatment  as 
the  Japanese,  is  a  matter  of  the  gravest  importance  and  calls  for 
the  most  drastic  diplomatic  action,  it  seems  to  me.  And  this 
statement  by  him  has  been  made  in  spite  of  the  repeated  and  em- 
phatic declaration  on  the  part  of  this  office  that  we  demand  and 
will  insist  upon  equal  rights. 

The  correspondence  enclosed  will  also  show  that  the  Chinese 
authorities  here,  prior  to  June  8th,  warned  the  Japanese  Consul 
General  about  the  danger  of  accepting  notes  issued  by  the  Bank 
of  Territorial  Development,  requesting  him  to  notify  the  Japanese 
merchants  accordingly.  On  June  13th  he  (the  Delegate  for  Foreign 
Affairs)  said  that  he  was  just  about  to  write  to  this  office  in  this 
regard.  It  is  probable  that  he  had  no  such  intention,  and  if  he 
did  have  any  such  intention  the  question  arises  as  to  why  the 
Japanese  Consul  General  should  have  the  information  so  far  in 
advance  of  all  others.  His  letter  to  me  was  dated  June  13th  and 
received  on  the  evening  of  that  day,  yet  he  says  that  all  holdings 
of  Americans  (of  the  bank  notes)  should  be  reported  to  him  be- 
fore the  14th,  an  absolute  impossibility. 

When  the  Bank  of  Territorial  Development  was  closed,  its  notes 
immediately  dropped  in  value  and  many  refused  to  accept  them 
at  any  price.  The  Japanese,  knowing  that  they  were  safe  on 
account,  of  their  preferential  treatment  in  such  matters — as  has 
been   frequently   reported  by  this   office — bought   the   depreciated 


268     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

notes  at  a  heavy  discount,  and  foreign  firms  sold  at  a  loss  in  order 
to  avoid  being  loaded  down  with  paper  worthless  to  them.  This 
office  assured  all  Americans  concerned  that  every  effort  would  be 
made  to  have  all  notes  redeemed  for  them  on  the  same  terms  as 
for  the  Japanese,  but  they  felt  that  the  Japanese  have  such  a 
hold  throughout  China  as  well  as  in  Manchuria  that  there  is  no 
real  assurance  of  equal  treatment.  When  the  Japanese  flout  the 
British  and  American  governments,  and  British  and  Americans 
in  China  lose  confidence  in  their  governments'  willingness  or  ability 
to  protect  them,  it  is,  I  believe,  high  time  that  some  decisive  and 
definite  steps  be  taken  to  dispel  such  impressions  and  to  maintain 
the  dignity  and  prestige  of  these  two  great  occidental  nations. 
The  Japanese  also  should  be  made  to  see  that  they  cannot  steal 
a  march  on  their  Allies  in  any  such  manner  and  obtain  special 
advantages  from  the  Chinese  government  and  use  them  in  driving 
out  their  western  competitors.  The  enclosed  correspondence  and 
the  letters  in  this  connection  received  and  sent  by  my  British 
colleague  are  absolutely  identical.  We  decided  to  take  similar 
action  in  order  to  bring  the  greater  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  local 
Chinese  authorities,  and  we  now  both  agreed  that  all  local  resources 
are  exhausted  and  have  decided  to  present  the  whole  matter  to 
our  respective  Legations  for  settlement.  The  question  has  reached 
a  very  critical  stage  and  requires  the  strongest  kind  of  diplomatic 
pressure,  as  predicted  in  my  previous  despatches. 

That  the  situation  described  in  reports  on  this  subject  is  incom- 
patible with  the  "open  door"  theory  is  very  evident.  The  "open 
door'  in  China  is  a  trap-door  for  us  to  fall  through  when  the 
Japanese  are  ready  to  release  the  spring,  They  are  perfecting 
the  apparatus  from  day  to  day  and  unless  adequate  steps  are 
taken  we  shall  assuredly  be  the  victims. 

As  the  Governor  General  and  the  Delegate  for  Foreign  Affairs 
are  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  views  of  my  colleague  and 
myself,  and  as  we  have  repeatedly  expressed  ourselves  concerning 
the  equal  rights  which  we  demand  for  British  and  Americans 
and,  as  both  the  Chinese  officials  not  only  disregard  but  scorn 
the  representations  which  we  have  made,  it  is  time  for  pressure 
to  be  exerted  from  above,  if  such  a  thing  is  possible.  .  .  . 

As  the  Japanese  have  secured  a  deposit  of  three  millions  gold 
yen  to  cover  any  loss  which  they  may  incur  by  accepting  the  de- 
preciated paper  currency  here — a  fact  not  denied  by  the  Delegate 
for  Foreign  Affaris  in  his  letter,  a  copy  of  which  is  enclosed — it 
may  be  that  the  Americans  and  British  can  secure  a  similar  deposit, 
or  that  the  suggestion  of  one  might  bring  the  Chinese  to  terms. 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  269 

Some  of  the  Salt  Gabelle  money,  in  fact,  might  be  retained  for 
this  purpose  in  foreign  banks.  A  proposition  like  this  might 
readily  solve  the  problem.  Some  solution  must  be  found  if  Euro- 
pean and  American  firms  are  to  enjoy  that  ''equality  of  com- 
mercial opportunity"  which  is  supposed  to  exist. 

It  is  most  significant  that,  after  the  publication  in  China  of 
the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  and  the  interpretations  given  to 
that  instrument  by  the  Japanese  officials  and  propaganda 
there,  Chinese  officials  in  regions  with  spheres  claimed  by 
Japan  began  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  Japanese  con- 
ception of  the  agreement.  Incidents  of  discriminations 
against  other  foreigners  in  Manchuria,  and  especially  against 
Americans,  were  more  numerous  and  provocative  than  for- 
merly. These  incidents  became  so  frequent  and  pointed  that 
the  American  consul-general  at  Mukden,  on  April  9,  1918, 
asked  instruction  as  follows : 

As  several  Americans  in  this  district  have  asked  what  attitude 
they  should  take  toward  the  impudent  and  aggressive  Japanese 
officials  and  spies  in  this  region  [Manchuria],  I  should  appreciate 
some  expression  from  the  Department  on  this  subject,  which  is 
likely  to  become  very  important.  I  see  no  reason  why  the  Japa- 
nese Government  should  not  be  asked  to  instruct  their  detectives 
and  other  officials  in  such  a  way  that  their  objectionable  and  in- 
sulting activities  may  at  least  be  mitigated. 

Another  incident  showing  Japanese  particular  contempt 
for  Americans  in  Manchuria  occurred  at  Mukden  in  April, 
1915,  at  the  time  the  twenty-one  demands  were  being  pressed 
on  China  by  the  Japanese  Government,  and  when  the  Jap- 
anese press  was  representing  America  as  being  opposed  to 
the  demands.  This  was  a  demonstration  conducted  by  Jap- 
anese troops  before  the  American  consulate  at  Mukden,  and 
was  officially  reported  as  follows: 

.  .  .  the  other  party  [of  Japanese  troops],  two  score  or  so, 
turned  off  the  main  street  and  proceeded  to  the  American  Con- 
sulate General.  This  is  a  group  of  old  temple  buildings  with  a 
raised  gateway  facing  a  rather  wide  street.  This  body  of  soldiers 
baited  directly  in  front  of  the   Consulate,  and   the  commanding 


270     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

officer  stood  in  the  raised  gateway  directing  them  while  they 
maneuvered  for  some  fifteen  minutes.  The  American  flag  was  fly- 
ing overhead.    After  a  time  the  soldiers  were  marched  away. 

It  is  to  be  emphasized  that  this  demonstration  took  place  near 
the  climax  of  the  negotiations  over  the  Twenty-One  Demands, 
just  before  Japan  delivered  her  ultimatum  to  China  and  began 
to  move  troops  into  Manchuria.  Further  ...  it  was  the  climax 
of  a  series  of  outrages  [against  Americans]  by  Japanese  subjects, 
which  had  occurred  during  recent  years  in  Manchuria,  and  for 
which  I  believe  no  real  satisfaction  had  been  obtained.  These  in- 
cluded an  assault  upon  the  American  Consul  at  Dalny,  an  assault 
upon  the  American  Consul  at  Newchwang,  an  attack  upon  the  wife 
of  the  American  Consul-General  at  Mukden.  Of  course  these  in- 
cidents all  served  the  purpose  of  helping  to  convince  the  Chinese, 
who  are  so  impressionable  in  matters  of  this  kind,  that  America 
had  given  up  interest  in  Manchuria,  and  even  that  America  is 
willing  to  submit  to  what  would  appear  to  Chinese,  at  least,  a 
deliberate  and  official  affront. 

The  truculence  of  Japanese  in  China,  and  especially  in 
Manchuria  and  Shantung  has  been  growing  ever  since  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  but  it  attained  a  climax  in  1918.  The 
conduct  of  Japanese  officials  and  troops  in  Manchuria  led  to 
many  unpleasant  incidents.  I  overheard  a  colloquy  between 
British  and  American  officials  there. 

"The  Japanese  act  now  as  if  they  own  this  country,"  re- 
marked one. 

"Yes,  only  they  would  not  dare  act  in  Japan  as  they  do 
here,"  was  the  reply,  "for  in  that  case  the  foreign  govern- 
ments would  make  a  fuss." 

One  of  the  most  striking  demonstrations  of  this  attitude  of 
Japanese,  or  one  that  caused  more  than  usual  indignation 
among  other  foreigners,  was  the  expprience  of  a  young  woman 
attached  to  the  Irish  mission  at  Changchun.  Her  story,  as 
reported  in  writing  to  the  nearest  British  consul,  follows : 

Irish  Mission,  Changchun, 
October  3rd,  1918. 
Sir, 

Yesterday  afternoon  I  went  for  a  walk.  After  a  mile  or  two 
I  struck  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  line  at  a  point  I  should 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  271 

judge  to  be  two  or  three  miles  west  of  Changchun  station.  There 
was  a  good  path  along  by  the  side  of  the  railway  and  I  decided 
to  return  home  that  way  as  I  had  done  before  on  several  occasions 
without  let  or  hindrance.  I  had  gone  about  a  mile  and  was  just 
about  to  leave  the  railway  line  by  a  road  running  south  towards 
the  Mission  House,  when  I  met  three  Japanese  soldiers  coming 
from  the  direction  of  Changchun  station.  I  was  about  to  pass 
quietly  on  when  one  of  them  blocked  my  way  and  pushed  me  back 
with  his  hand,  shouting  something  unintelligible.  I  thought  that 
they  were  merely  taking  advantage  of  my  being  alone  and  un- 
protected to  indulge  in  some  horse  play,  so  stood  my  ground. 
They  could  speak  no  English  and  only  a  word  or  two  of  Chinese. 
After  a  rather  fruitless  argument  in  which  they  were  rude  and 
unpleasant,  I  decided  discretion  was  the  better  part  of  valour,  and 
tuned  to  go  back  the  way  I  had  come  only  to  find  that  way  also 
barred  by  one  of  the  other  soldiers,  who  threatened  to  strike  me 
if  I  attempted  to  pass.  There  was  an  embankment  on  either  side. 
I  protested  that  I  must  be  allowed  either  to  go  back  or  go  for- 
ward and  was  thereupon  struck  forcibly  by  the  soldier  in  front. 
I  regret  I  lost  my  temper  and  struck  the  man  across  the  face  with 
my  walking  stick.  With  that  the  three  of  them  fell  upon  me. 
They  broke  my  stick  in  two  and  beat  me  with  it.  They  buffeted 
me  about  the  face  and  head,  threw  me  down  and  dragged  me  by 
the  hair  of  the  head.  They  pulled  out  quantities  of  my  hair  and 
broke  my  combs  with  the  force  of  their  blows.  They  then  sub- 
jected me  to  a  humiliating  search,  ostensibl}'  for  bombs,  the  de- 
tails of  which  I  do  not  care  to  enter  into,  and  finally  bound  me 
with  a  rope  and  marched  me  to  barracks.  While  standing  in  the 
barracks,  bound  in  such  a  way  that  I  was  almost  choking,  await- 
ing the  arrival  of  the  superior  officer,  two  soldiers  from  among 
the  crowd  which  had  gathered  around  me  struck  me  across  the 
face  with  great  force.  I  have  the  marks  of  their  blows  still  upon 
me. 

When  the  officer  arrived  on  the  scene  he  ordered  me  to  be  un- 
bound and  brought  into  his  office,  and  I  must  admit  that  from 
that  time  on,  although  I  was  detained  for  over  three  hours  and  in- 
terviewed by  three  or  four  officials,  including  the  Vice  Consul,  I 
suffered  no  further  ill  treatment. 

I  should  like  to  emphasize  the  following  facts:  That  the  part 
of  the  line  where  I  was  walking  was  nowhere  near  any  bridges, 
munition  dumps  or  war  materials  of  any  kind;  that  I  was  struck 
first  by  the  soldier  and  that  apart  from  the  one  blow  in  self  defense 
I  offered  no  resistance  to  arrest;  that  after  I  was  bound  and  help- 


272     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

less  I  was  stuck  repeatedly  on  the  head  and  face  and  was  assaulted 
gratuitously  in  the  barracks  by  soldiers  who  had  not  seen  the 
circumstances  of  my  arrest. 

I  can  see  now  that  to  walk  along  the  railway  line  under  pres- 
ent conditions  was  a  mistake  as  there  may  be  regulations  forbid- 
ding it  of  which  I  was  unaware,  but  I  had  walked  that  way  several 
times  before  without  being  molested.  Granting  even  that  my  arrest 
was  justifiable,  the  brutality  with  which  it  was  effected  and  the  un- 
speakable conduct  of  the  soldiers  subsequent  to  it  were  utterly 
indefensible  and  inexcusable. 

Much  as  I  resent  the  intolerable  indignity  to  which  I  have  been 
subjected  I  would  be  glad  to  avoid  the  publicity  involved  in  bring- 
ing the  matter  before  you,  Sir,  but  I  feel  that  it  is  my  duty  as  a 
British  subject  to  bring  the  facts  to  your  notice.  I  have  also  sought 
the  advice  of  the  only  Anglo-Saxon  diplomatic  agent  at  present 
in  Changchun,  W.  M.  Palmer,  Esq.,  Commercial  Attache  to  the 
American  Legation,  who  strongly  recommends  your  being  informed 
of  the  occurrence.  I  have  therefore  written  you  full  details  in 
the  hope  that  you  may  be  able  to  take  the  steps  necessary  to  secure 
satisfaction  for  this  and  to  avoid  similar  outrages  against  others 
of  my  countrymen  resident  in  Manchuria. 

I  am,  Sir, 

Yours  faithfully, 

On  receipt  of  this  report,  a  British  consular  officer  went  to 
Changchun  to  make  an  investigation.  He  was  treated  rudely 
by  the  Japanese  consul  there,  but  he  obtained  most  of  the 
facts,  which  he  reported  to  the  British  legation  at  Peking. 
As  usual  in  such  instances,  the  Japanese  press  tried  to  ob- 
scure and  misrepresent  the  incident.  The  "Manchurian 
Daily  News,"  organ  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway,  pub- 
lished in  its  issue  of  October  22,  1918 : 

Another  Unpleasant  Affair  Near  Changchun 

We  are  sorry  to  have  to  report  another  unpleasant  affair,  this 
time  involving  a  British  lady  missionary  at  Changchun.  The  in- 
cident would  have  been  passed  over  by  us  if  the  matter  had  not 
been  carried  to  the  British  Legation  at  Peking. 

On  the  2nd  inst.,  about  6  p.  m.,  after  the  shadows  of  dusk 
sufficiently  deepened  as  to  make  it  difficult  to  tell  the  people's 
faces,  the  figure  of  some  one  taking  a  walk  up  and  down  the  rail- 
way track  at  Sbihipu,  about  three  miles  south  of  Changchun,  could 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  273 

be  made  out.  Lately  the  fish  plates  and  rivets  of  the  railway 
tracks  had  often  been  found  removed  to  the  menace  of  the  railway 
traffic.  The  stranger  was  found  to  be  a  British  lady  missionary 
residing  at  Changchun,  who,  when  challenged  by  one  of  the  Japa- 
nese patrolling  soldiers  made  as  if  to  deal  a  blow  on  the  soldier 
with  a  cane  carried  in  hand.  This  only  strengthened  the  suspicion 
of  the  Japanese  soldier,  and  the  lady  was  taken  to  the  Railway 
Guard  Office,  then  to  the  Gendarmery,  and  lastly  to  the  Consular 
Police.  The  lady  was  found  in  a  temper,  but,  it  is  said,  finally 
owned  her  own  indiscretion  in  strolling  along  the  railway  track 
after  dark.     She  was  allowed  to  go  home  without  further  ado. 

It  transpired  later  on  that  a  complaint  about  an  alleged  insult 
to  a  British  lady  was  lodged  with  the  British  Consul  General, 
Mukden,  who  hastened  in  person  to  Changchun  and  saw  Japanese 
Consul  Yamanouchi,  demanding  an  apology  from  the  offending 
Japanese  soldier.  Mr.  Yamanouchi  expressed  his  wonder  how  it 
was  that  the  lady  who  had  owned  her  own  indiscretion  and  gone 
home  should  lay  a  complaint,  but  promised  to  look  into  the  truth 
of  the  case  for  himself.  Mr.  O'Brien  Butler,  the  British  Consul 
General,  then  returned  to  Mukden.  Before  hearing  from  the  Japa- 
nese Consul  at  Changchun,  a  version  of  the  incident,  as  rendered 
by  the  lady  missionary,  was  transmitted  to  the  British  Legation, 
Peking,  and  the  case  was  duly  referred  to  the  Japanese  Legation 
people.  Thereupon  the  Legation  authorities  asked  the  Consular 
people  at  Changchun  for  particulars,  and  the  matter  was  very 
carefully  gone  into. 


We  should  like  to  hear  the  story  of  the  other  side  or  at  least 
some  official  account  of  the  regrettable  incident  before  committing 
ourselves  to  any  remarks.  However,  we  are  nevertheless  sorry 
that  another  unpleasantry  should  have  thus  been  added. 

It  may  be  well  for  us  to  publish  that  a  Japanese  soldier  on 
duty  is  only  alive  to  duty  and  respects  no  person.  This  trait  is 
one  of  the  points  that  make  the  Japanese  soldiers  formidable. 
For  instance,  inside  a  war  zone  or  even  a  closely  guarded  zone, 
any  one  who  fails  to  respond  to  a  challenge,  especially  after  night- 
fall, made  by  a  Japanese  sentry  or  patrol  will  be  courting  the 
danger  of  being  fired  at. — Ed.     M.  D.  N. 

Of  the  scores  of  specific  occurrences  that  I  have  informa- 
tion of  from  official  sources,  I  mention  one  that  illustrates 
one  phase  of  the  constant  efforts  of  Japan  to  establish  actual 


2?4     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

sovereignty  in  China  and  to  force  the  nationals  of  other  na- 
tions to  recognize  it.  I  quote  from  an  official  report,  dated 
June,  1918 ; 

Recently  .  .  .  ,  a  British  subject  who  represents  one  of  the 
largest  of  British  firms  in  the  East  in  this  territory  (Manchuria) 
and  who  is  well  known  personally  to  the  inhabitants  of  this  region, 
was  traveling  on  a  train  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway.  One 
of  the  Japanese  train  officials,  after  having  been  very  impudent 
in  making  inquiries  regarding  the  passenger's  personal  affairs  and 
business,  demanded  to  see  his  passport.  The  passenger  was  not 
accustomed  to  carry  his  passport,  as  it  is  not  required  by  the 
Chinese  authorities  and  he  is  well  known.  He  even  was  known 
to  the  train  employes  from  having  traveled  so  frequently  on  the 
line.  When  he  could  not  produce  a  passport  he  was  treated  with 
indignity  and  violence  by  the  train  employes.  When  the  train 
reached  Changchun,  he  was  taken  to  a  police  station  (Japanese) 
and  detained  there  for  several  hours  and  subjected  to  various  ex- 
aminations. He  was  refused  an  interpreter.  He  was  finally  taken 
before  the  Japanese  Consul,  who,  so  the  British  subject  reports, 
said:  "In  the  view  and  contention  of  the  Japanese  Government 
you  are  in  Japanese  territory  (the  railway  zone)  and  must  sub- 
mit to  the  Japanese,  who  are  the  ruling  authority  in  the  East  and 
must  be  obeyed."  The  Japanese  Vice  Consul  said  that  he  had  in- 
structions that  no  foreigner  was  to  be  allowed  to  travel  on  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway  without  having  a  passport  visaed  by  a 
Japanese  Consul.  He  also  told  the  Britisher  that  he  could  not  re- 
main in  Changchun  without  having  his  passport  visaed  by  the  Jap- 
anese consulate  there.  It  may  be  interesting  to  state  that  the  firm 
for  which  his  Britisher  traveled  is  a  strong  competitor  in  the  Orient 
of  the  big  Japanese  sugar  factors. 

Recently  a  special  agent  of  the  United  States  Department  of 
Commerce  made  a  summary  of  the  disabilities  under  which 
American  merchants  now  operate  in  Manchuria  and  Shan- 
tung, as  follows : 

1.  Delays  at  the  Japanese  banks.  Shroffs  of  American 
and  other  foreign  firms  are  made  to  wait  while  Japanese  are 
given  prompt  attention. 

2.  Holding  of  goods  at  the  ports  of  entry  and  railway  sta- 
tions on  various  pretexts,  while  goods  shipped  by  or  con- 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  275 

signed    to    Japanese    merchants    are    moved    and    handled 
promptly. 

3.  Similar  delays  at  Kobe,  Japan,  and  at  other  points  of 
transhipment,  where  cargo  shipped  by  or  consigned  to  Ameri- 
can firms  is  held  up,  while  cargo  shipped  by  or  consigned  to 
Japanese  firms  is  moved  promptly. 

4.  Special  favors  accorded  by  the  railways  in  China  under 
Japanese  control  to  Japanese  shippers,  including  an  obscure 
system  of  rebates. 

5.  Subjection  of  Chinese  to  a  ''graft"  system,  except  those 
who  work  in  with  the  Japanese. 

6.  Encroachments  on  Chinese  business  and  property,  except 
those  who  work  in  with  the  Japanese. 

7.  Evasion  of  local  Chinese  taxes  by  Japanese  traders  and 
merchants,  while  other  foreign  merchants  and  the  Chinese 
have  to  pay  them. 

8.  Manipulation  of  public  utilities  controlled  by  Japanese, 
like  postal  and  telephone  and  telegraph  communications,  to 
give  advantage  to  Japanese  merchants. 

9.  Taking  advantage  of  the  war  censorship  and  the  circum- 
stances which  have  caused  mails  from  America  destined  to 
China  and  other  places  in  the  Orient  to  be  turned  over  to  the 
Japanese  postal  authorities  in  Japan  to  be  forwarded,  to 
delay  the  business  mail  of  American  firms  trading  in  China 
and  other  Oriental  countries,  to  learn  the  business  secrete  of 
those  firms,  and  to  use  the  information  thus  gained  to  obtain 
the  business  for  Japanese  firms ;  and  similar  use  of  telegraph 
and  other  communications  controlled  by  Japan. 

10.  Refusing  space  in  Japanese  ships  to  American  cargo  in 
order  to  give  advantage  to  competing  Japanese  firms,  and 
giving  lower  rates  or  rebates  to  Japanese  shippers  than  are 
given  to  competing  American  firms. 

11.  Counterfeiting  of  the  trade-marks  and  other  distin- 
guishing features  of  well-known  American  manufactured  ar- 
ticles and  the  extensive  sale  in  China  of  inferior  Japanese 
imitations  of  those  articles. 


276     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

A  large  volume  could  be  filled  with  specific  citations  of 
evidence  and  proofs  of  the  allegations  contained  in  that  sum- 
mary. Many  of  the  matters  it  mentions  have  in  recent  years 
become  the  occasion  of  action  and  recommendations  by  Amer- 
ican commercial  organizations  in  China.  The  delay  and 
wrong  uses  of  American  mails  made  possible  by  the  censor- 
ship in  Japan  finally  caused,  in  1918,  the  American  Govern- 
ment to  order  that  American  mails  destined  to  China  should 
be  sent  by  American  ships  only,  and  that  they  should  not  be 
transhipped  at  Japan,  thereby  avoiding  their  being  over- 
looked by  Japanese.  The  reason  for  this  transhipment  of 
American  mails  was  to  save  time.  For  instance,  ships  from 
America  touch  first  at  Yokohama,  then  proceed  to  Kobe  and 
Nagasaki,  with  stops  at  each  port.  By  taking  the  mails  off  a 
ship  as  soon  as  it  reaches  Yokohama,  and  sending  them  on  by 
rail  to  Shimonoseki,  thence  by  Japanese  ship  to  Shanghai,  or 
by  rail  through  Korea  and  Manchuria  to  Tientsin  and  Peking, 
several  days  can  be  saved.  Also,  during  the  war,  many  Amer- 
ican and  British  ships,  and  Japanese  mail  ships  from  Amer- 
ica, proceeded  from  Nagasaki  to  Manila  before  going  to 
Shanghai,  and  the  China  mails  and  passengers  were  trans- 
ferred. 

The  manipulation  of  Japanese  shipping  in  the  China  and 
trans-Pacific  trade  during  the  war  against  American  and 
other  foreign  commerce  was  the  cause  of  bitter  complaints. 
I  quote  from  a  consular  report  on  this  subject : 

Subject :  Shipping  Activities  of  Japanese  in  the  Far  East. 
Aug.  31,  1917. 

Much  complaint  is  made  regarding  Japan's  unfair  methods.  The 
Japanese  have  their  national  characteristics,  and  they  may  be  ex- 
pected to  exploit  every  form  of  what  we  may  consider  questionable 
trade  maneuvering  in  accomplishing  their  ends.  This  should  be 
taken  for  granted,  and  should  be  met  and  overcome  by  the  demon- 
strated superior  abilities  which  Americans  are  capable  of  display- 
ing. .  .  . 

In  the  enclosed  memorandum,  an  alert  and  active  trader  has  sum- 
marized a  number  of  startling  shipping  reports,  all  of  which,  I 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  277 

am  assured  and  believe,  may  be  supported,  in  a  general  sense,  con- 
fidentially, by  affidavits. 

I  quote  from  the  annual  report  of  the  American  Association 
of  China  made  on  December  29,  1914: 

Turning  now  from  trade  in  general  to  some  particular  consider- 
ations— what  is  the  outlook?  American  cotton  formerly  held  a 
premier  position  in  Manchuria.  Under  Russian  occupation,  every 
nation  stood  on  an  equal  footing  in  Manchuria.  The  same  duties 
and  charges  were  assessed  against  all  and  facilities  for  distributing 
goods  and  doing  business  in  general  were  satisfactory.  Now  it  is 
all  changed.  Under  Japanese  administration,  no  chance  to  advance 
its  own  trade  is  overlooked  and  to  competitors  the  means  taken 
appear  to  be  a  departure  from  fair  trading.  In  fact,  they  con- 
stitute a  most  serious  violation  of  the  open  door  principle  on  which 
the  diplomacy  of  the  United  States  in  China  is  based.  Japanese 
competition  takes  the  form  of  a  system  of  rebates  not  only  in 
freight  and  steamer  rates,  but  in  remission  of  duties  and  charges 
which  are  assessed  against  all  other  nations.  In'  addition  to  this 
many  forms  of  petty  annoyances  have  been  worked  out  for  the 
non-Japanese  trader,  and  the  imitation  of  established  trade-marks 
is  common. 

Now  that  the  Japanese  are  in  Shantung,  not  the  mere  foothold 
that  the  Germans  held  at  Tsingtau,  but  with  an  apparent  deter- 
mination to  dominate  the  Province,  the  same  tactics  may  be  ex- 
pected, since  it  would  be  exactly  in  line  with  the  course  employed 
in  Korea  and  Manchuria.  With  Dalny  on  the  northern  promontory 
and  Tsingtau  on  the  southern  Japan  has  secured  a  potential  con- 
trol of  the  trade  of  North  China  from  the  Russian  frontier  to 
the  Yangtze  upon  whose  valley  her  traders  have  long  cast  covetous 
eyes.  In  this  connection  it  will  become  apparent  that  not  only 
ourselves,  but  other  nationalities  face  a  loss  of  trade. 

The  apprehensions  expressed  about  results  of  Japan's  oc- 
cupation of  Shantung  have  been  fully  justified  by  events. 

The  American  Association  of  China  is  composed  of  repre- 
sentative American  residents  of  all  classes  and  occupations. 
The  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  China,  as  its  name 
implies,  is  composed  of  business  men  principally.  The  offi- 
cers of  the  chamber  in  1918  were :  J.  Harold  Dollar,  of  the 
Robert  Dollar  Company,  President;  W.  C.  Sprague,  manager 


278     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

of  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  Vice-President;  J.  W.  Galla- 
gher, of  the  United  States  Steel  Products  Company,  Treas- 
urer; J.  B.  Powell,  of  "Millard's  Review,"  Secretary.  The 
chamber  recently  made  public  the  following  letter : 

Shanghai,  December  16,  1918. 
Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch, 

American  Minister  to  China, 
Peking. 
Dear  Sir: 

The  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  China,  several  members 
of  which  organization  have  interests  in  Tsingtao,  have  the  honor 
to  draw  your  urgent  attention  to  the  terms  on  which  the  Japanese 
Government  has  declared  its  readiness  to  restore  the  Leased  Terri- 
tory of  Kiaochow  to  China  and  to  what  in  our  opinion  would  be 
their  inevitable  consequence  to  American  interests  in  North  China. 

You  will  recall  that  the  Note  relative  to  the  Leased  Territory 
presented  by  the  Japanese  Minister  to  the  Chinese  Government 
in  the  autumn  of  1917  stated — we  quote  the  translation  published 
by  the  "Japan  Chronicle"  on  November  8th,  1917 — that : 

"When  after  the  termination  of  the  present  war  the  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiaochow  Bay  is  completely  left  to  the  free  disposal  of 
Japan,  the  Japanese  Government  will  restore  the  said  leased  terri- 
tory to  China  under  the  following  conditions: 

"1.  The  whole  of  Kiaochow  Bay  to  be  opened  as  a  commercial 
port. 

"2.  A  concession  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Japan  to 
be  established  at  a  place  to  be  designed  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment. 

"3.  If  the  foreign  powers  desire  it,  an  international  concession 
may  be  established. 

"4.  As  regards  the  disposal  to  be  made  of  the  buildings  and 
properties  of  Germany  and  the  conditions  and  procedures  relating 
thereto,  the  Japanese  Government  shall  arrange  the  matter  by  mutual 
agreement  before  the  restoration." 

We  submit  that  in  view  of  actual  developments  there  these  terms 
would  amount  in  reality  to  the  absolute  control  of  Tsingtao  and 
its  hinterland  by  the  Japanese  and  would  in  effect  be  equivalent, 
from  a  business  point  of  view,  to  outright  annexation  of  the  Port 
and  to  virtual  annexation  of  the  Province  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment. For  the  concession  which  the  Japanese  intend  to  demand 
is  that  part  of  Tsingtao  in  which  the  commerce  of  the  Port  is 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  279 

inevitably  centered,  namely  the  districts  surrounding  the  harbor, 
the  Customs  House,  and  the  proposed  new  railway  goods  station. 
The  part  of  the  town  left  for  an  international  concession  would  be 
the  present  residential  district  and  this  could  be  rendered  valueless 
from  the  point  of  view  of  revenue  by  such  ''disposal"  as  is  proved 
in  clause  4  of  the  terms  quoted  above,  which  would  even  include 
the  Public  Slaughter  House  and  the  Electricity  Station. 

The  evidence  for  this  view  of  Japanese  intention  is  unmistakable 
and  patent.  It  meets  the  eyes  in  business  houses,  banks,  schools 
and  tea-houses,  and  private  residences,  all  the  outcome  of  an  adroitly 
conceived  and  rapidly  executed  program  designed  entirely  to  oc- 
cupy and  effectively  to  enrich  the  district  essential  to  trade  and 
commerce.  What  Japanese  control  of  wharves,  railways  and  Cus- 
toms Houses  would  mean,  has,  we  submit,  been  amply  illustrated 
in  Dalny  and  Manchuria,  where  are  practically  no  prospects  what- 
ever of  American  or  other  "foreign"  participation  in  business 
which  should  be  open  to  all. 

Accordingly  we  urge  that  if  non-Japanese  subjects  are  to  have 
equal  opportunities  with  the  Japanese  for  business  in  Tsingtao 
and  the  Province  of  Shantung  as  a  whole,  the  whole  port  should 
be  either  internationalized  or  restored  to  the  Chinese  Government, 
and  further  that  in  either  case,  if  the  Japanese  be  given  the  choice 
of  location  for  their  concession  all  wharves,  railways  and  Customs 
House  should  be  kept  from  their  control. 

We  urge  this  not  on  behalf  of  American  interests  in  Tsingtao, 
but  on  behalf  of  those  of  Shanghai  and  Tientsin,  the  export  and 
import  trade  of  which  would  be  seriously  handicapped  were  con- 
trol of  this  port  and  of  the  Shantung  Railway  and  its  proposed  ex- 
tensions to  be  vested  in  Japanese  hands,  to  be  made  the  hinge  of 
an  Open  Door  for  Japanese  only.  In  view  of  the  recent  develop- 
ments in  America  and  the  probability  of  an  almost  immediate 
discussion  of  the  Far  Eastern  situation  as  a  whole  we  feel  sure 
that  you  will  appreciate  the  urgency  of  this  memorandum. 

As  to  the  preference  of  this  Chamber  in  reference  to  the  future 
disposition  of  this  former  German  leased  property,  we  are  in  favor 
of  making  it  a  real  international  settlement  with  all  harbor  facilities 
and  water-front  privileges  under  the  absolute  control  of  an  in- 
ternational commission.  As  soon  as  our  special  committee  can  make 
further  investigation  of  this  matter  of  international  control,  we 
shall  take  pleasure  in  sending  to  you  copies  of  our  memorandum 
and  recommendations. 

As  you  are  doubtless  aware,  detailed  information  corroborating 


280     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

and  illustrating  our  views  is  already  in  the  possession  of  the  Amer- 
ican Government,  but  should  you  require  further  or  specific  par- 
ticulars, we  shall  be  ready  to  supply  them. 
Very  truly  yours, 
(Signed)   American  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  China. 

I  include  an  extract  from  a  letter  written  by  an  American 
business  man  who  has  resided  at  Tsingtau  before  and  during 
the  war,  and  the  comment  of  the  office  of  the  American  Com- 
mercial Attache  to  China  on  the  letter.  The  letter  was  written 
in  July,  1917  (my  italics)  : 

If  you  want  to  do  some  real  good  to  American  business  men  it 
would  be  well  for  you  to  find  some  means  to  transport  merchandise 
to  and  from  China,  without  compelling  a  shipper  to  have  a  Japanese 
connection  in  order  to  ship  his  goods.  It  is  very  nice  for  the  De- 
partment of  Commerce  to  send  men  abroad  to  gather  information, 
and  to  maintain  a  foreign  service,  but  the  whole  purpose  is  handi- 
capped because  of  lack  of  shipping  facilities.  If  a  buyer  buys  goods 
here  in  north  China  he  is  at  the  mercy  of  the  foreign  steamship  lines 
entirely,  the  agents  of  which  are  likewise  merchants  who  want  to 
market  their  own  goods.  The  same  thing  applies  to  imports.  .  .  . 
The  plain  truth  is,  if  you  don't  buy  through  the  Japanese  here,  you 

can't  ship  your  goods.     Ask  Mr. ,  who  says  he  cannot  fly  the 

American  flag,  nor  put  a  sign  in  English  on  his  gate-post  because  of 
the  Japanese  regulations. 

Comment  of  Commercial  Attache. 

I  am  in  receipt  of  your  communication  of  Sept.  7,  enclosing  a 
letter  from  Tsingtau,  dated  July  27  and  addressed  to  the  Department 
of  Commerce  and  Labor.  You  ask  me  for  my  opinion  as  to  whether 
or  not  the  statements  made  in  the  enclosure  are  justified.  In  most 
parts  I  believe  the  statements  are  justified  by  facts.  Japan  appears 
to  be  doing  everything  within  her  power  to  strengthen  her  position 
in  China,  before  the  conclusion  of  the  war.  The  Japanese  Govern- 
ment evidently  has  instructed  Japanese  shipping  companies  to  dis- 
criminate against  shippers  of  other  than  Japanese  nationality.  I 
make  this  statement  as  a  result  of  evidence  furnished  me  by  Ameri- 
can merchants  in  China.  Several  American  firms  have  informed  me 
that  they  have  been  refused  space  on  Japanere  steamers  for  cargo, 
which  space  was  subsequently  given  to  Japanese  firms.     A  very  com- 


THE  OPEN-DOOR  POLICY  281 

mon  complaint  on  the  part  of  American  firms  in  China  is  that  goods 
in  transit  through  Kobe  either  to  or  from  the  United  States  and 
China,  are  often  held  unnecessarily  at  Kobe,  while  the  transshipment 
of  goods  shipped  by  Japanese  firms  on  the  same  ships  and  destined 
to  or  from  the  same  ports,  is  expedited.  One  firm  informed  me  that 
certain  materials  for  a  heating  plant,  shipped  from  the  United  States 
and  destined  to  Peking,  via  Kobe,  lay  in  Kobe  for  three  months, 
during  which  time  Japanese  firms  were  bidding  on  the  same  mate- 
rials at  Peking  and  offering  immediate  delivery.  American  firms  in 
Shanghai  state  that  shipments  of  steel  and  iron  from  the  U.  S.  to 
China,  via  Japanese  ships  during  the  past  two  years,  have  been  ar- 
riving short,  the  Japanese  shipping  companies  willingly  paying  all 
claims  for  such  shortages.  In  one  case  a  Japanese  ship  was  beached 
in  Japan,  and  the  cargo  of  American  iron  and  steel  billed  to  Ameri- 
can firms  in  China,  was  removed  and  the  claims  of  these  firms  was 
paid  in  full.  These  methods  were  used  to  secure  all  possible  stocks 
of  American  iron  and  steel  for  the  Japanese  ship-building  industry. 

American  merchants  in  China  also  state  that  Japanese  shipping 
companies  use  information  secured  through  shipping  documents  of 
American  firms  to  assist  Japanese  merchants.  Another  source  of 
embarrassment  to  American  shippers  comes  in  practices  of  the 
Japanese  in  Tsingtau  and  Dairen.  .  .  . 

On  the  whole,  it  appears  that  Japan  is  doing  everything  possible 
in  the  United  States  to  make  it  appear  that  America  will  have  noth- 
ing to  fear  from  Japanese  paramountcy  in  China,  or,  in  other 
words,  that  a  so-called  Japanese  Monroe  Doctrine  in  Asia  will  guar- 
antee to  America  equality  of  trade  opportunity  in  China.  Further- 
more, it  appears  that  Japan  is  also  trying  to  convince  the  American 
public  that  it  will  fare  well  with  Japanese  control  of  Pacific  ship- 
ping. Unfortunately,  Japan's  acts  in  China  are  not,  in  any  sense, 
in  keeping  with  the  representations  made  through  her  agencies  and 
propaganda  in  the  United  States.  Here  in  China,  Japan  is  doing 
everything  possible  to  block  American  enterprise  and  to  force  Amer- 
ican trade  with  China  to  pass  through  Japanese  channels.  ...  I 
fear  that  protests  to  Japan  at  this  time  will  be  futile.  Our  most 
effective  recourse  lies  in  providing  such  American  shipping  and 
other  facilities  as  will  conserve  our  trade  independence. 

The  discrimination  of  Japanese  shipping  companies  during 
the  war  against  merchandise  shipped  to,  from  or  through  other 
foreign  firms  in  China,  was  especially  noticeable  also  on  the 
Yangtze  River.     This  question  of  ships  as  a  means  for  the  pro- 


282     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

motion,  or  the  obstruction,  of  foreign  trade  is  one  of  tre- 
mendous importance  to  the  American  nation ;  for  ships  or  the 
lack  of  them  can  be  made  to  interpose  handicaps  to  trade  as 
effectual  as  discriminating  tariff  or  taxation  regulations. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  SIBERIAN   QUESTION 

Siberia  and  the  Eastern  question — Their  close  relation — Developments 
after  Russia's  collapse — Japan  and  intervention — The  attitude  of  Rus- 
sians^— The  propaganda  for  intervention — Japan's  sounding  of  the  Allies 
— Attitude  of  France — Great  Britain's  attitude — Japan  and  Germany 
— Danger  of  a  combination — The  interests  of  China — The  menace  to 
China — Japan's  proposal  to  intervene  exclusively — Motives  of  Great 
Britain  and  France — Effort  to  obtain  America's  assent — A  flood  of 
propaganda — America's  interest  analyzed — Importance  of  protecting 
democratic  peoples — Territorial  proximity — The  old  diplomacy  at  work 
— Suspicion  of  Japan — Rejection  of  the  one-nation  plan — Change  of  Ja- 
pan's attitude — Conversion  from  asset  to  liability. 

SIBERIA  is  bound  up  inextricably  with  the  far-Eastern 
problem,  and  when,  following  the  collapse  of  govern- 
ment in  Russia  in  1917,  disorder  extended  to  Russia's 
Asiatic  territories,  it  reacted  strongly  on  the  international 
balance  of  power  in  that  region,  and  came  at  once  into  the 
purview  of  the  politics  of  the  Great  War. 

Japan  was  the  more  sensitive  of  the  meaning  and  possibili- 
ties of  these  developments.  There  is  much  evidence  that  the 
Tokio  Government  hardly  knew  how  to  take  them  at  first. 
Regarded  one  way,  the  disorganization  of  Russia  complicated 
Japan's  position  in  world  politics  seriously.  From  another 
point  of  view,  the  inability  of  the  new  Russian  Government 
to  protect  the  outlying  territories  of  the  old  empire,  and  their 
weakness  as  separate  governments,  might  bring  a  great  oppor- 
tunity for  Japan's  expansion  on  the  continent.  This  pros- 
pect was  so  alluring  that  for  a  time  it  almost  diverted  Jap- 
anese attention  from  China.  Two  schools  of  opinion  quickly 
formed  in  Japan  on  this  question,  having  the  common  object 

283 


284     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

of  gaining  advantage  for  Japan,  but  differing  as  to  the  meas- 
ures to  be  taken  to  accomplish  that  end. 

Sifted  down,  the  course  which  almost  unanimously  would 
have  been  indorsed  by  Japanese  sentiment  was  to  send  a  large 
military  force  into  Siberia,  occupy  that  country  as  far  to  the 
east  as  seemed  practicable  and  expedient,  use  the  period  of 
occupation  to  intrench  Japanese  interests  there,  prolong  the 
period  of  occupation  as  long  as  possible,  and  then  to  use  the 
position  so  gained  as  a  trading  proposition  at  the  general 
peace  settlement.  But  there  were  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
putting  this  policy  into  effect.  For  Japan  to  have  acted  in- 
dependently would  have  caused  serious  complications  with 
strong  nations  in  the  Allied  group.  The  situation  perhaps 
can  be  made  clear  by  an  analysis  of  the  overlapping  national 
interests  and  sensibilities  that  were  involved. 

If  Japan  alone  had  sent  troops  into  Siberia  and  had  occu- 
pied that  territory,  without  doubt  it  would  be  construed  by 
the  greater  part  of  the  Russian  people  as  a  thinly-masked  en- 
croachment. Russians  would  assuredly  believe  that  Japan's 
ultimate  purpose  was  acquisition  of  the  territory  so  occupied, 
by  the  same  process  that  Germany  was  then  using  in  the  west 
of  Russia,  and  Japan  used  in  Korea,  Manchuria  and  Shantung. 
Russians  profoundly  distrust  Japan,  which  nation  they  regard 
as  absolutely  autocratic  and  imperialistic  in  form  of  govern- 
ment and  national  aims.  At  that  juncture  the  great  masses  of 
Russians,  however  keenly  they  felt  that  they  must  for  the 
time  accept  the  unsatisfactory  peace  with  Germany,  would  be 
less  resentful  of  German  penetration  than  of  a  similar  Japan- 
ese penetration.  As  between  a  European  or  an  Asiatic  foreign 
domination  of  them,  Russians  will  prefer  to  be  controlled  by 
a  white  civilization.  That  is  the  fundamental  psychology  of 
this  juxtaposition  with  Russians  en  masse.  Allied  "assist- 
ance" of  Russia,  which  took  the  shape  of  an  Asiatic  invasion 
of  Russia's  far-Eastern  possessions  by  a  nation  which  only  a 
decade  before  was  at  war  against  Russia  in  that  region,  prob- 
ably would  have  dried  up  any  remaining  sentiments  of  sym- 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  285 

pathy  for  the  Allied  war  aims  among  Russians  and  inclined 
them  to  accept  Germany's  efforts  at  conciliation  and  peace- 
ful penetration  of  Russia  in  Europe,  and  would  provide  Ger- 
man agents  in  Russia  with  a  potent  anti-Allies  argument. 
At  that  time  the  military  situation  in  Europe  was  precarious, 
and  it  was  thought  to  be  very  inexpedient  to  risk  turning 
Russian  sentiment  wholly  against  the  Allies.  Moreover,  the 
question  had  numerous  other  aspects  which  affected  the  in- 
terests of  other  nations  and  world  conditions  after  the  war. 

The  idea  that  Japan  should  intervene  in  Siberia  was  first 
advanced  in  the  summer  of  1917.  It  always  is  interesting  to 
watch  Japan's  publicity  propaganda  in  its  handling  of  such 
matters.  In  this  case  the  device  of  having  the  suggestion  ap- 
pear to  come  from  another  power  was  used.  The  first  pub- 
licity that  I  noticed  was  in  telegrams  from  London  to  the 
press  in  Japan  and  America,  stating  that  the  British  and 
French  governments  were  becoming  uneasy  at  developments 
in  Siberia,  and  they  might  ask  Japan  to  intervene  there. 
These  despatches  probably  were  inspired  by  the  Japanese  em- 
bassy at  London,  and  served  to  start  discussion  of  the  ques- 
tion. Apparently  the  press  propaganda,  which  continued  in 
a  desultory  way  during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1917,  had 
no  definite  official  foundation  until  Japan  gave  it  that  by  ad- 
dressing a  note  to  several  of  the  Allied  nations  and  to  the 
United  States,  in  December,  1917.  I  have  seen  what  purports 
to  be  a  copy,  or  rough  draft,  of  that  note.  It  pointed  out 
certain  alleged  conditions,  and  suggested  terms  for  Japan 
providing  troops  to  "preserve  order"  and  to  protect  the 
Allied  interests  in  Siberia.  Japan  disclaimed  any  purpose  of 
territorial  annexations  or  permanent  occupation,  but  she 
asked  that  her  paramount  position  with  respect  to  China 
would  be  recognized,  and  that  she  would  have  exclusive  con- 
cessions for  mining  and  timber  exploitation  and  fisheries  in 
eastern  Siberia.  In  return,  Japan  engaged  to  aid  in  protect- 
ing the  economic  and  political  interests  of  the  Allied  nations 
in  European  Russia. 


286     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

This  action  of  the  Japanese  Government  brought  attention 
to  the  question,  and  compelled  the  Allied  Powers  to  outline 
their  positions.  In  this  connection  it  should  be  remembered 
that  the  United  States  was  not  technically  one  of  the  Allied 
nations,  as  the  American  Government  had  reserved  inde- 
pendence of  action  and  had  not  entered  into  any  agreements 
or  alliances  with  the  nations  it  jointly  was  making  war  with. 
It  was  a  foregone  conclusion  that  Italy  and  the  lesser  Euro- 
pean belligerents  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  would  agree  to 
Japan's  actions  in  the  East  in  exchange  for  a  promise  that 
Japan  would  support  their  special  desires  in  Europe.  This 
left  only  Great  Britain  and  France  to  be  dealt  with. 

The  national  policy  of  France  at  that  juncture  can  be  put 
in  a  sentence,  "Get  Alsace  and  Lorraine  back!"  Everything 
was  subordinated  to  that  object  and  to  making  France  secure 
after  the  war.  France  had  virtually  no  interests  that  are 
directly  affected  by  the  Manchurian  and  eastern  Siberian 
questions  except  as  the  loss  or  alienation  of  Siberia  would 
affect  Russia's  ultimate  solvency.  France's  investments  in 
Russia  were  a  grave  consideration,  and  the  revolutionary 
Government  in  Russia  already  had  given  intimation  of  a 
thought  to  repudiate  the  empire's  debts.  As  to  French  eco- 
nomic opportunities  in  Manchuria,  they  years  before  had 
been  traded  off  for  the  recognition  by  other  powers  of 
France's  special  position  in  South  China.  French  sentiment 
seemed  vaguely  to  connect  a  Japanese  intervention  in  Siberia 
with  a  restoration  of  former  conditions  and  a  sustaining  of 
the  financial  obligations  of  the  Imperial  Russian  Government. 
It  was  however  by  no  means  certain  that  a  Japanese  occupa- 
tion of  eastern  Siberia  would  accomplish  that,  and  it  might 
have  an  opposite  effect  by  angering  the  Russians  against 
their  former  allies.  It  was  of  course  certain  that  the  Jap- 
anese Government  would  not  bestir  itself  or  make  any  sacri- 
fices to  save  or  protect  French  investments  in  Russia;  indeed, 
it  safely  can  be  assumed  that  Japan  is  indifferent  whether 
these  investments  are  lost  or  recovered.     Japan  was  anxious 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  287 

to  secure  Russia's  war  indebtedness  to  Japanese,  which  would 
be  assured  by  a  Japanese  occupation  of  Siberia.  At  the  mo- 
ment the  French  view  of  world  politics  was  obscured  by  the 
German  peril,  and,  moreover,  the  Eastern  question  means 
comparatively  little  to  France.  In  the  abstract,  if  no  other 
matters  were  involved,  French  statesmen  probably  would  in- 
cline to  restrain  Japan's  expansion  on  the  continent  of  Asia, 
although  France's  economic  reasons  for  opposition  are  less 
than  those  of  Great  Britain. 

Great  Britain's  attitude  toward  the  Siberian  question  has 
been  perplexing  at  times,  and  it  seems  to  have  been  actuated 
solely  by  imperial  expediency.  As  a  separate  and  detached 
proposition,  the  British  Government  probably  would  not  want 
Japan  to  enter  Siberia,  for  such  action  will  tend  further  to 
impair  British  position  and  prestige  in  China.  But  the  col- 
lapse of  Russia  and  the  opening  of  a  way  for  German  political 
influence,  and  possibly  a  combined  German  and  Turkish  mili- 
tary pressure,  to  reach  India,  had  at  that  time  exposed  that 
part  of  the  British  Empire  dangerously.  With  the  war  situa- 
tion in  Europe  as  it  was  then,  Great  Britain  could  ill  spare 
troops  to  protect  India  in  the  event  of  latent  nationalistic 
aspirations  and  German  propaganda  inciting  a  seditious  up- 
rising there.  In  such  an  event,  there  were  intimations  that 
Japan  might  be  asked  to  send  troops  to  India,  and  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  provided  apparently  for  this  contingency. 
But  there  is  a  sharp  difference  of  opinion  among  the  British 
about  the  use  of  Japanese  troops  in  India.  Many  students  of 
Asiatic  politics  firmly  believe  that  Japan's  Pan- Asian  propa- 
ganda constitutes  a  far  more  potent  danger  to  British  rule  in 
India  than  Germany's  propaganda  and  intrigue  there,  or 
than  Russia's  propaganda  and  intrigue  did  formerly.  At 
that  time  (1917)  it  seemed  that  the  British  Government  might 
have  to  choose  between  two  evils,  a  German  propaganda  sup- 
ported by  a  military  approach  through  the  Caucasus,  with  a 
Mohammedan  coloring;  or  a  Japanese  influence  brought 
within  the  country  and  extended  everywhere  by  a  Japanese 


288     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

army.  Contemporary  utterances  in  Parliament  indicated 
that  the  British  Government  was  inclined  to  regard  Japanese 
military  help  as  the  lesser  danger,  but  many  Englishmen  dis- 
sent. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  the  possibility,  which  lurked 
in  the  background  of  the  Allies'  policy  during  most  of  the 
war,  that  Japan  might  come  to  an  understanding  with  Ger- 
many. There  was  the  possibility  that  German  influence 
would  cross  the  Ural  Mountains,  and  somewhere  in  Siberia 
come  in  contact  with  the  influence  of  Japan  or  China,  as  the 
case  may  be.  This  is  not  to  say  exactly  that  Germany  or 
any  nation  in  the  East  ever  will  succeed  in  annexing  or  in- 
corporating Russia ;  but  whether  what  was  Great  Russia  and 
its  dependencies  becomes  united  under  one  wide-spread  gov- 
ernment, or  if  its  former  territories  are  divided  among  sev- 
eral governments,  the  internal  situation  of  the  country  will 
be  such  that  it  will  be  susceptible  to  the  process  of  peaceful 
economic  penetration  from  the  stronger  nations  that  are 
contiguous  to  it,  East  and  West.  So  Germany,  having  a  thor- 
ough understanding  of  the  real  character  of  the  Japanese  na- 
tion and  its  ambitions,  will  at  this  time  be  indifferent  to  the 
extension  of  Japanese  influence  or  the  establishment  of  a 
Japanese  "sphere"  in  eastern  Siberia.  In  that  event,  the 
German  and  Japanese  spheres  would  move  forward  gradu- 
ally until  they  met  somewhere  in  Siberia.  Their  limitations 
could  then  be  adjusted  by  mutual  agreement,  just  as,  after 
the  war  between  Japan  and  Russia  in  1904-05,  those  nations 
by  treaty  agreed  to  divide  the  regions  about  which  they  had 
fought,  and  which  had  belonged  to  neither  of  them ;  and  then 
in  1916  by  a  later  secret  treaty  they  mutually  agreed  to  de- 
fend what  they  had  gained  against  any  third  power.  Ger- 
many probably  would  have  welcomed  an  exclusive  interven- 
tion by  Japan  in  Siberia,  for  it  would  have  tended  to  alienate 
Russian  sympathy  from  the  Allies  and  make  a  German  policy 
of  friendly  assimilation  in  Russia  easier,  and  it  also  would 
have  caused  disagreement  among  nations  in  the  Allied  group. 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  289 

The  logic  of  independent  intervention  by  Japan  was  that  it 
was  more  likely  to  work  out  in  Germany's  favor  than  it  was 
to  benefit  the  Allies  or  Russia. 

China  is  the  focus  of  the  Eastern  question,  and  her  interest 
in  all  phases  of  it  is  absolute.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
China's  interest  in  the  Siberian  question  is  as  vital  to  her 
future  security  and  national  position  as  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
question  is  vital  to  France,  or  the  existence  of  buffer  states 
like  Holland  and  Belgium  in  Europe  has  been  vital  to  the 
security  of  England.  As  a  result  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
China  virtually  lost  control  of  her  vast  provinces  of  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia.  As  a  result  of  Russia's  collapse  in  the 
Great  War,  China  has  a  chance  to  regain  control  of  northern 
Manchuria  and  to  recover  Mongolia.  Now  came  a  proposed 
Japanese  occupation  of  eastern  Siberia  to  menace  again  the 
whole  of  China's  northern  territories  and  to  cast  a  longer 
shadow  over  the  Middle  Kingdom.  By  all  the  catch-phrase 
tests  which  diplomacy  has  invented  in  the  process  of  mod- 
ern empire  building,  China's  interest  in  the  Siberian  question 
is  fundamental.  By  the  test  of  ''territorial  propinquity," 
China  has  a  major  position,  for  China  and  Siberia  are  con- 
tiguous on  a  land  frontier  extending  for  several  thousands  of 
miles.  By  the  test  of  "vested  interests,"  China  is  again 
paramount  by  reason  of  her  reversionary  ownership  of  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  which  lies  for  about  a  thousand 
miles  in  Chinese  territory.  By  the  test  of  population  con- 
tacts, China  also  is  paramount,  for  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Chinese  reside  in  Siberia  and  own  much  property  there.  By 
the  test  of  the  alleged  menace  of  Bolshevism,  China  is  more 
exposed  to  its  penetration,  for  China  at  bottom  is  a  great, 
loosely  knit  democracy  and  very  susceptible  to  such  penetra- 
tion; whereas,  for  instance,  Japan  is  a  rigid  autocracy  re- 
markably impervious  to  such  penetration.  In  the  circum- 
stances that  existed,  China  could  not  feel  otherwise  than 
menaced  if  Japan  was  given  a  "free  hand"  in  Siberia,  for  a 
Japanese  occupation  of  that  country  east  of  Lake  Baikal 


290     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

would  envelop  China's  northern  provinces  in  an  elbow,  with 
a  large  part  of  southern  Manchuria  already  under  a  Japanese 
quasi-sovereignty.  In  short,  the  considerations  that  were  po- 
tent in  inducing  China  to  join  the  Allied  group  at  war  against 
the  Central  powers  would  vanish  in  good  part,  and  a  situa- 
tion would  be  created  that  probably  would  work  out  adversely 
to  China  in  practice.  At  any  rate,  the  Chinese  were  much 
alarmed  at  the  prospect,  and  made  their  uneasiness  known. 

Early  in  1918,  probably  in  January,  an  understanding  on 
the  Siberian  intervention  proposal  was  reached  by  the  Japa- 
nese, French,  and  British  governments.  The  details  of  this 
understanding  as  yet  are  confidential  with  those  governments, 
but  there  scarcely  is  room  to  doubt  that  Japan  induced  the 
French  and  British  governments  to  consent  to  her  exclusive 
intervention  provided  the  United  States  also  would  agree. 
Japan  chose  a  time  to  press  this  proposition  when  the  military 
situation  for  the  Allies  was  in  its  darkest  phase,  just  preced- 
ing the  big  German  drive  on  the  western  front.  France  and 
Great  Britain  were  not  then  in  a  position  to  offend  Japan  by 
showing  distrust  of  her  motives;  and  still  less,  since  Ameri- 
can military  reinforcements  and  supplies  were  imperatively 
essential  to  defeat  Germany,  could  they  venture  to  affront 
America.  "What  Japan  offered  or  promised  in  return  for  the 
support  of  her  allies  on  the  Siberian  question  is  not  known 
positively  outside  the  inner  circles  of  governments,  but  it  is 
believed  to  include  a  promise  to  send  troops  to  Europe  in  cer- 
tain contingencies,  and  to  exert  pressure  on  Russia  jointly 
with  the  Allies  to  validate  Russia's  foreign  debts.  France 
and  Great  Britain  were  to  support  Japan  in  adjusting  certain 
questions  and  conditions  in  the  far  East. 

Strengthened  with  this  support,  Japanese  diplomacy  then 
began  a  campaign  to  gain  the  assent  of  the  United  States  to 
Japan's  plan  for  intervention.  Late  in  January,  1918,  and 
through  the  month  of  February,  Japan's  publicity  propa- 
ganda in  America,  strongly  supported  by  both  the  British 
and  French  propagandas,  made  an  active  drive  in  favor  of 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  291 

giving  Japan  a  free  hand.  "Trust  Japan"  was  the  slogan, 
and  an  effort  was  made  to  hush  arguments  against  the  pro- 
posal by  attributing  them  to  German  propaganda.  The 
American  press  was  complaisant  to  a  remarkable  degree,  and 
it  seemed  for  a  while  that  Japan  would  get  her  way  and  that 
the  United  States  would  be  rushed  into  giving  its  assent 
With  respect  to  the  policy  of  the  United  States,  on  February 
28,  1918,  I  then  analyzed  the  issue  as  follows,  in  a  memoran- 
dum not  published  before: 

By  reason  of  its  relation  to  the  war  in  Europe,  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  of  America  can,  if  it  will,  exercise  a  deter- 
mining influence  on  this  and  other  Eastern  questions.  The  ob- 
jects of  the  American  Government  in  participating  in  the  war  have 
been  announced  by  the  President  to  be  the  establishment  of  the 
democratic  forms  of  government  in  a  secure  position,  the  relega- 
tion of  military  autocracy  as  a  ruling  factor  in  civilization,  and 
the  suppression  of  all  international  policies  and  methods  which  are 
outgrowths  of  military  autocracies  and  the  imperialistic  tendencies 
of  nations.  The  two  largest  democracies  in  the  world,  in  terri- 
tory and  population,  are  Russia  and  China.  We  see  how  these 
two  countries  and  peoples  may  be  affected  by  this  Siberian  ques- 
tion. Both  countries  are  struggling,  somewhat  vaguely  and  very 
inefficiently,  to  establish  democratic  forms  of  government. 

If  a  Japanese  military  occupation  of  eastern  Siberia  should 
happen  to  be  co-existent  and  co-extensive  with  a  German  similar 
advance  from  the  other  side,  and  the  two  autocracies  should  effect 
a  combination  for  mutual  security  of  their  gains,  it  is  evident  what 
might  be  the  fate,  at  least  for  a  long  time,  of  the  nascent  democra- 
tic movements  in  Russia  and  China.  Furthermore,  if  that  would 
come  about,  it  might  occur  that  the  forces  of  efficient  autocracy,  as 
expressed  by  that  combination,  and  control  over  the  destinies  of 
more  than  half  of  humanity  and  nearly  half  of  the  earth's  natural 
resources  under  those  two  powers  and  their  satellites,  would  ulti- 
mately overcome  democratic  forms  in  government  and  set  civiliza- 
tion backward  for  centuries. 

The  United  States  also  has  very  considerable  material  interests 
in  this  question — or  rather,  in  some  of  its  probable  results.  The 
future  development  of  Russia  and  China  offers  a  great  opportunity 
for  American  finance  and  commerce.  While  America  has  many 
good  reasons  for  desiiing  always  (if  that  is  possible)  to  remain  on 
very  friendly  terms  with  Japan,  this  desire  is  secondary  in  im- 


292     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

portance  to  the  maintenance  of  the  independence  and  integrity  of 
China  cis-a-vis  Japan  or  another  autocratic  Government.  Also, 
the  commercial  possibilities  of  Russia  and  China,  singly  or  to- 
gether, are  vastly  more  important  potentially  than  commerce  be- 
tween Japan  and  America  will  be  in  the  future.  Should  Japan 
occupy  eastern  Siberia,  and  not  be  dislodged  after  the  war;  and 
on  the  other  side  Germany  should  obtain  possession  of  or  economic 
domination  over  Russia's  western  provinces;  then  after  the  war 
American  trade  can  enter  Russia  only  by  passing  through  a  Japa- 
nese zone  on  the  East  and  a  German  zone  on  the  West.  Japan's 
commercial  policy  in  the  parts  of  China  which  she  already  has 
penetrated,  and  what  is  known  of  Germany's  policy  of  commercial 
penetration  of  weaker  nations,  give  sufficient  intimation  of  what 
such  zones  on  each  border  of  Russia  would  mean  to  American 
and  all  other  foreign  trade. 

American  statesmen  no  doubt  are  not  oblivious  to  certain  utter- 
ances of  some  high  officials  of  our  co-belligerent  nations  about  the 
thesis  of  world  governance  after  the  war.  In  a  recent  speech  in 
Parliament,  Mr.  Balfour  plainly  intimated  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment is  not  prepared  to,  or  cannot  yet  see  its  way  clear  to  abandon 
what  is  usually  called  the  balance  of  power  theory  of  world  politics. 
This  presages,  after  tbe  war,  a  continuation  of  international  poli- 
tics on  the  checks-and-balances  principle.  Under  this  system,  it 
will  not  be  in  the  ultimate  interest  of  America,  or  of  democracy, 
to  augment  the  power  and  influence,  in  any  balance  of  power,  of 
powers  whose  governments  are  based  on  the  autocratic  principle. 
The  application  of  this  argument  to  the  existing  Siberian  ques- 
tion, and  its  relation  to  China,  are  evident. 

The  peace  which  is  made  at  the  end  of  this  war  will  not  settle 
the  struggle  for  a  really  democratic  world;  it  may  not  even  make 
much  of  an  advance  toward  this  object  except  that  it  will  awake 
the  democratic  peoples  to  their  peril,  and  stimulate  them  to  con- 
tinue to  work  for  free  institutions  and  to  equip  themselves  for  this 
work.  If  the  war  results  only  in  extending  the  balance  of  power 
system  for  another  epoch,  and  creates  a  balance  almost  even  as 
between  the  autocratic  and  democratic  forces  in  civilization,  it 
might  be  that  the  way  the  Russian  and  the  Chinese  peoples  are 
propelled  by  events  will  be  the  deciding  weight  in  the  balance. 

This  possibility,  with  the  fundamental  interest  which  America 
always  will  have  in  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  gives 
to  the  Siberian  question  great  importance  at  a  time  when  the  other 
democratic  powers  are  preoccupied.  Notwithstanding  that  the 
British    and    French    Governments    appear    to  acquiesce  with  the 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  293 

proposed  move  of  Japan  into  Siberia,  it  is  evident  that  this  attitude 
of  those  nations  is  inspired  either  by  political  expediency,  by  pre- 
vious secret  agreements,  or  by  too  close  concentration  or  proccupa- 
tion  with  the  situation  in  Europe.  The  true  interests  of  Great 
Britain  and  of  France  are  not  likely  to  be  served  by  allowing  Japan 
a  free  hand  in  Siberia  and  in  China.  It  is  very  likely  that  the 
British  and  French  Governments,  while  inhibited  from  openly  op- 
posing an  independent  move  by  Japan  in  this  case  because  of 
previous  commitments  or  immediate  interests  elsewhere,  will  not 
be  displeased  if  objections  of  America  to  the  move  should  stop 
it,  or  give  it  a  different  character.  And  even  if  the  United  States 
should  diverge  from  the  views  of  the  British  and  French  Govern- 
ments in  this  instance,  such  a  policy  by  America  is  more  apt  to 
serve  British  and  French  interests  in  the  end  than  a  free  hand  for 
Japan  and  the  far  East  will. 

The  very  close  proximity  of  extreme  eastern  Siberia — Kamchatka 
and  beyond — to  Alaska,  a  valuable  and  rapidly  developing  posses- 
sion of  the  United  States,  should  be  considered  by  the  American 
Government  in  this  connection.  A  permanent  occupation  by  Japan 
of  that  region  would  have  in  the  future  a  serious  effect  on  the 
military  security  of  America.  "While,  in  relation  to  the  present 
proposal  for  Japan  to  occupy  eastern  Siberia,  the  contingency  of  a 
Japanese  possession  of  the  part  of  Asia  lying  directly  across 
Behring  Straits  from  Alaska  (with  the  possibility  in  time  of  a 
railway  connection  between  the  two  continents  by  that  route)  may 
seem  remote,  it  should  be  remembered  that  Japan  never  has  given 
up  any  territory  which  she  has  occupied  on  the  excuse  of  military 
necessity,  although  she  frequently  has  given  assurances  that  she 
would.  The  great  and  undeveloped  natural  resources  of  eastern 
Siberia  in  minerals,  coal  and  timber,  offer  a  great  temptation  to 
Japan  if  she  once  gets  in  possession  of  them;  and  for  her  to  give 
them  up  would  mark  a  reversal  of  her  whole  history  as  a  modern 
power.  If  she  takes  military  control  of  this  vast  region  for  the 
period  of  the  war,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  she  will  use  the 
time  to  entrench  herself  there,  and  with  Russia  probably  a  weak 
and  disintegrated  nationality  for  many  years  to  come,  no  force 
from  that  quarter  will  be  able  to  dislodge  Japan.  In  that  situation, 
Japan  can  perhaps  so  manceuver  in  the  field  of  world  politics  that 
she  can  get  the  assent  of  a  majority  of  the  powers  to  her  retention 
of  eastern  Siberia;  just  as,  treaties  and  positive  assurances  to  the 
contrary  notwithstanding,  Japan  was  able  to  get  the  assent  of  the 
powers  to  her  annexation  of  Korea.  Once  Japan's  occupation  of 
eastern  Siberia  becomes  de  facto,  it  gradually  will  be  accepted  as 


294     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

a  fait  accompli  in  world  politics,  and  no  power  except  America 
will  have  sufficient  interest  in  the  question  to  make  it  worth  while 
to  go  to  extreme  in  opposing  Japan. 

This  aspect  of  the  Siberian  Question  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to 
pass  unnoticed  now  by  the  American  Government.  Later  it  may 
be  difficult  to  raise  the  point,  after  perchance  Japan  has  become 
established  in  military  occupation  of  those  regions  closely  con- 
tiguous to  United  States  territory.  In  case  events  subsequently 
should  really  disclose  a  genuine  necessity  for  an  Allied  occupation 
of  eastern  Siberia,  then  without  doubt  the  United  States  might 
itself  take  over  the  task  of  policing  the  trans-Amur  region,  on  the 
ground  that  by  reason  of  its  nearer  territorial  propinquity  to  United 
States  possessions,  it  is  the  right  and  duty  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment to  undertake  the  preservation  of  order  there.  Geographically, 
a  large  part  of  that  region  is  closer  to  America  than  to  Japan. 

In  securing  the  assent  of  France  and  Great  Britain  to  her 
independent  intervention  in  Siberia,  Japan's  methods  of  ap- 
proach demonstrates  the  old  oblique  diplomatic  method  aptly. 
The  Tokio  Foreign  Office  no  doubt  realized  all  along  that  the 
real  difficulty  would  be  to  obtain  the  consent  of  Washington, 
but  Washington  was  not  approached  directly.  In  presenting 
the  matter  at  London  and  Paris,  Japan,  so  I  am  reliably  in- 
formed, stated  that  since  the  American  Government  had  by 
the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  recognized  Japan's  special  mis- 
sion in  China,  according  to  Japan's  interpretation  of  that 
agreement,  it  hardly  could  refuse  to  recognize  Japan's 
similar  relation  to  eastern  Siberia.  It  may  be  that  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  governments  accepted  the  Japanese  interpre- 
tation of  the  Lansing-Ishii  notes:  certainly  almost  any  old- 
school  diplomat  would  so  interpret  them.  At  any  rate,  the 
British  and  French  foreign  offices  may  have  thought  it  a  good 
time  to  ' '  pass  the  buck ' '  and  put  the  issue  up  to  Washington. 
But,  somewhat  unexpectedly,  Washington  was  cold  to  the 
proposal.  Several  things  may  have  influenced  the  State  De- 
partment 's  attitude.  For  one  thing,  Washington  at  that  time 
took  a  more  optimistic  view  of  the  war  situation  than  Paris 
and  London  did,  and  consequently  did  not  feel  that  the  situa- 
tion was  so  desperate  that  important  principles  had  to  be 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  295 

traded  off  or  qualified.  For  another  thing,  Washington  by 
that  time  may  have  begun  to  feel  uneasy  at  constructions 
Japan  was  giving  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement,  and  thought 
it  was  time  to  make  its  position  better  understood.  At  any 
rate,  Washington  refused  to  assent  to  the  plan  for  Japan  to 
intervene  exclusively,  and  that  killed  it. 

This  outline  of  the  broader  political  motives  which  ani- 
mated the  policies  of  the  principal  powers  in  the  Allies  group 
indicates  why  the  "give  Japan  a  free  hand"  idea  of  inter- 
vention in  Siberia  was  rejected.  That  suspicion  of  Japan 
was  the  major  reason  for  rejecting  it  was  so  obvious  that  the 
inspired  propaganda  of  all  the  western  powers  devoted  col- 
umns to  asserting  how  implicitly  trusted  Japan  was  by  all  of 
them,  that  distrust  of  her  was  not  the  reason  for  dropping 
the  one-nation  intervention  plan,  but  that  other  important 
considerations  required  that  the  move,  if  made,  should  be  of 
international  character.  The  plain  truth  probably  is  that  the 
Washington  Government  (that  is,  President  Wilson)  insisted 
that  there  should  be  joint  action  in  Siberia  or  none  at  all,  and 
its  influence  was  sufficient  to  decide  the  matter. 

The  decision  to  make  action  in  Siberia  a  joint  operation 
in  case  intervention  became  necessary  completely  changed  the 
situation  for  Japan,  and  therefore  changed  her  policy.  It  is 
clear  that  intervention  in  Siberia  by  Japan  alone,  with  a 
secret  free-hand  mandate  from  the  other  powers  in  the  Allied 
group,  is  a  very  different  situation  for  Japan  than  participa- 
tion by  her  in  a  joint  international  intervention.  Acting 
singly,  Japan  would  have  everything  in  her  own  hands  and 
could  fix  matters  to  her  own  satisfaction  without  being  inter- 
fered with,  and  probably  could  get  whatever  status  quo  that 
resulted  confirmed  in  the  peace  terms.  On  those  conditions 
Japan  was  anxious  to  intervene.  That  situation  was  a  dis- 
tinct imperialistic  asset,  or  could  be  worked  out  into  one. 
But  joint  international  intervention,  with  the  limitations  it 
necessarily  would  place  on  military  and  civil  functions  in 
the  occupied  regions,  and  the  further  need  of  having  the  sit- 


296     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

uation  take  an  international  character  in  the  peace  settle- 
ment, took  on  to  Japan  the  aspect  of  a  liability.  If  Japan  in- 
tervened alone,  she  could  at  the  peace  conference  set  her 
action  out  as  a  special  contribution  to  the  cause  of  the  Allies 
and  claim  compensation,  or  accept  a  "special  position"  in 
eastern  Siberia  as  compensation,  to  be  converted  after  a  few 
years  into  annexation,  as  in  the  case  of  Korea.  But  if  Japan 
intervened  jointly  with  the  United  States  and  other  powers, 
then  they  would  have  an  equal  say  in  the  final  disposition 
of  the  region;  and  if,  as  was  probable  in  the  case  of  the 
United  States,  the  cost  of  the  expedition  and  occupation  was 
charged  on  the  general  expense  of  the  war,  and  not  charged 
on  the  country  occupied,  then  the  cost  to  Japan  of  her  expe- 
dition might  be  a  total  loss.  So  from  the  time  the  one-nation 
intervention  plan  was  defeated,  Japanese  sentiment  was 
against  any  intervention.  In  short,  Japan  would  prefer  to 
let  disorder  run  its  course  in  Siberia  and  take  a  chance  on 
fishing  quietly  in  the  troubled  waters  there  rather  than  have 
military  forces  and  civil  officers  of  other  powers  established  in 
the  country;  for  once  there,  their  presence  would  be  a  check 
on  Japan,  and  it  might  be  years  before  they  would  be  with- 
drawn. 

With  this  survey  of  the  elements  of  the  situation,  we  can 
turn  to  events  in  Siberia  and  Manchuria. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE   SIBERIAN   QUESTION CONCLUDED 

Effects  of  the  Russian  Revolution — Its  extension  to  the  East — The 
position  of  Siberia — How  it  differed  from  Russia  in  Europe — China's 
close  relation  to  the  question — The  Chinese  Eastern  Railway — Disorders 
in  Manchuria — Political  elements  analyzed — Different  motives — Japan's 
selfish  policy — The  German  influence — Various  Russian  factions — Col- 
lapse of  Russian  authority  in  Manchuria — China  forced  to  act — Japan's 
fear  of  America — A  secret  diplomatic  note — Japan,  Russia,  and  Ger- 
many— .Japan  seeking  for  advantage — Proposals  to  Russian  groups — 
Backing  different  factions — Secret  anti-American  propaganda — Some 
examples  of  this — The  American  intervention  plan — Japan  and  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway — Obstruction  of  the  Allies — Rushing  Japanese 
troops  into  Manchuria — Usurpation  of  China's  prerogatives — The  Man- 
chuli  incident — Attitude  of  Japanese  toward  other  allies — Incident  at 
Changchun — The  armistice  and  after. 

BY  the  latter  part  of  1917  the  Russian  revolution  had 
extended  to  the  far-Eastern  possessions  of  the  empire, 
where  its  effects  were  up  to  a  point  almost  identical 
with  its  course  in  European  Russia.  There  was  a  time  when 
society  instinctively  submitted  to  the  existing  administrative 
regime,  which  continued  to  function  automatically  after  a 
fashion.  Then  came  a  period  of  rapid  disintegration,  when 
the  old  authority  and  forms  crumbled  and  were  succeeded  by 
unlicensed  personal  liberty,  when  the  ties  holding  the  remote 
and  sparsely  populated  dominions  to  the  older  seats  of  gov- 
ernment weakened  and  then  parted  altogether,  when  efforts 
were  made  to  form  new  governments  under  various  groups 
and  leaders,  when  rivalries  and  dissensions  sprung  up  among 
those  groups  and  leaders,  and  when  all  of  them  were  seeking 
the  support  of  governments  in  the  Allied  combination.    As 

297 


298     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

to  its  internal  condition,  Siberia  was  moving  under  the  same 
impulses  and  stimulus,  composed  of  the  same  constituent  ele- 
ments, from  which  the  revolution  had  grown. 

But  there  were  important  differences  in  the  external  con- 
tacts of  European  and  Asiatic  Russia.  In  Europe,  Russia 
was  contiguous  to  the  Central  powers  and  cut  off  from  the 
Allies.  Siberia  was  contiguous  to  three  nations  in  the  Allied 
group,  China,  Japan,  and  America;  to  China  by  a  very  long 
land  frontier,  and  to  Japan  and  America  by  close  oversea 
proximity.  These  geographical  and  political  contacts,  cou- 
pled with  semi-detachment  from  Russia  in  Europe,  marked 
out  Siberia  as  a  new,  almost  a  separate  problem. 

It  was  natural  that  the  international  reactions  from  Siberia 
would  first  be  felt  by  China.  This  came  about  chiefly  by 
reason  of  the  location  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  that 
part  of  the  so-called  Siberian  trunk-line  which  skirts  Mongo- 
lia and  crosses  Manchuria,  and  is  the  main-traveled  route  be- 
tween Chita,  where  the  Amur  line  branches  off  northward, 
and  Vladivostok.  Under  the  old  agreement  this  railway  in 
Manchuria,  which  China  has  a  right  to  purchase  outright  at 
the  expiration  of  a  stated  period,  was  operated  and  policed 
by  Russia.  The  offices  of  the  trans-Baikal  division  were  at 
Harbin,  in  the  center  of  Manchuria,  a  junction-point  with 
railways  connecting  with  Peking  and  Port  Arthur.  There 
was  a  large  Russian  garrison  at  Harbin  and  smaller  garrisons 
at  other  points,  and  a  considerable  Russian  civil  population 
had  settled  in  Manchuria,  especially  at  Harbin.  At  times  in 
previous  years  a  controversy  had  occurred  between  Russia 
and  China  about  the  extent  of  Russia's  administrative  au- 
thority in  the  railway  zone,  and  on  several  occasions  the 
United  States  Government  had  taken  China's  side  by  refus- 
ing to  recognize  Russia's  pretensions.  This  attitude  of  the 
United  States  had  irritated  the  Russian  Government,  espe- 
cially in  view  of  the  fact,  that  Great  Britain  and  other  powers 
acquiesced  with  Russia's  interpretation  and  had  submitted 
their  nationals  at  Harbin  and  other  places  to  the  Russian 


THE  SIBEKIAN  QUESTION  299 

jurisdiction,  thereby  qualifying,  in  effect,  China's  sov- 
ereignty.1 

Strikes  and  other  manifestations  of  insubordination  among 
the  workmen  of  the  Siberian  and  Chinese  Eastern  railways, 
and  among  garrisons  along  the  railways,  began  to  develop  late 
in  1917.  Thousands  of  ex-officers  and  soldiers  from  the  dis- 
banded army  of  Kussia  in  Europe  were  drifting  eastward  to 
escape  conditions  caused  by  the  revolution,  and  many  of 
them  found  Harbin  a  convenient  refuge.  Also  drifted  to 
Harbin,  where,  because  of  the  dual  municipalities  (Russian 
and  Chinese),  police  administration  was  confused  and  lax, 
many  Bolshevik  agitators,  and  agents  of  the  Central  powers. 
Harbin  became  a  center  of  intrigue.  At  that  time  and  during 
the  year  1918  the  distinguishable  political  elements  operating 
in  eastern  Siberia  and  Manchuria  can  be  differentiated  as 
follows : 

Western  Allies,  including  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy, 
United  States. 

China. 

Japan. 

Russian  groups.  Three  pro-Ally  groups  roughly  defined 
territorially  as  the  Omsk,  Harbin,  and  Vladivostok  adminis- 
trations ;  the  Bolsheviks,  who  were  trying  to  overturn  the  more 
orderly  groups  in  all  those  administrations. 

German  agents,  composed  partly  of  trained  men  assigned 
by  the  German  Government  and  partly  of  released  German 
and  Austrian  prisoners  of  war. 

Czecho-Slovaks. 

I  have  so  outlined  these  elements  because  of  their  distinctly 
different  motivations. 

Although  at  war  against  Germany,  China  had  no  deep 
hostility  to  that  nation   and  no  special  fear  of  it.     China 

i  This  agreement  between  Russia  and  Great  Britain  (Appendix  F)  is 
a  very  good  example  of  the  practice  of  the  powers  to  make  private 
agreements  among  themselves,  based  on  the  rcognition  of  their  various 
spheres  in  China.. 


300     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

nominally  was  allied  with  Japan,  and  Japan  was  the  nation 
she  most  feared.  China's  motive  was  to  protect  her  own  ter- 
ritories, to  sustain  her  authority  within  those  territories,  to 
protect  her  rights  and  property  there,  and  to  prevent  Rus- 
sian disorders  from  penetrating  farther  into  China.  Beyond 
that  China  did  not  want  to  go.  Her  attitude  was  purely 
defensive.  She  was  distinctly  averse  to  interfering  in  Rus- 
sia (that  is,  in  Siberia)  or  to  any  action  that  could  be  con- 
strued as  aggression.  In  that  course  China  continued  to  fol- 
low the  United  States,  as  she  had  done  on  broad  questions 
since  entering  the  war. 

I  shall  state  Japan's  motives  here  as  I  believe  them  to  have 
been,  and  shall  present  evidence  later.  Japan's  motives  were 
complex,  yet  perfectly  definite.  She  hoped  to  take  advan- 
tage of  Russia's  disorganization  and  disintegration  to  oust 
Russia  from  Manchuria  and  to  replace  her  there  by  gaining 
control  over  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway.  To  do  that  she 
schemed  to  foment  Russian  dissensions,  secretly  backing  dif- 
ferent factions  and  leaders  against  one  another,  sowing  mu- 
tual suspicions  among  them:  on  the  other  hand,  she  gave 
encouragement  to  the  Bolsheviks  for  the  purpose  of  adding  to 
the  disorder  and  creating  an  excuse  for  intervention ;  she  pri- 
vately tried  to  sow  distrust  of  America  among  the  Russians, 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the 
American  railway  commission  that  had  been  sent  to  help  put 
the  Siberian  line  in  order,  and  to  incline  the  Russians  to  ac- 
cept assistance  from  Japan ;  she  occupied  Manchuria  with  her 
troops,  arrogantly  thrusting  aside  the  Chinese  and  taking 
over  their  functions;  she  manceuvered  diplomatically  to  pre- 
vent joint  Allied  action  in  Siberia,  and  when  that  was  adopted, 
she  obstructed  it  by  surreptitious  methods.  This  tortuous 
course  required  seeming  inconsistencies  and  contradictions, 
but  the  ruling  motive  always  was  perceptible. 

The  motives  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  were  the 
same  as  those  of  the  United  States  in  principle,  but  subject 
to  private  understandings  among  them  which  circumscribed 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  301 

their  acts  to  some  extent,  especially  in  their  application  to 
Japan. 

The  motives  of  the  United  States  were  not  tainted  by  any 
purpose  to  reap  a  national  advantage  in  any  form  except 
by  helping  to  create  a  situation  beneficial  to  Russia  and  to  the 
general  Allied  interests,  and  to  respect  the  territories  and 
rights  of  all  nations  involved. 

The  Czecho-Slovaks  were  a  part  of  the  situation  not  by  de- 
sign, but  by  circumstances,  having  forced  their  way  out  of 
Russia  in  an  effort  to  reach  the  western  front.  They  had 
no  motive  except  to  protect  themselves  against  attacks  from 
the  Bolsheviks  and  to  aid  the  general  cause  of  the  Allies,  on 
the  theory  that  after  the  war  the  Allies  would  support  the 
creation  of  a  Czecho-Slovak  nation  in  Europe.  They  supplied 
a  highly  picturesque  feature  to  the  situation,  but  one  de- 
void of  any  fundamental  relation  to  it. 

The  activities  of  German  agents  and  the  factor  of  released 
German  and  Austrian  prisoners  requires  elucidation,  and 
then  it  can  be  dismissed,  for  its  influence  was  brief  and 
transitory.  It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  Germans 
and  Austrians  in  Siberia  and  Manchuria  who  were  working 
under  orders  from  their  governments,  and  released  prisoners 
who  were  passive  or  of  their  own  notion  joined  the  Bol- 
sheviks to  escape  repatriation  and  further  military  service. 
This  latter  class  is  negligible,  for  it  was  merged  into  the  Bol- 
shevik mob  without  appreciably  adding  to  its  strength,  and 
it  passed  out  of  control  or  intelligent  direction  of  the  Cen- 
tral powers.  The  other  and  less  numerous  class  of  Germans 
and  Austrians  who  responded  to  direction  from  their  govern- 
ments pursued  a  definite  and  easily  distinguishable  course. 
For  some  time  after  the  revolution  the  German  agents  in 
eastern  Siberia  followed  the  same  policy  as  those  in  European 
Russia  and  for  the  same  object — to  disorganize  Russia  and 
make  her  incapable  of  further  participation  in  the  war,  and 
to  pave  the  way  for  a  German  commercial  penetration  of 
the  country.     In  Manchuria  these  agents  did  what  they  could 


302     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

to  sow  dissensions  among  the  Allies,  and  especially  to  play 
upon  China's  fear  of  Japan  and  Japan's  jealousy  of  Amer- 
ica. But  a  time  soon  came  when  the  German  Government 
saw  that  it  was  not  to  its  advantage  to  have  disorder  in  east- 
ern Siberia,  for  that  would  bring  intervention  by  the  Allies, 
an  armed  intervention  that  might  develop  into  a  serious 
menace  to  Germany's  eastern  front  by  rallying  the  Russians 
to  resume  the  war.  The  German  Government  realized  that 
a  tranquil  and  detached  Siberia  was  for  the  time  more  to 
Germany's  advantage,  for  it  would  serve  as  a  buffer  against 
an  Allied  advance  from  that  quarter.  So  the  German  agents 
and  propaganda  in  eastern  Siberia  were  called  off  as  to 
their  incitements  of  turbulence  or  provocations  of  the  Allies. 
"German  propaganda"  continued  to  serve  Japan  as  a  con- 
venient scapegoat  to  which  exposures  of  her  true  policy  can 
be  attributed. 

There  remained,  however,  enough  turbulent  qualities  in 
Bolshevism  to  keep  Siberia  in  disorder.  In  every  prominent 
Siberian  city — Tomsk,  Omsk,  Irkutsk,  Blagovestchenk, 
Khabarosk,  Vladivostok — the  Bolsheviks  made  an  effort  to 
seize  the  reins  of  administration.  Fighting  occurred  in  many 
places,  with  attendant  destruction  of  property.  Supplies 
of  a  military  character  purchased  by  the  old  Russian  Govern- 
ment from  its  allies  and  America,  but  not  paid  for,  were  ac- 
cumulated at  Vladivostok  and  other  points  on  the  Siberian 
and  Chinese  Eastern  railways  as  far  as  Irkutsk  and  beyond. 
These  supplies  had  been  stationary  at  those  points  for  months, 
even  before  the  military  collapse  of  Russia  and  prior  to  the 
revolution.  When  Japan  began  a  propaganda  in  Europe  and 
America  to  pave  the  way  for  her  exclusive  intervention  in 
Siberia,  the  alleged  need  to  protect  these  supplies  was  given 
prominence.  In  the  winter  of  1917-18  several  of  the  Allied 
powers  sent  war-ships  to  Vladivostok  to  aid  the  Russian  au- 
thorities there  to  preserve  order,  as  it  was  explained.  Japan 
was  one  of  the  powers  to  send  ships,  and  Japanese  thought 
on  this  question  was  very  clearly  revealed  by  the  tone  of 


THE  SIBEKIAN  QUESTION  303 

the  Japanese  press  then,  which  voiced  a  distrust  of  the  mo- 
tives of  the  United  States  in  sending  war-ships.  By  that 
time  the  alleged  peril  from  an  army  of  released  German  and 
Austrian  war  prisoners  was  really  past,  and  with  German 
intrigue  removed  as  a  factor,  the  other  intriguing  elements 
began  to  stand  out  more  plainly.  By  that  time,  also,  the 
other  powers,  especially  the  United  States,  were  taking  meas- 
ures to  learn  the  real  situation  by  having  their  officials  re- 
port and  by  sending  confidential  agents  to  study  conditions 
on  the  ground. 

Early  in  1918  it  became  apparent  that  the  Chinese  East- 
ern Railway  was  becoming  disorganized,  and  the  local  admin- 
istration of  the  railway  zones  at  Harbin  and  other  towns  in 
Manchuria  was  so  lax  and  inefficient  that  ministers  of  some 
of  the  Allied  powers  at  Peking  suggested  to  the  Chinese 
Government  the  advisability  of  its  taking  over  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  railway  and  of  the  railway  zone.  It  was 
pointed  out,  since  the  ability  of  Russia  to  preserve  order  and 
to  operate  the  railway  had  collapsed,  that  this  responsibility 
and  right  devolved  on  China.  At  that  time  Japan  was 
pressing  the  Chinese  Government  to  extend  the  "military 
agreement"  relating  to  joint  operations  against  the  enemy, 
and  when  the  Japanese  legation  at  Peking  heard  of  the 
proposal  that  China  should  take  over  the  administration  of 
the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  and  the  policing  of  the  rail- 
way zone,  it  at  once  interposed  private  diplomatic  objections 
on  the  ground  that  these  matters  were  included  in  the  agree- 
ment. Japan  tried  to  prevent  the  Chinese  Government  from 
taking  that  step,  and  to  arrange  so  that  Japan  would  succeed 
Russia  as  administrator  of  the  railway  and  of  the  zone,  or 
would  act  jointly  with  China.  China  evaded  the  issue,  but 
finally  decided  to  increase  her  military  forces  in  Manchuria 
and  to  take  over  the  policing  of  Harbin  and  other  places. 

It  is  interesting  now  to  go  back  a  little  and  cite  steps  taken 
by  Japan  from  the  time  of  the  Russian  revolution  to  secure 
a  preferential  and  predominant  position  in  eastern  Siberia. 


304     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

The  fall  of  the  empire  might  have  carried  off  with  it  the 
secret  treaty  made  between  Japan  and  Russia  in  1916,  and 
Japan  was  anxious  to  replace  it  by  understandings  with  the 
new  Government.  It  is  evident  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment felt  that  it  had  by  private  arrangements  then  in  effect 
assured  its  position  in  that  region  with  regard  to  the  Euro- 
pean Allied  powers.  But  the  United  States  remained,  and 
that  nation  was  becoming  a  very  important  factor.  From  its 
entrance  as  a  belligerent  the  American  Government  had  taken 
a  strong  interest  in  the  situation  of  Russia.  Immediately 
following  the  revolution  it  had  sent  a  special  mission  to 
Russia  to  offer  counsel  and  aid,  and  as  one  of  those  measures 
there  was  created  a  railway  commission  (called  the  Stevens 
commission)  to  help  Russia  to  put  her  railway  system  on 
an  efficient  basis.  There  were  further  proposals  of  economic 
help  by  America  to  Russia  by  way  of  developing  her  mineral 
and  agricultural  resources,  and  there  was  a  good  deal  of  dis- 
cussion of  those  plans  in  the  press.  How  Japan  regarded 
American  assistance  to  Russia  is  revealed  both  by  the  con- 
temporaneous comment  of  the  Japanese  press  and  by  certain 
moves  of  Japanese  diplomacy.  Among  the  secret  documents 
published  after  the  revolution  in  Russia  was  a  telegram  to 
the  Russian  Foreign  Office  from  Krupensky,  Russian  am- 
bassador at  Tokio,  dated  July  7,  1917: 

The  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  asked  me  to  verify 
a  rumor  that  the  self-styled  Russian  Government  has  granted  ex- 
clusive concessions,  covering  mining  undertakings  in  the  regions 
of  the  Pacific  littoral,  and  the  island  of  Saghalien.  Viscount 
Motono  added  that  if  this  rumor  was  in  accordance  with  the  truth 
it  would  have  a  very  depressing  effect  in  Japan.  While  fully 
recognizing  that  Russia  was  entitled  to  dispose  of  Russian  terri- 
tory, Viscount  Motono  remarked,  on  the  other  hand,  that  Japanese 
capitalists  had  long  expressed  the  desire  to  participate  in  the  de- 
velopment of  those  mining  resources  and  at  the  present  time,  as  in 
the  past,  they  were  ready  to  organize  private  Japanese  companies 
for  that  purpose  to  co-operate  with  Russian  capitalists  to  that  end. 

While  still  acting  as  ambassador  at  Petrograd  the  Viscount  had 
raised  this  question,  but  the  reply  he  had  received  was  that  the 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  305 

Russian  mining  laws  did  not  permit  the  participation  of  these 
foreigners  in  mining  in  that  province.  If  at  the  present  time  any 
modification  of  that  law  had  been  decided  upon,  the  Japanese,  as 
the  nearest  neighbors  and  the  oldest  explorers  of  those  regions, 
had  a  pre-eminent  right  to  the  concessions  in  question.  The  Min- 
ister pressed  the  point  that  if  such  negotiations  (?  with  foreign 
capitalists)  had  already  been  begun,  the  Japanese  Government 
would  much  appreciate  their  cancellation. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  in  calling  attention  to  the  importance 
of  this  declaration,  believes  that  in  the  event  of  unfavorable  com- 
plications the  Japanese  claims  might  result  in  very  dangerous  con- 
sequences. In  view  of  the  Japanese  attitude  the  Ambassador  thinks 
it  extremely  desirable  that  the  rumors  of  negotiations  with  Amer- 
ican capitalists  should  be  denied. 


A  Russo-Japanese  alliance:  Confidential  report  to  a  foreign  lega- 
tion at  Peking,  October  27,  1917. 

On  or  about  October  20  there  arrived  in  Peking  direct  from  Rus- 
sia a  special  representative  of  the  Premier  of  Japan,  General 
Terauchi.  This  man  had  an  interview  with  the  Chinese  Premier 
(General  Tuan)  in  which  he  stated  that  Russia  would  be  forced  to 
conclude  a  separate  peace  with  the  Central  Powers,  that  Japan 
would  then  enter  into  an  alliance  or  arrangement  with  Russia,  and 
that  it  was  extremely  desirable  that  China  should  join  them,  which 
action  would  be  welcomed  by  Japan.  He  ended  by  saying  that 
this  was  for  China's  best  interest,  as  when  the  European  war  was 
concluded  there  would  be  but  two  great  Powers  left  and  these 
would  rule  the  world.  He  named  Japan  and  Germany  as  the  two 
Powers.     This  report  is  absolutely  authentic. 

The  purpose  of  the  United  States  Government  at  that  time 
in  trying  to  aid  Russia  was  absolutely  confined  to  a  desire  to 
enable  Russia  again  to  become  useful  as  an  ally  in  the  war 
against  Germany,  and  for  that  purpose  it  would  have  aided 
by  capital  and  by  supplying  experts  to  put  Russian  agricul- 
ture, transportation,  and  mineral  production  on  an  efficient 
basis.  But  Japan  saw  these  projects  only  as  moves  to  pro- 
cure for  America  an  economic  and  political  predomination 
in  Russia.     It  is  perfectly  logical  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 


306     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

ment  would  put  this  construction  on  all  moves  of  other  na- 
tions, for  it  never  made  a  move  anywhere  during  the  war 
except  with  such  objects.  Thus  in  the  early  months  of  the 
revolution  Japan  was  trying  to  establish  for  herself  an  ex- 
clusive and  preferential  position  in  eastern  Siberia,  and  to 
prevent  am'  other  nation  from  getting  a  foothold.  From 
that  time  every  development,  every  move  made  by  any  nation 
in  Siberia  or  relating  to  Siberia,  every  move  made  by  Japan 
herself  in  that  region  or  relating  to  conditions  there,  was 
calculated  by  Japanese  statesmen  with  that  motive. 

In  this  policy  Japan  was  reckoning  primarily  of  America, 
not  that  her  people  and  statesmen  have  any  special  antipathy 
to  America,  but  because  they  regard  that  nation  as  the  nat- 
ural and  at  present  the  only  formidable  opponent  of  Japan's 
ambitions  in  Asia.  "While  Japan  did  not  want  any  of  the 
powers  to  interfere  or  to  send  forces  into  Siberia,  and  showed 
an  irritation  at  all  of  them  when  they  did  so,  she  was  specially 
uneasy  about  America.  The  course  of  her  intrigue  and  prop- 
aganda during  that  period  revealed  this  plainly.  I  quote 
from  some  reports  of  American  and  other  official  investigators 
and  secret  agents  who  were  observing  conditions  in  Siberia 
then: 

Dated  Harbin,  April  23,  1918. 

The  Japanese  plans,  so  far  as  they  have  been  disclosed,  exhibit 
little  of  advantage  to  the  Allies  and  offer  the  prospect  of  Japan 
creating  for  herself  in  Siberia  one  of  those  exclusive  positions 
which  it  is  one  of  our  purposes  in  the  war  to  remove  from  inter- 
national relations.  I  have  talked  with  no  element  (Russian)  yet 
which  does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  treating  Japanese  offers  of  assist- 
ance and  actual  assistance  only  as  a  last  resort,  reluctantly  accepted, 
and  which  was  not  eager  for  American  assistance  as  the  only 
help  that  could  be  fully  trusted  to  be  both  unselfish  and  sympathetic 
toward  the  legitimate  aspirations  of  the  Russian  people.  The 
Japanese,  with  their  excellent  knowledge  of  the  extraordinary  pos- 
sibilities of  the  region,  have  opportunities  for  acquiring  properties 
at  a  time  when  industrial  conditions  are  unsettled,  as  they  are  at 
present.  Their  purchases  at  Harbin  up  to  the  present  time,  as 
ascertained  by  ,  are:  .  .  . 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  307 

Dated,  April  23  (Harbin). 

I  am  confidentially  informed  by  the  Russian  Committee  that 
they  are  assured  by  the  Japanese  Government,  through  its  repre- 
sentatives here,  that  Japan  is  prepared  to  send  troops  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  control  the  situation  and  to  place  in  power  any  govern- 
ment backed  by  Japan.  The  Committee  has  informed  me  that 
Japan  asks,  for  her  support,  the  following  terms: 

1.  Vladivostok  to  be  made  a  free  port. 

2.  Japan  to  be  granted  exclusive  mining  rights  hi  Siberia. 

3.  Japan  to  have  free  navigation  of  the  Amur  river. 

4.  Any  further  financial  needs  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway 
to  be  first  submitted  to  Japan. 

While  the  other  Allied  powers  were  debating  ways  and 
means  to  solve  the  Russian  question,  Japan  already  was  on 
the  ground  and  taking  an  active  part.  I  quote  from  a  con- 
fidential report  of  a  secret  agent  employed  by  a  foreign 
government  to  study  conditions  in  Siberia.  This  man  spoke 
Russian  fluently  and  was  thoroughly  familiar  with  that  re- 
gion from  long  residence  and  experience  there: 

Dated  June,  1918. 

All  the  Russian  groups  and  factions  require  money  for  conduct- 
ing a  propaganda  in  their  favor,  for  expenses  of  their  military 
forces  and  for  other  needs  of  their  administrations.  The  Japanese 
understand  very  well  these  difficulties  and  are  the  first  to  propose 
to  make  them  loans.  The  Japanese  have  offered  loans  to  almost 
every  faction  and  group  of  Russians  in  Siberia  at  different  times 
since  the  revolution,  and  frequently  have  made  loans  to  opposing 
factions  at  the  same  time.  I  mention  especially  the  proposed  loan 
of  100,000,000  rubles  on  most  favorable  conditions  to  the  new  Sibe- 
rian Provisional  Government.  According  to  the  statement  to  me 
of  the  Minister  for  Interior  Affairs  of  the  Siberian  Provisional 
Government  (M.  Novosseloff)  this  loan  was  not  accepted  by  the 
Government,  but  he  recognizes  that  the  situation  of  the  Siberian 
Government  in  Vladiostok  was  critical  owing  to  lack  of  necessary 
cash  in  hand  and  to  difficulties  met  in  obtaining  funds.  The  at- 
tempts of  the  Government  to  get  money  from  America  were  un- 
successful, though  the  Americans  did  not  refuse  but  were  only 
promising  to  arrange  the  matter  later,  probably  after  the  situation 
of  the  Government  is  more  stable. 


308     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

In  any  ease  we  see  that  Japan  is  continuing  the  same  policy 
which  she  practiced  toward  Seminoff;  that  means  the  policy  of 
secret  loans  on  unknown  conditions.  It  is  the  same  policy  that 
was  not  long  ago  discussed  in  the  newspapers  concerning  Japanese 
loans  in  China,  which  loans  attracted  special  attention  of  the 
Allied  Powers.  It  seems  that  something  definite  must  be  under- 
taken by  the  Allies  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  Japan  to  continue 
her  separate  loan  policy,  which  sooner  or  later  will  bring  com- 
plications in  Russian  affairs,  if  in  fact  it  is  not  intended  to  create 
confusion  and  dissension.  From  another  point  of  view  something 
must  be  done  to  organize  an  open  and  legal  assistance  by  the 
Allies  to  the  authorities  responsible  for  these  localities  which  are 
in  none  of  the  Czech's  influence,  because  measures  directed  to  main- 
tain order  require  money  before  all. 

Here  we  must  point  out  a  considerable  difference  in  the  ma- 
terial (money)  security  of  the  rival  groups.  The  group  of  Horvath 
disposes  considerable  official  and  private  resources,  thanks  to  the 
exceptional  situation  of  Horvath  personally  and  the  support  of 
the  Bourgeoise  class;  whilst  the  Siberian  government  has  absolutely 
no  money  at  its  disposition  in  the  Far  East. 

Here  follows  a  good  example  of  the  Japanese  anti-American 
propaganda  and  intrigue  in  Siberia  and  Manchuria,  extracted 
from  a  confidential  official  report  to  a  foreign  government. 
It  is  a  letter  from  the  Japanese  consul-general  at  Harbin 
to  the  Russian  newspaper  there. 

Imperial  Japanese  Consulate  General  at  Harbin, 

June  8,  1918,  No.  Ex.  6. 
To  the  Editor  of  the  "Novosti  Zhizni" : 

The  Japanese  Consul  General  has  the  honor  to  forward  you 
herewith  a  translation  in  Russian  of  a  leading  article  from  the 
Japanese  newspaper  "Osaka  Mainichi  Shimbun"  of  May  31,  1918, 
which  is  one  of  the  most  influential  press  organs  in  Japan.  This 
article  was  translated  from  Japanese'  into  Russian  by  an  amateur 
in  this  Consulate  General,  and  I  request  you  not  to  refuse  to  pub- 
lish it  in  the  earliest  issue  of  your  esteemed  paper,  giving  a  frank 
critique  of  the  content  of  the  article  in  question.  But  at  the  same 
time  this  Consulate  General  humbly  requests  that  under  no  circum- 
stances should  it  be  indicated  by  your  esteemed  newspaper  that 
this  document  was  received  from  this  Consulate  General. 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  309 

The  official  report  transmitting  this  letter  to  a  foreign  gov- 
ernment commented  thus: 

The  article  in  question  contained  an  attack  on  the  motives  of 
the  Allies,  and  especially  the  United  States,  in  their  dealings  with 
Russia,  and  as  propaganda  it  can  only  do  harm  to  the  Allies,  and 
tend  to  create  mistrust  of  American  motives. 

As  examples  of  the  method  of  Japan's  propaganda  in  the 
far  East  and  its  special  anti-American  trend,  I  will  give  a 
few  pertinent  instances.  When  Japan  was  trying  to  obtain 
a  hold  on  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  after  the  revolution 
in  Russia,  one  effort  was  to  make  it  security  for  a  loan  to 
be  given  to  the  political  faction  led  by  General  Horvath, 
head  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  administration  at  Har- 
bin. This  scheme  was  discovered,  and  was  exposed  by  the 
press  in  China  before  it  could  be  carried  through  (although 
there  is  still  uncertainty  about  whether  Horvath  has  com- 
promised the  Russian  title  with  Japan  in  some  way) ,  where- 
upon the  "Manchurian  Daily  News,"  the  Japanese  organ  in 
Manchuria  printed  in  English,  published  a  report  that  an 
American  loan  was  being  negotiated  on  the  same  collateral. 
This  was  criticized  as  a  characteristic  American  move  to  gain 
a  position  in  Manchuria,  and  it  set  off  the  press  in  Japan  in 
a  great  clamor.  Of  course  there  was  no  truth  in  the  report 
of  an  American  loan  with  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  as 
security,  and  it  was  a  pure  fabrication  by  the  "Manchurian 
Daily  News."  Another  example  was  the  premature  report 
in  Japanese  press  organs  that  an  American  fleet  had  been 
sent  to  Vladivostok  with  the  purpose  of  occupying  Siberia. 
Another  canard  circulated  by  Japanese  newspapers  was  that 
the  United  States  had  purchased  and  would  take  over  the 
Siberian  Railway.  Another  canard  was  that  the  United 
States  had  purchased  the  northern  part  of  the  island  of 
Saghalin  from  Russia.  Another  canard  was  that  the  United 
States,  or  American  capitalists,  had  obtained  an  exclusive 
concession  to  work  all  mines  in  Siberia,  this  being  given  out 


310     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

to  offset  the  publication  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence 
revealing  that  Japan  actually  was  trying  to  obtain  such  a 
right.  The  method  is,  when  some  secret  Japanese  scheme  is 
discovered  prematurely  and  published,  for  a  Japanese  propa- 
ganda organ  to  create  a  "smoke  screen"  by  attributing  the 
plan  to  America.  A  very  pertinent  example  of  this  method 
is  the  following,  printed  in  the  "Japan  Advertiser,"  an 
American-owned  newspaper  published  at  Tokio,  on  April 
27,  1918: 

Asahi  Service 

Vladivostok,  April  26. — An  important  diplomatic  document  re- 
garding a  secret  agreement  between  the  Governments  of  Siberia 
and  America  has  been  discovered  by  Soviet  officials  at  tbe  residence 
of  a  man  called  Kolobov,  one  of  tbe  committee  of  the  Siberian 
Government.  The  document  is  a  sensational  one,  in  which  the 
following  articles  are  stated  as  the  proposals  of  the  Siberian  Gov- 
ernment to  America. 

1.  Eastern  Siberia  is  to  be  recognized  as  an  independent  self- 
governing  state. 

2.  The  people  of  Eastern  Siberia  are  to  be  guaranteed  as  hav- 
ing the  right  of  not  being  intervened  with  by  foreign  powers. 

3.  A  republic  form  of  government  is  to  be  guaranteed  for  East- 
ern Siberia. 

4.  The  United  States  Government  may  assume  the  right  of  con- 
trol over  the  whole  Trans-Siberian  and  Chinese  Eastern  Railways, 
to  be  restored  to  the  Siberian  Government  as  soon  as  the  war  is 
over. 

5.  In  view  of  preventing  the  main  points  along  these  railways 
from  possible  disturbances,  the  American  Government  holds  the 
right  of  dispatching  its  troops  or  asking  the  expedition  of  troops 
of  the  other  Allied  Powers,  and  occupy  the  territories  as  far  as 
from  Vladivostok  to  Irkutsk. 

6.  The  Siberian  Government  should  not  conclude  peace  with 
Germany  without  America's  approval. 

7.  All  administrative  and  military  affairs  are  to  be  entrusted 
to  the  American  Government. 

8.  In  case  the  American  Government  decides  to  give  financial 
assistance  to  the  Siberian  Government,  the  former  may  hold  an 
absolute  controlling  power  over  the  expenditures  of  the  Siberian 
Government.     This   includes   affairs   regarding   ammunition. 

The   discovery   was   naturally   a   shock   to   the   Russian    public, 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  311 

especially  to  the  Soviet,  who  had  regarded  America  as  their  best 
friend.  It  is  anticipated  that  the  friendly  diplomatic  inter-course 
between  America  and  the  Soviet  Government  will  be  greatly  af- 
fected by  this  discovery. 

To  this  "Asahi"  despatch  the  "Advertiser"  prefixed  this 
comment : 

The  "Asahi's"  correspondent  at  Vladivostok  telegraphs  an  extra- 
ordinary story,  about  an  alleged  agreement  between  Americans, 
unnamed,  and  a  Siberian  provisional  government.  The  agreement 
is  said  to  have  been  discovered  by  Soviet  officials  in  a  domiciliary 
search — that  convenient  method  of  discovering  what  one  wants  to 
discover.  It  is  an  obvious  fabrication.  America'  is  still  in  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Petrograd,  and  would  not  be  the  least  likely 
to  enter  into  such  extraordinary  negotiations  with  unauthorised 
persons. 

The  terms  of  this  alleged  "secret  treaty"  would  be  tanta- 
mount to  the  creation  of  an  American  protectorate  over 
Siberia,  exactly  such  a  relation  as  Japan  has  for  years  been 
trying  to  establish  for  herself  with  respect  to  China,  and 
which  at  that  very  time  she  was  scheming  to  create  for  her- 
self in  Siberia. 

Conditions  in  Russia  continued  to  grow  worse,  and  in 
the  summer  of  1918  the  principal  Allied  powers  decided  upon 
action  in  Siberia.  This  time  the  United  States  took  the 
initiative,  and  proposed  a  joint  and  proportionately  equal  in- 
tervention, with  express  limitations  as  to  extent  and  objects. 
It  was  interesting  to  note  how  the  Japanese  press,  which  had 
been  actively  propagandizing  for  separate  intervention  by 
Japan,  now  began  to  doubt  the  need  for  it.  The  fact  was 
that  the  Japanese  Government  wanted  to  intervene  by  itself, 
but  it  preferred  no  intervention  to  joint  intervention.  But 
the  Allied  governments  were  very  well  informed  by  that  time, 
and  Japan  had  the  alternative  of  joining  or  of  seeing  the 
other  powers  intervene  without  her.  In  that  situation  she, 
of  course,  joined.  It  was  agreed  that  the  four  leading  Allied 
powers,  Great  Britain,  Japan,  France,  and  the  United  States, 


312     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

would  supply  a  maximum  of  seven  thousand  troops  each, 
while  Italy  also  was  to  send  a  contingent.  That  force,  with 
the  small  Czecho-Slovak  army,  was  deemed  sufficient  for  the 
purposes  of  the  intervention  as  then  conceived. 

Japan  did  not  wait  upon  a  decision  of  the  other  Allied 
powers  to  move.  As  early  as  the  spring  of  1918  Japan  be- 
gan to  send  troops  into  Manchuria  by  increasing  the  gar- 
risons, or  "railway  guards/'  there.  This  was  done  chiefly 
to  intimidate  the  Chinese  Government,  which  had  increased 
its  forces  in  north  Manchuria  for  the  purpose  of  policing 
the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  which  remained  under  the 
direction  of  General  Horvath  by  virtue  of  an  arrangement 
made  at  Peking  in  April,  1918,  whereby  the  railway  admin- 
istration was  declared  to  be  detached  from  the  authority  of 
the  Petrograd  Government.  Japanese  diplomacy  had  favored 
that  arrangement  because  it  was  backing  Horvath,  and  it 
prevented  China  from  taking  full  control.  The  increase  of 
Chinese  forces  in  north  Manchuria  made  necessary  by  the 
lapse  of  Russian  authority  in  that  region  was  resented  by 
Japan,  which  claimed  the  right  to  decide  such  measures  un- 
der the  "military  agreement"  recently  concluded  between 
Japan  and  China.  Meanwhile  Great  Britain  had  taken  a 
hand  and  was  giving  some  financial  and  military  support  to 
the  Russian  leader  Seminoff,  who  had  organized  a  mixed 
force  of  Russians,  Chinese,  Japanese  (volunteers)  and  Mon- 
gols to  oppose  the  Bolsheviks  in  the  Baikal  territory.  Sem- 
inoff and  Horvath  did  not  agree  very  well,  owing  to  clever 
playing  upon  their  mutual  jealousy  by  the  elements  (Japa- 
nese and  German)  that  wanted  to  create  dissension.  Seminoff 
had  made  an  effort  to  take  Irkutsk,  but  was  repulsed  near 
the  Manchuria  frontier  and  retreated  into  Chinese  territory, 
where  most  of  his  troops  were  interned  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, which  was  trying  to  observe  neutrality  toward  the 
revolution  in  Russia,  and  of  course  could  not  permit  its  terri- 
tory to  be  used  as  a  military  base  of  operations  for  armed 
excursions  into  Siberia.     During  this  time  it  was  convenient, 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  313 

owing  to  congestion  at  Vladivostok,  to  ship  medical  and  other 
Red  Cross  supplies,  and  supplies  needed  for  other  Allied 
uses,  into  Manchuria  and  Siberia  by  the  South  Manchurian 
Railway,  which  connects  with  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway 
at  Changchun.  As  illuminating  a  phase  of  the  situation,  I 
quote  from  an  official  report  to  a  foreign  government,  dated 
in  April: 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  Japanese  railway  authorities 
here  have,  during  the  past  week,  been  seriously  hampering  Allied 
war  operations.  Their  motives  in  doing  so  are  easily  imagined, 
but  difficult  to  determine  with  any  certainty  or  exactness.  They 
are  more  or  less  inscrutable,  as  many  of  their  recent  actions  are. 

The  Japanese  evidently  do  not  want  order  restored  by  the  Rus- 
sians themselves  in  Siberia,  for  in  such  a  case  they  would  have  no 
excuse  to  interfere.  Another  chance  to  "fish  in  troubled  waters" 
would  thereby  be  lost.  Then,  too,  it  seems  that  they  are  moving 
large  quantities  of  their  own  arms  and  munitions  to  the  north 
and  they  want  theirs  to  arrive  first.  However,  their  action  in 
this  matter  hardly  accords  with  the  statements  made  by  Viscount 
Ishii  and  other  Japanese  diplomats  about  Japan  '"standing  shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  the  Allies"  and  doing  their  utmost,  etc.  When 
one  considers  the  celerity  and  efficiency  with  which  the  Japanese 
move  their  own  supplies  over  the  railway,  it  cannot  for  a  moment 
be  thought  by  any  rational  person  that  the  delays  and  ineptitude 
which  characterize  their  actions  where  other  Allied  interests  are 
concerned  are  anything  but  studied  and  deliberate.  That,  at  least, 
is  the  opinion  of  every  official  here  who  has  anything  to  do  with 
the  incidents  described.  The  British  Consul-General,  who  is  a 
careful,  cautious  and  conservative  man,  expressed  his  opinion  on 
this  subject  in  unmeasured  terms. 

The  action  of  the  Japanese  in  holding  up  the  Allied  supplies 
is  in  keeping  with  their  general  railway  policy  in  Manchuria,  and 
affords  another  striking  example  of  their  abuse  of  railway  rights, 
which  abuse  has  been  frequently  reported  in  my  despatches  Nos. 
79  and  84,  dated  respectively  February  16  and  March  5,  1918. 
When  American  Red  Cross  supplies  were  being  sent  to  Russia,  this 
office  had  the  utmost  difficulty  in  getting  the  Japanese  to  accept 
them  for  shipment.  They  deliberately  placed  obstacles  in  the 
way,  and  showed  no  disposition  whatever  to  help.  It  was  a  sorry 
day   for   European    and   American   interests   when    the    Japanese 


314     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

gained  control  of  the  railway  lines  in  South  Manchuria,  and  all 
the  plausible  explanations  about  ''equal  rights"  and  the  hypocritical 
vaporings  by  the  Japanese  about  the  impartiality  of  their  railway 
administration  carry  no  weight  with  those  who  have  any  personal 
knowledge  of  the  subject. 

At  the  time  when  the  Japanese  Government  was  consider- 
ing the  proposal  of  the  United  States  Government  for  a  joint 
and  limited  intervention  in  Siberia,  and  when  it  began  to 
perceive  the  expediency  of  accepting  the  American  view 
of  the  situation,  a  strict  censorship  was  clapped  on  the  press 
in  Japan,  which  up  to  then  had  been  allowed  free  expression 
on  the  topic.  In  July,  1918,  a  special  order  was  issued,  re- 
ported by  the  " Japan  Advertiser"  as  follows: 

NEWSPAPERS  ABE  WARNED 

REGARDING  SIBERIAN  VIEWS 


As  is  the  order  on  the  eve  of  important  events  in  Japan,  the  Met- 
ropolitan Police  last  night  issued  to  all  newspapers  a  warning 
against  the  publishing  of  conjectures  regarding  particulars  of 
negotiations  between  Japan  and  the  Allies  in  regard  to  the  Siberian 
question. 

The  police  also  warned  against  the  publication  of  anything  that 
is  likely  to  cause  resentment  to  the  Allies  among  the  Japanese. 
This  last  warning  is  evidently  issued  in  view  of  the  attitude  of 
some  Japanese  newspapers  in  commenting  on  the  reported  attitude 
of  the  United  States  toward  intervention  in  Siberia. 

The  joint  Allied  intervention  in  Siberia  was  promulgated 
in  August,  1918.  In  that  connection  it  is  interesting  to  quote 
in  full  the  official  announcement  of  its  participation  by  the 
Japanese  Government: 

The  Japanese  Government,  actuated  by  the  sentiments  of  sincere 
friendship  toward  the  Russian  people,  have  always  entertained 
the  most  sanguine  hopes  of  the  speedy  reestabhshment  of  order 
in  Russia,  and  a  healthy  and  untrammeled  development  of  her  na- 
tional life.  Abundant  proof,  however,  is  now  afforded  to  show 
that  the  Central  European  Empires,  taking  advantage  of  the  chaotic 
and  defenceless  condition  in  which  Russia  has  momentarily  been 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION      "  315 

placed,  are  consolidating  their  hold  on  that  country,  and  are 
steadily  extending  their  activities  to  the  Russian  far  Eastern  posses- 
sions. They  have  persistently  interfered  with  the  passage  of  the 
Czecho-Slovak  troops  through  Siberia.  In  the  forces  now  opposing 
these  valiant  troops  German  and  Austrian  prisoners  are  freely  en- 
listed, and  they  practically  assume  the  position  of  command.  The 
Czecho-Slovak  troops,  aspiring  to  secure  a  free  and  independent 
existence  for  their  races  and  loyally  espousing  the  common  cause  of 
the  Allies,  justly  command  every  sympathy  and  consideration  from 
the  cobelligerents  to  whom  their  destiny  is  a  matter  of  deep  and 
abiding  concern.  In  the  presence  of  the  threatening  danger  to 
which  the  Czecho-Slovak  troops  are  actually  exposed  in  Siberia 
at  the  hands  of  the  Germans  and  Austro-Hungarians,  the  Allies 
have  naturally  felt  themselves  unable  to  view  with  indifference  the 
untoward  course  of  events,  and  a  certain  number  of  their  troops 
have  already  been  ordered  to  proceed  to  Vladivostok.  The  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  equally  sensible  of  the  gravity  of  the 
situation,  recently  approached  the  Japanese  Government  with  pro- 
posals for  early  despatch  of  troops  to  relieve  pressure  now  weigh- 
ing upon  the  Czecho-Slovak  forces.  The  Japanese  Government, 
being  anxious  to  fall  in  with  the  desires  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment, and  also  to  act  in  harmony  with  their  Allies  in  this  expedi- 
tion, have  decided  to  proceed  at  once  to  disposition  of  suitable 
forces  for  the  proposed  mission.  A  certain  number  of  these  troops 
will  be  sent  forthwith  to  Vladivostok.  In  adopting  this  course,  the 
Japanese  Government  remain  unshaken  in  their  constant  desire  to 
promote  the  relations  to  enduring  friendship  with  Russia  and  the 
Russian  people,  and  they  reaffirm  their  policy  of  respecting  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Russia  and  of  abstaining  from  all  inter- 
ference in  her  internal  politics.  They  further  declare  that,  upon 
the  realization  of  the  objects  above  indicated,  they  will  immed- 
iately withdraw  all  the  Japanese  troops  from  the  Russian  terri- 
tories, and  will  leave  wholly  unimpaired  the  sovereignty  of  Russia 
in  all  its  phases  whether  political  or  military. 

Once  intervention  was  decided  on,  Japan  easily  forestalled 
her  allies  in  celerity  in  moving  troops,  because  of  proximity 
and  also  because  she  had  been  ready  for  a  long  time.  (I 
have  trustworthy  information  that  Japan  mobilized  three 
divisions  for  occupation  of  Siberia  in  August,  1917).  By  her 
railway  communications  through  Korea  and  Manchuria, 
Japan  quickly  had  troops  at  Harbin,  and  soon  pushed  them 


316     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

westward.  At  all  points  of  contact,  and  particularly  on  the 
line  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  the  Japanese  military 
commanders  at  once  assumed  a  superior  authority  over  the 
officers  of  Chinese  troops  that  had  been  sent  to  maintain  or- 
der in  those  localities.  Japan  asserted  this  seniority  under 
the  terms  of  the  so-called  "military  agreement"  with  China. 
China  did  not  place  that  interpretation  on  the  agreement, 
and  the  Chinese  commanders  in  Manchuria  showed  firmness 
in  maintaining  that  they  controlled  in  Chinese  territory,  and 
in  refusing  to  yield  authority  there  to  the  Japanese. 

This  situation  led  to  many  clashes  between  Chinese  and 
Japanese  troops  in  Manchuria,  some  of  which  assumed  serious 
proportions.  Japanese  troops  moved  along  the  Chinese  East- 
ern Railway,  placing  guards  at  all  bridges,  culverts,  and 
stations.  As  Chinese  guards  in  ample  numbers  already  were 
stationed  at  all  those  points,  and  the  line  was,  to  quote  from 
a  report  of  an  American  military  expert,  "as  safe  as  Broad- 
way," the  Chinese  resented  being  thrust  aside,  especially  as 
the  political  motive  of  Japan  in  trying  to  take  over  the  rail- 
way was  fully  understood.  At  several  places  Japanese 
troops  actually  drove  the  Chinese  guards  away  by  force.  As 
an  example  of  this  condition,  the  occurrence  known  as  the 
"Manchuli  incident"  will  serve. 

Manchuli  is  a  town  on  the  line  of  the  railway  between 
Chita  and  Vladivostok  at  the  point  where  it  enters  Chinese 
territory  in  western  Manchuria,  and  has  importance  because 
it  is  where  frontier  customs  examinations  are  made,  pass- 
ports visaed,  and  other  official  functions  performed.  At 
that  time  the  town  was  a  rendezvous  for  Russian  refugees 
drifting  across  the  frontier,  and  stragglers  from  Seminoff's 
little  army  that  was  operating  against  the  soviet  government 
at  Irkutsk.  I  quote  from  an  official  report  of  the  incident 
made  by  a  foreign  military  officer  who  obtained  the  facts 
on  the  ground : 

I  have  to  report  an  unpleasant  collision  that  occurred  at  Man- 
chuli  between   Japanese   and    Chinese   troops   and    officials.     This 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  317 

point  has  lately  been  the  scene  of  considerable  trouble  owing  to 
the  attempt  of  the  Seminoff  forces  to  use  it  as  a  base  and  as  a 
place  to  which  they  can  retreat  when  repulsed  by  the  enemy.  It 
has  been  necessary  for  the  Chinese  authorities  here  to  take  meas- 
ures to  preserve  China's  neutrality  in  this  warfare  between  Rus- 
sian political  factions,  and  the  Chinese  troops  have  disarmed  many 
of  Seminoff's  men  who  have  been  thrust  back  into  Chinese  terri- 
tory. This  has  led  to  some  unpleasant  incidents,  but  the  Chinese 
officials  were  acting  with  moderation  and  a  fair  amount  of  dis- 
cretion. 

This  was  the  situation  when  a  Japanese  military  force  com- 
manded by  General  Fujii  arrived  at  Manchuli.  General  Fujii,  I 
am  informed,  at  first  tried  to  take  command  of  the  Chinese  troops, 
claiming  to  be  the  senior  officer.  The  Chinese  commander  declined 
to  yield  the  command,  and  on  being  pressed  by  General  Fujii,  he 
referred  the  question  to  the  Peking  Government.  I  understand 
that  the  Japanese  Government  through  its  legation  at  Peking  put 
pressure  on  the  Chinese  Government  to  concede  the  authority  of 
the  Japanese  commander  here,  but  the  Chinese  Government  refused. 
The  relations  between  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  headquarters  here 
therefore  have  been  strained,  and  there  have  been  brawls  between 
the  Japanese  and  Chinese  troops  which,  according  to  my  investiga- 
tion, are  almost  invariably  caused  by  the  truculence  of  the  Japanese 
soldiers,  who  show  their  contempt  of  the  Chinese  in  all  ways.  This 
was  the  general  situation  when  the  unfortunate  incident  occurred. 

At  midnight  or  thereabout  on  last  Tuesday  night  a  detachment  of 
Japanese  soldiers,  about  fifteen  men  with  one  non-commissioned  of- 
ficer, went  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Chinese  military  commandant. 
The  Japanese  were  armed  with  rifles  and  hand  grenades.  They 
found  the  outer  gate  of  the  compound  closed,  and  they  told  the  Chi- 
nese sentry  that  they  wanted  to  talk  with  the  Chinese  commander 
and  demanded  admittance.  The  guard  refused  to  let  them  inside  and 
tried  to  induce  them  to  leave.  The  Japanese  then  attempted  to  force 
an  entrance.  The  Chinese  sentry  resisted  and  was  killed.  The  Jap- 
anese then  forced  the  gate  and  marched  in  a  body  to  the  inner  en- 
trance, again  demanding  to  talk  with  the  Chinese  commandant.  By 
this  time  the  Chinese  commandant  (General  Pao)  was  awakened  and 
one  of  his  staff  parleyed  with  the  Japanese,  who  demanded  admit- 
tance. The  Chinese  officer  told  them  that  General  Pao  could  not  dis- 
cuss matters  with  them  as  there  was  no  Japanese  officer  present,  and 
asked  them  to  go  and  bring  an  officer.  This  the  Japanese  refused  to 
do,  and  started  to  force  an  entrance  to  the  building  where  General 
Pao  and  his  staff  were  quartered.     The  Chinese  guard  then  fired. 


318     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Three  Japanese  soldiers  were  killed  and  the  rest  retreated.  The 
bodies  of  three  men  in  the  uniform  of  the  Japanese  army  were  found 
in  the  compound  after  the  affray  was  over. 

The  next  day,  before  the  Chinese  commander  had  time  to  make 
a  report  of  the  affair,  the  Japanese  commanding  general  demanded 
an  apology  for  the  injury  done  to  Japanese  troops  and  practically 
detained  the  Chinese  commandant  under  arrest.  The  Japanese 
Government  make  a  diplomatic  issue  of  the  incident,  backed  up 
the  Japanese  General,  and  demanded  an  apology  from  China  and 
that  the  Chinese  troops  be  withdrawn  from  Manchuli,  except 
a  few. 

While  a  Chinese  officer  was  parleying  with  the  Japanese  soldiers 
on  the  night  of  the  incident,  another  Chinese  officer  telephoned  to 
the  Japanese  military  headquarters  asking  that  a  Japanese  officer 
be  sent  to  discipline  the  Japanese  soldiers  who  were  making  the 
disturbance,  but  no  attention  was  paid  to  this  request. 

I  understand  that  the  matter  has  now  been  settled  by  the  Japa- 
nese and  Chinese  Governments  as  follows:  China  is  to  pay  an  in- 
demnity in  money  for  the  three  Japanese  who  were  killed,  and  the 
Chinese  commandant  is  to  apologize  to  the  Japanese  commander 
here;  Japan  is  to  pay  an  indemnity  for  the  one  Chinese  who  was 
killed.  Thus  China  is  put  officially  in  the  wrong  and  is  com- 
pelled to  submit  to  humiliation  and  "loss  of  face,"  as  is  usual  in 
such  cases.  The  facts  seem  to  be  that  the  incident  was  a  case  of 
wanton  and  insolent  affront  by  Japanese  soldiers  who  took  this 
way  of  showing  their  contempt  of  the  Chinese. 

Soon  after  the  Manchuli  incident,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment suddenly  and  without  previous  intimation  notified  the 
Chinese  Government  that  it  intended  to  act  under  the  "mili- 
tary agreement."  China  was  not  consulted  as  to  this  action 
in  any  way,  either  as  to  its  advisability  or  the  means  to  be 
used.  At  the  time  when  China  was  so  officially  notified, 
Japanese  troops  already  were  moving.  This  notice  to  China 
was  given  on  September  20.  By  September  28  it  was  esti- 
mated by  a  foreign  military  expert  on  the  ground  that  there 
were  22,000  Japanese  troops  north  of  Changchun,  the  north- 
ern terminus  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway;  3,000  at 
Changchun,  and  15,000  at  Mukden.  By  the  end  of  October 
there  were  about  60,000  Japanese  troops  in  Manchuria  out- 
side of  the  alleged  Japanese  sphere  tapped  by  the  South 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  319 

Manchurian  Railway,  and  the  Kirin  and  Mukden-Antung 
lines.  By  the  understanding  among  the  powers  about  joint 
intervention  in  Siberia,  each  of  the  four  principal  powers 
was  to  send  7,000  troops.  Japan  did  send  about  10,000  to 
Siberia  by  way  of  Vladivostok,  which  evidently  the  Tokio 
Government  considered  its  quota  under  the  joint  intervention. 
But,  including  those  in  South  Manchuria,  Japan  had  about 
75,000  troops  in  Manchuria,  showing  that  the  Japanese 
Government  regarded  Manchuria  as  its  special  field  a«id  as 
not  included  in  the  joint  intervention  plan.  At  the  time 
when  the  United  States  had  approached  the  Allied  nations 
with  its  intervention  plan,  China  also  "was  invited  to  par- 
ticipate, and  had  consented;  but  China's  quota  of  troops  was 
not  fixed,  it  being  apparently  assumed  that  her  part  would  be 
to  preserve  order  in  Manchuria  and  on  the  line  of  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railway.  That  is,  China  was  to  do  what  was  neces- 
sary within  her  own  territory  contiguous  to  Siberia,  and  was 
to  facilitate  the  Allies'  operations  as  she  could. 

It  quickly  developed  that  Japan  was  determined  that  China 
should  take  no  part,  at  least  no  creditable  part,  in  these  op- 
erations, just  as  Japan  had  succeeded  in  preventing  China 
from  having  any  real  participation  in  the  war  elsewhere. 
Japan  took  it  solely  to  herself  to  decide  upon  when  and  how 
the  ''military  agreement"  would  be  applied,  and  in  acting 
professedly  under  it  Japan  did  not  consult  China  or  assign 
any  part  to  China.  Yet  the  operations  alleged  to  be  under- 
taken by  agreement  were  confined  exclusively  to  China's  ter- 
ritory, and  affected  Chinese  interests  more  importantly  than 
those  of  any  other  nation. 

The  period  from  the  time  joint  Allied  intervention  in 
Siberia  began  (August,  1918)  until  November,  when  the 
armistice  was  signed,  can  be  summarized  briefly.  Out  of 
courtesy,  a  Japanese  general  was  given  command  (or  senior- 
ity) of  the  Allied  expeditionary  forces  in  theory,  but  in  fact 
each  different  national  force  was  directed  according  to  the 
policy  of  its  government.     For  instance,  Japan  for  her  own 


320     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

reasons  desired  to  push  as  far  into  Siberia  as  was  possible 
without  having  to  do  much  actual  fighting.  The  excuse  to  do 
this  was  to  support  the  Czecho-Slovak  forces  that  were  com- 
bating the  army  of  the  Soviets  in  central  and  western  Si- 
beria. France  and  Great  Britain  also  seemed  to  favor  a 
move  deeper  into  Siberia,  Great  Britain  probably  on  the 
theory  that  the  general  war  situation  for  the  Allies  would 
be  helped,  and  France  perhaps  for  the  same  reason.  The 
American  Government,  however,  held  its  forces  at  or  near 
the  coast  and  declined  to  participate  in  a  move  toward  the 
interior.  Evidently  Washington  foresaw  the  end  of  the  war 
and  did  not  want  to  become  further  involved  in  Russia's 
civil  strife. 

This  period,  brief  as  it  was,  was  long  enough  to  demon- 
strate the  strong  antagonism  felt  by  the  Japanese  toward  all 
of  their  allies.  The  Japanese  seemed  to  regard  the  British, 
French,  and  American  troops  as  interlopers,  as  trespassers 
in  a  Japanese  preserve,  with  the  sole  motive  of  depriving 
Japan  of  legitimate  spoils  of  war.  This  disposition  caused 
numerous  very  unpleasant  incidents,  and  serious  trouble  be- 
tween the  Japanese  troops  and  those  of  the  other  allies  was 
at  times  narrowly  averted.  I  could  relate  dozens  of  incidents 
illustrative  of  this  condition,  but  two  will  be  enough.  Two 
British  officers,  in  uniform,  were  walking  in  the  outskirts  of 
Vladivostok  on  some  military  business,  when  they  noticed  the 
peculiar  actions  of  a  Japanese  soldier  who  was  stationed  as 
a  sentry  near  some  supplies.  The  sentry  was  beckoning,  and 
seemed  to  wish  the  officers  to  approach  him.  Disregarding 
his  unmilitary  demeanor,  and  thinking  the  man  might  be  in 
trouble,  the  officers  walked  over  to  where  he  was  and  asked 
what  he  wanted.  The  sentry  greeted  them  with  an  insolent 
grin  and  a  tirade  in  Japanese,  which  the  officers  could  not 
understand.  Then  the  sentry  seized  a  swagger-stick  which 
one  of  the  officers  was  carrying,  broke  it,  and  cast  the  pieces 
into  a  near-by  puddle  of  water.  By  this  time  the  officers 
comprehended  that  the  soldier  meant  to  insult  them,  and  they 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  321 

took  him  suddenly  by  his  arms  and  threw  him,  gun  and  all, 
into  the  puddle.  They  then  continued  their  walk.  The  of- 
ficers did  not  report  the  incident  formally,  for  many  previ- 
ous similar  incidents  had  shown  that  no  satisfaction  would 
be  obtained  from  the  Japanese  superior  command.  Japa- 
nese troops  in  Vladivostok  and  Manchuria  habitually  failed  to 
salute  officers  of  other  Allied  forces,  and  on  occasion  even 
would  shoulder  them  off  sidewalks  and  display  other  studied 
rudeness  toward  them.  By  the  late  autumn  of  1918  there 
was  a  feeling  almost  of  hostility  between  the  Japanese  troops 
in  that  region  and  the  troops  of  other  Allied  forces,  which 
became  so  intense  that  measures  had  to  be  taken  to  prevent 
serious  collisions. 

An  example  of  this  attitude  of  the  Japanese  military  was 
given  in  Manchuria.  Italy's  part  in  the  Siberian  interven- 
tion was  to  send  a  battalion  of  troops  from  the  garrison  main- 
tained in  North  China  under  the  protocol  of  1901.  The  short- 
est and  quickest  way  for  these  troops  to  reach  the  scene  of 
events  was  by  the  Chinese  Government  railways  to  Mukden, 
then  by  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  to  Changchun,  where 
was  a  connection  with  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  on  to 
Harbin.  The  practice  has  been,  in  transferring  passengers 
at  this  point,  to  shunt  trains  from  the  Japanese  line  over  to 
the  Russian  station,  when  trains  could  be  changed  by  merely 
walking  across  a  platform.  The  train  conveying  the  Italian 
troops  had  arrived  at  Changchun  and  was  shunted  over  to 
the  Russian  station.  There  the  troops  detrained  for  trans- 
fer. While  this  was  taking  place,  an  Italian  sentry  was 
posted  to  guard  some  supplies  on  the  station  platform.  A 
number  of  Japanese  soldiers  were  strolling  about  the  plat- 
form, and  one  of  them  started  to  examine  the  supplies,  where- 
upon the  sentry  properly  warned  him  off.  The  Japanese 
went  away,  and  soon  returned  with  a  Japanese  officer,  who 
reprimanded  the  Italian  sentry.  The  sentry  stood  his 
ground,  and  when  the  Japanese  officer  started  to  handle  the 
supplies,  presented  his  bayonet.     The  Japanese  officer  then 


322     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

left,  and  returned  soon  with  a  file  of  Japanese  soldiers  fully 
armed,  which  he  drew  up  in  a  line  on  the  platform.  By 
then  an  Italian  officer  had  appeared,  and  a  sharp  colloquy 
occurred.  The  Japanese  officer  demanded  that  the  sentry 
be  ordered  to  apologize,  which  the  Italian  officer  refused  to 
order  him  to  do,  and  objected  to  the  presence  of  the  file  of 
Japanese  soldiers  and  their  menacing  attitude.  After  an 
argument,  the  Japanese  withdrew.  In  the  opinion  of  officers 
of  other  nationalities,  the  Japanese  adopt  these  methods  to 
impress  the  natives  that  the  other  powers  are  subservient  to 
Japan,  and  that  Japan  is  the  dictator  in  Manchuria. 

The  situation  caused  by  the  conduct  of  Japanese  troops  in 
Siberia  and  Manchuria  became  so  strained  that  a  joint  pro- 
test, which,  I  am  informed,  was  quite  strong  in  its  phraseol- 
ogy, was  sent  to  the  Japanese  commanding  general  by  the 
other  allied  commanders. 

With  the  signing  of  the  armistice  in  Europe,  the  joint 
Allied  intervention  in  Siberia  took  a  new  character.  It  no 
longer  had  the  complexion  of  an  oblique  military  move 
against  the  Central  powers,  which  was  no  longer  necessary. 
It  now  became  purely  an  intervention  in  Russia's  internal 
affairs,  a  situation  that  called  for  fresh  consideration  by  the 
peace  conference  at  Paris.  Therefore  military  measures  in 
Siberia  were  suspended  pending  the  adoption  of  a  new  policy. 

The  Japanese  Government  soon  grasped  the  meaning  of 
these  events.  In  December  it  announced  that  it  was  with- 
drawing its  troops  from  Siberia  and  Manchuria,  and  it  is 
probable  that  the  number  was  reduced.  In  February,  1919, 
it  was  reported  that  Japan  had  agreed  to  advance  a  loan  to 
the  Siberian  Provisional  Government  at  Omsk  and  to  give 
military  aid  and  support  to  that  Government.  For  this  aid 
Japan  is,  so  the  reports  said,  to  receive  exclusive  concessions 
in  central  and  eastern  Siberia.  Such  a  step  of  course  would 
be  a  violation  of  the  inter-allied  agreement  regarding  inter- 
vention in  Russia,  by  which  none  of  them  were  to  act  except 
in  consultation,  and  conjunction  with  the  other  allied  nations. 


THE  SIBERIAN  QUESTION  323 

Semi-official  denials  of  the  reports  were  given  out  at  Tokio. 
Observers  of  far-Eastern  polities  are  apt  to  conclude  that 
Japan  makes  a  show  of  withdrawing  from  Siberia  in 
order  to  get  the  other  powers  out,  and  at  the  same  time 
is  planning  to  take  an  active  part,  for  a  definite  quid  pro  quo, 
in  the  civil  war  in  Russia  by  renting  Japanese  troops  (for 
the  reported  arrangement  amounts  to  that)  to  one  of  the 
factions.  In  January,  1919,  it  was  announced  that  an  agree- 
ment had  been  reached  among  the  Allied  powers  (which  in 
effect  meant  between  Japan  and  the  United  States)  by  which 
the  Chinese  Eastern  and  Siberian  railways  are  for  a  while  to 
be  operated  by  the  Stevens  Commission  under  joint  interna- 
tional control. 

In  response  to  inquiries  of  press  correspondents  at  Wash- 
ington, the  State  Department  questioned  the  correctness  of 
the  reports  about  Japanese  loans  to  the  Omsk  government  in 
return  for  concessions  in  the  Pri-Amur  district  of  Siberia, 
and  pointed  out  that  Japan,  as  a  loyal  ally,  and  with  full 
representation  at  the  peace  conference,  could  not  take  inde- 
pendent action  in  Russia.  A  few  days  later,  on  February  12, 
the  State  Department  announced  that  the  United  States  and 
Japan  had  agreed  in  regard  to  plans  for  the  restoration  of 
railway  traffic  in  Siberia.  Acting  Secretary  of  State  Polk 
was  quoted  by  the  Associated  Press  as  stating: 

The  purpose  of  the  agreement  is  to  assist  the  Russians  in  Siberia 
in  regaining  their  normal  condition  of  life,  and  has  been  reached 
upon  a  definite  understanding  that  the  railways  are  to  be  operated 
for  the  interests  of  the  people  of  Siberia.  The  United  States  and 
Japan  have  expressly  voiced  their  disinterested  purpose  not  to  in- 
fringe on  any  existing  right,  either  of  Russia  or,  where  the  Chinese 
Eastern  is  concerned,  of  China. 

Under  the  plan  adopted,  which  was  to  be  put  into  effect 
immediately,  the  Siberian  railway  system,  including  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  was  to  be  supervised  by  an  inter- 
Allied  committee  with  a  Russian  as  chairman.  Russia,  Great 
Britain,  Japan,  the  United  States,  France,  Italy  and  China 


324     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

are  to  have  representation  on  the  Committee.  The  technical 
and  economic  management  of  the  railways  will  be  in  the  hands 
of  a  technical  board,  the  president  of  which  will  be  John  F. 
Stevens,  head  of  the  American  railway  commission  sent  to 
Russia  in  1917.  An  inter-Allied  military  board  will  co- 
ordinate matters  affecting  military  transportation  arising 
from  the  presence  in  Russia  of  military  forces  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Allies. 

It  required  months  of  negotiations  to  effect  this  simple  ar- 
rangement, owing  to  the  difficulties  raised  by  Japan.  As 
friction  developed,  the  other  Allied  powers  fell  into  the  back- 
ground, and  left  the  issue  to  be  adjusted  by  Japan  and 
America.  The  result,  so  far,  indicates  that  the  American 
Government  is  not  disposed  to  abandon  the  Manchurian  and 
Siberian  situations  to  the  exclusive  treatment  of  Japan. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  SOLUTION 

Effects  in  China  of  the  collapse  of  Germany — The  internal  situation — 
Composition  of  the  Government — Japan  forcing  her  schemes — The 
armistice — Weakening  of  Japanese  influence  at  Peking — Some  causes 
of  this — Injection  of  American  ideals — President  Wilson's  prin- 
ciples— Their  application  to  China — Work  of  American  propaganda — 
Japan's  plan  to  represent  China  at  the  peace  conference — The  scheme 
blocked — Uneasiness  of  Chinese — The  Southern  point  of  view — Further 
effort  by  Japan  to  intimidate  China — Effort  to  prevent  the  publication 
of  secret  treaties — Outcome  of  that  matter — Further  advice  of  the  Al- 
lied powers  to  China — Trying  to  end  the  civil  strife — The  conference  at 
Shanghai — What  shall  be  done  for  China? — The  case  of  China  sum- 
marized— Responsibility  of  America — The  problem  analyzed — Question 
of  extraterritoriality — A  plan  for  its  gradual  abolition — This  plan  con- 
sidered— The  railway  question — The  question  of  loans  and  finance — 
New  declaration  of  the  American  Government — Will  China  take  the 
cure? — China's  appeal  to  civilization. 

THE  breakdown  of  the  German  military  offensive  in 
France  in  the  summer  of  1918  threw  a  shadow  over 
Japan's  influence  at  Peking,  and  alarmed  the  group 
of  corrupt  Chinese  officials  who  owed  their  positions  and  power 
to  Japanese  backing.  For  a  while  it  was  felt  that  the  forma- 
tion of  a  new  "liberal7'  ministry  at  Tokio  might  mean  an  ac- 
tual change  in  Japan's  China  policy.  But  events  quickly 
showed  the  fallacy  of  such  expectations. 

It  soon  developed  that  the  Japanese  Government  did  not  in- 
tend to  change  its  course  in  China  except  under  compulsion, 
but  would  continue  during  the  probably  long  period  of  peace 
negotiations  to  push  the  China  game  for  all  it  would  stand. 
Baron  Hayashi,  the  Japanese  minister  at  Peking,  who  had 
been  out  of  sympathy  with  the  reckless  Japanese  loan  policy 
and  was  not  a  believer  in  drastic  methods,  was  recalled,  and 

325 


326     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

replaced  by  Mr.  Obata.  Obata  was  known  in  China  as  the 
"table-pounder,"  because  during  the  pressure  for  the  secret 
acceptance  of  the  twenty-one  demands  and  the  negotiation  of 
the  "agreement"  of  1915  he,  so  it  is  said,  would  emphasize 
Japan's  arguments  during  the  conferences  by  thumping  the 
council  table  vigorously.  Obata 's  return  to  Peking  at  that 
juncture  was  taken  to  mean  that  Japan  would,  if  necessary, 
revert  to  table-pounding  tactics  to  gain  her  points. 

A  brief  resume  of  the  condition  of  China  internally  at  that 
time  is  necessary  to  make  the  situation  comprehensible.  The 
government  at  Peking  was  composed  of  a  president,  a  cabinet, 
and  an  assembly,  or  council.  The  president,  Hsu  Shih-chang, 
was  amiable,  and  was  believed  to  be  a  patriotic  man,  but  one 
lacking  a  forceful  personality.  The  strong  man  in  the  Gov- 
ernment was  the  premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  who  with  his  hench- 
men composed  the  predominant  group  in  the  cabinet,  and  con- 
trolled the  ministries  of  war,  finance,  and  communications. 
Tuan  Chi-jui 's  power  rested  on  his  affiliations  with  the  north- 
ern Tuchuns,  his  command  of  such  troops  that  were  in  and 
near  Peking,  and  the  financial  and  diplomatic  support  of 
Japan.  The  other  cabinet  ministries,  including  the  ministry 
of  foreign  affairs,  were  not  strongly  under  Japanese  influence, 
and  felt  that  China's  safest  course  was  to  follow  the  United 
States  and  the  western  powers.  The  council,  which  had  been 
set  up  to  replace  the  seceding  parliament,  really  amounted  to 
nothing,  and  did  nothing.  As  president  of  the  senate,  Liang 
Shao-yi,  who  had  been  powerful  in  the  regime  of  Yuan  Shih 
K'ai,  had  a  foothold  from  which  he  exercised  a  certain  influ- 
ence. Outside  of  the  Tuan  group  there  was  a  strong  sentiment 
in  favor  of  compromising  the  dispute  with  the  South  and 
creating  a  united  national  government.  The  Peking  Govern- 
ment exercised  nominal  authority  over  about  three  fifths  of 
the  country.  The  remaining  provinces,  mostly  lying  south  of 
the  Yangtze  River,  supported  the  secession  government  estab- 
lished at  Canton. 

The  so-called  Southern  Government  was  composed  of  mem- 


THE  SOLUTION  327 

bers  of  the  old  parliament,  that  had  been  dissolved  in  1917  by 
President  Li  Yuan  Hung  at  the  dictation  of  the  Tuehun's 
party  led  by  Tuan  Chi-jui,  and  a  number  of  liberal  leaders, 
prominent  among  whom  were  Wu  Ting-fang  and  Tang  Shao- 
yi.  Sun  Yat  Sen  for  a  while  also  affiliated  with  this  faction, 
but  in  1918  he  severed  relations  with  it  and  retired  to  Shang- 
hai. The  Southern  Government  protested  strongly  against 
any  foreign  loans  being  made  to  the  Peking  Government  after 
the  schism,  on  the  ground  that  the  money  was  used  only  to  at- 
tempt to  suppress  the  effort  to  maintain  democratic  institu- 
tions in  China.  In  1918  Tang  Shao-yi  undertook  a  visit  to 
Japan  for  the  purpose  of  trying  to  persuade  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment to  stop  the  lending  of  money  by  Japanese  to  the 
Northern  Tuchuns  and  Government,  and  to  stop  the  supply  of 
arms  and  ammunition  from  Japan ;  but  the  visit  had  no  prac- 
tical results.  The  Southern  Government  subsisted  from  per- 
sonal contributions,  provincial  revenues,  and  portions  of  the 
Salt  Gabelle  it  was  able  to  withhold.  It  denied  ever  taking 
money  from  Japan,  but  it  is  quite  clearly  established  that  some 
of  the  southern  Tuchuns  and  local  officials  went  into  the  Jap- 
anese loan  game  pretty  deeply. 

Foreseeing  an  end  of  the  war,  but  not  its  abrupt  termination, 
the  Japanese  Government  evidently  decided  to  strike  while 
the  iron  was  hot,  and  to  try  to  close  up  a  number  of  matters 
which  had  been  brought  to  a  certain  point,  but  not  fully  con- 
summated. For  some  time  Japan  had  been  pressing  to  have 
the  Chinese  Government  ratify  a  number  of  additional  or  sup- 
plementary clauses  to  the  "agreement"  of  1915  and  the  "mili- 
tary agreement"  of  1918.  These  clauses  related  to  Japan's 
position  in  Shantung  and  Manchuria,  and  would  give  Japan 
almost  complete  control  over  all  future  development  and  or- 
ganization of  China's  military  and  naval  forces,  with  right  to 
supply  arsenals,  naval  plants,  arms,  and  munitions ;  to  provide 
Japanese  officers  to  oversee  those  equipments  and  train  China 's 
forces.  Several  grandiose  projects  also  were  afoot :  one  a 
plan  for  China  to  entrust  her  interests  at  the  peace  conference 


328     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

to  Japan;  and  another  for  Japan  to  acquire  from  Russia 
(which  meant  from  the  Horvath  party  in  eastern  Siberia,  or 
another  of  the  Russian  groups  in  Siberia)  with  China's  con- 
sent the  Russian  interests  and  rights  in  the  Chinese  Eastern 
Railway;  and  various  concessions  and  loans  negotiated  with 
provincial  officials,  and  with  men  in  the  Tuan  group,  were 
being  pressed  for  ratification  by  the  central  Government. 
These  negotiations  were  being  conducted  chiefly  at  Tokio,  in 
order  to  avoid  the  too  close  scrutiny  to  which  Japan's  moves 
were  subjected  at  Peking,  and  because  Japan  seemed  to  have 
obtained  a  strong  influence  over  the  Chinese  minister  at  Tokio. 
In  October,  1918,  it  was  announced  that  General  Hsu  Chang, 
who  was  considered  the  right  hand  of  Premier  Tuan,  had  ac- 
cepted an  invitation  to  attend  the  autumn  field  military 
manceuvers  in  Japan.  This  announcement  at  once  aroused 
much  suspicion  and  comment,  for  General  Hsu  was  one  of  the 
leaders  of  the  pro-Japan  group  in  the  Chinese  Government 
and  the  chief  lieutenant  of  the  premier.  The  pro-China  and 
anti-Japan  Chinese  press  published  speculations  on  the  pur- 
pose of  General  Hsu's  visit,  and  the  consensus  of  opinion  was 
that  he  was  to  sign  an  agreement  by  which  Japan  was  to  ad- 
vance Tls.  100,000,000  to  the  Peking  Government  (which 
meant  to  the  Tuan  group)  ;  and  that  China  was  to  delegate 
Japan  to  represent  her  at  the  peace  conference,  was  to  ratify 
the  supplementary  articles  of  the  1915  and  military  agree- 
ments and  other  loan  concessions,  and  was  to  give  additional 
security  and  concessions.  It  was  reported,  in  return  for  those 
concessions  of  China,  that  Japan  would  return  to  China  the 
balance  of  the  "boxer"  indemnity  still  due  to  Japan;  a  plan 
which,  under  the  conditions  that  existed,  would  have  been 
merely  an  adroit  form  of  bribery.  In  the  midst  of  these  dis- 
cussions, and  in  the  face  of  a  bitterly  hostile  attitude  of  the 
greater  part  of  China  and  open  accusations  that  he  had  been 
bribed  to  betray  his  country,  General  Hsu  departed  for  Japan. 
Before  he  had  time  to  develop  his  projects  there  the  sudden 
signing  of  the  armistice  brought  another  change  in  the  situa- 


THE  SOLUTION  329 

tion.  The  Hsu  mission  dropped  quietly  into  the  background, 
or  the  soft  pedal  was  put  on  it.  The  peace  conference,  which 
had  been  considered  as  an  event  months  and  perhaps  a  year  in 
the  future,  now  was  actually  at  hand. 

Partly  to  recall  to  the  Chinese  Government  a  sense  of  its 
true  position  and  responsibility,  and  perhaps  also  for  its 
oblique  effect  upon  Japanese  influence  at  Peking,  the  Allied 
governments  took  occasion  in  October,  1918,  to  address  a 
friendly  remonstrance  and  admonition  to  China  concerning 
her  part  in  the  war.  This  act  was  called  a  protest  in  current 
press  discussion,  and  it  pointed  out  a  number  of  matters 
wherein  it  was  alleged  that  China  had  been  delinquent.  One 
was  that  the  remissions  of  the  "boxer''  indemnity  payments 
had  been  spent  foolishly;  another  was  that  the  War  Partici- 
pation Bureau  had  accomplished  nothing ;  another  matter  was 
the  prevalence  of  banditry;  and  failure  to  intern  enemy  sub- 
jects, to  liquidate  enemy  business,  to  prevent  trading  with  the 
enemy,  were  other  points  made.  The  protest  was  based  on  just 
grounds;  but  the  representatives  of  the  powers  who  drafted 
and  presented  it  knew  that  the  Peking  Government  was  only 
partly  to  blame  for  its  failures  in  the  war,  and  that  a  much 
stronger  indictment  would  rest  against  Japan ;  indeed,  the  pro- 
test probably  was  meant  for  Japan  although  made  to  China. 
Evidence  that  Japanese  were  evading  the  enemy  trading  regu- 
lations in  China  had  been  accumulating  since  early  in  the  war. 
After  it  was  plain  that  Germany  would  be  defeated,  and  that 
Germans  would  be  deported  from  China  and  their  business 
liquidated,  the  Germans  were  very  anxious  to  dispose  of  their 
property.  Japanese  were  the  principal  purchasers.  At 
Tsingtau,  at  Tsinan.  Tientsin,  Hankow,  and  many  other  places, 
German  real  and  other  property  was  purchased  by  Japanese. 
By  the  end  of  1918  a  large  proportion  of  the  desirable  German 
property  in  China  had  passed  into  Japanese  hands. 

The  armistice  weakened  Japan's  influence  at  Peking  in  sev- 
eral ways.  First,  it  completely  disproved  one  of  the  most 
potent  arguments  which  Japanese  sub  rosa  propaganda  in 


330     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

China  had  been  using  to  depress  pro-Ally  sentiment  among 
the  Chinese — the  argument  that  Germany  eventually  would 
win  the  war  or  get  a  stalemate.  With  that  theory  also  went 
down  a  number  of  arguments  which  depended  on  it,  such  as  a 
new  alliance  of  Japan  and  Germany,  with  Russia  and  China 
under  their  protection,  a  plan  which  had  been  presented  to 
the  Chinese  Government  by  Japan  as  being  a  possible  and  a 
logical  outcome  of  the  war. 

But  the  principal  thing  which  lessened  Japan's  influence 
at  Peking  was  the  demonstration  of  the  power  of  the  United 
States  as  shown  by  events  of  the  year  1918,  and  the  growing 
influence  of  the  American  Government,  or  rather  of  President 
Wilson,  in  world  politics.  To  most  Chinese  the  result  of  the 
war  resolved  into  comparatively  simple  elements.  As  they 
saw  it,  for  years  the  Allies  could  not  defeat  Germany,  and 
Germany  seemed  to  be  getting  the  better  of  it.  Then  America 
entered  the  war,  and  changed  its  whole  aspect,  resulting  in  a 
victory  of  the  Allies.  Chinese  also  were  impressed  by  the 
fact  that  Germany,  when  she  came  to  sue  for  peace,  addressed 
not  France  or  Great  Britain  or  the  Allies  in  Europe,  but  the 
President  of  the  United  States ;  and  as  far  as  they  could  judge, 
it  was  the  decision  of  the  President  that  led  to  the  end  of  the 
war.  Furthermore,  the  Chinese  had  by  then  begun  to  learn 
something  about  the  purposes  of  the  American  Government  in 
entering  the  war.  This  information  had  been  conveyed  to 
them  by  the  United  States  Committee  on  Public  Information, 
which,  after  repeated  urging  of  Americans  in  China,  finally, 
in  the  summer  of  1918,  had  created  an  organization  for  propa- 
ganda in  China.  This  propaganda  was  under  the  direction 
of  Carl  Crow,  formerly  with  "The  China  Press,"  "The  Japan 
Advertiser,"  and  "Millard's  Review";  and  with  Dr.  Paul  S. 
Reinsch,  the  American  minister  to  China,  and  John  B.  Powell, 
of  "Millard's  Review,"  as  official  advisers.  A  telegraph  serv- 
ice of  American  news  was  instituted,  and  circulated  among 
the  Chinese  vernacular  and  foreign  press  in  China.  But  even 
more  effective  was  the  translation  into  Chinese  and  publication 


THE  SOLUTION  331 

in  book  form  of  the  principal  war  addresses  of  President  Wil- 
son. My  last  information  was  that  this  edition  of  the  Presi- 
dent 's  addresses  in  Chinese  was  running  into  the  hundreds  of 
thousands  and  was  taxing  the  "Commercial  Press"  of  Shang- 
hai to  meet  the  demand.  Placards  in  Chinese  and  English, 
with  striking  phrases  of  President  Wilson's  speeches,  suitable 
for  hanging  in  windows  and  homes  or  for  posting  on  walls, 
were  printed  and  circulated  in  all  parts  of  China.  One  of 
these  placards  quoted  a  paragraph  of  the  President's  Fourth 
of  July  address  of  1918 : 

Second,  the  settlement  of  every  question,  whether  of  territory,  of 
sovereignty,  of  economic  arrangement,  or  political  relationship  upon 
the  basis  of  the  free  acceptance  of  that  settlement  by  the  people 
immediately  concerned  and  not  upon  the  basis  of  the  material  in- 
terest or  advantage  of  any  other  nation  or  people  which  may  desire 
a  different  settlement  for  the  sake  of  its  own  exterior  influence  or 
mastery. 

And  almost  as  hopeful  to  Chinese  was  another  paragraph 
of  that  same  address  of  Mr.  Wilson : 

First,  the  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power,  anywhere,  that 
can  separately,  secretly  and  of  its  single  choice  disturb  the  peace 
of  the  world  or,  if  it  cannot  be  presently  destroyed,  at  least  its 
reduction  to  virtual  impotence. 

The  utterances  of  leading  officials  of  the  European  Allied 
governments  about  the  war  and  their  aims  and  purposes  in 
waging  it  to  a  conclusion  had  not  been  lacking  in  eloquence 
and  force,  and  all  had  been  published  in  China  by  the  British 
and  French  press  there.  But  such  utterances  of  European 
statesmen  had  come  to  be  meaningless  to  Chinese,  in  view  of 
what  they  knew  of  the  actions  of  one  of  the  Allies,  Japan,  with 
the  tacit  and  perhaps  the  positive  secret  assent  and  approval 
of  the  other  Allied  powers.  The  Chinese  also  knew  of  some 
of  the  secret  agreements  made  among  the  leading  Allied  powers 
during  the  war  relating  to  annexations  of  territories  of  other 
belligerent  nations  and  even  of  some  neutral  states.     Now 


332     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

came  a  new  voice,  speaking  words  and  principles  which  to  the 
Chinese  seemed  to  be  written  especially  to  apply  to  them  and 
to  their  country  and  its  situation.  It  was  a  new  voice,  from 
a  new  world  leader,  representing  a  nation  that  Chinese  long 
had  regarded  as  friendly  to  their  country.  They  listened  to 
the  voice,  and  for  the  first  time  the  war  began  to  take  a  mean- 
ing to  them  which  they  could  apply  to  themselves.  Now  came 
the  positive  proof  that  the  nation  and  its  leader  who  uttered 
those  principles  were  a  great,  perhaps  the  greatest,  power  for 
the  settlement  of  the  issues  of  the  war  and  the  questions  of 
the  peace.  Doubts  and  fears  began  to  diminish.  The  Chinese 
officials  who  were  holding  out  against  Japan's  blandishments, 
inducements,  and  pressure  took  heart  again  and  strengthened 
their  resistance.  Then  there  was  the  hope  held  out  by  the 
proposed  league  of  nations,  as  stated  by  another  paragraph  of 
President  Wilson 's  Fourth  of  July  address : 

Fourth,  the  establishment  of  an  organization  of  peace  which  shall 
make  it  certain  that  the  combined  power  of  the  free  nations  will 
check  every  invasion  of  right  and  serve  to  make  peace  and  justice 
the  more  secure  by  affording  a  definite  tribunal  of  opinion  to  which 
every  international  readjustment  that  cannot  be  amicably  agreed 
upon  by  the  people  directly  concerned  shall  be  sanctioned. 

Notwithstanding  Japan's  pressure  to  induce  the  Chinese 
Government  to  commit,  or  in  some  way  to  delegate,  China's 
representation  at  the  peace  conference  to  her  care,  the  Peking 
Government,  supported  by  the  advice  of  the  American,  British, 
and  other  Allied  legations,  declined  so  to  act,  and  decided  to 
send  a  separate  delegation  to  Paris.  Lu  Cheng  Hsiang,  minis- 
ter of  foreign  affairs,  was  nominated  as  head  of  the  delegation ; 
with  V.  K.  Wellington  Koo,  Chinese  minister  at  Washington; 
Alfred  Tze,  Chinese  minister  to  Great  Britain ;  Wei  Tsun-chu, 
Chinese  minister  to  Belgium,  as  advisers;  and  with  a  staff  of 
counselors  and  secretaries. 

Failing  to  become  China's  attorney  in  the  case,  Japan  then 
instigated  an  intrigue  through  the  pro-Japan  group  at  Peking 
to  have  the  peace  delegation  include  a  majority  of  Chinese 


THE  SOLUTION  333 

who  were  under  Japan 's  control.  To  this  end  it  was  proposed 
that  the  premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui,  should  be  a  member  of  the 
delegation,  and  that  Tsao  Ju-lin,  the  minister  of  finance,  and 
General  Hsu  Chang,  should  accompany  Tuan  as  expert  advis- 
ers. It  also  was  suggested  to  the  Chinese  Government  pri- 
vately by  the  Japanese  legation  at  Peking  that  the  relations 
of  Japan  and  China  and  their  mutual  interests  at  the  peace 
conference  would  be  greatly  facilitated  if  China  would  ap- 
point a  Japanese  adviser  to  her  delegation  at  Paris.  This 
offer  was  declined.  The  suggestion  that  Tuan  Chi-jui  and 
his  chief  lieutenants  should  be  sent  as  delegates  aroused  so 
much  opposition  throughout  the  country,  and  especially  among 
the  Southern  party,  that  it  was  quietly  dropped.  I  was  in 
Peking  during  this  time,  and  a  little  later  I  met  some  of  the 
Southern  leaders  at  Shanghai  and  discussed  the  situation  with 
them.  I  found  them  willing,  even  anxious,  to  make  peace 
with  the  Northern  party  provided  a  suitable  basis  for  compro- 
mise could  be  arrived  at.  They  seemed  to  realize  the  danger 
to  China  of  divided  counsels  and  motives  at  such  a  world  crisis, 
and  that  it  would  seriously  impair  her  position  at  the  peace 
conference.  But  they  did  not  trust  the  Peking  Government 
as  long  as  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  his  satellites  were  in  power.  A 
principal  Southern  leader  thus  discussed  the  question  with 
me: 

"At  this  time  all  Chinese  must  put  aside  party  advantage 
and  personal  ambitions  and  concentrate  on  getting  justice  for 
our  nation  in  the  peace  settlement.  To  this  end  we  of  the 
Southern  party  are  willing  to  concur  with  and  to  take  part 
in  the  conferences  at  Paris.  I  think  the  South  should  be  repre- 
sented in  the  delegation  at  the  conference.  We  fear  that 
Japan's  control  of  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  his  followers  will  some- 
how commit  the  Peking  Government  to  delegate  China's  case 
to  Japan,  or  to  cause  it  to  be  presented  inadequately.  There 
are  a  number  of  men  in  the  Tuan  crowd  at  Peking  who,  for  a 
money  consideration,  will  sign  'on  the  dotted  line'  at  the  end 
of  any  kind  of  agreement  which  Japan  will  write.     Their  sig- 


334     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

natures,  of  course,  will  not  make  the  documents  valid,  but  it 
may  be  that  Japan,  if  she  can  get  them  signed  cheaply  enough, 
will  think  that  somehow  she  will  be  able  to  get  them  ratified 
later ;  and  at  any  rate  she  may  be  able  to  use  them  for  trading 
purposes  at  Paris.  I  believe  it  is  true  that  a  large  number  of 
secret  agreements  have  been  signed  with  Japan  by  different 
officials  of  the  Tuan  crowd  at  Peking  with,  as  you  Americans 
say,  the  'blue  sky  as  the  limit.'  Most  of  these  secret  agree- 
ments never  have  been  formally  ratified,  for  that  requires 
action  by  the  parliament,  and  to  present  them  to  parliament, 
or  even  to  the  Peking  council,  would  give  them  publicity.  So 
far  a  few  officials  at  Peking,  whose  signatures  are  necessary, 
have  held  out  against  all  Japanese  inducements  and  intimida- 
tion. The  Southern  party  will  raise  any  amount  of  money  to 
prevent  Japan  from  controlling  the  Chinese  delegation  at 
Paris  or  to  prevent  it  from  being  muzzled  there." 

A  result  of  this  sentiment  was  that  C.  T.  Wang,  who  had 
gone  to  America  as  a  representative  of  the  Canton  Government 
in  September,  1918,  was  appointed  by  President  Hsu  as  an 
associate  of  the  Chinese  peace  delegation,  and  joined  it  in 
Paris  with  several  other  members  of  the  Southern  party. 

Although  it  is  futile  to  draw  conclusions  about  events  that 
are  in  process  of  formulation,  as  I  write  this  the  peace  confer- 
ence already  has  developed  some  very  interesting  matters  of 
China  vis-a-vis  Japan.  On  its  way  from  Peking  to  Paris  the 
original  Chinese  delegation  traveled  by  rail  through  Man- 
churia and  Korea,  across  the  straits  of  Shimonoseki,  and  on 
to  Yokohama  by  rail,  where  a  Japanese  ship  conveyed  it  to 
Seattle.  From  Mukden,  in  Manchuria,  on  to  America,  the 
delegation,  and  of  course  all  of  its  numerous  pieces  of  luggage, 
moved  entirely  by  Japanese-owned,  and,  so  far  as  the  railways 
are  concerned,  Government-owned  and  managed  means  of 
transportation.  At  Yokohama,  the  day  before  the  delegation 
sailed,  I  met  one  of  the  Chinese  secretaries,  and  he  told  me 
that  some  pieces  of  the  delegation 's  luggage  were  missing,  hav- 
ing been  lost  or  delayed  in  transit,  and  that  the  luggage  con- 


THE  SOLUTION  335 

tained  documentary  matter  for  use  at  Paris.  Later  it  was 
reported  that  this  luggage,  containing  certified  copies  of  cer- 
tain documents,  was  not  recovered,  and  the  delegation  arrived 
at  Paris  without  it.  This  became  public  when  the  Chinese 
delegates  at  Paris  made  known  their  intention  to  submit  to 
the  conference  copies  of  all  secret  agreements  signed  and  rati- 
fied or  not  ratified,  or  proposed  by  Japan,  but  not  signed, 
between  Japan  and  China  during  the  course  of  the  war. 

The  report  that  the  Chinese  delegation  would  place  all  these 
questions  confidentially  before  their  confreres  at  Paris  caused 
a  somewhat  sensational  incident,  which  is  aptly  illustrative  of 
Japan's  methods  in  China.  Through  the  Japanese  legation 
at  Peking  it  was  strongly  put  to  the  Chinese  Government  that 
those  matters  were  private  between  Japan  and  China,  and 
should  not  be  submitted  to  the  Paris  conference;  and  it  was 
urged  that  the  Chinese  Government  would  immediately  repudi- 
ate the  action  of  its  representatives  at  Paris.  The  Chinese 
Government  refused  to  be  intimidated,  and  informed  the  other 
Allied  legations  at  Peking  of  what  had  occurred,  and  also 
made  the  matter  public. 

The  disclosures  placed  Japan  in  such  a  bad  light  that  the 
whole  of  Japan 's  diplomatic  organization  and  propaganda  was 
focused  on  an  effort  to  deny  her  part  in  the  matter  and  to 
obscure  the  facts.  For  instance,  as  a  "smoke  screen,"  the 
Japanese  embassy  at  Washington  gave  out  statements  to  the 
effect  that  Japan  was  indifferent  about  the  publication  of  all 
her  agreements  with  China,  that  indeed  she  alwaj's  had  in- 
tended to  publish  them  herself,  and  as  an  evidence  of  that,  the 
embassy  gave  out  for  publication  the  old  "agreement"  of 
1915,  which  of  course  had  been  published  years  before.  Find- 
ing that  China  could  not  be  bluffed  by  such  methods,  Japan 
then  proposed  to  China  that  she  (Japan)  would  withdraw 
certain  of  the  unratified  and  pending  agreements,  and  that 
the  remaining  ones  would  be  jointly  given  out  for  publication. 
It  appears  that  China  assented  to  this  proposal,  which  had 
advantages  for  her  in  that  it  amounted  to  wiping  out  a  number 


336     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

of  embarrassing  issues ;  for  on  February  25,  1919,  a  statement 
was  given  out  at  Paris  containing  texts  of  the  secret  supple- 
mentary agreements  in  the  form  of  notes  exchanged  at  Tokio 
on  September  24,  1918,  between  Baron  Goto,  Japanese  minis- 
ter of  foreign  affairs,  and  the  Chinese  minister.  The  notes 
follow : 

[Note  1. — Tsung-hsiang  Chang  to  Baron  Goto.] 
The  Chinese  Government  has  decided  to  obtain  loans  from  Japa- 
nese capitalists  and  proceed  speedily  to  build  railways  connecting 
the  points  as  below  set  forth.  Having  received  authorization  from 
my  Government,  I  have  the  honor  to  communicate  the  same  to  your 
Government. 

First,  between  Kaiyuan,  Hailung,  and  Kirin;  second,  between 
Chang-ghun  and  Taonan,  and,  third,  from  a  point  between  Taonan 
and  Jehol  to  some  seaport.  (This  line  to  be  determined  subject  to 
future  investigation.) 

Should  there  be  no  objection  to  the  above  propositions,  it  is  re- 
quested that  your  Government  lose  no  time  in  taking  the  necessary 
steps  to  cause  capitalists  in  your  country  to  agree  to  enter  negotia- 
tions for  loans  on  the  same.  A  reply  to  the  above  is  awaited  and 
will  be  appreciated. 

[Note  2. — Baron  Goto  to  the  Chinese  Minister.] 
I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  Excellency's 
note,  intimating  that  your  Government  has  decided  speedily  to 
build  with  loans  from  Japanese  capitalists  railways  connecting  the 
points  as  set  forth  below.  (The  note  cites  items  1,  2,  and  3  as 
contained  in  the  note  of  the  Chinese  Minister.) 

The  Imperial  Government,  while  noting  with  much  pleasure  the 
communication  of  the  Chinese  Government,  begs  to  state  in  reply 
that  it  will  lose  no  time  in  taking  necessary  steps  to  cause  Japanese 
capitalists  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  loans  on  the  same. 

[Notes  3  and  4  missing.] 

[Note  5. — Baron  Goto  to  the  Chinese  Minister.] 
I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  Imperial  Government,  in 
view  of  the  feeling  of  good  neighborhood  existing  between  the  two 
countries  and  in  a  spirit  of  mutual  accommodation,  has  deemed  it 
fitting,  and  accordingly  has  decided,  to  propose  to  your  Government 
to  settle  various  questions  relating  to  the  Province  of  Shantung  in  a 
manner  as  set  forth  below: 


THE  SOLUTION  337 

First — To  concentrate  at  Tsing-tao  all  Japanese  troops  stationed 
along  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinan  Railway,  excepting  a  contingent  to  be 
left  at  Tsinan. 

Second — The  Chinese  Government  to  provide  for  the  guarding  of 
the  Tsing-tao-Tsinan  Railway  and  to  organize  a  police  force  for  that 
purpose. 

Third — The  Tsing-tao-Tsinan  Railway  to  contribute  an  appropri- 
ate sum  to  defraying  the  expenses  of  such  police  force. 

Fourth — Japanese  to  be  employed  at  the  headquarters  of  the  police 
force,  the  principal  railway  stations,  and  the  training  stations  of  the 
police  force. 

Fifth — Chinese  to  be  employed  on  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinan  Railway. 

Sixth — On  determination  of  ownership,  the  Tsing-tao-Tsinan  Rail- 
way to  be  run  as  a  joint  Chino-Japanese  undertaking. 

Seventh — The  civil  administrations  now  in  force  to  be  withdrawn. 

In  acquainting  you  with  the  above,  the  Japanese  Government  de- 
sires to  be  advised  as  to  the  disposition  of  your  Government  regard- 
ing the  proposals. 

[Note  6. — Tsung-hsiang  Chang  to  Baron  Goto.] 
I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your  note  with  contents 
to  the  following  effect.  (Repeats  almost  verbatim  the  contents  of 
Baron  Goto's  note.)  I  beg  to  acquaint  you  in  reply  that  the  Chinese 
Government  gladly  agrees  to  the  proposals  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment above  alluded  to. 

The  Japanese  and  Chinese  delegates  at  Paris,  and  the  Chi- 
nese and  Japanese  governments  at  Peking  and  Tokio,  at  the 
same  time  stated  publicly  that  these  notes  were  all  the  agree- 
ments that  had  been  made  between  those  governments,  and 
that  there  were  no  other  secret  agreements.  That  statement 
probably  is  not  true  literally ;  but  it  can  be  taken  to  mean  that 
any  other  secret  agreements  were  abrogated  by  mutual  con- 
sent, leaving  only  these  in  issue  as  to  their  validity.  By  mak- 
ing that  statement  to  the  Conference,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment is  estopped  from  presenting  later  as  valid  instruments 
any  other  agreements  with  China  that  it  may  be  holding  up 
its  sleeve.  The  Japanese  Government  probably  preferred  thus 
to  disclaim  secret  agreements  that  it  has  extorted  from  China 
or  obtained  by  bribery  or  attempted  to  obtain,  rather  than  to 
have  them  exposed  to  the  world. 


S38     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

While  these  events  connected  with  the  peace  conference 
were  developing,  attention  was  being  given  by  the  Allied 
powers  to  the  internal  situation  of  China.  As  at  several  times 
previously,  the  lead  was  taken  by  the  United  States,  and  on 
October  10,  the  anniversary  of  the  Chinese  Revolution,  which 
is  a  national  holiday,  President  Wilson  sent  a  telegram  to  the 
President  of  China.     The  telegram  and  the  reply  follow: 

The  President  of  The  Republic  of  China,  Peking. 

On  this  memorable  anniversary  when  the  Chinese  people  unite  to 
commemorate  the  birth  of  the  Republic  of  China  I  desire  to  send  to 
you  on  behalf  of  the  American  people  my  sincere  congratulations 
upon  your  accession  to  the  Presidency  of  the  Republic  and  my  most 
heartfelt  wishes  for  the  future  peace  and  prosperity  of  your  country 
and  people.  I  do  this  with  the  greatest  earnestness  not  only  because 
of  the  long  and  strong  friendship  between  our  countries  but  more 
especially  because  in  this  supreme  crisis  in  the  history  of  civilisation, 
China  is  torn  by  internal  dissension  so  grave  that  she  must  compose 
these  before  she  can  fulfil  her  desire  to  cooperate  with  her  sister 
nations  in  their  great  struggle  for  the  future  existence  of  their  high- 
est ideals.  This  is  an  auspicious  moment  as  you  enter  upon  the 
duties  of  your  high  office  for  the  leaders  in  China  to  lay  aside  their 
differences  and  guided  by  a  spirit  of  patriotism  and  self-sacrifice  to 
unite  in  a  determination  to  bring  about  harmonious  cooperation 
among  all  elements  of  your  great  nation  so  that  each  may  contribute 
its  best  effort  for  the  good  of  the  whole  and  enable  your  Republic 
to  reconstitute  its  national  unity  and  assume  its  rightful  place  in  the 
council  of  nations. 

Woodrow  Wilson. 

Hsu  Shih-chang's  reply  follows : 
The  President  of 

The  United  States  of  America, 
Washington. 

Please  accept  my  very  sincere  thanks  for  your  telegram  of  con- 
gratulations upon  my  assumption  of  the  office  to  which  I  was  duly 
elected  by  the  Parliament  of  the  Republic.  It  is  my  earnest  desire 
that  not  only  the  traditional  intimate  friendship  existing  between  our 
two  countries  will  be  maintained  and  strengthened  but  also  all  efforts 
within  our  power  will  continue  to  be  exerted  toward  the  furtherance 
of  the  common  cause  in  which  the  splendid  success  of  the  army  of 
your  country  has  won  the  admiration  and  respect  of  the  world. 


THE  SOLUTION  339 

National  unity  upon  which  the  welfare  of  the  people  entirely  de- 
pends is  a  matter  demanding  my  first  attention,  and  you  may  be 
assured  that  I  will  put  forth  my  best  effort  to  bring  about  its  con- 
summation and  meet  the  wishes  of  the  people  of  the  whole  country 
that  in  the  coming  councils  of  the  family  of  nations  our  country  may 
assume  its  rightful  place  and  work  with  your  country  hand  in  hand 
toward  the  realisation  of  the  highest  ideals. 

Hsu  Shih-chang. 

As  was  to  have  been  expected,  this  telegram  of  President 
Wilson  was  taken  amiss  by  the  Japanese  press,  which  made 
the  usual  effort  to  construe  it  as  an  interference  in  China's 
affairs  contrary  to  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement.  As  typical 
of  the  Japanese  view  of  this  question,  can  be  quoted  a  telegram 
sent  from  Peking  by  a  Japanese  news  agency,  and  published 
in  the  ' '  Shanghai  Times, ' '  a  Japanese  organ : 

It  has  been  noticed  that  since  his  return  from  the  United  States, 
Dr.  Reinsch,  the  American  minister  to  Peking,  has  been  endeavoring 
to  arrange  a  compromise  between  the  North  and  the  South.  If  this 
is  true,  it  will  be  an  infringement  of  the  American-Japanese  agree- 
ment. 

This  in  effect  meant  that  the  Japanese  idea  of  the  Lan- 
sing-Ishii Agreement  is  that  the  American  Government  or 
President  properly  cannot  address  a  communication  to  the 
Chinese  Government  or  to  Chinese  without  first  consulting 
Japan  or  by  sending  the  communication  through  Tokio.  Some 
Japanese  newspapers  stated  that  plainly.  Of  course  Dr. 
Reinsch,  who  had  just  returned  from  a  short  trip  to  Washing- 
ton to  consult  with  his  Government,  was  taking  absolutely  no 
part  in  China 's  internal  strife  except  as  instructed  by  the  state 
department  j  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  all  the  Allied  legations 
at  Peking  were  very  strongly  urging  upon  their  governments 
the  need  for  some  action  by  the  powers  to  settle  China's  politi- 
cal troubles  and  bring  the  North  and  South  together.  Only 
Japan  did  not  want  that  done,  and  every  move  toward  that 
end  irritated  the  Japanese  press  exceedingly.  However,  after 
the  armistice  was  signed,  the  Japanese  Government  made  an- 


340     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

other  change  of  attitude,  and  when  it  was  again  suggested  that 
the  powers  advise  China  jointly  to  make  internal  peace,  Japan 
rushed  to  the  front  and  tried  to  carry  off  the  matter  as  if  it 
was  her  proposal  and  initiative.  On  December  2,  1918,  the 
following  joint  note  was  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government 
through  the  legations  at  Peking: 

It  is  with  grave  concern  that  the  American,  British,  French,  Italian 
and  Japanese  governments  have  witnessed  the  continued  civil  strife 
which  for  the  past  two  years  has  divided  this  country.  This  un- 
happy division  has  proved  no  less  harmful  to  foreign  interests  than 
disastrous  to  the  welfare  of  China  itself.  The  consequent  unrest  has 
been  an  encouragement  to  the  enemy,  and  during  the  crisis  of  the 
war  hampered  the  effective  cooperation  of  China  with  the  Allies  and 
now  that  that  crisis  is  past  and  the  nations  look  forward  to  the  hope 
of  effecting  some  reorganization  of  the  world  for  the  realization  of 
peace  and  justice  among  all  peoples,  the  disunion  still  prevailing  in 
China  makes  their  task  more  difficult.  The  associated  governments 
aforesaid  have  observed  with  hopefulness  the  steps  already  taken  by 
the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China  with  a  view  to  the  settlement 
of  civil  strife,  and  have  been  happy  to  believe  that  the  attitude  of  the 
Southern  leaders  indicated  no  less  a  desire  on  their  part  to  arrive  at 
a  suitable  adjustment  of  differences.  These  governments,  therefore, 
have  taken  the  occasion  to  express  the  sympathy  and  hopefulness 
with  which  they  regard  these  indications  of  a  desire  on  the  part  both 
of  the  Peking  government  and  the  leaders  of  the  Southern  party  to 
set  aside  all  considerations  of  merely  personal  sentiment  and  legal 
technicality  and,  while  carefully  refraining  from  taking  any  step 
which  might  be  an  obstacle  to  peace,  to  seek  without  delay,  by  frank 
conference,  some  means  of  attaining  a  reconciliation  upon  a  basis  of 
law  and  devotion  to  the  interests  of  the  Chinese  nation  such  as  is 
necessary  to  assure  to  China  peace  and  unity  within  its  borders.  In 
taking  this  action  to  express  earnest  sympathy  with  the  efforts  of 
both  sides  to  achieve  a  solution  of  the  difficulties  that  have  hitherto 
divided  them,  the  governments  aforesaid  desire  to  make  clear  that  in 
so  doing  they  have  contemplation  of  no  ulterior  plan  of  intervention 
and  no  desire  to  control  or  influence  the  particular  terms  of  the  ad- 
justment, which  must  remain  for  the  Chinese  themselves  to  arrange. 
They  only  desire  to  lend  what  encouragement  they  can  to  the  aspira- 
tions and  efforts  of  both  parties  for  a  reconciliation  and  re-union 
which  will  enable  the  Chinese  nation  to  bear  the  more  worthily  of  its 


THE  SOLUTION  341 

own  traditions  its  part  in  the  reconstruction  which  the  nations  of 
the  world  are  now  hoping  to  attain. 

In  Japanese  newspapers  and  news  services  in  the  far  East 
this  note  was  represented,  in  some  cases,  as  having  been  pre- 
sented by  Japan  exclusively,  and  in  all  other  cases  it  was  made 
to  appear  that  the  other  powers  had  acted  only  on  Japan's 
request  that  they  do  so.  Thus  the  fiction  of  Japan's  alleged 
paramountcy  in  China  was  preserved,  in  so  far  as  Japanese 
propaganda  could  do  that,  among  the  natives  of  far  Eastern 
countries. 

An  immediate  result  of  this  note  was  that  the  Northern 
and  Southern  groups  made  arrangements  for  a  conference  at 
Shanghai  for  the  purpose  of  agreeing  upon  a  cessation  of  the 
civil  war.  These  conferences  are  going  on  at  this  wrriting,  but 
it  already  has  developed  that  Japanese  intrigue,  operating 
through  the  Tuan  Chi-jui  group  in  the  Peking  Government 
and  through  other  pro-Japan  Chinese  officials  in  the  provinces, 
is  working  to  prevent  agreement.  This  civil  war  in  China  will 
soon  die  of  inanition  if  its  leaders  are  deprived  of  funds  to 
pay  their  private  armies.  The  Japanese  loan  orgy  of  1917- 
18  has  provided  most  of  the  funds,  and  even  after  the  Shang- 
hai peace  conference  was  convened,  Japanese  financiers,  with 
the  knowledge  and  backing  of  their  Government,  were  trying 
to  arrange  for  a  large  loan  to  the  Tuan  Chi-jui  faction. 
Without  doubt  such  loans,  and  only  such  loans,  will  keep  the 
civil  strife  alive ;  for  as  long  as  the  military  party  can  obtain 
funds  it  can  hold  the  reins  of  power  in  at  least  a  part  of  the 
country.  The  pro-Japan  group  of  Chinese  officials  at  Peking 
seem  to  have  decided  that  it  is  as  well  to  be  hanged  for  a  sheep 
as  for  a  goat  and  to  play  out  their  string  to  its  last  thread. 
Until  China  is  rid  of  them,  there  can  be  little  progress  toward 
reform. 

Of  the  so-called  weak  nations  whose  fates  may  be  decisively 
influenced  by  acts  or  omissions  of  the  peace  conference,  China 
ranks  with  Russia  as  the  more  important.     Her  population, 


342     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

territory,  and  resources  indisputably  give  her  that  place. 
China  has  been  a  sick  nation  for  many  years.  Only  yesterday 
Russia  was  ranked  among  the  great  powers.  Her  rapid  de- 
cline shows  how  easy  it  may  become  to  convert  a  nation  from 
a  power  into  a  distracted  and  impotent  country  that  is  a 
menace  to  civilization.  China  is  trembling  on  the  brink  of  a 
similar  abyss;  or,  conversely,  she  might  as  unexpectedly  and 
almost  as  rapidly,  by  organizing  her  vast  human  and  material 
resources,  assume  a  respected  place  among  nations.  These 
alternative  possibilities  ought  to  be  enough  to  obtain  attention 
for  her  case. 

But  with  regard  to  China's  case,  Americans  should  realize 
that  they  and  their  nation  have  very  definite  obligations  relat- 
ing thereto.  Events  daily  remind  us  that  we  have  become  en- 
tangled with,  and  to  some  extent  have  become  responsible  for, 
the  right  settlement  of  European  questions  in  which  our  na- 
tional interests  are  not  very  clearly  involved  except  on  broad 
humanitarian  and  sociological  grounds.  There  are  no  pre- 
vious treaties  or  published  agreements  that  commit  the  United 
States  to  any  policy  regarding  the  Balkan  question  or  the  dis- 
position of  Turkey  or  the  reconstitution  of  Poland  or  the 
security  of  Belgium  or  the  reconstruction  of  Russia :  yet  many 
Americans,  on  moral  grounds,  now  feel  a  degree  of  responsi- 
bility for  the  solution  of  these  issues,  and  the  war  has  demon- 
strated how  they  can  impair  our  peace  and  safety  and  prop- 
erty. Toward  China  the  United  States,  many  years  ago 
and  recently,  assumed  specific  obligations  and  responsibilities, 
written  into  international  treaties  and  agreements.  Further- 
more, almost  every  modern  authority  on  the  Eastern  question 
has  reached  a  conclusion  that  of  all  western  nations  the 
United  States,  because  of  geographical  juxtaposition  and 
modern  economic  propulsions,  has  the  greatest  practical  inter- 
est in  the  future  course  of  China,  and  also  that  no  satisfactory 
future  for  China  can  be  assured  without  the  direct  and  active 
participation — some  say  leadership — of  America. 

As  the  protagonist  of  the  Hay  doctrine,  the  United  States  is 


THE  SOLUTION  343 

obligated  to  observe  and  to  maintain  the  territorial  integrity 
and  administrative  autonomy  of  China,  and  the  commercial 
"open  door"  in  China's  territories.  The  American  Govern- 
ment has  itself  signed  several  international  covenants  asserting 
these  principles,  and  has  been  instrumental  in  inducing  five 
other  powers  to  sign  similar  agreements.  Moreover,  I  know 
that  a  majority  of  Chinese  are  now  looking  hopefully  to 
America  to  use  its  friendly  offices  in  China's  behalf,  and  if 
our  Government  fails  in  this  obligation,  it  will  forfeit  the  con- 
fidence and  respect  of  the  Chinese,  and  diminish  its  influence 
in  far  Eastern  affairs  for  many  years  to  come.  Since  the 
American  Government  is  thus  obligated  about  China,  and  our 
nation  has  such  an  enormous  stake  in  the  future  development 
and  nationalistic  impetus  of  that  country,  it  obviously  is  very 
important  for  Americans  to  understand  what  China  wants, 
what  she  purposes  to  ask,  what  justice  demands  should  be 
given  her,  and  in  what  the  problem  of  stabilizing  China  during 
the  reconstruction  period  consists. 

Probably  none  would  be  willing  or  able  at  this  time  to 
announce  a  specific  list  of  what  China  wants  as  a  result  of  the 
peace  settlement.  Chinese,  that  is,  the  politically  intelligent 
class,  have  a  tolerably  clear  idea  of  what  China  wants;  but 
opinion  among  them  differs  about  the  expediency  of  asking 
or  demanding  this  or  that.  Some  Chinese  and  foreigners 
think  that  China  should  be  modest,  and  should  confine  her 
petition  to  a  few  essential  points,  without  referring  to  some 
issues  that  are  certain  to  arouse  controversy  and  incite  opposi- 
tion. Others  believe  that  the  appointed  hour  has  struck  and 
that  China  must  seize  the  opportunity  forcibly  to  assert  her 
full  rights;  that  unless  she  speaks  now  she  may  have  forever 
after  to  hold  her  peace ;  that  it  is  better  to  ask  and  be  refused 
than  to  allow  certain  issues  presumably  to  go  by  default. 

There  are  two  points  of  view  regarding  what  China  wants, 
Chinese  and  foreign.  Even  the  most  pro-Chinese  foreign 
friends  of  China  scarcely  are  willing  to  grant  all  that  the  radi- 
cal pan-China  element  now  assert.     In  outlining  China's  case 


344     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

I  will  try  to  draw  the  line  of  moderation,  for  I  believe  that 
the  greater  part  of  intelligent  Chinese  will  approve  a  settle- 
ment that  will  also  accord  with  the  views  of  progressive  for- 
eigners in  China. 

First,  I  shall  set  out  China 's  case  in  summary : 

1.  Cancellation  of  all  treaty  provisions  with  foreign  govern- 
ments that  grant  or  recognize  rights  tantamount  to  "spheres 
of  influence"  within  China's  territories,  or  any  monopolistic 
privileges  that  cannot  be  available  to  all  nations  under  the 
most-favored  nation  clauses. 

2.  Nationalization  and  international  neutralization  of  all 
railways  in  China's  territories. 

3.  Cancellation  of  all  monopolistic  mining  rights  accorded 
to  foreigners  or  foreign  nations  in  China,  and  of  all  other 
"concessions"  that  tend  to  limit  and  impair  China's  sover- 
eignty and  the  commercial  "open  door"  principle. 

4.  Relinquishment  of  all  leases  of  China's  territories  to 
foreign  nations,  and  the  temporary  substitution  therefor  of 
international  control,  with  a  proviso  that  they  will  revert  fully 
to  China  on  the  fulfilment  by  her  of  certain  stipulations. 

5.  Removal  of  all  foreign  troops  from  China's  territories, 
except  those  provided  by  the  protocol  of  1901,  these  to  be  also 
withdrawn  on  the  fulfilment  by  China  of  certain  stipulations. 

6.  Removal  of  all  foreign  posts  and  telegraphs  from  China, 
and  foreign  supervision  over  the  Chinese  postal  service  to 
cease  on  the  fulfilment  by  China  of  certain  stipulations. 

7.  Establishment  of  a  uniform  currency  system  in  China, 
to  be  supported  by  an  international  loan  under  conditions 
tending  to  a  gradual  assumption  of  Chinese  control. 

8.  Granting  of  complete  tariff  autonomy  to  China,  under 
certain  specified  conditions  whereby  China's  fiscal  adminis- 
tration will  be  gradually  reformed. 

9.  Abolition  of  extra-territoriality  in  China  on  the  fulfil- 
ment by  China  of  certain  stipulations. 

10.  Consolidation  of  the  national  debts  of  China:  all  out- 
standing loans,  provincial  and  national,  to  be  absorbed  in  a 


THE  SOLUTION  345 

single  loan  or  series  of  loans  underwritten  by  a  financial  syndi- 
cate under  international  supervision. 

11.  Restoration  of  Chinese  local  administrative  autonomy 
in  all  parts  of  Chinese  territories  where  during  recent  years 
it  has  been  insidiously  subordinated  to  foreign  authority. 

The  effort  to  obtain  justice  for  China  in  the  peace  settle- 
ment has  two  aspects :  the  protection  of  China  in  her  age-estab- 
lished territories  and  national  life  and  help  for  the  Chinese 
in  changing  their  country  into  a  modern  nation,  and  the  re- 
moval in  China  of  those  frictions  and  causes  for  antagonism 
among  foreign  nations  that  in  modern  times  are  the  chief 
causes  of  war.  Both  of  these  conditions  distinctly  fall  within 
the  main  and  explicit  purposes  of  the  American  nation  in 
making  war,  as  repeatedly  uttered  by  President  Wilson  and 
scores  of  our  public  men,  and  also  acceded  to  by  other  major 
nations  in  the  Allied  group.  They  embody  the  principles  that 
constitute  the  essence  of  the  famous  fourteen  articles,  which 
opened  a  way  to  peace. 

The  eleven  articles  of  China's  petition,  as  I  have  composed 
it,  will,  I  think,  be  found  to  comprehend  all  essential  matters 
and  questions  involved  in  the  present  very  complicated  situa- 
tion of  that  country.  Numbers  1,  2,  3,  and  10  will  cover  the 
whole  list  of  quasi-political,  foreign  "concessions"  that  have 
been  foisted  on  China  in  the  last  twenty-five  years,  including 
the  Japanese  loan  and  concession  madness  of  the  last  two 
years.  Although  many  of  these  loans  and  concessions  were 
conceived  and  obtained  by  and  through  bribery,  coercion,  and 
intimidation,  it  is  not  now  proposed  to  repudiate  all  of  them, 
but  to  liquidate  those  which  have  any  sound  status  in  equity 
in  a  way  that  will  remove  them  as  a  disturbing  political  factor 
in  international  affairs  and  as  obstacles  to  China's  internal 
progress.  The  means  to  finance  this  liquidation  would  be  pro- 
vided under  Number  10,  which  also  would  provide  for  the 
currency  reform  mentioned  in  Number  7. 

It  is  probable  that  the  question  included  in  article  Number 
4  contains  serious  difficulties ;  yet  it  should  not  if  the  principal 


346     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

powers  are  sincere  and  far-sighted  in  their  recent  professions. 
This  article  would  embrace  the  leased  territories  of  Kiaochou 
(Tsingtau),  Weihaiwei  and  Kwangtung  (Port  Arthur  and 
Dalny),  and  in  its  complete  meaning  also  would  include  the 
so-called  "foreign  settlements"  at  the  various  principal  treaty 
ports.  Attention,  however,  is  called  to  the  proviso  that  these 
leased  regions  and  municipal  settlements  would  remain  under 
international  jurisdiction  until,  according  to  stipulation, 
China  should  be  judged  capable  of  taking  over  the  full  ad- 
ministration. Such  a  system  seems  entirely  compatible  with 
any  practical  plan  for  a  league  of  nations,  which  presumably 
must  have  a  supervisory  body  and  a  method  to  deal  with  the 
affairs  of  the  weaker  and  temporarily  disorganized  nations. 

Article  Number  9  probably  will  arouse  greater  opposition 
than  any  of  the  others  in  my  list.  It  is  certain  that  a  majority 
of  foreigners,  who  live  in  and  know  China  and  who  may  be 
willing  to  grant  all  of  the  other  ten  articles,  will  enter  strong 
objections  to  the  abolition  of  extra-territoriality  now.  But, 
I  hasten  to  point  out,  the  article  as  I  have  drawn  it  does  not 
call  for  the  immediate  or  even  the  early  abolition  of  extra- 
territoriality. It  is  true  that  a  radical  section  of  the  Young 
China  party  have  taken  this  occasion  to  agitate  for  the  imme- 
diate abolition  of  extra-territoriality,  but  they  are  getting  little 
serious  approval  even  among  the  Chinese.  I  am  sure,  from 
having  discussed  the  subject  with  many  of  the  politically  in- 
telligent Chinese  class,  that  the  substantial  elements  in  Chinese 
society  would  not  approve  having  the  extra-territorial  system 
abolished  suddenly  and  before  China  has  organized  something 
to  take  its  place.  The  present  system,  anomalous  and  galling 
to  Chinese  pride  as  it  undoubtedly  is,  nevertheless  does  throw 
about  even  Chinese  business  and  property  safeguards  that 
otherwise  would  be  lacking.  Foreigners  residing  in  China  and 
foreign  business  and  property  interests  there  would  regard 
the  early  substitution  of  Chinese  authority  for  the  extra-terri- 
torial system  as  criminal  recklessness.  Yet  in  recent  years  I 
have  become  aware  of  a  disposition  among  those  foreign  resi- 


THE  SOLUTION  347 

dents  who  reflect  seriously  about  conditions  there  and  the 
future,  to  realize  that  the  present  system  cannot  be  considered 
permanent,  and  there  is  a  feeling  that  a  plan  should  be  devised 
that  not  only  would  promise  to  restore  to  the  Chinese  the  full 
administration  of  law  in  their  own  country  (such  international 
promises  already  exist),  but  would  also  have  a  working  method 
to  bring  such  a  condition  about  by  aiding  China  to  establish 
it.  I  believe  such  a  plan  to  be  feasible,  and  that  an  accom- 
modation of  foreign  powers  to  meet  the  spirit  of  article  Num- 
ber 9  in  the  previous  list  need  not  alarm  foreign  interests  or 
enterprises  in  China;  on  the  contrary,  I  think  the  eventual 
result  will  greatly  benefit  and  extend  foreign  trade  and  in- 
vestments in  China. 

In  1918  Mr.  Charles  Denby  visited  China  as  a  special  official 
of  the  American  Government.  His  work  was  chiefly  in  con- 
nection with  the  activities  and  regulations  of  the  "War  Trade 
Board,  but  Mr.  Denby  took  advantage  of  his  sojourn  to  study 
anew  the  situation  of  China  in  other  than  commercial  matters. 
He  had  many  qualifications  for  such  investigation.  His  youth, 
when  his  father  was  American  minister  at  Peking,  and  much 
of  his  adult  life  were  spent  in  China.  He  has  been  associated 
with  such  Chinese  officials  as  Li  Hung  Chans:  and  Yuan  Shih 
K  'ai,  and  later  was  United  States  Consul-Oeneral  at  Shanghai. 
Mr.  Denby  evolved  a  plan  by  which  the  Western  powers  can 
aid  China  in  preparing  for  the  abolition  of  extra-territoriality 
by  a  gradual  process,  which  was  submitted  to  the  state  depart- 
ment in  a  memorandum.  This  plan  is,  having  given  reason- 
able notice  of  the  change,  to  abolish  all  foreign  courts  in  China, 
these  to  be  replaced  by  Chinese  courts  after  the  order  of  the 
present  mixed  court  at  Shanghai.  As  a  preliminary  to  this 
change,  China  would  be  required  and  aided  to  establish  a  de- 
partment of  justice,  having  direction  of  all  courts  in  the  na- 
tion, and  also  over  the  courts  with  jurisdiction  of  foreigners 
and  foreign  legal  causes.  The  leading  official  of  the  depart- 
ment of  justice,  next  to  the  minister  of  justice,  would  be  a 
foreigner,  just  as  in  the  Maritime  Customs  and  Salt  Gabelle 


348     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

administrations.  Foreigners  also  would  be  a  part  of  the 
machinery  of  all  the  mixed  courts,  but  under  the  department 
of  justice,  not  under  various  foreign  consulates,  as  now.  In 
time,  by  this  process,  it  is  hoped  that  China  would  reach  a 
point  when  she  could  safely  be  entrusted  with  the  sole  ad- 
ministration of  justice.  By  the  Denby  plan,  however,  extra- 
territoriality is  not  to  be  fully  abolished  until  China,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  powers,  has  fully  qualified  to  act  by  herself. 
Under  a  department  of  justice,  with  foreign  legal  advisers, 
the  legal  codes  could  be  brought  up  to  date,  and  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  completely  reorganized.  A  government  law 
college,  with  foreign  as  well  as  Chinese  instructors,  would  edu- 
cate young  Chinese  for  legal  and  judicial  careers.  That,  in 
brief,  is  an  outline  of  the  plan  proposed  by  Mr.  Denby.  He 
submitted  it,  I  understand,  to  many  legal  authorities,  includ- 
ing Judee  Lobingier  of  the  United  States  Court  for  China,  to 
Dr.  W.  W.  Willoughby,  former  adviser  on  constitutional  law 
to  the  Chinese  Government,  and  to  "W.  C.  Dennis,  now  legal 
adviser  to  the  Chinese  Government,  all  of  whom  thought  favor- 
ably of  it. 

I  firmly  believe  that  the  time  has  come  when  it  not  only  is 
safe,  but  it  is  necessary  in  the  interest  of  foreigners  as  well  as 
of  China,  to  devise  a  way  to  eliminate  the  anomaly  of  extra- 
territoriality. This  of  course  does  not  mean  that  extra-terri- 
toriality  should  be  at  once,  or  even  quickly,  abolished.  As  I 
understand  the  Denby  plan,  it  almost  surely  would  require 
twenty  years,  and  might  take  even  longer  than  that,  before  a 
sound  organization  for  the  administration  of  justice  in  China 
could  be  created.  But  that  plan  would  provide  a  practical 
way  to  attain  that  goal,  whereas  the  present  system  merely 
stands  still,  tending  to  extend  and  perhaps  to  perpetuate  itself. 
The  complete  abolition  of  extra-territoriality  of  course  would 
depend  and  be  contingent  upon  a  decision  of  the  powers,  or 
of  a  League  of  Nations,  that  China  had  fulfilled  the  stipulated 
requirements. 

Candid  foreign  students  of  conditions  in  China  have  felt 


THE  SOLUTION  349 

for  some  time  that  a  system  of  continuing  and  perpetuating 
the  existing  status  of  foreigners  in  China  had  outworn  its  use- 
fulness, and  should  be  changed  as  much  in  the  interest  of 
foreigners  and  foreign  trade  as  in  justice  to  the  legitimate 
aspirations  of  Chinese.  Any  condition  that  causes  resentment 
among  Chinese  at  the  presence  and  status  of  foreigners  in  their 
country  must  operate  as  a  handicap  to  the  development  of 
good  relations  between  them,  and  to  the  development  of  foreign 
trade.  If  the  same  protection  can  be  thrown  about  the  per- 
sons, property,  and  legal  rights  of  foreigners  residing  in  China 
by  a  new  class  of  courts  administered  under  a  reorganized  de- 
partment of  justice,  as  these  now  have  under  the  foreign  and 
mixed  courts  in  the  foreign  settlements,  and  Chinese  sentiment 
can  be  appeased  thereby,  it  is  worth  considering. 

The  fact  is  that  extra-territoriality  as  now  practised,  coupled 
with  certain  other  events  and  tendencies,  are  placing  Western 
interests  in  China  somewhat  at  a  disadvantage.  For  in- 
stance, by  encroachments  upon  Chinese  administrative  auton- 
omy in  Manchuria,  Shantung,  and  in  other  parts  of  China, 
and  by  provisions  enforced  on  China  by  the  so-called  agree- 
ment of  1915,  Japan  has  managed  to  establish  for  her  subjects 
in  China  a  preferential  position  and  extra-legal  status.  The 
Japanese  are  now  able  to  travel  and  reside  and  do  business 
anywhere  in  China,  and  they  carry  with  them  wherever  they 
go  the  protection  of  Japanese  laws.  Now,  the  disadvantages 
that  foreign  residents  of  Japan  are  under  because  of  the 
peculiar  administration  and  interpretation  of  Japanese  laws 
when  foreigners  are  involved  vis-a-vis  Japanese  are  too  well 
known  for  it  to  be  necessary  to  give  details  here.  By  the 
process  of  their  penetration  of  China  in  the  last  few  years 
Japanese  are  carrying  with  them  to  the  vast  hinterland  of 
China,  outside  the  treaty  ports,  where  the  extra-territorial 
position  of  other  foreigners  is  confined,  the  same  advantages 
over  foreigners  in  commercial  legal  status  and  security  that 
Japanese  have  over  foreigners  in  Japan.  The  only  protec- 
tion foreigners  in  China  other  than  Japanese  have  against 


350     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

this  process  is  either  in  the  extension  of  extra-territoriality 
over  the  whole  of  China,  the  restriction  of  Japanese  to  the 
position  of  other  foreigners,  or  the  creation  of  a  sj'stem  for 
all  China  that  will  make  all  foreigners  equal  under  the  laws 
and  before  the  courts.  In  China  it  is  notorious  that  the 
Japanese  consular  courts  in  the  treaty  ports  will  not  properly 
punish  Japanese  for  minor  and  even  for  serious  offenses, 
and  that  it  is  virtually  useless  for  other  foreigners  and  Chi- 
nese to  sue  Japanese  in  the  Japanese  consular  courts.  This 
condition,  coupled  with  the  presence  of  Japanese  gendarmes 
and  police,  frequently  leads  to  serious  clashes  between  Chinese 
and  Japanese,  and  sometimes  even  between  other  foreigners 
and  Japanese.  By  recent  treaties  wrung  from  China  under 
menace,  and  by  quasi-occupation  of  large  regions  in  China, 
Japan  now  in  effect  has  extended  the  jurisdiction  of  Japanese 
law  and  Japanese  courts  over  Japanese  in  all  parts  of  China, 
and  with  the  same  results  that  appear  in  the  treaty  ports  and 
in  Japan. 

An  important  point  in  laying  the  foundations  for  a  modern 
legal  system  for  China  is  the  character  of  the  system  to  be 
given  to  or  selected  by  her,  and  handed  on  as  the  permanent 
code  for  future  generations  of  Chinese  and  foreign  residents 
to  live  under.  In  modernizing  her  jurisprudence,  Japan 
copied  the  German  code,  with  changes  which  did  not  improve 
it  any  from  the  point  of  view  of  peoples  accustomed  to  the 
Anglo-Saxon  system.  If  Japan  obtains  control  or  direction 
of  China's  legal  administration,  it  will  without  doubt  be 
modeled  after  that  in  Japan,  which  is  a  Nipponized  version 
of  the  German  system.  While  the  German  code  may  have 
much  in  it  that  is  well  applicable  to  Oriental  peoples  in  the 
process  of  shifting  from  old  to  new  forms  of  government, 
Americans  and  British  in  China,  who  of  western  foreigners 
have  the  predominating  population  and  vested  and  trade 
interests,  probably  will  prefer  to  see  China,  in  shaping  her 
course  on  democratic  lines,  adopt  or  adapt  Anglo-Saxon  legal 
practices  and  principles.     The  more  nearly  the  new  China 


THE  SOLUTION  351 

harmonizes  with  the  administrative  forms  of  the  leading 
democratic  nations  of  the  West,  the  easier  it  should  be  to  main- 
tain a  sympathy  and  understanding  between  Chinese  and 
those  western  peoples,  and  to  extend  their  international  and 
personal  relations. 

For  many  years  the  American  Government  has  desired,  and 
at  times  has  made  efforts,  to  solve  the  difficulty  embodied  in 
article  Number  2  of  my  list.  The  proposal  of  Mr.  P.  C.  Knox, 
when  he  was  secretary  of  state,  to  neutralize  the  railways 
in  Manchuria,  and  its  defeat  by  a  combination  of  Russia, 
Japan,  Great  Britain,  and  France,  will  be  readily  recalled.1 
But  with  the  passing  of  time  conditions  in  the  world  have 
changed,  and,  let  us  hope,  some  lessons  have  been  learned. 
The  powers  that  survive  the  Great  War  may  now  see  the  ad- 
visability of  discontinuing  the  system  of  playing  the  railway 
game  in  China  (and  in  other  regions,  too)  for  their  own 
strategical  interests,  on  the  old  theory  of  the  balance  of 
power.  That  will  mean  the  complete  and  perhaps  final  aban- 
donment by  some  of  them  of  long-cherished  imperialist  designs 
and  ambitions.  They  already  have  abjured  these  ambitions 
in  pronouncement ;  will  they  now  relinquish  them  in  practice  ? 
In  discussing  the  railway  question  with  informed  persons  I 
have  found  a  general  belief  that  the  old  system  must  be  aban- 
doned not  only  in  justice  to  China,  but  also  in  the  interest  of 
world  peace.  While  different  men  have  different  thoughts 
about  methods,  those  with  whom  I  have  talked  recently  are 
almost  unanimous  in  agreeing  upon  principles.  In  the  article 
as  I  have  phrased  it,  it  asks  for  the  "nationalization  and  inter- 
national neutralization  of  all  railways  in  China."  Used  in 
this  connection,  nationalization  and  international  neutraliza- 
tion amount  substantially  to  the  same  thing,  or  would  accom- 
plish the  same  results,  working  together.  What  I  mean  is, 
the  railways  to  be  nationalized  under  the  ownership  and  ad- 

i  A  full  account  of  this  proposal,  with  the  official  representations  of 
the  various  governments  about  it,  is  given  in  Chapter  I  of  the  author's 
book,  "Our  Eastern  Question." 


352     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

ministration  of  the  Chinese  Government,  to  focus  control; 
while  the  foreign  investments  in  them  and  the  foreign  super- 
vision over  them  necessary  to  protect  the  investments  and 
assure  efficient  administration  should  be  neutralized,  or,  in 
other  words,  made  international  in  character,  similar  to  the 
Maritime  Customs  and  Salt  administrations.  In  drafting 
such  a  plan  I  can  think  of  no  better  model  than  Mr.  Knox's 
proposal  about  railways  in  Manchuria,  advanced  in  1909,  as 
to  the  principle  it  displays. 

To  finance  the  various  liquidations  embraced  in  this  case  of 
China  and  the  administrative  reforms  which  it  contemplates, 
will  require  some  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars.  Much  of 
this  sum  would  be  used  to  retire  debts  now  existing,  and  the 
remainder  would  be  used  to  promote  constructive  measures. 
In  this  connection,  it  is  pertinent  to  point  out  that  among 
large  nations  China  is  to-day,  next  perhaps  to  the  United 
States,  in  the  most  solvent  condition  fundamentally.  By  this 
I  mean  that  her  debts,  as  compared  with  her  realizable  re- 
sources, are  comparatively  small.  Unfortunately,  however, 
it  is  not  feasible  now  to  entrust  the  Chinese  Government  with 
the  exclusive  administration  of  the  country's  fiscal  affairs. 
The  disturbed  and  divided  condition  of  the  country,  the  lack 
of  modern  administrative  teehnic,  and  other  causes,  combine 
to  detain  China  as  yet  in  the  class  of  nations  not  quite  able 
to  dispense  with  outside  help.  Almost  all  educated  Chinese, 
except  a  few  of  the  radical  Young  China  party,  now  openly 
say  that  China  is  at  present  incapable  of  straightening  out 
her  affairs,  and  that  she  needs  foreign  help.  They  want  this 
help  to  be  temporary,  and  given  with  a  view  to  making  China 
eventually  able  to  dispense  with  it  altogether.  They  realize 
that  such  foreign  help  will  of  necessity  carry  with  it  a  degree 
of  foreign  assistance  and  supervision  in  China's  administra- 
tion, and  they  are  ready  to  accept  this.  In  view  of  the  semi- 
dependent  state  of  many  nations  that  were  recently  proud 
and  powerful,  sensible  Chinese  begin  to  see  that  it  would  be 


THE  SOLUTION  353 

a  false  and  foolish  pride  that  would  pretend  that  China  is 
independent  of  foreign  influence,  counsel,  and  aid. 

But  with  regard  to  this  matter  of  foreign  financial  and  ad- 
ministrative aid  and  supervision,  there  is  one  condition  that 
is  absolutely  essential  to  make  it  acceptable  to  the  Chinese. 
This  condition  is  that  the  United  States  will  be  an  active  par- 
ticipator, if  not  the  recognized  leader,  in  its  organization.  It 
is  safe  to  say  that  no  international  consortium  that  does  not 
include  the  United  States,  or  any  plan  that  does  not  receive 
the  approval  and  cooperation  of  America,  with  respect  to 
China,  will  now  be  acceptable  to  Chinese. 

By  its  action,  early  in  the  first  administration  of  Woodrow 
Wilson  as  President,  in  withdrawing  from  the  six-power 
financial  group  that  was  organized  to  finance  administrative 
reform  in  China,  the  American  Government  had  taken  a 
stand  against  any  participation  in  financing  in  China  that 
would  impair,  or  that  could  be  construed  as  impairing,  China's 
political  autonomy.  Certain  provisions  of  the  reorganization 
loan  agreement  had  seemed  to  the  American  Government  then 
as  having  that  tendency  and  perhaps  that  purpose.  After 
that  withdrawal,  various  attempts  were  made  to  secure  inde- 
pendent American  loans  by  the  Chinese  Government,  but  with 
the  exception  of  the  small  loan  made  by  the  Continental  & 
Commercial  Bank  of  Chicago,  they  resulted  in  failure  because, 
as  it  seemed  to  American  financiers,  the  policy  of  the  Ameri- 
can Government  did  not  sufficiently  protect  their  investments. 
To  remedy  this  situation,  and  probably  also  realizing  that 
changes  in  world  conditions  relating  to  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  applied  also  to  China,  the  state  department  an- 
nounced, on  July  29,  1918,  its  policy  with  regard  to  loans  in 
China  as  follows :     [My  italics.] 

China  declared  war  against  Germany  very  largely  because  of  the 
action  of  the  United  States.  Therefore  this  Government  has  felt  a 
special  interest  in  the  desire  of  China  so  to  equip  herself  as  to  be  of 
more  specific  assistance  in  the  war  against  the  Central  Powers. 


354     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Until  the  present  time  the  engagements  of  the  United  States  in 
preparing  to  exert  effectively  its  strength  in  the  European  theatre  of 
war  has  operated  to  prevent  specific  constructive  steps  to  help  China 
realize  her  desires.  Recently,  however,  this  Government  felt  that, 
because  of  the  approach  to  Chinese  territory  of  the  scenes  of  dis- 
order, a  special  effort  should  be  made  to  place  proper  means  at  the 
disposal  of  China.  Consequently  a  number  of  American  bankers, 
who  had  been  interested  in  the  past  in  making  loans  to  China  and 
who  had  had  experience  in  the  Orient,  were  called  to  Washington 
and  asked  to  become  interested  in  the  matter.  The  bankers  re- 
sponded very  promptly  and  an  agreement  has  been  reached  between 
them  and  the  Department  of  State  which  has  the  following  salient 
features : 

First — The  formation  of  a  group  of  American  bankers  to  make  a 
loan  or  loans  and  to  consist  of  representatives  from  different  parts 
of  the  country.  ' 

Second — An  assurance  on  the  part  of  the  bankers  that  they  will  co- 
operate with  the  Government  and  follow  the  policies  outlined  by  the 
Department  of  State. 

Third — Submission  of  the  names  of  the  banks  who  will  compose 
the  group  for  approval  by  the  Department  of  State. 

Fourth — Submission  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  any  loan  or 
loans  for  approval  by  the  Department  of  State. 

Fifth — Assurances  that,  if  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  loan  are 
accepted  by  this  Government  and  by  the  Government  to  which  the 
loan  is  made,  in  order  to  encourage  and  facilitate  the  free  inter- 
course between  American  citizens  and  foreign  States  which  is  mu- 
tually advantageous,  the  Government  will  be  willing  to  aid  in  every 
way  possible  and  to  make  prompt  and  vigorous  representations  and 
to  take  even'  possible  step  to  insure  the  execution  of  equitable  con- 
tracts made  in  good  faith  by  its  citizens  in  foreign  lands. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  American  group  will  be  associated  with  bank- 
ers of  Great  Britain,  Japan,  and  France.  Negotiations  are  now  in 
progress  between  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  those 
Governments  which  it  is  hoped  will  result  in  their  co-operation  and 
in  the  participation  by  the  bankers  of  those  countries  in  equal  parts 
in  any  loan  which  may  be  made. 

Following  that  announcement,  a  group  of  American  bank- 
ers was  formed  to  take  up  the  matter  of  American  participa- 
tion in  loans  in  China,  and  it  began  investigations  of  all  con- 
ditions relating  to  the  fiscal  obligations  of  that  country.     The 


THE  SOLUTION  355 

news  that  the  American  Government  would  support  loans  to 
China  was  received  in  China  with  enthusiasm,  and  the  natural 
expectation  of  most  Chinese  was  that  an  American  loan  would 
be  forthcoming  immediately.  Those  expectations,  of  course, 
were  disappointed,  for  owing  to  the  world  situation  and  the 
need  to  clarify  the  various  international  relationships  involved 
in  financing  China,  and  to  formulate  a  comprehensive  plan  ac- 
ceptable to  all  the  powers  or  to  a  majority  of  them,  it  was 
not  advisable  to  move  prematurely.  The  expected  American 
loan,  therefore,  was  delayed,  and  is  still  pending,  thereby  pro- 
longing the  lease  of  life  of  the  Japanese  loan  orgy.  An  in- 
ternational plan  for  the  financial  support  and  relief  of  China 
should  be — one  may  put  it  must  he,  if  we  are  to  secure  order 
in  the  far  East — a  result  of  the  conditions  of  peace  and  the 
machinery  for  its  preservation. 

In  connection  with  American  participation  in  loans  to  China 
hereafter,  one  point  needs  to  be  made  clear.  The  American 
financial  policy  in  China  must  keep  absolutely  free  of  any 
association  with  Japanese  business  methods  there,  and  with 
Japan's  political  policy  as  it  has  been  expressed  in  recent 
years.  All  important  American  financial  operations  in  China 
should  be  under  the  supervision  and  only  with  the  approval 
of  the  American  Government,  and  should  conform  to  whatever 
plan  for  international  cooperation  that  is  adopted.  For  in- 
stance, American  capital  should  not  become  associated  with 
distinctly  or  exclusively  Japanese  railway  or  mining  schemes 
in  China.  In  the  last  year  or  two  Japanese,  by  methods  which 
are  described  previously,  have  obtained  many  so-called  "con- 
cessions" for  railways  and  other  industrial  enterprises  there. 
The  validity  of  many  of  these  concessions  is  dubious ;  and  some 
of  them  are  purely  strategical  in  character.  As  an  example 
of  this,  take  certain  projected  railways  in  Manchuria  and 
Mongolia  which  Japan  has  forced  China  to  grant.  They  have 
no  tangible  commercial  basis  at  this  time.  Their  real  purpose 
is  to  strengthen  Japan's  position  in  those  regions  in  a  military 
sense;    and    they   will    weaken    China's    defensive    position. 


356     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

Judge,  therefore,  the  feelings  of  Chinese  if  hereafter  Japan 
should  obtain  the  capital  in  America  to  develop  and  exploit 
her  strategical  position  in  China !  Such  use  of  American  capi- 
tal not  only  will  be  invidious  to  China,  but  it  also  will  be  in- 
vidious to  American  commercial  interests  there,  and  to  the 
thesis  of  the  policy  of  the  American  Government. 

A  careful  analysis  of  the  foregoing  eleven  articles  and  the 
methods  by  which  they  of  necessity  would  become  practicable 
at  once  suggests  the  thought  that  such  a  settlement  will  in 
some  respects  extend  foreign  authority  in  China,  rather  than 
diminish  it.  This  is  true.  But  foreign  friends  of  China,  and 
also  enlightened  Chinese,  ought  frankly  to  face  the  truth,  that 
in  order  to  deliver  China  from  foreign  quasi-domination  it 
is  necessary  to  use  foreign  administrative  efficiency.  We  have 
this  paradox:  that  to  diminish  foreign  intervention  in  China's 
administrative  processes  it  is  first  necessary  to  increase  it. 
But  the  new  conditions  would  be  very  different  from  those 
that  have  burdened  China  for  the  last  half  century.  They 
would  differ  not  only  in  form  and  application,  but  in  purpose. 
An  enlightened  foreign  assistance,  under  the  aegis  of  a  league 
of  nations,  having  the  object  of  restoring  China's  complete 
administrative  and  fiscal  autonomy  by  educating  Chinese  in 
modern  methods  and  tranquilizing  the  country,  would  carry 
a  real  hope  for  that  people  and  a  real  benefit  to  the  world. 

Article  Number  11  of  my  list  scarcely  permits  of  qualifica- 
tion or  extenuation,  as  most  of  the  other  articles  do.  It  refers 
to  a  condition  that  is  an  open  and  flagrant  outrage  upon 
China,  the  usurpation  in  large  regions  of  her  administration 
functions,  and  their  restriction  under  the  intimidation  of  for- 
eign military  occupation.  First  introduced  by  Russia  in  con- 
nection with  the  policing  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway 
zone,  the  system  was  greatly  extended  by  Japan  when  she  by 
conquest  secured  the  reversion  of  Russia's  rights  in  southern 
Manchuria,  and  later  was  extended  over  nearly  the  whole  of 
Shantung  province.  This  system  has  even  been  implanted  in 
the  heart  of  China  by  Japanese  police  supervision  of  coal-  and 


THE  SOLUTION  357 

iron-mines  and  plants  in  the  Yangtse  valley,  and  by  the  in- 
stallation of  a  Japanese  garrison  in  permanent  barracks  at 
Hankow;  and  the  beginnings  of  the  system  have  recently  ap- 
peared in  Fukien  province. 

Put  succinctly,  China's  appeal  to  the  democratic  nations 
amounts  to  a  cry  to  be  delivered  from  the  old  system  of 
predatory  penetration  and  exploitation  by  imperialistic  pow- 
ers, and  to  be  allowed,  and  helped,  to  work  out  a  peaceful 
national  destiny  on  democratic  lines.  The  league  of  nations 
is  not  yet  perfected  or  adopted,  but  its  first  draft,  which  re- 
ceived the  assent  of  all  the  nations  represented  at  Paris, 
should  be  satisfactory  to  China  with  one  proviso.  That  is 
how  the  matter  of  creating  mandatary  nations  for  the  super- 
vision, under  the  league,  of  weak  and  backward  nations,  might 
be  applied  in  practice.  It  is  evident  from  the  tone  of  the 
Japanese  press  that  Japan  may  be  expecting,  under  that  pro- 
vision, to  be  nominated  the  mandatary  of  the  league  with  re- 
spect to  China,  thereby  confirming  her  "special  position"  and 
paramountcy  in  the  far  East.  Chinese  will  bitterly  resent 
that,  and  probably  they  will  rebel  with  force  against  such  a 
solution.  First,  China  should  not  be  put  in  the  class  of  na- 
tions or  states  that  require  a  mandatary  guardian ;  and,  second, 
if  China  should  against  her  wish  be  placed  under  a  manda- 
tary, Japan  probably  is  the  last  nation  the  Chinese  would  want 
to  occupy  that  position.  However,  the  provision  that  the  back- 
ward states  will  be  allowed  to  choose  their  mandatary  guar- 
dians, or  that  they  must  approve  them,  seems  to  safeguard 
them  from  being  subjected  to  an  objectionable  alien  super- 
vision. 

Taking  the  case  of  China  in  toto,  it  presents  almost  an  ideal 
test  to  apply  the  announced  principles  of  the  major  nations 
in  prosecuting  the  war  and  in  making  the  peace.  It  con- 
tains as  yet  no  extraordinary  difficulties,  as  the  case  of  Russia 
does;  no  conglomeration  of  national  and  racial  problems,  as 
middle  Europe  does;  no  such  festering  caldron  of  jealousies 
and  hatreds,  as  the  Balkan  question  does.     Yet  in  the  last 


358     DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION 

twenty  years  China  has  been  developing  into  a  combined 
Russia,  middle  Europe,  and  Balkans,  with  the  antagonistic 
ambitions  of  several  powerful  nations  concentrated  on  a. strug- 
gle to  control  her,  or  to  possess  the  lion 's  share  of  her  remains. 
What  this  situation  leads  to  in  international  affairs  has  been 
sufficiently  demonstrated  by  recent  events.  If  China's  case 
does  not  get  sympathetic  attention  and  just  treatment  by  the 
world,  it  will  not  be  possible  for  any  one  who  knows  the  reali- 
ties of  international  politics  hereafter  to  hear  their  altruistic 
professions  with  any  confidence  or  respect. 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  A 

THE  HAY  DOCTRINE 

NOTES  AND  TREATIES  BETWEEN  THE  POWERS  AFFIRM- 
ING THE  COMMERCIAL  PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  ''OPEN 
DOOR"  AND  DECLARING  THEIR  INTENTION  TO  RE- 
SPECT THE  INDEPENDENCE  AND  TERRITORIAL  IN- 
TEGRITY OF  CHINA,  AND  SEPARATE  AGREEMENTS 
AMONG  THE  POWERS  CONCERNING,  AND  DEFINING 
THEIR  RESPECTIVE  "SPHERES  OF  INTEREST"  AND 
"SPECIAL  POSITIONS"  IN  CHINA. 


MR.  HAY,  AMERICAN   SECRETARY  OF   STATE,   TO   MR. 
WHITE,  AMERICAN  AMBASSADOR  TO  GERMANY 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  September  6,  1899. 
Sir: 

At  the  time  when  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was  in- 
formed by  that  of  Germany  that  it  had  leased  from  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  China  the  port  of  Kiaoehou  and  the  adjacent  territory  in 
the  province  of  Shantung,  assurances  were  given  to  the  Ambassador 
of  the  United  States  at  Berlin  by  the  Imperial  German  Minister  for 
Foreign  affairs  that  the  rights  and  privileges  insured  by  treaties  with 
China  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  would  not  thereby  suffer  or  be 
in  anywise  impaired  within  the  area  over  which  Germany  had  thus 
obtained  control. 

More  recently,  however,  the  British  Government  recognized  by  a 
formal  agreement  with  Germany  the  exclusive  right  of  the  latter 
country  to  enjoy  in  said  leased  area  and  the  contiguous  "sphere  of 
influence  or  interest"  certain  privileges,  more  especially  those  re- 
lating to  railroads  and  mining  enterprises;  but,  as  the  exact  nature 
and  extent  of  the  rights  thus  recognized  have  not  been  clearly  de- 
fined, it  is  possible  that  serious  conflicts  of  interests  may  at  any  time 
arise,  not  only  between  British  and  German  subjects  within  said  area, 

361 


362  APPENDICES 

but  that  the  interests  of  our  citizens  may  also  be  jeopardized  thereby. 

Earnestly  desirous  to  remove  any  cause  of  irritation  and  to  insure 
at  the  same  time  to  the  commerce  of  all  nations  in  China  the  un- 
doubted benefits  which  should  accrue  from  a  formal  recognition  by 
the  various  Powers  claiming  ''spheres  of  interest"  that  they  shall  en- 
joy perfect  equality  of  treatment  for  their  commerce  and  navigation 
within  such  "spheres,"  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would 
be  pleased  to  see  His  German  Majesty's  Government  give  formal  as- 
surances, and  lend  its  cooperation  in  securing  like  assurances  from 
the  other  interested  Powers,  that  each  within  its  respective  sphere 
of  whatever  influence — 

First.  Will  in  no  way  interfere  with  any  treaty  port  or  any 
vested  interest  within  any  so-called  "sphere  of  interest"  or  leased 
territory  it  may  have  in  China. 

Second.  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the  time  being  shall  ap- 
ply to  all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all  such  ports  as  are 
within  said  "sphere  of  interest"  (unless  they  be  "free  ports"),  no 
matter  to  what  nationality  it  may  belong,  and  that  duties  so  leviable 
shall  be  collected  by  the  Chinese  Government. 

Third.  That  it  will  levy  no  higher  harbor  dues  on  vessels  of 
another  nationality  frequenting  any  port  in  such  "sphere"  than  shall 
be  levied  on  vessels  of  its  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  railroad 
charges  over  lines  built,  controlled,  or  operated  within  its  "sphere" 
on  merchandise  belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationali- 
ties transported  through  such  "sphere"  than  shall  be  levied  on  sim- 
ilar merchandise  belonging  to  its  own  nationals  transported  over 
equal  distances. 

The  liberal  policy  pursued  by  His  Imperial  German  Majesty  in 
declaring  Kiaochou  a  free  port  and  in  aiding  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment in  the  establishment  there  of  a  custom-house  are  so  clearly  in 
line  with  the  proposition  which  this  Government  is  anxious  to  see 
recognized  that  it  entertains  the  strongest  hope  that  Germany  will 
give  its  acceptance  and  hearty  support. 

The  recent  Ukase  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia  declaring 
the  port  of  Ta-lien-wan  open  during  the  whole  of  the  lease  under 
which  it  is  held  from  China  to  the  merchant  ships  of  all  nations, 
coupled  with  the  categorical  assurances  made  to  this  Government  by 
His  Imperial  Majesty's  representative  at  this  capital  at  the  time, 
and  since  repeated  to  me  by  the  present  Russian  Ambassador,  seem 
to  insure  support  of  the  Emperor  to  the  proposed  measure.  Our 
Ambassador  at  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  has  in  consequence  been 
instructed  to  submit  it  to  the  Russian  Government  and  to  request 
their  early  consideration  of  it.     A  copy  of  my  instruction  on  the 


APPENDICES  363 

subject  to  Mr.  Tower  is  herewith  enclosed  for  your  confidential  in- 
formation. 

The  commercial  interests  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan  will  be  so 
clearly  served  by  the  desired  declaration  of  intentions,  and  the  views 
of  the  Governments  of  these  countries  as  to  the  desirability  of  the 
adoption  of  measures  insuring  the  benefits  of  equality  of  treatment 
of  all  foreign  trade  throughout  China  are  so  similar  to  those  enter- 
tained by  the  United  States,  that  their  acceptance  of  the  proposition 
herein  outlined  and  their  cooperation  in  advocating  their  adoption 
by  the  other  Powers  can  be  confidently  expected.  I  enclose  herewith 
copy  of  the  instruction  which  I  have  sent  to  Mr.  Choate  on  the  sub- 
ject. 

In  view  of  the  present  favorable  conditions,  you  are  instructed  to 
submit  the  above  considerations  to  His  Imperial  German  Majesty's 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  to  request  his  early  consideration 
of  the  subject. 

Copy  of  this  instruction  is  sent  to  our  Ambassadors  at  London  and 
at  St.  Petersburg  for  their  information. 

I  have,  etc. 

John  Hat. 

COUNT  VON  BULOW,  HIS  IMPERIAL  GERMAN  MAJESTY'S 
MINISTER  FOR  FOREIGN  AFFAIRS,  TO  MR.  WHITE 

(Translation.) 

Foreign  Office, 
Berlin,  February  19,  1900. 
Mr.  Ambassador: 

Your  Excellency  informed  me,  in  a  memorandum  presented  on  the 
24th  of  last  month,  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  had  received  satisfactory  written  replies  from  all  the  Pow- 
ers to  which  an  inquiry  had  been  addressed  similar  to  that  contained 
in  Your  Excellency's  note  of  September  26  last,  in  regard  to  the 
policy  of  the  open  door  in  China.  While  referring  to  this,  Your 
Excellency  thereupon  expressed  the  wish  that  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment would  now  also  give  its  answer  in  writing. 

Gladly  complying  with  this  wish,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your 
Excellency,  repeating  the  statements  already  made  verbally,  as  fol- 
lows: As  recognized  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  according  to  Your  Excellency's  note  referred  to  above,  the 
Imperial  Government  has,  from  the  beginning,  not  only  asserted, 
but  also  practically  carried  out  to  the  fullest  extent  in  its  Chinese 
possessions  absolute  equality  of  treatment  of  all  nations  with  regard 


364  APPENDICES 

to  trade,  navigation,  and  commerce.  The  Imperial  Government  en- 
tertains no  thought  of  departing  in  the  future  from  this  principle, 
which  at  once  excludes  any  prejudicial  or  disadvantageous  commer- 
cial treatment  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America,  so  long 
as  it  is  not  forced  to  do  so,  on  account  of  considerations  of  reci- 
procity, by  a  divergence  from  it  by  other  governments.  If,  there- 
fore, the  other  Powers  interested  in  the  industrial  development  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  are  willing  to  recognize  the  same  principles,  this  can 
only  be  desired  by  the  Imperial  Government,  which  in  this  case  upon 
being  requested  will  gladly  be  ready  to  participate  with  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  other  Powers  in  an  agreement  made  upon 
these  lines,  by  which  the  same  rights  are  reciprocally  secured. 
I  avail  myself,  etc. 

Bulow. 

II. 

BRITISH  AND  GERMAN  AGREEMENT  RE  RAILWAY 
CONSTRUCTION  IN  CHINA 

Minutes  of  Meeting  held  at  New  Court,  St.  Swithen's  Lane,  Lon- 
don, on  the  1st  and  2nd  September,  1S98. 

Present: — Representing  the  German  Syndicate — MA.  von  Hanse- 
mann.  Representing  the  British  and  Chinese  Corporation,  Ltd. — 
Mr.  W.  Keswick.  Representing  the  Honekong  and  Shanghai  Bank- 
ing Corporation — Mr.  Ewen  Cameron,  Mr.  Julius  Brussel. 

M.  von  Hansemanx  proposed  the  following: — "It  is  desirable  for 
the  British  and  German  Governments  to  agree  about  the  sphere  of 
interest  of  the  two  countries  regarding  the  railway  constructions  in 
China,  and  to  mutually  support  the  interest  of  either  country." 
This  proposal  was  agreed  to. 

The  following  proposal  of  M.  von  Hansemann  regarding:  the 
British  and  German  spheres  of  interest  for  applications  for  Railway 
concessions  in  China,  viz. 

"1. — British  sphere  of  interest,  viz. — The  Yangtze  Valley,  subject 
to  the  connection  of  the  Shantung  lines  to  the  Yangtze  at  Chinkiang:: 
the  provinces  south  of  the  Yangtze;  the  province  of  Shansi  with 
connection  to  the  Peking-Hankow  line  at  a  point  south  of  Chen^ting 
and  a  connecting  line  to  the  Yans^ze  Valley,  crossing  the  Hoangho 
Valley. 

"2. — German  sphere  of  interest,  viz. — The  Province  of  Shantung 
and  the  Hoangho  Valley  with  connection  to  Tientsin  and  Chengting, 
or  other  point  of  the  Peking-Hankow  line,  in  the  south  with  connect 


APPENDICES  365 

tion  to  the  Yangtze  at  Chinkiang  or  Nanking.  The  Hoangho  Valley 
is  understood  to  be  subject  to  the  connecting  lines  in  Sbansi  forming 
part  of  the  British  sphere  of  interest,  and  to  the  connecting  line  to 
the  Yangtze  Valley,  also  belonging  to  said  sphere  of  interest.'' 

Was  agreed  to  with  the  following  alterations,  viz. — "The  line  from 
Tientsin  to  Tsinan,  or  another  point  of  the  northern  frontier  of  the 
Province  of  Shantung,  and  the  line  from  the  southern  point  of  the 
Province  of  Shantung  to  Chinkiang  to  be  constructed  by  the  Anglo- 
German  Syndicate  (meaning  the  German  Syndicate  on  the  one  part, 
and  the  Hongkong  and  Shanghai  Banking  Corporation  and  the 
British  and  Chinese  Corporation,  Limited,  on  the  other  part)  in  the 
following  manner,  viz. — 

"1 — The  capital  for  both  lines  to  be  raised  jointly. 

"2 — The  line  from  Tientsin  or  Tsinan  or  another  point  on  the 
northern  frontier  of  the  Province  of  Shantung  to  be  built  and 
equipped  and  worked  by  the  German  group. 

"3 — The  line  from  the  southern  point  of  the  province  of  Shantung 
to  Chinkiang  to  be  built  and  equipped  and  worked  by  the  English 
Group. 

"4— On  completion  the  lines  to  be  worked  for  joint  account."  So 
far  the  minutes  of  the  proceedings  of  the  meetings,  and  it  is  further 
agreed  upon  that  neither  the  German  Group  nor  the  English  Group 
will  be  bound  to  construct  the  lines  assigned  to  their  sphere  unless 
the  Shantung  lines  be  constructed  simultaneously. 

Signed  London,  September  2,  1898. 

Approved  of  and  signed  by  A.  von  Hahnemann,  W.  Keswick, 
Ewen  Cameron,  Julius  Brussel. 


III. 

AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  GERMANY 
DEFINING  THEIR  MUTUAL  POLICY  IN  CHINA 

Signed  at  London,  16th  October,  1900 

Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  and  the  Imperial  German 
Government  beinsr  desirous  to  maintain  their  interests  in  China  and 
their  rights  under  existing  Treaties,  have  agTeed  to  observe  the  fol- 
lowing principles  in  regard  to  their  mutual  policy  in  China : 

1. — It  is  a  matter  of  joint  and  permanent  international  interest 
that  the  ports  on  the  rivers  and  littoral  of  China  should  remain  free 
and  open  to  trade  and  to  every  legitimate  form  of  economic  activity 
for  the  nationals  of  all  countries  without  distinction;  and  the  two 


366  APPENDICES 

Governments  agree  on  their  part  to  uphold  the  same  for  all  Chinese 
territory  as  far  as  they  can  exercise  influence. 

2. — Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  and  the  Imperial  German 
Government  will  not,  on  their  part,  make  use  of  the  present  compli- 
cation to  obtain  for  themselves  any  territorial  advantages  in  Chinese 
dominions,  and  will  direct  their  policy  towards  maintaining  undimin- 
ished the  territorial  condition  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

3. — In  case  of  another  Power  making  use  of  the  complications  in 
China  in  order  to  obtain  under  any  form  whatever  such  territorial  ad- 
vantages, the  two  Contracting  parties  reserve  to  themselves  to  come 
to  a  preliminary  understanding  as  to  the  eventual  steps  to  be  taken 
for  the  protection  of  their  own  interests  in  China. 

4. — The  two  Governments  will  communicate  this  Agreement  to  the 
other  Powers  interested,  and  especially  to  Austria-Hungary,  France, 
Italy,  Japan,  Russia,  and  the  United  States  of  America,  and  will 
invite  them  to  accept  the  principles  recorded  in  it. 

Salisbury. 
Hatzfeldt. 


DECLARATION  BY  GREAT  BRITAIN  RESPECTING 
WEIHAIWEI 

April  19,  1898 

England  formally  declares  to  Germany  that  in  establishing  herself 
at  Weihaiwei,  she  has  no  intention  of  injuring  or  contesting  the 
rights  and  interests  of  Germany  in  the  Province  of  Shantung,  or  of 
creating  difficulties  for  her  in  that  province.  It  is  especially  under- 
stood that  England  will  not  construct  any  railroad  communication 
from  Weihaiwei  and  the  district  leased  therewith  into  the  interior  of 
the  Province  of  Shantung. 

IV. 

IDENTIC  NOTES  EXCHANGED  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED 
KINGDOM  AND  RUSSIA  WITH  REGARD  TO  THEIR 
RESPECTIVE  RAILWAY  INTERESTS  IN  CHINA 

April  28,  1899. 
Sir  C.  Scott  to  Count  Mouravieff 
The   undersigned,   British    Ambassador,   duly   authorized    to   that 
effect,  has  the  honor  to  make  the  following  declaration  to  His  Excel- 
lency Count  Mouravieff,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


APPENDICES  367 

Great  Britain  and  Russia,  animated  by  a  sincere  desire  to  avoid 
in  China  all  cause  of  conflict  on  questions  where  their  interests  meet, 
and  taking  into  consideration  the  economic  and  geographical  gravi- 
tation of  certain  parts  of  that  Empire,  have  agreed  as  follows : 

1.  Great  Britain  engages  not  to  seek  for  her  own  account,  or  on 
behalf  of  British  subjects  or  of  others,  any  railway  concessions  to 
the  north  of  the  Great  Wall  of  China,  and  not  to  obstruct,  directly 
or  indirectly,  applications  for  railway  concessions  in  that  region  sup- 
ported by  the  Russian  Government. 

2.  Russia,  on  her  part,  engages  not  to  seek  for  her  own  account, 
or  on  behalf  of  Russian  subjects  or  of  others,  any  railway  conces- 
sions in  the  basin  of  the  Yangtze  and  not  to  obstruct,  directly  or 
indirectly,  applications  for  railway  concessions  in  that  region  sup- 
ported by  the  British  Government. 

The  two  Contracting  Parties,  having  nowise  in  view  to  infringe  in 
any  way  the  sovereign  rights  of  China  or  existing  Treaties,  will  not 
fail  to  communicate  to  the  Chinese  Government  the  present  arrange- 
ment, which,  by  averting  all  cause  of  complications  between  them,  is 
of  a  nature  to  consolidate  peace  in  the  far  East,  and  to  serve  the 
primordial  interests  of  China  herself. 

Charles  S.  Scott. 
St.  Petersburg,  April  28,  1899. 

Sir  C.  Scott  to  Count  Mouraviefp 

In  order  to  complete  the  notes  exchanged  this  day  respecting  the 
partition  of  spheres  for  concessions  for  the  construction  and  work- 
ing of  railways  in  China,  it  has  been  agreed  to  record  in  the  present 
additional  note  the  agreement  arrived  at  with  regard  to  the  line 
Shanhaikwan-Newchwang,  for  the  construction  of  which  a  loan  has 
been  already  contracted  by  the  Chinese  Government  with  the  Shang- 
hai-Hongkong Bank,  acting  on  behalf  of  the  British  and  Chinese 
Corporation. 

The  general  arrangement  established  by  the  above-mentioned  notes 
is  not  to  infringe  in  any  way  the  rights  acquired  under  the  said  Loan 
Contract,  and  the  Chinese  Government  may  appoint  both  an  English 
engineer  and  an  European  accountant  to  supervise  the  construction 
of  the  line  in  question,  and  the  expenditure  of  the  money  appropri- 
ated to  it. 

But  it  remains  understood  that  this  fact  cannot  be  taken  as  con- 
stituting a  right  of  property  or  foreign  control,  and  that  the  line  in 
question  is  to  remain  a  Chinese  line,  under  the  control  of  the  Chinese 
Government,  and  cannot  be  mortgaged  or  alienated  to  a  non-Chinese 
Company. 


368  APPENDICES 

As  regards  the  branch  line  from  Siaohieshan  to  Simmintin,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  aforesaid  restrictions,  it  has  been  agreed  that  it  is  to 
be  constructed  by  China  herself,  who  may  permit  European — not 
necessarily  British — engineers  to  periodically  inspect  it,  and  to  verify 
and  certify  that  the  work  is  being  properly  executed. 

The  present  special  agreement  is  naturally  not  to  interfere  in  any 
way  with  the  right  of  the  Russian  Government  to  support,  if  it 
thinks  fit,  applications  of  Russian  subjects  or  establishments  for  con- 
cessions for  railways,  which,  starting  from  the  main  Manchurian  line 
in  a  southwesterly  direction,  would  traverse  the  region  in  which  the 
Chinese  line  terminating  at  Simmintin  and  Newchwang  is  to  be  con- 
structed. 

Charles  S.  Scott. 
St.  Petersburg,  April  28,  1899. 

The  same,  mutatis  mutandis,  was  sent  the  same  day  by  Count 
Mouravieff,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Sir  Charles 
Scott. 


FRANCO-JAPANESE  ARRANGEMENT 

Signed  at  Paris,  June  10,  1907. 

arrangement 

The  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  and  the 
Government  of  the  French  Republic,  animated  by  the  desire  to 
strengthen  the  relations  of  amity  existing  between  them,  and  to  re- 
move from  those  relations  all  cause  of  misunderstanding  for  the 
future,  have  decided  to  conclude  the  following  Arrangement: 

"The  Governments  of  Japan  and  France,  being  agreed  to  respect 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  China,  as  well  as  the  principle  of 
equal  treatment  in  that  country  for  the  commerce  and  subjects  or 
citizens  of  all  nations,  and  having  a  special  interest  to  have  the 
order  and  pacific  state  of  things  preserved  especially  in  the  regions 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  adjacent  to  the  territories  where  they  have 
the  rights  of  sovereignty,  protection  or  occupation,  engage  to  sup- 
port each  other  for  assuring  the  peace  and  security  in  those  regions, 
with  a  view  to  maintain  the  respective  situation  and  the  territorial 
rights  of  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  in  the  Continent  of 
Asia." 

In  witness  whereof,  the  Undersigned :  His  Excellency  Monsieur 
Kurino,  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary  of  His  Maj- 


APPENDICES  369 

esty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  to  the  President  of  the  French  Republic, 
and  His  Excellency  Moiisier  Stephen  Pichon,  Senator,  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  authorized  by  their  respective  Governments,  have 
signed  this  Agreement  and  have  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

Done  at  Paris,  the  10th  of  June,  1907. 

(L.  S.j  S.  Kurino. 

(L.  S.)  S.  Pichon. 

DECLARATION 

The  two  Governments  of  Japan  and  France,  while  reserving  the 
negotiations  for  the  conclusion  of  a  Convention  of  Commerce  in  re- 
gard to  the  relations  between  Japan  and  French  Indo-China,  agree 
as  follows: 

The  treatment  of  the  most  favored  nation  shall  be  accorded  to  the 
officers  and  subjects  of  Japan  in  French  Indo-China  in  all  that  con- 
cerns their  persons  and  the  protection  of  their  property,  and  the 
same  treatment  shall  be  applied  to  the  subjects  and  proteges  of 
French  Indo-China  in  the  Empire  of  Japan,  until  the  expiration  of 
the  Treaty  of  Commerce  and  Navigation  signed  between  Japan  and 
France  on  the  4th  of  August,  1896. 

Paris,  the  10th  of  June,  1907. 

(L.  S.)  S.  Kurino. 

(L.  S.)  S.  Pichon. 

VI. 

CONVENTION  BETWEEN  JAPAN  AND  RUSSIA 
Signed  July  30,  1907 

The  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  and  the 
Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  All  the  Russias,  desir- 
ing to  consolidate  the  relations  of  peace  and  good  neighborhood 
which  have  happily  been  reestablished  between  Japan  and  Russia, 
and  wishing  to  remove  for  the  future  every  cause  of  misunderstand- 
ing in  the  relations  of  the  two  Empires,  have  agreed  to  the  following 
arrangements : — 

Article  I. — Each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  engages  to  re- 
spect the  actual  territorial  integrity  of  the  other,  and  all  the  rights 
accruing  to  one  and  the  other  Party  from  treaties,  conventions  and 
contracts  in  force  between  them  and  China,  copies  of  which  have 
been  exchanged  between  the  Contracting  Parties  (in  so  far  as  these 
rights  are  not  incompatible  with  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity) 
of  the  Treaty  signed  at  Portsmouth  on  the  5th  day  of  September 


370  APPENDICES 

(23rd  of  August)  1905,  as  well  as  the  special  conventions  concluded 
between  Japan  and  Russia. 

Art.  II. — The  two  High  Contracting  Parties  recognize  the  inde- 
pendence and  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China  and 
the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  in  whatever  concerns  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  all  nations  in  that  empire,  and  engage  to 
sustain  and  defend  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  and  respect 
for  this  principle  by  all  the  pacific  means  within  their  reach. 

In  witness  whereof,  the  undersigned,  duly  authorized  by  their  re- 
spective Governments,  have  signed  this  Convention  and  have  aifixed 
their  seals. 

Done  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  30th  day  of  the  7th  month  of  the  40th 
year  of  Meiji,  corresponding  to  the  30th  (17th)  of  July,  1907. 

(Signed)     I.  Motono. 
(Signed)     Iswolskt. 

VII 

NOTES  EXCHANGED  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AND  JAPAN,  NOVEMBER  30,  1908,  DECLARING  THEIR 
POLICY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Imperial   Japanese   Embassy,  "Washington, 

November  30,  1908. 
Sir: 

The  exchange  of  views  between  us,  which  has  taken  place  at  the 
several  interviews  which  I  have  recently  had  the  honor  of  holding 
with  you,  has  shown  that  Japan  and  the  United  States  holding  im- 
portant outlying  insular  possessions  in  the  region  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  the  Governments  of  the  two  countries  are  animated  by  a  com- 
mon aim,  policy,  and  intention  in  that  region. 

Believing  that  a  frank  avowal  of  that  aim,  policy,  and  intention 
would  not  only  tend  to  strengthen  the  relations  of  friendship  and 
good  neighborhood,  which  have  immemorially  existed  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States,  but  would  materially  contribute  to  the  preser- 
vation of  the  general  peace,  the  Imperial  Government  have  author- 
ized me  to  present  to  you  an  outline  of  their  understanding  of  that 
common  aim,  policy,  and  intention: 

1.  It  is  the  wish  of  the  two  Governments  to  encourage  the  free 
and  peaceful  development  of  their  commerce  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

2.  The  policy  of  both  Governments,  uninfluenced  by  any  aggres- 
sive tendencies,  is  directed  to  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  status 
quo  in  the  region  above  mentioned  and  to  the  defense  of  the  prin- 


APPENDICES  371 

ciple  of  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  in  China. 

3.  They  are  accordingly  firmly  resolved  reciprocally  to  respect  the 
territorial  possessions  belonging  to  each  other  in  said  region. 

4.  They  are  also  determined  to  preserve  the  common  interest  of 
all  powers  in  China  by  supporting  by  all  pacific  means  at  their  dis- 
posal the  independence  and  integrity  of  China  and  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  that 
Empire. 

5.  Should  any  event  occur  threatening  the  status  quo  as  above 
described  or  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  as  above  defined,  it 
remains  for  the  two  Governments  to  communicate  with  each  other 
in  order  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  as  to  what  measures  they 
may  consider  it  useful  to  take. 

If  the  foregoing  outline  accords  with  the  view  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  I  shall  be  gratified  to  receive  your  con- 
firmation. 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Your  Excellency  the  assur- 
ance of  my  highest  consideration. 

K.  Takahira. 

Honorable  Elihu  Root, 
Secretary  of  State. 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  November  30,  1908. 
Excellency : 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  note  of  to- 
day setting  forth  the  result  of  the  exchange  of  views  between  us  in 
our  recent  interviews  defining  the  understanding  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments in  regard  to  their  policy  in  the  region  of  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  inform  you  that  this  expression  of  mutual 
understanding  is  welcome  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
as  appropriate  to  the  happy  relations  of  the  two  countries  and  as 
the  occasion  for  a  concise  mutual  affirmation  of  that  accordant  policy 
respecting  the  far  East  which  the  two  Governments  have  so  fre- 
quently declared  in  the  past. 

I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  confirm  to  Your  Excellency,  on  behalf 
of  the  United  States,  the  declaration  of  the  two  Governments  em- 
bodied in  the  following  words: 

1.  It.  is  the  wish  of  the  two  Governments  to  encourage  the  free 
and  peaceful  development  of  their  commerce  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

2.  The  policy  of  both  Governments,  uninfluenced  by  any  agres- 
sive  tendencies,  is  directed  to  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  status 
quo  in  the  region  above  mentioned,  and  to  the  defense  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  in  China. 


372  APPENDICES 

3.  They  are  accordingly  firmly  resolved  reciprocally  to  respect  the 
territorial  possessions  belonging  to  each  other  in  said  region. 

4.  They  are  also  determined  to  preserve  the  common  interests 
of  all  powers  in  China  by  supporting  by  all  pacific  means  at  their 
disposal  the  independence  and  integrity  of  China  and  the  principle 
of  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in 
that  Empire. 

5.  Should  any  event  occur  threatening  the  status  quo  as  above 
described  or  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  as  above  defined, 
it  remains  for  the  two  Governments  to  communicate  with  each  other 
in  order  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  as  to  what  measures  they 
may  consider  it  useful  to  take. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurance  of  my  highest  con- 
sideration. 

Elihu  Root. 
His  Excellency 
Baron  Kogoeo  Takahira. 


VIII. 

EXTRACTS  PROM  THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  ALLIANCE 
TREATIES,  RELATING  TO  THE  HAY  DOCTRINE 

(Second  Alliance  Treaty,  Signed  at  London,  August  12,  1905) 

(b)  The  preservation  of  the  common  interest  of  all  Powers  in 
China  by  insuring  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce 
and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China. 

(Third  Alliance  Treaty,  Signed  July  13,  1911) 

B. — The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all  the  Powers 
in  China  by  insuring  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce 
and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China. 


APPENDIX  B 

JAPAN'S  DIPLOMATIC  DEMANDS  ON  CHINA  IN  1905,  WITH 
THE  ORIGINAL  SECRET  TWENTY-ONE  ARTICLES, 
THE  ELEVEN  ARTICLES  PRESENTED  TO  THE  POW- 
ERS INCORRECTLY  REPRESENTING  JAPAN'S  DE- 
MANDS, THE  REVISED  DEMANDS,  THE  CHINESE 
GOVERNMENT'S  OFFICIAL  STATEMENT  OF  THE 
NEGOTIATIONS,  AND  THE  AGREEMENT  AND  NOTES 
WHICH  CHINA  WAS  COMPELLED  TO  SIGN. 

THE  ORIGINAL  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 


The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government  being  de- 
sirous of  maintaining  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and  fur- 
ther strengthening  the  friendly  relations  and  good  neighborhood 
existing  between  the  two  nations  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  to  give  full  assent 
to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  Government  may  hereafter 
agree  with  the  German  Government  relating  to  the  disposition  of 
all  rights,  interests,  and  concessions,  which  Germany  by  virtue  of 
treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Province  of  Shan- 
tung. 

Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  that  within  the 
Province  of  Shantung  and  along  its  coast,  no  territory  or  island 
will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  a  third  Power  under  any  pretext. 

Article  3.  The  Cliinese  Government  consents  to  Japan's  building 
a  railway  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkou  to  join  the  Kiaochou-Tsinanfu 
Railway. 

Article  4.  Th.*  Chinese  Government  engages,  in  the  interest  of 
trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  herself  as 
soon  as  possible  certain  important  cities  and  towns  in  the  Province 
of  Shantung  as  commercial  ports.  What  places  shall  be  opened 
are  to  be  jointly  decided  upon  in  a  separate  agreement. 


373 


374  APPENDICES 

II 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government,  since  the 
Chinese  Government  has  always  acknowledged  the  special  position 
enjoyed  by  Japan  in  South  Manchuria  and  eastern  inner  Mongolia, 
agree  to  the  following  articles : 

Article  1.  The  two  contracting  parties  mutually  agree  that  the 
term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  the  term  of  lease  of 
the  South  Manchurian  Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway 
shall  be  extended  to  the  period  of  ninety-nine  years. 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  and  eastern 
inner  Mongolia  shall  have  the  right  to  lease  or  own  land  required 
either  for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or 
for  farming. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and  travel 
in  south  Manchuria  and  eastern  inner  Mongolia  and  to  engage  in 
business  and  in  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  grant  to  Japanese 
subjects  the  right  of  opening  the  mines  in  south  Manchuria  and 
eastern  Mongolia.  As  regards  what  mines  are  to  be  opened,  they 
shall  be  decided  upon  jointly. 

Article  5.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  in  respect  of  the 
(two)  cases  mentioned  herein  below  the  Japanese  Government's  con- 
sent shall  be  first  obtained  before  action  is  taken : 

(a)  Whenever  permission  is  granted  to  the  subject  of  a  third 
Power  to  build  a  railway  or  to  make  a  loan  with  a  third  Power 
for  the  purpose  of  building  a  railway  in  south  Manchuria  and 
eastern  inner  Mongolia. 

(b)  Whenever  a  loan  is  to  be  made  with  a  third  Power  pledging 
the  local  taxes  of  south  Manchuria  and  eastern  inner  Mongolia  as 
security. 

Article  6.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  if  the  Chinese 
Government  employs  political,  financial  or  military  advisers  or  in- 
structors in  south  Manchuria  or  eastern  Mongolia,  the  Japanese 
Government  shall  first  be  consulted. 

Article  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  the  control  and 
management  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  shall  be  handed  over 
to  the  Japanese  Government  for  a  term  of  ninety-nine  years  dating 
from  the  signing  of  this  agreement. 

Ill 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government,  seeing 
that  Japanese  financiers  and  the  Hanyehping  Company,  have  close 


APPENDICES  375 

relations  with  each  other  at  present  and  desiring  that  the  common 
interests  of  the  two  nations  shall  he  advanced,  agree  to  the  following 
articles : 

Article  1.  The  two  contracting  parties  mutually  agree  that  when 
the  opportune  moment  arrives  the  Hanyehping  Company  shall  be 
made  a  joint  concern  of  the  two  nations  and  they  further  agree 
that  without  the  previous  consent  of  Japan,  China  shall  not  by  her 
own  act  dispose  of  the  rights  and  property  of  whatsoever  nature 
of  the  said  company  nor  cause  the  said  company  to  dispose  freely 
of  the  same. 

Article  2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  all  mines  in  the 
neighborhood  of  those  owned  by  the  Hanyehping  Company  shall 
not  be  permitted,  without  the  consent  of  the  said  company,  to  be 
worked  by  other  persons  outside  of  the  said  company;  and  further 
agrees  that  if  it  is  desired  to  carry  out  any  undertaking  which,  it 
is  apprehended,  may  directly  or  indirectly  affect  the  interests  of 
the  said  company,  the  consent  of  the  said  company  shall  first  be 
obtained. 

IV 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government  with  the 
object  of  effectively  preserving  the  territorial  integrity  cf  China 
agree  to  the  following  special  article: 

The  Chinese  Government  engages  not  to  cede  or  lease  to  a  third 
Power  any  harbor  or  bay  or  island  along  the  coast  of  China. 


Article  1.  The  Chinese  Central  Government  shall  employ  in- 
fluential Japanese  as  advisers  in  political,  financial,  and  military 
affairs. 

Article  2.  Japanese  hospitals,  churches  and  schools  in  the  in- 
terior of  China  shall  be  granted  the  right  of  owning  land. 

Article  3.  Inasmuch  as  the  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese 
Government  have  had  many  cases  of  dispute  between  Japanese 
and  Chinese  police  which  caused  no  little  misunderstanding,  it  is 
for  this  reason  necessary  that  the  police  departments  of  important 
places  (in  China)  shall  be  jointly  administered  by  Japanese  and 
Chinese  or  that  the  police  departments  of  these  places  shall  em- 
ploy numerous  Japanese,  so  that  they  may  at  the  same  time  help 
to  plan  for  the  improvement  of  the  Chinese  Police  Service. 

Article  4.  China  shall  purchase  from  Japan  a  fixed  amount  of 
munitions  of  war  (say  50  per  cent,  or  more  of  what  is  needed  by 


376  APPENDICES 

the  Chinese  Government)  or  that  there  shall  be  established  in  China 
a  Sino-Japanese  jointly  worked  arsenal.  Japanese  technical  ex- 
perts are  to  be  employed  and  Japanese  material  to  be  purchased. 

Article  5.  China  agrees  to  grant  to  Japan  the  right  of  construct- 
ing a  railway  connecting  Wuchang  with  Kiukiang  and  Nanchang, 
another  line  between  Nanchang  and  Hangchow,  and  another  be- 
tween Nanchang  and  Chaochou. 

Article  6.  If  China  needs  foreign  capital  to  work  mines,  build 
railways  and  construct  harbor-works  (including  dock-yards)  in 
the  Province  of  Fukien,  Japan  shall  be  first  consulted. 

Article  7.  China  agrees  that  Japanese  subjects  shall  have  the 
right  of  missionary  propaganda  in  China. 

THE  INCORRECT  VERSION  OF  JAPAN'S  DEMANDS  AS 
COMMUNICATED  BY  THE  JAPANESE  GOVERNMENT 
TO  THE  OTHER  POWERS  IN  RESPONSE  TO  THEIR 
INQUIRIES. 

I. — In  relation  to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

1. — Engagement  on  the  part  of  China  to  consent  to  all  matters 
that  may  be  agreed  upon  between  Japan  and  Germany  with  re- 
gard to  the  disposition  of  all  rights,  interests  and  concessions,  which 
in  virtue  of  treaties  or  otherwise  Germany  possesses  in  relation  to 
the  Province  of  Shantung. 

2. — Engagement  not  to  alienate  or  lease  upon  any  pretext  the 
Province  of  Shantung  or  any  portion  thereof  and  any  island  lying 
near  the  coast  of  the  said  province. 

3. — .Grant  to  Japan  the  right  of  construction  of  a  railway  con- 
necting Cliifu  or  Lungkow  and  the  Tsinan-Kiaochou  railway. 

4. — Addition  of  open  marts  in  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

II. — In  relation  to  south  Manchuria  and  eastern  inner  Mongolia. 

1. — Extension  of  the  terms  of  the  lease  of  Kwangtung,  the  South 
Manchuria  Railway,  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway. 

2. —  (A).  Acquisition  by  the  Japanese  of  the  right  of  residence 
and  ownership  of  land. 

(B).  Grant  to  Japan  of  the  mining  rights  of  mines  specified  by 
Japan. 

3. — Obligation  on  the  part  of  China  to  obtain  in  advance  the  eon- 
sent  of  Japan  if  she  grants  railway  concessions  to  any  third  Power, 
or  procures  the  supply  of  capital  from  any  Power  for  railway 
construction  or  a  loan  from  any  other  Power  on  the  security  of 
any  duties  or  taxes. 


APPENDICES  377 

4. — Obligation  on  the  part  of  China  to  consult  Japan  before  em- 
ploying advisers  or  tutors  regarding  political,  financial  or  military 
matters. 

5. — Transfer  of  the  management  and  control  of  the  Kirin-Chang- 
chun  Railway  to  Japan. 

III. — Agreement  in  principle  that,  at  an  opportune  moment  in  the 
future,  the  Hanyehping  Company  should  be  placed  under  Jap- 
anese and  Chinese  cooperation. 

IV. — Engagement  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  the  main- 
tenance of  the  territorial  integrity  of  China,  not  to  alienate  or 
lease  any  ports  and  bays  on,  or  any  island  near,  the  coast  of 
China. 


JAPAN'S  REVISED  DEMANDS  PRESENTED  APRIL  26,  1915 

Group  I 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government,  being 
desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and 
further  strengthening  the  friendly  relations  and  good  neighborhood 
existing  between  the  two  nations,  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  to  give  full  assent  to 
all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  Government  may  hereafter 
agree  with  the  German  Government,  relating  to  the  disposition  of 
all  rights,  interests,  and  concessions,  which  Germany,  by  virtue  of 
treaties  or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Province  of 
Shantung. 

Article  2.  (Changed  into  an  exchange  of  notes).  The  Chinese 
Government  declares  that  within  the  Province  of  Shantung  and 
along  its  coast  no  territory  or  island  will  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any 
Power  under  any  pretext. 

Article  3.  The  Chinese  Government  consents  that  as  regards  the 
railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow,  to 
connect  with  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway,  if  Germany  is  will- 
ing to  abandon  the  privilege  of  financing  the  Chefoo- Weihsien  line, 
China  will  approach  Japanese  capitalists  to  negotiate  for  a  loan. 

Article  4.  The  Chinese  Government  engages  in  the  interest  of 
trade  and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China  herself 
as  soon  as  possible  certain  suitable  places  in  the  Province  of 
Shantung  as  commercial  ports. 

(Supplementary  exchange  of  notes.) 


378  APPENDICES 

» 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be  chosen,  and  the 
regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by  the  Chinese  Government,  but  the 
Japanese  minister  must  be  consulted  before  making  a  decision. 

Group  II 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government,  with  a 
view  to  developing  their  economic  relations  in  south  Manchuria 
and  eastern  inner  Mongolia,  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  1.  The  two  contracting  Powers  mutually  agree  that  the 
term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  the  term  of  the  South 
Manchurian  Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway,  shall  be 
extended  to  99  years. 

(Supplementary  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  shall  expire  in  the 
86th  year  of  the  Republic  or  1997.  The  date  for  restoring  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway  to  China  shall  fall  due  in  the  91st  year 
of  the  Republic  or  2002.  Article  12  in  the  original  South  Man- 
churian Railway  Agreement  that  it  may  be  redeemed  by  China  after 
36  years  after  the  traffic  is  opened  is  hereby  canceled.  The  term 
of  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway  shall  expire  in  the  96th  year  of 
the  Republic  or  2007. 

Article  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  south  Manchuria  may  lease  or 
purchase  the  necessary  land  for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for 
trade  and  manufacture  or  for  prosecuting  agricultural  enterprises. 

Article  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and  travel  in 
south  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  business  and  manufacture  of  any 
kind  whatsoever. 

Article  3a.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in  the  preceding 
two  articles,  besides  being  required  to  register  with  the  local  au- 
thorities passports  which  they  must  procure  under  the  existing 
regulations,  shall  also  submit  to  police  laws  and  ordinances  and 
tax  regulations,  which  are  approved  by  the  Japanese  consul.  Civil 
and  criminal  cases  in  which  the  defendants  are  Japanese  shall  be 
tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  Japanese  consul ;  those  in  which  the 
defendants  are  Chinese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  Chinese 
authorities.  In  either  case  an  officer  can  be  deputed  to  the  court 
to  attend  the  proceedings.  But  mixed  civil  cases  between  Chinese 
and  Japanese  relating  to  land  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by 
delegates  of  both  nations  conjointly,  in  accordance  with  Chinese 
law  and  local  usage.  When  the  judicial  system  in  the  said  region 
is  completely  reformed,  all  civil  and  criminal  cases  concerning  Jap- 
anese subjects  shall  be  tried  entirely  by  Chinese  law  courts. 


APPENDICES  379 

Article  4.     (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  Japanese  subjects  shall  be 
permitted  forthwith  to  investigate,  select,  and  then  prospect  for  and 
open  mines  at  the  following  places  in  south  Manchuria,  apart  from 
those  mining  areas  in  which  mines  are  being  prospected  for  or 
worked;  until  the  mining  ordinance  is  definitely  settled,  methods  at 
present  in  force  shall  be  followed : 


Province 

of  Feng-tien 

LOCALITY 

DISTRICT                                           MINERAL 

Niu  Hsin  T'ai 

Pen-hsi                                       Coal 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou 

Pen -h  si                                         dc. 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Hai-lung                                    do. 

T'ieh  Ch'ang 

T'ung-hua                                  do. 

Nuan  Ti  T'ang 

Chin                                            do. 

An  Shan  Chan  region 

From  Liao-yang  to  Pen-shi    Iron 

Province  of  Kirin   (Southern  Portion) 
Sha  Sung  Kang  Ho-lung  C.  &  I. 

Kang  Yao  Chi-lin 

(Kirin)  Coal 

Chia  Pi'i  Kou  Hua-tien  Gold 

Article  5.     (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  China  will  hereafter  pro- 
vide funds  for  building  railways  in  south  Manchuria;  if  foreign 
capital  is  required  the  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  negotiate  for 
a  loan  with  Japanese  capitalists  first. 

Article  5a.     (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  hereafter,  when  a  foreign 
loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security  of  the  taxes  of  south  Manchuria 
(not  including  customs  and  salt  revenue  on  the  security  of  which 
loans  have  already  been  made  by  the  Central  Government),  it  will 
negotiate  for  the  loan  with  Japanese  capitalists  first. 

Article  G.     (Changed  to  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declares  that  hereafter  if  foreign  ad- 
visers or  instructors  on  political,  financial,  military,  or  police  mat- 
ters are  to  be  employed  in  south  Manchuria,  Japanese  will  be  em- 
ployed first. 

Article  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  speedily  to  make  a 
fundamental  revision  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  Loan  Agree- 
ment, taking  as  a  standard  the  provisions  in  railway  loan  agreements 
made  heretofore  between  China  and  foreign  financiers.     If,  in  fu- 


380  APPENDICES 

ture,  more  advantageous  terms  than  those  in  existing  railway  loan 
agreements  are  granted  to  foreign  financiers,  in  connection  with 
railway  loans,  the  above  agreement  shall  again  be  revised  in  ac- 
cordance with  Japan's  wishes. 

Chinese  Counter-Proposal  to  Article  7 

All  existing  treaties  between  China  and  Japan  relating  to  Man- 
churia shall,  except  where  otherwise  provided  for  by  this  conven- 
tion, remain  in  force. 

Matters  Relating  to  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  hereafter  when  a  foreign 
loan  is  to  be  made  on  the  security  of  the  taxes  of  eastern  inner 
Mongolia,  China  must  negotiate  with  the  Japanese  Government 
first. 

2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  China  will  herself  pro- 
vide funds  for  building  the  railways  in  eastern  inner  Mongolia;  if 
foreign  capital  is  required,  she  must  negotiate  with  the  Japanese 
Government  first. 

3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the  interest  of  trade  and 
for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China  herself,  as  soon 
as  possible,  certain  places  suitable  in  eastern  inner  Mongolia  as 
commercial  ports.  The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be 
chosen,  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, but  the  Japanese  minister  must  be  consulted  before  making 
a  decision. 

4.  In  the  event  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  desiring  jointly  to  un- 
dertake agricultural  enterprises  and  industries  incidental  thereto, 
the  Chinese  Government  shall  give  its  permission. 

Group  III 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping  Company  being 
very  intimate,  if  the  interested  party  of  the  said  company  comes  to 
an  agreement  with  the  Japanese  capitalists  for  cooperation,  the 
Chinese  Government  shall  forthwith  give  its  consent  thereio.  The 
Chinese  Government  further  agrees  that,  withont  the  consent  of  the 
Japanese  capitalists,  China  will  not  convert  the  company  into  a 
state  enterprise,  nor  confiscate  it,  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use 
foreign  capital  other  than  Japanese. 


APPENDICES  381 

Article  IV 

China  to  give  a  pronouncement  by  herself  in  accordance  with 
the  following  principle: 

No  bay,  harbor,  or  island  along  the  coast  of  China  may  be  ceded 
or  leased  to  any  Power. 

Notes  to  Be  Exchanged 


As  regards  the  right  of  financing  a  railway  from  Wuchang  to 
connect  with  the  Kiukiang-Nanchang  line,  the  Nanchaug-Hangchow 
Railway,  and  the  Nanehang-Chaochow  Railway,  if  it  is  clearly  as- 
certained that  other  Powers  have  no  objection,  China  shall  grant 
the  said  right  to  Japan. 


As  regards  the  right  of  financing  a  railway  from  Wuchang  to  con- 
nect with  the  Kiukiang-Nanchang  Railway,  a  railway  from  Nan- 
chang  to  Hangchow  and  another  from  Nanchang  to  Chaochow,  the 
Chinese  Government  shall  not  grant  the  said  right  to  any  foreign 
Power  before  Japan  comes  to  an  understanding  with  the  other 
Power  which  is  heretofore  interested  therein. 

Notes  to  Be  Exchanged 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  no  nation  whatever  is  to  be 
permitted  to  construct,  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province,  a  dock- 
yard, a  coaling  station  for  military  use,  or  a  naval  base;  nor  to 
be  authorized  to  set  up  any  other  military  establishment.  The 
Chinese  Government  further  agrees  not  to  use  foreign  capital  for 
setting  up  the  above-mentioned  construction  or  establishment. 

Mr.  Lu,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  stated  as  follows: 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  shall,  whenever,  in  future,  it  con- 
siders this  step  necessary,  engage  numerous  Japanese  advisers. 

2.  Whenever,  in  future,  Japanese  subjects  desire  to  lease  or  pur- 
chase land  in  the  interior  of  China  for  establishing  schools  or  hos- 
pitals, the  Chinese  Government  shall  forthwith  give  its  consent 
thereto. 

3.  When  a  suitable  opportunity  arises  in  future,  the  Chinese 
Government  will  send  military  officers  to  Japan  to  negotiate  with 
Japanese  military  authorities  the  matter  of  purchasing  arms  or  that 
of  establishing  a  joint  arsenal. 


382  APPENDICES 

Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  minister,  stated  as  follows: 
As  relates  to  the  question  of  the  right  of  missionary  propaganda, 
the  same  shall  be  taken  up  again  for  negotiation  in  future. 

OFFICIAL  STATEMENT  BY  THE  CHINESE  GOVERNMENT 
RESPECTING  THE  SINO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS 
NOW  BROUGHT  TO  A  CONCLUSION  BY  CHINA'S  COM- 
PLIANCE WITH  THE  TERMS  OF  JAPAN'S  ULTIMATUM 
DELIVERED  ON  MAY  7,  1915. 

At  three  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  May  7,  1915,  His  Excellency, 
the  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking  delivered  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, in  person  an  Ultimatum  from  the  Imperial  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, with  an  accompanying  Note  of  seven  articles.  The  conclud- 
ing sentences  of  the  Ultimatum  read  thus: 

"The  Imperial  Government  hereby  again  offer  their  advice  and 
hope  that  the  Chinese  Government,  upon  this  advice,  will  give  a  sat- 
isfactory reply  by  six  o'clock  p.  m.  on  the  ninth  day  of  May.  It  is 
hereby  declared  that  if  no  satisfactory  reply  is  received  before  or  at 
the  specified  time  the  Imperial  Government  will  take  such  steps  as 
they  may  deem  necessary." 

The  Chinese  Government,  having  received  and  accepted  the  Ulti- 
matum, feel  constrained  to  make  a  frank  and  plain  statement  of 
the  facts  connected  with  the  negotiations  which  were  abruptly  ter- 
minated by  this  drastic  action  on  the  part  of  Japan. 

The  Chinese  Government  have  constantly  aimed,  as  they  still  aim, 
at  consolidating  the  friendship  existing  between  China  and  Japan, 
and,  in  this  period  of  travail  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  have  been 
particularly  solicitous  of  preserving  peace  in  the  far  East.  Un- 
expectedly on  January  18,  1915,  His  Excellency  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister in  Peking,  in  pursuance  of  instructions  from  his  Government, 
adopted  the  unusual  procedure  of  presenting  to  his  Excellency  the 
President  of  the  Republic  of  China  a  list  (hereto  appended)  of 
twenty-one  momentous  demands,  arranged  in  five  Groups.  The  first 
four  Groups  were  each  introduced  by  a  preamble,  but  there  ivas  no 
preamble  or  explanation  to  the  fifth  Group.  In  respect  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  demands  in  this  Group,  however,  no  difference  was  in- 
dicated in  the  document  between  them  and  those  embodied  in  the 
pr ceding  Groups. 

Although  there  was  no  cause  for  such  a  demarche,  the  Chinese 
Government,  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  the  Imperial  Japanese 
Government,  at  once  agreed  to  open  negotiations  on  those  articles 
which  it  was  possible  for  China  to  consider,  notwithstanding  that 


APPENDICES  383 

it  was  palpable  that  the  whole  of  the  demands  were  intended  to 
extend  the  rights  and  interests  of  Japan  without  securing  a  quid 
pro  quo  of  any  kind  for  China. 

China  approached  the  pending  conferences  in  a  spirit  of  utmost 
friendliness  and  with  a  determination  to  deal  with  all  questions 
frankly  and  sincerely.  Before  negotiations  were  actually  com- 
menced, the  Japanese  Minister  raised  many  questions  with  regard 
to  the  number  of  delegates  proposed  to  represent  China,  the  num- 
ber of  conferences  to  be  held  in  each  week,  and  the  method  of  dis- 
cussion. The  Chinese  Government,  though  their  views  differed  from 
those  of  the  Japanese  Minister,  yielded  in  all  tbese  respects  to  his 
contentions  in  the  hope  of  avoiding  any  delay  in  the  negotiations. 
The  objections  of  the  Japanese  Minister  to  the  customary  recording 
and  signing  of  the  minutes  of  each  conference,  which  the  Chinese 
Government  suggested  as  a  necessary  and  advisable  precaution,  as 
well  as  one  calculated  to  facilitate  future  reference,  were  also  ac- 
cepted. Nor  did  the  Chinese  Government  retaliate  in  any  way  when 
in  the  course  of  the  negotiations  the  Japanese  Minister  twice  sus- 
pended the  conferences,  obviously  with  the  object  of  compelling 
compliance  with  his  views  on  certain  points  at  the  time  under  dis- 
cussion. Even  when  delay  was  threatened  owing  to  the  unfortunate 
injury  sustained  by  the  Japanese  Minister  as  a  result  of  a  fall 
from  his  horse,  the  Chinese  delegates,  in  order  to  avert  interruption, 
proposed  that  the  conferences  should  be  continued  at  the  Japanese 
Legation,  which  proposal  was  accepted.  Later,  when,  on  March 
22,  the  Japanese  Government  despatched  large  bodies  of  troops  to 
South  Manchuria  and  Shantung  for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  re- 
lieving the  garrison — whose  term  of  service  had  not  then  expired — 
the  Japanese  Minister  stated  at  the  conference,  in  reply  to  a  direct 
question  as  to  when  the  retiring  troops  would  be  withdrawn,  that 
this  would  not  be  done  until  negotiations  could  be  brought  to  a 
satisfactory  conclusion.  Although  this  minatory  step  caused  much 
excitement,  indignation  and  alarm  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese 
people,  and  made  it  difficult  for  the  Chinese  Government  to  con- 
tinue the  conferences,  they  successfully  exerted  efforts  to  avert  a 
rupture  and  thus  enabled  the  negotiations  smoothly  to  proceed. 
All  this  demonstrates  that  the  Chinese  Government  were  dominated 
by  a  sincere  desire  to  expedite  the  progress  of  the  conferences; 
and  that  the  Japanese  Government  recognized  this  important  fact 
was  made  clear  on  March  11  when  the  Japanese  Minister  conveyed 
to  the  Chinese  Government  an  expression  of  his  Government's  ap- 
preciation of  China's  frankness  and  sincerity  in  the  conduct  of  the 
negotiations. 


384  APPENDICES 

One  of  the  supplementary  proposals  was  in  these  terms : 
From  February  2,  when  the  negotiations  were  commenced,  to 
April  17,  twenty-four  conferences  were  held  in  all.  Throughout 
this  whole  period  the  Chinese  Government  steadfastly  strove  to  ar- 
rive at  an  amicable  settlement  and  made  every  concession  possible. 
Of  the  twenty-one  demands  originally  submitted  by  Japan,  China 
agreed  to  fifteen,  some  in  principle  and  some  textually,  six  being 
initialled  by  both  parties. 

IN"  THE  MATTER  OP  THE  DEMANDS  TO  WHICH  CHINA  AGREED 

At  the  first  conference,  held  on  February  2,  China  agreed  in  prin- 
ciple to  the  first  article  of  the  Shantung  group  of  demands  which 
provides  that  Chiua  should  give  her  assent  to  the  transfer  of  Ger- 
many's rights  in  Shantung  to  Japan.  The  Chinese  Government 
maintained  at  first  that  the  subject  of  this  demand  related  to  the 
post  bellum  settlement,  and,  therefore,  should  be  left  over  for  dis- 
cussion by  all  the  parties  interested  at  the  Peace  Conference.  Fail- 
ing to  persuade  the  Japanese  Minister  to  accept  this  view,  the 
Chinese  Government  agreed  to  this  demand  in  principle,  and  made 
certain  supplementary  proposals. 

"The  Japanese  Government  declares  that  when  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment give  their  assent  to  the  disposition  of  interests  above  re- 
ferred to,  Japan  will  restore  the  Leased  Territory  of  Kiao-chou  to 
China,  and  further  recognizes  the  right  of  the  Chinese  Government 
to  participate  in  the  negotiations  referred  to  above  between  Japan 
and  Germany." 

The  provision  for  a  declaration  to  restore  Kiao-chou,  was  clearly 
not  a  demand  on  Japan  but  only  a  reiteration  of  Japan's  voluntary 
statement  in  her  Ultimatum  to  Germany  on  August  15,  1911  (a 
copy  of  which  was  officially  transmitted  to  the  Chinese  Government 
for  perusal  on  August  15),  and  repeated  in  public  statements  by 
the  Japanese  Premier.  Appreciating  the  earnest  desire  of  Japan  to 
maintain  the  peace  of  the  far  East  and  to  cement  her  friendship 
with  China,  as  evidenced  by  this  friendly  offer,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment left  the  entire  question  of  the  conditions  of  restoration  to  be 
determined  by  Japan,  and  refrained  from  making  any  reference 
thereto  in  the  supplementary  proposal.  The  suggestion  relating  to 
participation  in  the  Conference  between  Japan  and  Germany  was 
made  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Shantung,  the  object  of  future  nego- 
tiation between  Japan  and  Germany,  is  a  Chinese  Province,  and 
therefore  China  is  the  Power  most  concerned  in  the  future  of  that 
territory. 

Another  supplementary  proposal  suggesting  the  assumption  by 


APPENDICES  385 

Japan  of  responsibility  for  indemnification  of  the  losses  arising  out 
of  the  military  operations  by  Japan  in  and  about  the  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiao-chou  was  necessitated  by  the  fact  that  China  was 
neutral  vis-a-vis  the  war  between  Japan  and  Germany.  Had  China 
not  inserted  such  a  provision,  her  position  in  relation  to  this  con- 
flict might  have  been  liable  to  misconstruction — the  localities  in 
which  the  operations  took  place  being  a  portion  of  China's  terri- 
tory— and  might  also  have  exposed  herself  to  a  claim  for  indemnifica- 
tion of  losses  for  which  she  was  in  no  way  responsible. 

In  a  further  supplementary  proposal  the  Chinese  Government 
suggested  that,  prior  to  the  restoration  of  the  Kiao-chou  territory 
to  China,  the  Maritime  Customs,  the  telegraphs  and  post  offices 
should  be  continued  to  be  administered  as  heretofore;  that  the  mili- 
tary railway,  the  telegraph  lines,  etc.,  which  were  installed  by  Japan 
to  facilitate  her  military  operations,  should  be  removed  forthwith; 
that  the  Japanese  troops  now  stationed  outside  of  the  leased  terri- 
tory should  be  first  withdrawn,  and  those  within  the  territory  should 
be  recalled  at  the  time  when  Kiao-chou  is  returned  to  China.  Shan- 
tung being  a  Chinese  Province,  it  was  natural  for  China  to  be 
anxious  concerning  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo  ante  bellum. 
Although  the  Chinese  Government  were  confident  that  the  Japanese 
Government  Avould  effect  such  restoration  in  pursuance  of  their 
official  declaration,  it  was  necessary  for  China,  being  neutral 
throughout  the  war,  to  place  these  matters  on  record. 

At  the  third  conference,  held  on  February  22,  China  agreed  to  the 
second  demand  in  the  Shantung  Group  not  to  cede  or  lease  to  any 
Power  any  territory  or  island  on  the  sea  border  of  Shantung. 

At  the  fifth  conference,  held  on  February  29,  China  agreed  to 
give  Japan  the  preference,  provided  Germany  abandoned  the 
privilege,  to  supply  the  capital  for  the  construction  of  a  railway 
from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to  connect  with  the  Kiao-chou- Tsinanfu 
Railway,  in  the  event  of  China  deciding  to  build  that  railway  with 
foreign  capital. 

At  the  sixth,  conference,  held  on  March  3,  China,  in  the  interests 
of  foreign  trade,  agreed  to  open  certain  important  cities  in  Shan- 
tung as  trade  marts  under  regulations  approved  by  the  Japanese  . 
Government,  although  this  wras  a  demand  on  the  part  of  Japan  for 
privileges  additional  to  any  that  hitherto  had  been  enjoyed  by  Ger- 
many and  was  not  an  outcome  of  the  hostilities  between  Japan 
and  Germany,  nor,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government,  was 
its  acceptance  essential  to  the  preservation  of  peace  in  the  far 
East. 

At  the  eighth  conference,  held  on  March  9,  China  agreed  (1)  to 


386  APPENDICES 

the  extension  of  the  term  of  the  lease  of  Dairen  and  (2)  Port 
Arthur,  and  (3)  of  the  South  Manchuria  and  (4)  Antung-Mukden 
railways,  all  to  99  years. 

Owing  to  the  bitter  experiences  which  China  sustained  in  the  past 
in  connection  with  the  leased  portions  of  her  territory,  it  has  become 
her  settled  policy  not  to  grant  further  leases  nor  to  extend  the 
term  of  those  now  in  existence.  Therefore,  it  was  a  significant 
indication  of  China's  desire  to  meet  Japan's  wishes  when  she  agreed 
to  this  exceptional  departure  from  her  settled  policy. 

At  the  same  conference  the  Chinese  Government  also  agreed  to 
refrain  from  raising  objections  to  the  principle  of  cooperation  in  the 
Hanyehping  Company,  if  the  latter  should  arrive  at  an  agreement 
in  this  respect  with  the  Japanese  capitalists  concerned.  With  refer- 
ence to  this  question  it  was  pointed  out  to  the  Japanese  Minister 
that,  in  the  Provisional  Constitution  of  the  Kepublic  of  China, 
Chinese  subjects  are  guaranteed  the  right  of  protection  of  their 
property  and  freedom  to  engage  in  any  lawful  occupation.  The 
Government  were  precluded,  therefore,  from  interfering  with  the 
private  business  of  the  people,  and  could  not  find  any  other  solution 
than  the  one  thus  agreed  to. 

As  regards  the  single  article  of  the  Fourth  Group,  and  the  pre- 
amble thereto,  the  Chinese  Government  held  that  they  were  incon- 
sistent with  Chinese  sovereignty.  However,  China,  at  this  confer- 
ence, expressed  her  readiness  to  meet  the  wishes  of  Japan  so  far  as 
it  was  possible  without  infringing  her  sovereignty,  and  agreed  to 
make  a  voluntary  pronouncement  that  she  would  not  alienate  any 
portion  of  her  coast  line. 

In  connection  with  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  it  is  worthy  of 
note  that  the  provision  regarding  the  repurchase  period  in  the  agree- 
ment (36  years  from  1902)  was  not  mentioned  in  Japan's  original 
proposal.  Subsequently  the  Japanese  Government,  on  the  ground 
that  the  meaning  of  this  provision  was  not  clear,  requested  China 
to  agree  to  its  cancelation.  To  this  request  the  Chinese  Government 
acceded,  though  well  aware  that  the  proposed  change  could  only 
benefit  Japan.  China  thus  relinquished  the  right  to  repurchase  the 
railway  at  the  expiration  of  another  23  years. 

In  connection  with  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway,  the  fr'ticle,  which 
was  originally  initialled  at  the  conference,  provided  for  the  reversion 
of  the  railway  to  China  at  the  end  of  99  years  without  payment, 
but,  at  the  subsequent  meeting,  the  Japanese  Minister  requested 
that  the  reference  to  the  reversion  without  payment  be  deleted  from 
the  initialled  article.  In  acceding  to  the  Japanese  Minister's  re- 
quest, China  again  showed  her  sincere  desire  to  expedite  matters 


APPENDICES  387 

and  to  meet  Japan's  wishes  even  at  the  sacrifice  of  a  point  in  her 
favor,  to  which  Japan  had  already  agreed. 

At  the  eleventh  conference,  held  on  March  16,  China  agreed  to 
give  Japan  preference  in  regard  to  loans  for  railway  construction  in 
South  Manchuria. 

At  the  thirteenth  conference,  held  on  March  23,  China  agreed  (1) 
to  the  amendment  of  the  Kirm-Changehun  Railway  loan  agreement; 
(2)  to  give  preference  to  Japan  if  the  revenue  of  South  Manchuria 
were  ottered  as  security  for  loans;  (3)  to  give  preference  to  Jap- 
anese in  the  event  of  the  employment  of  adviser's  for  South  Man- 
churia; (4)  to  grant  to  Japanese  the  right  of  mining  in  nine  speci- 
fied areas  in  South  Manchuria. 

In  its  original  form  the  demand  with  reference  to  mining  in 
South  Manchuria  tended  to  creat  a  monopoly  for  Japanese  subjects, 
and,  therefore,  was  entirely  inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunity.  The  Chinese  Government  explained  that  they  could 
not,  in  view  of  the  treaty  rights  of  other  Powers,  agree  to  this 
monopoly,  but  they  readily  gave  their  acceptance  when  Japan  con- 
sented to  the  modification  of  the  demand  so  as  to  mitigate  its  mo- 
nopolistic character. 

In  connection  with  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway,  the  amendment 
agreed  to  involves  a  fundamental  revision  of  the  original  agree- 
ment on  the  basis  of  the  existing  railway  loan  contracts  concluded 
by  China  with  other  foreign  capitalists,  as  well  as  an  engagement 
on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  extend  to  this  railway 
any  better  terms  which  may  be  hereafter  accorded  to  other  railway 
concessionaires  in  China.  The  capital  of  this  railway  was  originally 
fifty  per  cent.  Chinese  and  fifty  per  cent.  Japanese.  The  effect  of 
this  undertaking  is  to  transfer  the  capital  originally  held  by  the 
Chinese,  as  well  as  the  full  control  and  administration  of  the  rail- 
way, to  the  Japanese. 

At  the  tuentii-first  conference,  held  on  April  10,  China  agreed,  in 
regard  to  the  demands  concerning  Fnkien  Province,  to  give  Japan 
an  assurance  in  accordance  with  Japan's  wishes  at  a  future  time. 

As  regards  demands  2  and  3  in  the  Manchuria  Group,  relating 
to  the  ownership  of  land  for  trade,  manufacture,  and  agricultural 
enterprises,  as  well  as  for  the  right  of  settlement  in  the  interior  of 
South  Manchuria,  the  Chinese  Government,  after  discussion  at  sev- 
eral conferences,  agreed  to  them  in  principle,  but  desired  to  intro- 
duce certain  amendments  concerning  the  control  and  protection  of 
the  Japanese  subjects  who  might  avail  themselves  of  these  riehts. 
The  course  of  the  negotiations  in  connection  with  these  amendments 
will  be  referred  to  subsequently. 


388  APPENDICES 


IN  THE  MATTER  OP  THOSE  DEMANDS   TO  WHICH   CHINA  COULD 
NOT  AGREE 

Of  the  twenty-one  original  demands  there  were  six,  as  previously 
mentioned,  to  which  China  could  not  agree  on  the  ground  that  they 
were  not  proper  subjects  for  international  negotiation,  conflicting 
as  they  did  with  the  sovereign  rights  of  China,  the  treaty  rights  of 
other  Powers,  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity. 

Thus,  for  example,  the  second  article  of  the  Hanyehping  question 
in  the  original  Third  Group  in  particular  seriously  affected  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  commercial  opportunity. 

The  proposal  that  there  should  be  joint  administration  by  China 
and  Japan  of  the  police  in  China  was  clearly  an  interference  with 
the  Republic's  domestic  affairs,  and  consequently  an  infringement 
of  her  sovereignty.  For  that  reason  the  Chinese  Government  could 
not  take  the  demand  into  consideration.  But  when  it  was  explained 
by  the  Japanese  Minister  that  this  referred  only  to  South  Man- 
churia, and  he  suggested  that  his  Government  would  be  satisfied 
if  China  agreed  to  engage  Japanese  as  police  advisers  for  that  ter- 
ritory, the  Chinese  Government  accepted  the  suggestion. 

The  two  articles  relating  to  the  acquisition  of  land  for  schools, 
hospitals,  and  temples,  as  well  as  to  the  right  of  missionary  prop- 
aganda, would,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government,  have 
presented  grave  obstacles  to  the  consolidation  of  the  friendly  feel- 
ing subsisting  between  the  two  people.  The  religions  of  the  two 
countries  are  identical  and,  therefore,  the  need  for  a  missionary 
propaganda  to  be  carried  on  in  China  by  Japanese  does  not  exist. 
The  natural  rivalry  between  Chinese  and  Japanese  followers  of  the 
same  faith  would  tend  to  create  incessant  disputes  and  friction. 
"Whereas  "Western  missionaries  live  apart  from  the  Chinese  com- 
munities among  which  they  labor,  Japanese  monks  would  live  with 
the  Chinese;  and  the  similarity  of  their  physical  characteristics, 
their  religious  garb,  and  their  habits  of  life  would  render  it  im- 
possible to  distinguish  them  for  purposes  of  affording  the  protection 
which  the  Japanese  Government  would  require  should  be  extended 
to  them  under  the  system  of  extra-territoriality  now  obtaining  in 
China.  Moreover  a  general  apprehension  exists  among  the  Chinese 
people  that  these  peculiar  conditions  favoring  conspiracies  for  polit- 
ical purposes  might  be  taken  advantage  of  by  some  unscrupulous 
Chinese. 

The  demand  for  railway  concessions  in  the  Yangtze  Valley  con- 
flicted with  the  Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo  Railway  Agreement  of 
March  6,  1908}  the  Nanking -Chang  sha  Railway  Agreement  of  March 


APPENDICES  389 

31, 1914,  and  the  engagement  of  August  24,  1914,  giving  preference 
to  British  firms  for  the  projected  line  from  Nanchang  to  Chao- 
chowfu.  For  this  reason  the  Chinese  Government  found  themselves 
unable  to  consider  the  demand,  though  the  Japanese  Minister,  while 
informed  of  China's  engagements  with  Great  Britain,  repeatedly 
pressed  for  its  acceptance. 

In  respect  to  the  demand  for  the  appointment  of  influential  Jap- 
anese to  be  advisers  and  instructors  in  political,  financial  and  mili- 
tary affairs,  the  policy  of  the  Chinese  Government  in  regard  to  the 
appointment  of  advisers  has  been  similar  to  that  which  has  pre- 
sumably guided  the  Japanese  Government  in  like  selection  of  the 
best  qualified  men  irrespective  of  their  nationality.  As  an  indica- 
tion of  their  desire  to  avail  themselves  of  the  services  of  eminent 
Japanese,  one  of  the  earliest  appointments  made  to  an  advisership 
was  that  of  Dr.  Ariga,  while  later  on  Dr.  Hirai  and  Mr.  Nakayami 
were  appointed  to  the  Ministry  of  Communications. 

It  was  considered  that  the  demand  that  Japanese  should  be  ap- 
pointed in  the  three  most  important  administrative  departments, 
as  well  as  the  demand  for  the  joint  control  of  China's  police,  and 
the  demand  for  an  engagement  to  purchase  a  fixed  amount  of  arms 
and  ammunition  from  Japan  or  to  establish  joint  arsenals  in  China, 
so  clearly  involved  the  sovereignty  of  the  Republic  that  the  Chinese 
Government  were  unable  even  to  consider  them. 

For  these  reasons  the  Chinese  Government,  at  the  very  outset  of 
the  negotiations,  declared  that  they  were  unable  to  negotiate  on 
the  demands;  but,  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister, the  Chinese  delegates  consented  to  give  the  reasons  for  de- 
clining to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  them. 

IN   THE  MATTER  OF  THE   QUESTIONS   OF  DISPUTE   INVOLVED  IN 
SOME   OF  THE  FOREGOING  DEMANDS 

The  demand  by  Japan  for  the  right  of  her  subjects  in  South  Man- 
churia to  lease  or  own  land,  and  to  reside  and  travel,  and  to  engage 
in  business  or  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatever,  was  deemed  by 
che  Chinese  Government  to  obtain  for  Japanese  subjects  in  this 
region  a  privileged  status  beyond  the  tenns  of  the  treaties  existing 
between  the  two  nations,  and  to  give  them  a  freedom  of  action  which 
would  be  a  restriction  of  China's  sovereignty  and  a  serious  in- 
fringement of  her  administrative  rights.  Should  Japanese  subjects 
be  granted  the  right  of  owning  land,  it  would  mean  that  all  the 
landed  property  in  the  region  might  fall  into  their  hands,  thereby 
endangering  China's  territorial  integrity.  Moreover,  residence  in 
the  interior  was  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  extra-territorial- 


390  APPENDICES 

ity,  the  relinquishment  of  which  is  necessary  to  the  actual  enjoy- 
ment of  the  privilege  of  inland  residence,  as  evidenced  in  the  prac- 
tice of  other  nations. 

Japan's  unconditional  demand  for  the  privilege  of  inland  resi- 
dence accompanied  with  a  desire  to  extend  extra-territonality  into 
the  interior  of  China  and  to  enable  Japanese  subjects  to  monopolize 
all  the  interests  in  South  Manchuria,  was  also  palpably  irreconcilable 
with  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity.  For  this  reason  the 
Chinese  Government  were,  in  the  first  instance,  unable  to  accept  this 
demand  as  a  basis  of  negotiation.  Their  profound  regard  for  the 
friendly  relations  of  the  two  countries,  however,  persuaded  them 
to  exert  their  utmost  efforts,  in  spite  of  all  the  inherent  difficulties, 
to  seek  a  solution  of  a  question  which  was  practically  impossible  to 
solve.  Knowing  that  the  proposal  made  by  Japan  was  incompatible 
with  treaties,  they  nevertheless  sought  to  meet  her  wishes  within  the 
limits  of  treaties.  Accordingly  they  submitted  a  counter-proposal 
to  open  more  places  in  South  Manchuria  to  international  trade  and 
to  establish  Sino-Japanese  joint  reclamation  companies. 

This  suggestion  was  made  in  the  belief  that  the  places  to  which 
Japanese  subjects  would  desire  to  resort  for  purposes  of  trade, 
could  not  be  other  than  important  localities;  if  all  these  localities 
were  opened  to  commerce,  then  they  could  reside,  trade,  and  lease 
land  there  for  joint  reclamation.  Thus  Japanese  subjects  might  en- 
joy the  essence  of  the  privilege  of  inland  residence  and  would  still 
be  able  to  reconcile  their  position  with  China's  treaties  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity. 

After  the  Japanese  Government  declined  to  accept  this  sugges- 
tion, China  withdrew  it  and  replaced  it  with  an  amendment  to  the 
original  articles.  It  was  proposed  in  this  amendment  to  grant  to 
Japanese  subjects  the  extra-treaty  privilege  of  inland  residence 
with  the  provisos  that  Japanese  subjects  in  places  outside  of  trade 
marts  should  observe  Chinese  police  regulations  and  pay  taxes  in  the 
same  manner  as  Chinese;  and  that  civil  and  criminal  cases  involving 
such  Japanese  subjects  should  be  adjudicated  by  Chinese  authori- 
ties, the  Japanese  Consul  attending  merely  to  watch  the  proceed- 
ings. This  suggestion  was  not  an  innovation ;  it  was  based  upon 
the  modus  operandi  now  in  force  as  regards  the  Korean  settlers 
in  inland  districts  in  Chientao.  But  the  Japanese  Government  again 
declined  to  accept  it. 

The  Chinese  Government  thereupon  made  a  third  proposal  along 
the  line  of  what  constitutes  the  present  practice  in  Turkey,  making 
a  distinction,  however,  in  favor  of  Japanese  subjects,  in  the  exercise 


APPENDICES  391 

of  jurisdiction  over  civil  and  criminal  cases.  This  was  once  more 
objected  to  by  the  Japanese  Government. 

Then  the  Chinese  Government  proposed  to  concede  still  another 
step — the  fourth  endeavor  to  meet  Japan's  wishes.  They  proposed 
to  agree  to  the  full  text  of  Articles  2  and  3  relative  to  the  question 
of  inland  residence,  except  that  "the  right  of  owning  land"  was 
changed  into  '"the  right  of  leasing  land"  and  to  the  phrase  "culti- 
vating land"  was  added  this  clause :  "the  regulations  for  which  shall 
be  determined  separately;"  and,  further,  to  add  a  supplementary 
article  which  embodied  a  modus  operandi  which  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment had  constrained  themselves  to  make,  out  of  a  desire  to  come 
to  a  settlement  over  this  question.  The  view  advanced  in  this  sup- 
plementary article  was  based  upon  the  Japanese  Minister's  declar- 
ation made  on  March  6,  1915,  that  a  separate  article  embodying 
some  compromise  might  be  added  to  the  original  articles  2  and  3 
for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  any  conflict  with  China's  sovereignty 
or  the  system  established  by  treaties.  These  suggestions  made  by 
the  Chinese  Government  were  not  accepted  by  Japan. 

As  regards  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  not  only  have  no  treaties 
been  entered  into  with  Japan  concerning  this  region,  but  also  the 
people  are  so  unaccustomed  to  foreign  trade,  that  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment invariably  feel  much  anxiety  about  the  safety  of  foreigners 
who  elect  to  travel  there.  The  Chinese  Government,  therefore,  con- 
sidered that  it  would  not  be  in  the  interest  of  foreigners  to  open 
the  whole  territory  to  them  for  residence  and  commerce,  and  on  these 
grounds  based  their  original  refusal  to  place  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia on  the  same  footing  as  South  Manchuria.  Still,  their  desire 
to  meet  the  wishes  of  the  Japanese  Government  eventually  prompted 
them  to  offer  to  open  a  number  of  places  in  the  region  to  foreign 
trade. 

IN   THE   MATTER  OP  JAPAN'S  REVISED  DEMANDS 

The  foregoing  is  an  outline  of  the  negotiations  up  to  April  17. 
It  was  hoped  by  the  Chinese  Government  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, in  view  of  the  great  concessions  made  by  China  at  the  con- 
ferences held  up  to  this  time,  would  see  a  way  of  effecting  an 
amicable  settlement  by  modifying  their  position  on  certain  points. 
In  regard  to  these  it  had,  by  this  time,  become  manifest  that  China 
would  encounter  almost  insuperable  difficulties  in  making  further 
concessions. 

The  Japanese  Government,  however,  suspended  the  negotiations 
until  April  26  when  they  surprised  the   Chinese  Government  by 


392  APPENDICES 

presenting  a  new  list  of  twenty-four  demands  (which  is  hereto  ap- 
pended), and  requested  the  Chinese  Government  to  accord  their  ac- 
ceptance without  delay,  adding  that  this  was  their  final  proposal. 
At  the  same  time  the  Japanese  Minister  stated  that  the  Japanese 
Government  would  restore  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow  to  China 
at  an  opportune  time  in  the  future  and  under  proper  conditions,  if 
the  Chinese  Government  would  agree  to  the  new  list  of  twenty-four 
demands  without  modification. 

In  this  new  list,  although  the  term  "special  position"  in  the  pre- 
amble of  the  Manchurian  Group  was  changed  to  "economic  rela- 
tions," and  although  the  character  of  the  articles  in  the  original 
Fifth  Group  was  altered  from  Demands  to  a  recital  of  alleged 
statements  by  the  Chinese  Foreign  Minister,  four  new  demands 
were  introduced  concerning  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia.  In  deference 
to  the  wishes  of  the  Japanese  Government,  the  Chinese  Government 
gave  the  revised  list  the  most  careful  consideration ;  and  being  sin- 
cerely desirous  of  an  early  settlement  offered  new  concessions  in 
their  reply  presented  to  the  Japanese  Minister  on  May  1.  (An- 
nexed.) 

In  this  reply  the  Chinese  Government  reinserted  the  proposal  in 
reference  to  the  retrocession  of  Kiaochow,  which  they  advanced  at 
the  first  conference  on  February  2,  and  which  was  postponed  at  the 
request  of  the  Japanese  Minister.  This,  therefore,  was  in  no  sense 
a  new  proposal. 

The  Chinese  Government  also  proposed  to  agree  to  three  of  the 
four  articles  relating  to  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia.  There  was  some 
difficulty  in  determining  a  definition  of  the  boundaries  of  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia — this  being  a  new  expression  in  Chinese  geograph- 
ical terminology — but  the  Chinese  Government,  acting  upon  a  state- 
ment made  at  a  previous  conference  by  the  Japanese  Minister  that 
the  Japanese  Government  meant  the  region  under  Chinese  admin- 
istrative jurisdiction,  and  taking  note,  in  the  list  presented  by  the 
Japanese  Minister,  of  the  names  of  places  in  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia to  be  opened  to  trade,  inferred  that  the  so-called  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  is  that  part  of  Inner  Mongolia  which  is  under  the  juris- 
diction of  South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  Intendency;  and  re- 
frained from  placing  any  limitations  upon  the  definition  of  this 
term. 

The  Chinese  Government  also  withdrew  their  supplementary  pro- 
posal reserving  the  right  of  making  regulations  for  agricultural  en- 
terprises to  be  undertaken  by  Japanese  settlers  in  South  Manchuria. 

In  respect  of  the  trial  of  cases  involving  land  disputes  between 
Japanese  only,  or  between  Japanese  and  Chinese,  the  Chinese  Gov- 


APPENDICES  393 

ernment  accorded  to  the  Japanese  Consul  the  right  of  deputing  an 
officer  to  watch  the  proceedings. 

The  Chinese  Government  also  agreed  to  accept  the  suggestion  of 
the  Japanese  Government  to  modify  the  term  ''police  law  and  or- 
dinances" into  "police  rules  and  regulations,"  thereby  limiting  the 
extent  of  control  which  the  Chinese  would  have  over  Japanese  sub- 
jects. 

As  regards  the  Hanyehping  demand,  the  Chinese  Government 
accepted  the  draft  made  by  the  Japanese  Government,  embodying 
an  engagement  by  the  Chinese  Government  not  to  convert  the  Com- 
pany into  a  State-owned  concern,  nor  to  confiscate  it,  nor  to  force 
it  to  borrow  foreign  capital  other  than  Japanese. 

In  respect  of  the  Fukien  question  the  Chinese  Government  also 
agreed  to  give  an  assurance  in  the  amplified  form  suggested  by  the 
Japanese  Government  that  the  Chinese  Government  had  not  given 
their  consent  to  any  foreign  nations  to  construct  a  dockyard,  or  a 
coaling  station,  or  a  naval  base,  or  any  other  military  establishment 
along  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province;  nor  did  they  contemplate  bor- 
rowing foreign  capital  for  the  foregoing  purposes. 

Having  made  these  concessions  which  practically  brought  the  views 
of  China  into  line  with  those  of  Japan,  and  having  explained  in  a 
note  accompanying  the  reply  the  difficulty  for  China  to  make  fur- 
ther concessions,  the  Chinese  Government  hoped  that  the  Japanese 
Government  would  accept  their  reply  of  May  1,  and  thus  bring  the 
negotiations  to  an  amicable  conclusion. 

The  Japanese  Government,  however,  expressed  themselves  as 
being  dissatisfied  with  China's  reply,  and  withdrew  the  conditional 
offer  to  restore  Kiaochow  to  China  made  on  April  26.'  It  was  fur- 
ther intimated  that  if  the  Chinese  Government  did  not  give  their 
full  compliance  with  the  list  of  twenty-four  demands,  Japan  would 
have  recourse  to  drastic  measures. 

Upon  receiving  this  intimation  the  Chinese  Government,  inspired 
by  the  conciliatory  spirit  which  had  been  predominant  from  the 
very  beginning  of  the  negotiations  and  desirous  of  avoiding  any  pos- 
sible rupture  in  the  relations  of  the  two  countries,  made  a  supreme 
effort  to  meet  the  situation,  and  represented  to  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment that  they  would  reconsider  their  position  and  make  another 
attempt  to  find  a  solution  that  would  be  more  satisfactory  to  Japan, 
in  respect  to  those  articles  which  China  had  declared  could  not  be 
taken  up  for  consideration,  but  to  which  Japan  attached  great  im- 
portance. Even  in  the  evening  of  May  6,  after  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister had  notified  the  Chinese  Government  that  the  Uultimatum  had 
arrived  in  Peking,  the  Chinese  Government  in  the  interests  of  peace 


394  APPENDICES 

still  exerted  efforts  to  save  the  situation  by  offering  to  meet  Japan's 
wishes. 

These  overtures  were  again  rejected,  and  thus  exhausted  the  means 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  prevent  an  impasse. 

It  is  plain  that  the  Chinese  Government  proceeded  to  the  fullest 
extent  of  possible  concession  in  view  of  the  strong  national  senti- 
ment manifested  by  the  people  throughout  the  whole  period  of 
negotiations.  All  that  the  Chinese  Government  strove  to  maintain 
was  China's  plenary  sovereignty,  the  treaty  rights  of  foreign  Pow- 
ers in  China  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity. 

To  the  profound  regret  of  the  Chinese  Government,  however,  the 
tremendous  sacrifices  which  they  had  shown  themselves  ready  to 
make,  proved  unavailing,  and  an  Ultimatum  (the  text  of  which  is 
appended)  was  duly  delivered  to  them  by  the  Japanese  Minister  at 
three  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  May  7. 

As  to  the  allegations  made  in  the  Ultimatum  against  China,  the 
Chinese  Government  hope  that  the  foregoing  outline  of  the  history 
of  the  negotiations  constitutes  a  clear,  dispassionate,  and  complete 
reply. 

In  considering  the  nature  of  the  course  they  should  take  with 
reference  to  the  Ultimatum  the  Chinese  Government  was  influenced 
by  a  desire  to  preserve  the  Chinese  people,  as  well  as  the  large  num- 
ber of  foreign  residents  in  China,  from  unnecessary  suffering,  and 
also  to  prevent  the  interests  of  friendly  Powers  from  being  im- 
periled. For  these  reasons  the  Chinese  Government  were  con- 
strained to  comply  in  full  with  the  terms  of  the  Ultimatum  (the  re- 
ply being  hereto  appended),  but  in  complying  the  Chinese  disclaim 
any  desire  to  associate  themselves  with  any  revision,  which  may 
thus  be  effected,  of  the  various  conventions  and  agreements  con- 
cluded between  other  Powers  in  respect  of  the  maintenance  of 
China's  territorial  independence  and  integrity,  the  preservation  of 
the  status  quo,  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China. 

Memorandum  Read  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  Mr.  Hioki, 

the  Japanese  Minister,  at  a  Conference  Held  at  Waichiaopu, 

May  1,  1915. 

The  list  of  demands  which  the  Japanese  Government  first  pre- 
sented to  the  Chinese  Government  consists  of  five  Groups,  the  first 
relating  to  Shantung,  the  second  relating  to  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  the  third  relating  to  the  Hanyehping  Com- 
pany,  the   fourth   asking   for  non-alienation   of   the   coast   of  the 


APPENDICES  395 

country,  and  the  fifth  relating  to  the  questions  of  national  advisers, 
national  police,  national  arms,  missionary  propaganda,  Yangtze 
Valley  railways  and  Fukien  Province.  Out  of  profound  regard  for 
the  intentions  entertained  by  Japan,  the  Chinese  Government  took 
these  momentous  demands  into  grave  and  careful  consideration  and 
decided  to  negotiate  with  the  Japanese  Government  frankly  and 
sincerely  what  were  possible  to  negotiate.  This  is  a  manifestation  to 
Japan  of  the  most  profound  regard  which  the  Chinese  Government 
entertains  for  the  relations  between  the  two  nations. 

Ever  since  the  opening  of  the  negotiations  China  has  been  doing 
her  best  to  hasten  their  progress,  holding  as  many  as  three  con- 
ferences a  week.  As  regards  the  articles  hi  the  second  group,  the 
Chinese  Government,  being  disposed  to  allow  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment to  develop  the  economic  relations  of  the  two  countries  in 
South  Manchuria,  realizing  that  the  Japanese  Government  attaches 
importance  to  its  interests  in  that  region,  and  wishing  to  meet  the 
hopes  of  Japan,  made  a  painful  effort,  without  hesitation,  to  agree 
to  the  extension  of  the  25-year  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny,  the 
36-year  period  of  the  South  Manchuria  railway  and  the  15-year 
period  of  the  Antung-Mukden  railway,  all  to  99  years;  and  to 
abandon  its  own  cherished  hopes  to  regain  control  of  these  places 
and  properties  at  the  expiration  of  their  respective  original  terms 
of  lease.  It  cannot  but  be  admitted  that  this  is  a  most  genuine  proof 
of  China's  friendship  for  Japan.  As  to  the  rights  of  opening  mines 
in  South  Manchuria,  the  Chinese  Government  has  already  agreed  to 
permit  Japanese  to  work  mines  within  the  mining  areas  designated 
by  Japan.  China  has  further  agreed  to  give  Japan  a  right  of  pref- 
erence in  the  event  of  borrowing  foreign  capital  for  building  rail- 
ways or  of  making  a  loan  on  the  security  of  the  local  taxes  in  South 
Manchuria  The  question  of  revising  the  arrangement  for  the  Kirin- 
Changchun  railway  has  been  settled  in  accordance  with  the  proposal 
made  by  Japan.  The  Chinese  Government  has  further  agreed  to 
employ  Japanese  first  in  the  event  of  employing  foreign  advisers  on 
political,  military,  financial  and  police  matters. 

Furthermore,  the  provision  about  the  repurchase  period  in  the 
South  Manchurian  railway  was  not  mentioned  in  Japan's  original 
proposal.  Subsequently,  the  Japanese  Government,  alleging  that  its 
meaning  was  not  clear,  asked  China  to  cancel  the  provision  al- 
together. Again,  Japan  at  first  demanded  the  right  of  Japanese  to 
carry  on  farming  in  South  Manchuria,  but  subsequently  she  con- 
sidered the  word  "farming"  was  not  broad  enough  and  asked  to 
replace  it  with  the  phrase  "agricultural  enterprises."  To  these  re- 
quests the  Chinese  Government,  though  well  aware  that  the  proposed 


396  APPENDICES 

changes  could  only  benefit  Japan,  still  acceded  without  delay.  This, 
too,  is  a  proof  of  China's  frankness  and  sincerity  toward  Japan. 

As  regards  matters  relating  to  Shantung,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment has  agreed  to  a  majority  of  the  demands. 

The  question  of  inland  residence  in  South  Manchuria  is,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Chinese  Government,  incompatible  with  the  treaties 
China  has  entered  into  with  Japan  and  other  Powers,  still  the  Chi- 
nese Government  did  its  best  to  consider  how  it  was  possible  to  avoid 
that  incompatibility.  At  first,  China  suggested  that  the  Chinese 
Authorities  should  have  full  rights  of  jurisdiction  over  Japanese 
settlers.  Japan  declined  to  agree  to  it.  Thereupon  China  recon- 
sidered the  question  and  revised  her  counter-proposal  five  or  six 
times,  each  time  making  some  definite  concession,  and  went  so  far 
as  to  agree  that  all  civil  and  criminal  cases  between  Chinese  and 
Japanese  should  be  arranged  according  to  existing  treaties.  Only 
cases  relating  to  land  or  lease  contracts  were  reserved  to  be  ad- 
judicated by  Chinese  Courts,  as  a  mark  of  China's  sovereignty  over 
the  region.  This  is  another  proof  of  China's  readiness  to  concede 
as  much  as  possible. 

Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  is  not  an  enlightened  region  as  yet  and 
the  conditions  existing  there  are  entirely  different  from  those  pre- 
vailing in  South  Manchuria.  The  two  places,  therefore,  cannot  be 
considered  in  the  same  light.  Accordingly,  China  agreed  to  open 
commercial  marts  first,  in  the  interests  of  foreign  trade. 

The  Hanyehping  Company  mentioned  in  the  third  group  is  en- 
tirely a  private  company,  and  the  Chinese  Government  is  pre- 
cluded from  interfering  with  it  and  negotiating  with  another  govern- 
ment to  make  any  disposal  of  the  same  as  the  Government  likes,  but 
having  regard  for  the  interests  of  the  Japanese  capitalists,  the 
Chinese  Government  agreed  that  whenever,  in  future,  the  said  com- 
pany and  the  Japanese  capitalists  should  arrive  at  a  satisfactory 
arrangement  for  cooperation,  China  will  give  her  assent  thereto. 
Thus  the  interests  of  the  Japanese  capitalists  are  amply  safe- 
guarded. 

Although  the  demand  in  the  fourth  group  asking  for  a  declara- 
tion not  to  alienate  China's  coast  is  an  infringement  of  her  sov- 
ereign rights,  yet  the  Chinese  Government  offered  to  make  a  vol- 
untary pronouncement  so  far  as  it  comports  with  China's  sovereign 
rights.  Thus,  it  is  seen  that  the  Chinese  Government,  in  deference 
to  the  wishes  of  Japan,  gave  a  most  serious  consideration  even  to 
those  demands  which  gravely  affect  the  sovereignty  and  territorial 
rights  of  China  as  well  as  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  and  the 


APPENDICES  397 

treaties  with  foreign  Powers.  All  this  was  a  painful  effort  on  the 
part  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  meet  the  situation — a  fact  of 
which  the  Japanese  Government  must  be  aware. 

As  regards  the  demands  in  the  fifth  group,  they  all  infringe 
China's  sovereignty,  the  treaty  rights  of  other  Powers  or  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity.  Although  Japan  did  not  indicate  any 
difference  between  this  group  and  the  preceding  four  in  the  list  which 
she  presented  to  China  in  respect  of  their  character,  the  Chinese 
Government,  in  view  of  their  palpably  objectionable  features,  per- 
suaded itself  that  these  could  not  have  been  intended  by  Japan  as 
anything  other  than  Japan's  mere  advice  to  China.  Accordingly 
China  has  declared  from  the  very  beginning  that  while  she  en- 
tertains the  most  profound  regard  for  Japan's  wishes,  she  was  un- 
able to  admit  that  any  of  these  matters  could  be  made  the  subject 
of  an  understanding  with  Japan.  Much  as  she  desired  to  pay  regard 
to  Japan's  wishes,  China  cannot  but  respect  her  own  sovereign  rights 
and  the  existing  treaties  with  other  Powers.  In  order  to  be  rid  of 
the  seed  for  future  misunderstanding  and  to  strengthen  the  basis  of 
friendship,  China  was  constrained  to  iterate  the  reasons  for  refus- 
ing to  negotiate  on  any  of  the  articles  in  the  fifth  group,  yet  in 
view  of  Japan's  wishes  China  has  expressed  her  readiness  to  state 
that  no  foreign  money  was  borrowed  to  construct  harbor  works  in 
Fukien  Province.  Thus  it  is  clear  that  China  went  so  far  as  to 
seek  a  solution  for  Japan  of  a  question  that  really  did  not  admit 
of  negotiation.     Was  there,  then,  evasion  on  the  part  of  China? 

Now,  since  the  Japanese  Government  has  presented  a  revised 
list  of  demands  and  declared  at  the  same  time  that  it  will  restore 
the  leased  territory  of  Kaiochow,  the  Chinese  Government  recon- 
siders the  whole  question  and  herewith  submits  a  new  reply  to  the 
friendly  Japanese  Government. 

In  this  reply  the  unsettled  articles  in  the  first  group  are  stated 
again  for  discussion.  As  regards  the  second  group,  those  articles 
which  have  already  been  initialled  are  omitted.  In  connection  with 
the  question  of  inland  residence  the  police  regulation  clause  has  been 
revised  in  a  more  restrictive  sense.  As  for  the  trial  of  cases  re- 
lating to  land  and  lease  contracts  the  Chinese  Government  now 
permits  the  Japanese  Consul  to  send  an  officer  to  attend  the  pro- 
ceedings. Of  the  four  demands  in  connection  with  that  part  of 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  which  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  South 
Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  Intendency,  China  agrees  to  three.  China, 
also,  agrees  to  the  article  relating  to  the  Hanyehping  Company  as 
revised  by  Japan. 


398  APPENDICES 

It  is  hoped  that  the  Japanese  Government  will  appreciate  the  con- 
ciliatory spirit  of  the  Chinese  Government  in  making  this  final  con- 
cession and  forthwith  give  her  assent  thereto. 

There  is  one  more  point.  At  the  beginning  of  the  present  nego- 
tiations it  was  mutually  agreed  to  observe  secrecy,  but  unfor- 
tunately a  few  days  after  the  presentation  of  the  demands  by  Japan 
an  Osaka  newspaper  published  an  "Extra"  giving  the  text  of  the 
demands.  The  foreign  and  the  Chinese  press  has  since  been  paying 
considerable  attention  to  this  question  and  frequently  publishing 
pro-Chinese  or  pro-Japanese  comments  in  order  to  call  forth  the 
world's  conjecture,  a  matter  which  the  Chinese  Government  deeply 
regrets.  The  Chinese  Government  has  never  carried  on  any  news- 
paper campaign  and  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  re- 
peatedly declared  it  to  the  Japanese  Minister. 

In  conclusion,  the  Chinese  Government  wishes  to  express  its  hope 
that  the  negotiations  now  pending  between  the  two  countries  will 
soon  come  to  an  end  and  whatever  misgivings  foreign  countries  en- 
tertain toward  the  present  situation  may  be  quickly  dispelled. 


CHINA'S  RELY  TO  JAPAN'S  REVISED  DEMANDS 

China's  Reply  of  May  1,  1915,  to  the  Japanese  Revised 
Demands  of  April  26,  1915. 

GROUP  I 

The  Chinese  Government  and  the  Japanese  Government,  being 
desirous  of  maintaining  the  general  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and 
further  strengthening  the  friendly  relations  and  good  neighborhood 
existing  between  the  two  nations,  agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  they  will  give 
full  assent  to  all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  and  German 
Governments  may  hereafter  mutually  agree,  relating  to  the  dis- 
position of  all  interests  which  Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties  or 
recorded  cases,  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

The  Japanese  Government  declares  that  when  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment give  their  assent  to  the  disposition  of  interests  above  re- 
ferred to,  Japan  will  restore  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao-chou 
to  China;  and  further  recognize  the  right  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment to  participate  in  the  negotiations  referred  to  above  between 
Japan  and  Gennany. 

Art.  2.  The  Japanese  Government  consent  to  be  responsible  for 
the  indemnification  of  all  losses  occasioned  by  Japan's  military  op- 


APPENDICES  399 

peration  around  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao-chou.  The  customs, 
telegraphs  and  post  offices  within  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao-chou 
shall,  prior  to  the  restoration  of  the  said  leased  territory  to  China, 
be  administered  as  heretofore,  for  the  time  being.  The  railways  and 
telegraph  lines  erected  by  Japan  for  military  purposes  are  to  be  re- 
moved forthwith.  The  Japanese  troops  now  stationed  outside  the 
original  leased  territory  of  Kiao-chou  are  now  to  be  withdrawn 
first,  those  within  the  original  leased  territory  are  to  be  withdrawn 
on  the  restoration  of  the  said  leased  territory  to  China. 

Art.  3.     (Changed  into  an  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  within  the  Province  of 
Shantung  and  along  its  coast  no  territory  or  island  will  be  ceded 
or  leased  to  any  Power  under  any  pretext. 

Art.  4.  The  Chinese  Government  consent  that  as  regards  the 
railway  to  be  built  by  China  herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow  to 
connect  with  the  Kiao-chou-Tsinanfu  Kailway,  if  Germany  is  willing 
to  abandon  the  privilege  of  financing  the  Chee-foo-Weihsien  line, 
China  will  approach  Japanese  capitalists  for  a  loan. 

Art.  5.  The  Chinese  Government  engage,  in  the  interest  of  trade 
and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  herself  as  soon 
as  possible  certain  suitable  places  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as 
Commercial  Ports. 

(Supplementary  exchange  of  notes.) 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to  be  chosen,  and  the 
regulations  are  to  be  drafted,  by  the  Chinese  Government,  but  the 
Japanese  Minister  must  be  consulted  before  making  a  decision. 

Art.  6.  If  the  Japanese  and  German  Governments  are  not  able 
to  come  to  a  definite  agreement  in  future  in  their  negotiations  re- 
specting transfer,  etc.,  this  provisional  agreement  contained  in  the 
foregoing  articles  shall  be  void. 

GROUP  II 

The  six  articks  which  are  found  in  Japan's  Revised  Demands  of 
April  26,  1015,  but  omitted  herein,  are  those  already  initialed  by  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Japanese  Minister. 

The    Chinese    Government   and    the   Japanese   Government,   with- 
a  view  to  developing  their  economic  relations  in  South  Manchuria, 
agree  to  the  following  articles: 

Art.  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  may,  by  ar- 
rangement with  the  owners,  lease  land  required  for  erecting  suit- 
able buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or  for  agricultural  enter- 
prises. 

Art.  3,    Japanese  subjects  shall  be   free  to  reside  and   travel 


400  APPENDICES 

in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  business  and  manufacture 
of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Art.  3a.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in  the  preceding  two 
articles,  besides  being  required  to  register  with  the  local  authorities 
passports,  which  they  must  procure  under  the  existing  regulations, 
shall  also  observe  police  rules  and  regulations  and  pay  taxes  in 
the  same  manner  as  Chinese.  Civil  and  criminal  cases  shall  be  tried 
and  adjudicated  by  the  authorities  of  the  defendant's  nationality  and 
an  officer  can  be  deputed  to  attend  the  proceedings.  But  all  eases 
purely  between  Japanese  subjects,  and  mixed  eases  between  Japanese 
and  Chinese,  relating  to  land  or  disputes  arising  from  lease  contracts, 
shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  Chinese  Authorities  and  the  Japa- 
nese Consul  may  also  depute  an  officer  to  attend  the  proceedings. 
When  the  judicial  system  in  the  said  Province  is  completely  reformed, 
all  the  civil  and  criminal  eases  concerning  Japanese  subjects  shall  be 
tried  entirely  by  Chinese  law  courts. 

RELATING   TO   EASTERN    INNER    MONGOLIA 

(To  be  exchanged  by  notes.) 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  China  will  not 
in  future  pledge  the  taxes,  other  than  customs  and  salt  revenue,  of 
that  part  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  under  the  jurisdiction  of  South 
Manchuria  and  Jehol  Intendency,  as  security  for  raising  loans. 

Art.  2.  The  Chinese  Government  declare  that  China  will  herself 
provide  funds  for  building  the  railways  in  that  part  of  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  under  the  jurisdiction  of  South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol 
Intendency;  if  foreign  capital  is  required,  China  will  negotiate  with 
Chinese  capitalists  first,  provided  this  does  not  conflict  with  agree- 
ments already  concluded  with  other  Powers. 

Art.  3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the  interest  of  trade 
and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China  herself  certain 
suitable  places  in  that  part  of  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  South  Manchuria  and  the  Jehol  Intendency,  as  Com- 
mercial Marts. 

The  regulations  for  the  said  Commercial  Marts  will  be  made  in 
accordance  with  those  of  other  Commercial  Marts  opened  by  China 
herself. 

GROUP  in 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Hanyehping  Company  being 
very  intimate,  if  the  said  Company  comes  to  an  agreement  with  the 
Japanese  capitalists  for  cooperation,  the  Chinese  Government  shall 
forthwith    give   their   consent   thereto.     The    Chinese    Government 


APPENDICES  401 

further  declare  that  China  will  not  convert  the  Company  into  a  state 
enterprise,  nor  confiscate  it  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign 
capital  other  than  Japanese. 

Letter  to  Be  Addressed  by  the  Japanese  Minister  to  the 
Chinese  Minister  op  Foreign  Affairs 

Excellency: 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  a  report  has  reached  me  that  the 
Chinese  Government  have  given  permission  to  foreign  nations  to 
construct  on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province  dock-yards,  coaling  sta- 
tions for  military  use,  naval  bases  and  other  establishments  for 
military  purposes  and  further  that  the  Chinese  Government  are  bor- 
rowing foreign  capital  for  putting  up  the  above-mentioned  construc- 
tion or  establishments.  I  shall  be  much  obliged  if  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment will  inform  me  whether  or  not  these  reports  are  well  founded 
in  fact. 

Reply  to  Be  Addressed  by  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  the  Japanese  Minister 

Excellency : 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  Excellency's 

Note  of .     In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  the  Chinese 

Government  have  not  given  permission  to  foreign  Powers  to  con- 
struct, on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province,  dock-yards,  coaling  stations 
for  military  use,  naval  bases  or  other  establishments  for  military 
purposes;  nor  do  they  contemplate  borrowing  foreign  capital  for 
putting  up  such  constructions  or  establishments. 


JAPAN'S  UTIMATUM 

Ultimatum  Delivered  by  Japanese  Minister  to  Minister  ov 
Foreign  Affairs  at  3  o'Clock  p.  m.  on  May  7th,  1915 

The  reason  why  the  Imperial  Government  opened  the  present  nego- 
tiations with  the  Chinese  Government  is  first  to  endeavor  to  dispose 
of  the  complications  arising  out  of  the  war  between  Japan  and  Ger- 
many, and  secondly  to  attempt  to  solve  various  questions  which  are 
detrimental  to  the  intimate  relations  of  China  and  Japan  with  a 
view  to  solidifying  the  foundation  of  cordial  friendship  subsisting 
between  the  two  countries  to  the  end  that  the  peace  of  the  far  East 
may  be  effectively  and  permanently  preserved.     With  this  object  in 


402  APPENDICES 

view,  definite  proposals  were  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  in 
January  of  this  year,  and  up  to  to-day  as  many  as  twenty-five  con- 
ferences were  held  with  the  Chinese  Government  in  perfect  sincerity 
and  frankness. 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiation  the  Imperial  Government  has  con- 
sistently explained  the  aims  and  objects  of  the  proposals  in  a  con- 
ciliatory spirit,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  proposals  of  the  Chinese 
Government,  whether  important  or  unimportant,  have  been  attended 
to  without  any  reserve. 

It  may  be  stated  with  confidence  that  no  effort  has  been  spared  to 
arrive  at  a  satisfactory  and  amicable  settlement  of  those  questions. 

The  discussion  of  the  entire  corpus  of  the  proposals  was  practically 
at  an  end  at  the  twenty-fourth  conference;  that  is,  on  17th  of  the  last 
month.  The  Imperial  Government,  taking  a  broad  view  of  the  nego- 
tiations and  in  consideration  of  the  points  raised  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, modified  the  original  proposals  with  considerable  conces- 
sions and  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  on  the  26th  of  the 
same  month  the  revised  proposals  for  agreement,  and  at  the  same 
time  it  was  offered  that,  on  the  acceptance  of  the  revised  proposals, 
the  Imperial  Government  would,  at  a  suitable  opportunity,  restore 
with  fair  and  proper  conditions,  to  the  Chinese  Government  the 
Kiao-chou  territory,  in  the  acquisition  of  which  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment had  made  a  great  sacrifice. 

On  the  1st  of  May,  the  Chinese  Government  delivered  the  reply 
to  the  revised  proposals  of  the  Japanese  Government,  which  is  con- 
trary to  the  expectations  of  the  Imperial  Government.  The  Chinese 
Government  not  only  did  not  give  a  careful  consideration  to  the 
revised  proposals,  but  even  with  regard  to  the  offer  of  the  Japanese 
Government,  to  restore  Kiao-chou  to  the  Chinese  Government,  the 
latter  did  not  manifest  the  least  appreciation  of  Japan's  good  will 
and  difficulties. 

From  the  commercial  and  military  points  of  view  Kiao-chou  is  an 
important  place,  in  the  acquisition  of  which  the  Japanese  Empire 
sacrificed  much  blood  and  money,  and,  after  the  acquisition,  the 
Empire  incurs  no  obligation  to  restore  it  to  China.  But  with  the 
object  of  increasing  the  future  friendly  relations  of  the  two  coun- 
tries, she  went  to  the  extent  of  proposing  its  restoration,  yet  to  her 
great  regret,  the  Chinese  Government  did  not  take  into  consideration 
the  good  intention  of  Japan  and  manifest  appreciation  of  her  diffi- 
culties. Furthermore,  the  Chinese  Government  not  only  ignored  the 
friendly  feelings  of  the  Imperial  Government  offering  the  restoration 
of  Kiao-chou  Bay,  but  also  in  replying  to  the  revised  proposals  they 
even  demanded  its  unconditional  restoration;  and  again  China  de- 


APPENDICES  403 

manded  that  Japan  should  bear  the  responsibility  of  paying  indem- 
nity for  all  the  unavoidable  losses  and  damages  resulting  from 
Japan's  military  operations  at  Kiao-chou;  and  still  further  in  con- 
nection with  the  territory  of  Kiao-chou  China  advanced  other  de- 
mands and  declared  that  she  has  the  right  of  participation  at  the 
future  peace  conference  to  be  held  between  Japan  and  Germany. 
Although  China  is  fully  aware  that  the  unconditional  restoration  of 
Kiao-chou  and  Japan's  responsibility  of  indemnification  for  the 
unavoidable  losses  and  damages  can  never  be  tolerated  by  Japan,  yet 
she  purposely  advanced  these  demands  and  declared  that  this  reply 
was  final  and  decisive. 

Since  Japan  could  not  tolerate  such  demands,  the  settlement  of  the 
other  question,  however  compromising  it  may  be,  would  not  be  to 
her  interest.  The  consequence  is  that  the  present  reply  of  the  Chi- 
nese Government  is,  on  the  whole,  vague  and  meaningless. 

Furthermore,  in  the  reply  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  the  other 
proposals  in  the  revised  list  of  the  Imperial  Government,  such  as 
South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  where  Japan  particu- 
larly has  geographical,  political,  commercial,  industrial  and  strategic 
relations,  as  recognized  by  all  the  nations,  and  made  more  remark- 
able in  consequence  of  the  two  wars  in  which  Japan  was  engaged, 
the  Chinese  Government  overlooks  these  facts  and  does  not  respect 
Japan's  position  in  that  place.  The  Chinese  Government  even  freely 
altered  those  articles  which  the  Imperial  Government,  in  a  compro- 
mising spirit,  have  formulated  in  accordance  with  the  statement  of 
the  Chinese  Representatives  thereby  making  the  statements  of  the 
Representatives  an  empty  talk ;  or  on  seeing  them  conceding  with  the 
one  hand  and  withholding  with  the  other,  it  is  very  difficult  to  at- 
tribute faithfulness  and  sincerity  to  the  Chinese  Authorities. 

As  regards  the  articles  relating  to  the  employment  of  advisers,  the 
establishment  of  schools  and  hospitals,  the  supply  of  arms  and  am- 
munition and  the  establishment  of  arsenals,  and  railway  concessions 
in  South  China  in  the  revised  proposals,  they  are  either  proposed 
with  the  proviso  that  the  consent  of  the  Power  concerned  must  first 
be  obtained,  or  they  are  merely  to  be  recorded  in  the  minutes  in 
accordance  with  the  statement  of  the  Chinese  delegates,  and  thus  they 
are  not  in  the  least  in  conflict  either  with  Chinese  sovereignty  or  her 
treaties  with  the  Foreign  Powers.  Yet  the  Chinese  Government  in 
their  reply  to  the  proposals,  alleging  that  these  proposals  are  incom- 
patible with  their  sovereign  rights  and  the  Treaties  with  the  Foreign 
Powers,  defeat  the  expectations  of  the  Imperial  Government.  In 
spite  of  such  attitude  of  the  Chinese  Government,  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, though  regretting  to  see  that  there  is  no  room  for  further 


404  APPENDICES 

negotiation,  yet  warmly  attached  to  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of 
the  far  East,  is  still  hoping  for  a  satisfactory  settlement  in  order  to 
avoid  the  disturbance  of  the  relations. 

So  in  spite  of  the  circumstances  which  admitted  no  patience,  they 
have  reconsidered  the  feelings  of  the  Government  of  their  neighbor- 
ing country  and  with  the  exception  of  the  article  relating  to  Fukien, 
which  is  to  be  the  subject  of  an  exchange  of  notes  as  has  already  been 
agreed  upon  by  the  Representatives  of  both  nations,  will  undertake 
to  detach  the  Group  V  from  the  present  negotiations  and  discuss  it 
separately  in  the  future.  Therefore  the  Chinese  Government  should 
appreciate  the  friendly  feelings  of  the  Imperial  Government  by  im- 
mediately accepting  without  any  alteration  all  the  articles  of  Groups 
I,  II,  III  and  IV  and  the  exchange  of  notes  in  connection  with 
Fukien  Province  in  Group  V  as  contained  in  the  revised  proposals 
presented  on  the  26th  of  April. 

The  Imperial  Government  hereby  again  offer  their  advice  and  hope 
that  the  Chinese  Government  upon  this  advice  will  give  a  satisfactory 
reply  by  6  o'clock  p.  m.  on  the  9th  day  of  May.  It  is  hereby  de- 
clared that  if  no  satisfactory  reply  is  received  before  or  at  the  desig- 
nated time,  the  Imperial  Government  will  take  steps  they  may  deem 
necessary. 

JAPAN'S  EXPLANATORY  NOTE 

Explanatory  Note  Accompanying  Memorandum  Delivered  to 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  by  the  Japanese  Minister 
the  Seventh  Day  of  May,  1915 

1.  With  the  exception  of  the  question  of  Fukien  to  be  arranged 
by  an  exchange  of  notes,  the  five  articles  postponed  for  later  nego- 
tiations refer  to  (a)  the  employment  of  advisers,  (b)  the  establish- 
ment of  schools  and  hospitals,  (c)  the  railway  concessions  in  South 
China,  (d)  the  supply  of  arms  and  ammunition  and  the  establishment 
of  arsenals,  (e)  the  propagation  of  Buddhism. 

2.  The  acceptance  by  the  Chinese  Government  of  the  article  relat- 
ing to  Fukien  may  be  either  in  the  form  as  proposed  by  the  Minister 
of  Japan  on  the  26th  of  April  or  in  that  contained  in  the  Reply  of 
the  Chinese  Government  of  May  1st.  Although  the  Ultimatum  calls 
for  the  immediate  acceptance  by  China  of  the  modified  proposals 
presented  on  April  26th,  without  alteration,  but  it  should  be  noted 
that  it  merely  states  the  principle  and  does  not  apply  to  this  article 
and  articles  4  and  5  of  this  note. 

3.  If  the  Chinese  Government  accept  all  the  articles  as  demanded 


APPENDICES  405 

in  the  Ultimatum  the  offer  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  restore 
Kiao-chou  to  China  made  on  the  26th  of  April,  -will  still  hold  good. 

4.  Article  2  of  Group  II  relating  to  the  lease  or  purchase  of  land, 
the  terms  "lease"  and  "purchase"  may  be  replaced  by  these  terms, 
"temporary  lease"  and  "perpetual  lease"  or  "lease  on  consultations," 
which  means  a  long-term  lease  with  its  unconditional  renewal. 

Article  4  of  Group  II  relating  to  the  approval  of  laws  and  ordi- 
nances and  local  taxes  by  the  Chinese  Consul  may  form  the  subject 
of  a  secret  agreement. 

5.  The  phrase  "to  consult  with  the  Japanese  Government"  in  con- 
nection with  questions  of  pledging  the  local  taxes  for  raising  loans 
and  the  loans  for  construction  of  railways,  in  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia, which  is  similar  to  the  agreement  in  Manchuria  relating  to  the 
matters  of  the  same  kind,  may  be  replaced  by  the  phrase  "to  consult 
with  the  Japanese  capitalists." 

The  article  relating  to  the  opening  of  trade  marts  in  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia  in  respect  to  location  and  regulations,  may,  following  the 
precedent  set  in  Shantung,  be  the  subject  of  an  exchange  of  notes. 

6.  From  the  phrase  "those  interested  in  the  Company"  in  Group 
III  of  the  revised  list  of  demands,  the  words  "those  interested  in" 
may  be  deleted. 

7.  The  Japanese  version  of  the  Formal  Agreement  and  its  annexes 
shall  be  the  official  text  or  both  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  shall  be 
official  texts. 

CHINA'S  RELY  TO  THE  ULTIMATUM 

The  Reply  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  the  Ultimatum  of 
the  Japanese  Government,  Delivered  to  the  Japanese  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  on  the  8th  of  May,  1915 

On  the  7th  of  this  month,  at  three  o'clock  p.  m.,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment received  an  Ultimatum  from  the  Japanese  Government  to- 
gether with  an  Explanatory  Note  of  seven  articles.  The  Ultimatum 
concluded  with  the  hope  that  the  Chinese  Government  up  to  6  o'clock 
p.  m.  on  the  0th  of  May,  will  give  a  satisfactory  reply,  and  it  is 
hereby  declared  that  if  no  satisfactory  reply  is  received  before  or  at 
the  designated  time,  the  Japanese  Government  will  take  steps  she 
may  deem  necessary. 

The  Chinese  Government  with  a  view  to  preserving  the  peace  of 
the  far  East,  hereby  accepts,  with  the  exception  of  those  five  articles 
of  Group  V  postponed  for  later  negotiation,  all  the  articles  of 
Groups  I,  II,  III  and  IV,  and  the  exchange  of  Notes  in  connection 
with  Fukien  Province  in  Group  V  as  contained  in  the  revised  pro- 


406  APPENDICES 

posals  presented  on  the  26th  of  April  and  in  accordance  with  the 
Explanatory  Note  of  seven  articles  accompanying  the  Ultimatum  of 
the  Japanese  Government  with  the  hope  that  thereby  all  outstanding 
questions  are  settled,  so  that  the  cordial  relationship  between  the 
two  couutries  may  be  further  consolidated.  The  Japanese  Minister 
is  hereby  requested  to  appoint  a  day  to  call  at  the  Ministry  of  For- 
eign Affairs  to  make  the  literary  improvement  of  the  test  and  sign 
the  Agreement  as  soon  as  possible. 

NEW  TREATIES  AND  NOTES 

BETWEEN 

CHINA  AND  JAPAN 
(Translated  from  the  Chinese) 

Treaty  Respecting  the  Province  of  Shantung 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China  and  His 
Majesty,  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  having  resolved  to  conclude  a  Treaty 
with  a  view  to  the  maintenance  of  general  peace  in  the  Extreme  East 
and  the  further  strengthening  of  the  relations  of  friendship  and  good 
neighborhood  now  existing  between  the  two  nations,  have  for  that 
purpose  named  as  their  Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say: 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China,  Lou 
Tseng-tsiang,  Chung-ching,  First  Class  Chia  Ho  Decoration,  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Affairs. 

And  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  Hioki  Eki,  Jushii,  Second 
Class  of  the  Imperial  Order  of  the  Sacred  Treasure,  Minister  Pleni- 
potentiary, and  Envoy  Extraordinary: 

Who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full  powers 
and  found  them  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  and 
concluded  the  following  Articles : — 

Article  1.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  give  full  assent  to 
all  matters  upon  which  the  Japanese  Government  may  hereafter 
agree  with  the  German  Government  relating  to  the  disposition  of  all 
rights,  interests  and  concessions  with  Germany,  by  virtue  of  treaties 
or  otherwise,  possesses  in  relation  to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

Art.  2.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  as  regards  the  rail- 
way to  be  built  by  China  herself  from  Chef oo  or  Lungkow  to  connect 
with  the  Kiao-chou-Tsinanfu  railway,  if  Germany  abandons  the 
privilege  of  financing  the  Chefoo-Weihsien  line,  China  will  approach 
Japanese  capitalists  to  negotiate  for  a  loan. 

Art.  3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  in  the  interest  of  trade 
and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China  herself  as  soon 


APPENDICES  407 

as  possible  certain  suitable  places  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  as 
Commercial  Ports. 

Art.  4.  The  present  treaty  shall  come  into  force  on  the  day  of  its 
signature. 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  His  Excellency  the  President 
of  the  Republic  of  China  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan, 
and  the  ratification  thereof  shall  be  exchanged  at  Tokio  as  soon  as 
possible. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  have  signed  and  sealed  the  present  Treaty,  two 
copies  in  the  Chinese  language  and  two  in  Japanese. 

Done  at  Peking  this  twenty-fifth  day  of  the  fifth  month  of  the 
fourth  year  of  the  Republic  of  China,  corresponding  to  the  same  day 
of  the  same  month  of  the  fourth  year  of  Taisho. 

Exchange  of  Notes  Respecting  Shantung 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

In  the  name  of  the  Chinese  Government  I  have  the  honor  to  make 
the  following  declaration  to  your  Government : — "Within  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung  or  along  its  coast  no  territory  or  island  will  b« 
leased  or  ceded  to  any  foreign  Power  under  any  pretext." 
I  avail,  etc., 

_*.    ^      „  (Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

His  Excellency, 

Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  made  the  following  declaration 
in  the  name  of  the  Chinese  Government: — "Within  the  Province  of 
Shantung  or  along  its  coast  no  territory  or  island  will  be  leased  or 
ceded  to  any  foreign  Power  under  any  pretext." 

In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  this  declaration. 
I  avail,  etc., 

His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Hl0KI  EkI' 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  Foreign  Affairs. 


408  APPENDICES 

Exchange  of  Notes  Respecting  the  Opening  of  Ports  in 
Shantung 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

1  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  places  which  ought  to  be  opened 
as  Commercial  Ports  by  China  herself,  as  provided  in  Article  3  of 
the  Treaty  respecting  the  Province  of  Shantung  signed  this  day,  will 
be  selected  and  the  regulations  therefor  will  be  drawn  up,  by  the 
Chinese  Government  itself,  a  decision  concerning  which  will  be  made 
after  consulting  the  Minister  of  Japan. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  stated  "that  the  places  which 
ought  to  be  opened  as  Commercial  Ports  by  China  herself,  as  pro- 
vided in  Article  3  of  the  Treaty  respecting  the  province  of  Shantung 
signed  this  day,  will  be  selected  and  the  regulations  therefor  will  be 
drawn  up,  by  the  Chinese  Government  itself,  a  decision  concerning 
which  will  be  made  after  consulting  the  Minister  of  Japan." 
In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Exchange  of  Notes  Respecting  the  Restoration  of  the  Leased 
Territory  of  Kiao-chou  Bay 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

In  the  name  of  my  Government  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the 
following  declaration  to  the  Chinese  Government : — 

"When,  after  the  termination  of  the  present  war,  the  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiao-chou  Bay  is  completely  left  to  the  free  disposal  of 


APPENDICES  409 

Japan,  the  Japanese  Government  will  restore  the  said  leased  territory 
to  China  under  the  following  conditions: — 

1.  The  whole  of  Kiao-chou  Bay  to  be  opened  as  a  Commercial 
Port. 

2.  A  concession  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Japan  to  be 
established  at  a  place  designated  by  the  Japanese  Government. 

3.  If  the  foreign  Powers  desire  it,  an  international  concession  may 
be  established. 

4.  As  regards  the  disposal  to  be  made  of  the  buildings  and  proper- 
ties of  Germany  and  the  conditions  and  procedure  relating  thereto, 
the  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government  shall  arrange 
the  matter  by  mutual  agreement  before  the  restoration. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Replt 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  j-ou  made  the  following  declaration 
in  the  name  of  your  Government: — 

"When,  after  the  termination  of  the  present  war,  the  leased  terri- 
tory of  Kiao-chou  Bay  is  completely  left  to  the  free  disposal  of 
Japan,  the  Japanese  Government  will  restore  the  said  leased  territory 
to  China  under  the  following  conditions: — 

"1.  The  whole  of  Kiao-chou  Bay  to  be  opened  as  a  Commercial 
Port. 

"2.  A  concession  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Japan  to  be 
established  at  a  place  designated  by  the  Japanese  Government. 

"3.  If  the  foreign  Powers  desire  it,  an  international  concession 
may  be  established. 

"4.  As  regards  the  disposal  to  be  made  of  the  buildings  and  prop- 
erties of  Germany  and  the  conditions  and  procedure  relating  thereto, 
the  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese  Government  shall  arrange 
the  matter  by  mutual  agreement  before  the  restoration." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  this  declaration. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 


410  APPENDICES 

Treaty  Respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China  and  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  having  resolved  to  conclude  a  Treaty 
with  a  view  to  developing  their  economic  relations  in  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  have  for  that  purpose  named  as 
their  Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say: 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China,  Lou 
Tseng-tsiang,  Chung-ching ,  First  Class  Chia-ho  Decoration,  and  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs;  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan, 
Hioki  Eki,  Jushii,  Second  Class  of  the  Imperial  Order  of  the  Sacred 
Treasure,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  and  Envoy  Extraordinary; 

Who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full  powers, 
and  found  them  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  and 
concluded  the  following  Articles : — 

Article  1.  The  Two  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  the 
term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  the  terms  of  the  South 
Manchuria  Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Railway,  shall  be  ex- 
tended to  99  years. 

Art.  2.  Japanese  subjects  in  South  Manchuria  may,  by  negotia- 
tion, lease  land  necessary  for  erecting  suitable  building's  for  trade 
and  manufacture  or  for  prosecuting  agricultural  enterprises. 

Art.  3.  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to  reside  and  travel  in 
South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in  business  and  manufacture  of  any 
kind  whatsoever. 

Art.  4.  In  the  event  of  Japanese  and  Chinese  desiring  jointly  to 
undertake  agricultural  enterprises  and  industries  incidental  thereto, 
the  Chinese  Government  may  give  its  permission. 

Art.  5.  The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to  in  the  preceding  three 
articles,  besides  being  required  to  register  with  the  local  Authorities 
passports  which  they  must  procure  under  the  existing  regulations, 
shall  also  submit  to  the  police  laws  and  ordinances  and  taxation  of 
China. 

Civil  and  criminal  cases  in  which  the  defendants  are  Japanese  shall 
be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  Japanese  Consul ;  those  in  which  the 
defendants  are  Chinese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  Chinese 
Authorities.  In  either  case  an  officer  may  be  deputed  to  the  court  to 
attend  the  proceedings.  But  mixed  civil  cases  between  Chinese  and 
Japanese  relating  to  land  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  delegates 
of  both  nations  conjointly  in  accordance  with  Chinese  law  and  local 
usage. 

When,  in  future,  the  judicial  system  in  the  said  region  is  com- 


APPENDICES  411 

pletely  reformed,  all  civil  and  criminal  cases  concerning  Japanese 
subjects  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  entirely  by  Chinese  law  courts. 

Art.  6.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the  interest  of  trade, 
and  for  the  residence  of  foreigners,  to  open  by  China  herself,  as 
soon  as  possible,  certain  suitable  places  in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
as  Commercial  Ports. 

Art.  7.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees  speedily  to  make  a 
fundamental  revision  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway  Loan-Agree- 
ment, taking  as  a  standard  the  provisions  in  railway  agreements 
made  heretofore  between  China  and  foreign  financiers. 

When  in  future,  more  advantageous  terms  than  those  in  existing 
railway  loan  agreements  are  granted  to  foreign  financiers  in  connec- 
tion with  railway  loans,  the  above  agreement  shall  again  be  revised 
in  accordance  with  Japan's  wishes. 

Art.  8.  All  existing  treaties  between  China  and  Japan  relating  to 
Manchuria  shall,  except  where  otherwise  provided  for  by  this  Treaty, 
remain  in  force. 

Art.  9.  The  present  Treaty  shall  come  into  force  on  the  date  of 
its  signature.  The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  His  Excellency 
the  President  of  the  Republic  of  China  and  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  Japan,  and  the  ratifications  thereof  shall  be  exchanged  at 
Tokio  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  two 
High  Contracting  Parties  have  signed  and  sealed  the  present  Treaty, 
two  copies  in  the  Chinese  language  and  two  in  Japanese. 

Done  at  Peking  this  twenty-fifth  day  of  the  fifth  month  of  the 
fourth  year  of  the  Republic  of  China,  corresponding  to  the  same  day 
of  the  same  month  of  the  fourth  year  of  Taisho. 

Exchange  op  Notes  Respecting  the  Terms  op  Lease  op  Port 
Arthur  and  Dalnt  and  the  Terms  op  South  Manchurian 

AND  AnTUNG-MuKDEN  RAILWAYS 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that,  respecting  the  provisions  contained 
in  Article  1  of  the  Treaty  relating  to  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia,  signed  this  day,  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur 
and  Dalny  shall  expire  in  the  86th  year  of  the  Republic  or  1997. 
The  date  for  restoring  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  to  China  shall 
fall  due  in  the  91st  year  of  the  Republic  or  2002.  Article  21  in  the 
Original  South  Manchurian  Railway  Agreement  providing  that  it 


412  APPENDICES 

may  be  redeemed  by  China  after  36  years  from  the  day  on  which  the 
traffic  is  opened  is  hereby  canceled.     The  term  of  the  Antung-Muk- 
den  Railway  shall  expire  in  the  96th  year  of  the  Republic  or  2007. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 
Japanese  Minister. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  stated  that  "respecting  the  pro- 
visions contained  in  Article  1  of  the  Treaty  relating  to  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  signed  this  day,  the  term  of  lease 
of  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  shall  expire  in  the  86th  year  of  the  Re- 
public or  1997.  The  date  for  restoring  the  South  Manchurian  Rail- 
way to  China  shall  fall  due  in  the  91st  year  of  the  Republic  or  2002. 
Article  12  in  the  original  South  Manchurian  Railway  Agreement  pro- 
viding that  it  may  be  redeemed  by  China  after  36  years  from  the  day 
on  which  the  traffic  is  opened,  is  hereby  canceled.  The  term  of  the 
Antung-Mukden  Railway  shall  expire  in  the  96th  year  of  the  Re- 
public or  2007." 

In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Exchange  of  Notes  Respecting  the  Opening  op  Ports  in  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  places  which  ought  to  be  opened 
as  Commercial  Ports  by  China  herself,  as  provided  in  Article  6  of  the 
Treaty  respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
signed  this  day,  will  be  selected,  and  the  regulations  therefor  will  be 


APPENDICES  413 

drawn  up,  by  the  Chinese  Government  itself,  a  decision  concerning 
which  will  be  made  after  consulting  the  Minister  of  Japan. 
1  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 
Japanese  Minister. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  stated  "that  the  places  which 
ought  to  be  opened  as  Commercial  Ports  by  China  herself,  as  provided 
in  Article  6  of  the  Treaty  respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day,  will  be  selected,  and  the  regulations 
therefor,  will  be  drawn  up,  by  the  Chinese  Government  itself,  a 
decision  concerning  which  will  be  made  after  consulting  the  Minister 
of  Japan." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

I  avail,  etc.,  (Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 

His  Excellency,  Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

South  Manchuria 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  Japanese  subjects  shall,  as  soon  as 
possible,  investigate  and  select  mines  in  the  mining  areas  in  South 
Manchuria  specified  hereinunder,  except  those  being  prospected  for 
or  worked,  and  the  Chinese  Government  will  then  permit  them  to 
prospect  or  work  the  same;  but  before  the  Mining  regulations  are 
definitely  settled,  the  practice  at  present  in  force  shall  be  followed. 
Fengtien. 

mineral 

Coal 
« 

« 
It 


LOCALITY 

DISTRICT 

Niu  Hsin  T'ai 

Pen-hsi 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou 

« 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Hai-lung 

T'ieh  Ch'ang 

Tung-hua 

Nuan  Ti  T'ang 

Chin 

414  APPENDICES 

An  Shan  Chan  region  From  Liaoyang  to  Pen-hsi  Iron 


Kirin  (Southern  portion) 

Coal  &  Iron 

Sha  Sung  Kang            Ho-lung 

Coal 

Kang  Yao                    Chi-lin  (Kirin) 

Gold 

Chia  P'i  Kou              Hua-tien 

I  avail,  etc., 

His  Excellency,  Hioki  Eki, 
Japanese  Minister. 


(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 


Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 

4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day  respectnig  the  opening  of  mines  in  South  Man- 
churia, stating:  "Japanese  subjects  shall,  as  soon  as  possible,  in- 
vestigate and  select  mines  in  the  mining  areas  in  South  Manchuria 
specified  hereunder  except  those  being  prospected  for  or  worked, 
and  the  Chinese  Government  will  then  permit  them  to  prospect  or 
work  the  same;  but  before  the  Mining  regulations  are  definitely  set- 
tled, the  practice  at  present  in  force  shall  be  followed." 
Fengtien. 


LOCALITY 

DISTRICT 

MINERAL 

Niu  Hsin  T'ai 

Pen-hsi 

Coal 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou 

u 

a 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Hai-lung 

it 

T'ieh  Ch'ang 

Tung-hua 

u 

Nuan  Ti  T'ang 

Chin 

u 

An  Shan  Chan  region 

From 
Liaoyang  to 

Pen-hsi 

Iron 

Kirin  (Southern  portion) 

Sha  Sung  Kang 

Ho-lung 

Coal  &  Iron 

Kang  Yao 

Chi-lin  (Kirin) 

Coal 

Chia  P'i  Kou 

Hua-tien 

Gold 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affars  of  the  Republic  of  China. 


APPENDICES  415 

Exchange  of  Notes  Respecting  Railways  and  Taxes  in  South 
Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

In  the  name  of  my  Government, 

I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  declaration  to  your  Gov- 
ernment : — 

China  will  hereafter  provide  funds  for  building  necessary  railways 
in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia;  if  foreign  capital 
is  required  China  may  negotiate  for  a  loan  with  Japanese  capitalists 
first:  and  further,  the  Chinese  Government,  when  making  a  loan  in 
future  on  the  security  of  the  taxes  in  the  above-mentioned  places  (ex- 
cluding the  salt  and  customs  revenue  which  have  already  been  pledged 
by  the  Chinese  Central  Government)  may  negotiate  for  it  with 
Japanese  capitalists  first. 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki  Eki, 
Japanese  Minister. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  respecting  railways  and  taxes  in  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  in  which  you  stated: 

"China  will  hereafter  provide  funds  for  building  necessary  rail- 
ways in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia ;  if  foreign 
capital  is  required  China  may  negotiate  for  a  loan  with  Japanese 
capitalists  first;  and  further,  the  Chinese  Government,  when  making 
a  loan  in  future  on  the  security  of  taxes  in  the  above  mentioned 
places  (excluding  the  salt  and  customs  revenue  which  have  already 
been  pledged  by  the  Chinese  Central  Government)  may  negotiate  for 
it  with  Japanese  Capitalists  first/' 

In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 
I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 


416  APPENDICES 

Exchange  op  Notes  Respecting  the  Employment  op  Advisers 
in  South  Manchuria 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

In  the  name  of  the  Chinese  Government  I  have  the  honor  to  make 
the  following  declaration  to  your  Government: — 

"Hereafter,  if  foreign  advisers  or  instructors  on  political,  finan- 
cial, military  or  police  matters  are  to  be  employed  in  South  Man- 
churia, Japanese  may  be  employed  first." 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki  Eki, 
Japanese  Minister. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  made  the  following  declaration 
in  the  name  of  your  Government : — 

"Hereafter  if  foreign  advisers  or  instructors  in  political,  military 
or  police  matters  are  to  be  employed  in  South  Manchuria,  Japanese 
may  be  employed  first." 

In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Exchange  op  Notes  Respecting  the  Explanation  op  "Lease  by 
Negotiation"  in  South  Manchuria 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 

4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  term  "lease  by  negotiation"  con- 
tained in  Article  2  of  the  Treaty  respecting  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day  shall  be  understood  to  imply 


APPENDICES  417 

a  long-term  lease  of  not  more  than  thirty  years  and  also  the  possi- 
bility of  its  unconditional  renewal. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou   Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  state : 

"The  term  'lease  by  negotiation'  contained  in  Article  2  of  the 
Treaty  respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 
signed  this  day  shall  be  understood  to  imply  a  long-term  lease  of  not 
more  than  thirty  years  and  also  the  possibility  of  its  unconditional 
renewal." 

In  reply  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsia.no. 
I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

Exchange  of  Notes  Respecting  the  Arrangement  for  Police 
Laws  and  Ordinances  and  Taxation  in  South  Manchuria 
and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  the  Chinese  Authorities  will  notify 
the  Japanese  Consul  of  the  police  laws  and  ordinances  and  the  taxa- 
tion to  which  Japanese  subjects  shall  submit  according  to  Article  5 
of  the  Treaty  respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mon- 
golia signed  this  day  so  as  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  him 
before  their  enforcement. 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 


418  APPENDICES 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year- of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  state: 

"The  Chinese  Authorities  will  notify  the  Japanese  Consul  of  the 
police  laws  and  ordinances  and  the  taxation  to  which  Japanese  sub- 
jects shall  submit  according  to  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  respecting 
South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day  so  as 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  him  before  their  enforcement." 
In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 
I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

The  Postponement  of  Articles  2,  3,  4  and  5  of  the  Treaty  Re- 
specting South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that,  inasmuch  as  preparations  have  to  be 
made  regarding  Articles  2,  3,  4  &  5  of  the  Treaty  respecting  South 
Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  signed  this  day,  the  Chinese 
Government  proposes  that  the  operation  of  the  said  Articles  be  post- 
poned for  a  period  of  three  months  beginning  from  the  date  of  the 
signing  of  the  said  Treaty. 

I  hope  your  Government  will  agree  to  this  proposal. 
I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hioki  Eki, 
Japanese  Minister. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 

4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  stated  that,  "inasmuch  as  prep- 
arations have  to  be  made  regarding  Articles  2,  3,  4  &  5  of  the  Treaty 


APPENDICES  419 

respecting  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  signed  this 
day,  the  Chinese  Government  proposes  that  the  operation  of  the  said 
Articles  be  postponed  for  a  period  of  three  months  beginning  from 
the  date  of  the  signing  of  the  said  Treaty." 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 
In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Exchange  of  Notes  Respecting  the  Matter  of  Hanyehping 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  if  in  future  the  Hanyehping  Com- 
pany and  the  Japanese  capitalists  agree  upon  cooperation,  the  Chinese 
Government,  in  view  of  the  intimate  relations  subsisting  between  the 
Japanese  capitalists  and  the  said  Company,  will  forthwith  give  its 
permission.  The  Chinese  Government  further  agrees  not  to  confis- 
cate the  said  Company,  nor  without  the  consent  of  the  Japanese 
capitalists  to  convert  it  into  a  state  enterprise,  nor  cause  it  to  bor- 
row and  use  foreign  capital  other  than  Japanese. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 
His  Excellency, 
Hoki  Eki, 

Japanese  Minister. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date  in  which  you  state: 

"If  in  future  the  Hanyehping  Company  and  the  Japanese  capital- 
ists agree  upon  cooperation,  the  Chinese  Government,  in  view  of  the 
intimate  relations  subsisting  between  the  Japanese  Capitalists  and 
the  said  Company,  will  forthwith  give  its  permission.  The  Chinese 
Government  further  agrees  not  to  confiscate  the  said  Company,  nor, 
without  the  consent  of  the  Japanese  capitalists  to  convert  it  into  a 


420  APPENDICES 

state  enterprise,  nor  cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital  other 
than  Japanese."  I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 
In  reply,  I  beg  to  state  that  I  have  taken  note  of  the  same. 
His  Excellency, 
Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Exchange  op  Notes  Respecting  the  Fukien  Question 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  Taisho. 
Excellency, 

A  report  has  reached  me  to  the  effect  that  the  Chinese  Government 
has  the  intention  of  permitting  foreign  nations  to  establish,  on  the 
coast  of  Fukien  Province,  dock-yards,  coaling  stations  for  military 
use,  naval  bases,  or  to  set  up  other  military  establishments ;  and  also 
of  borrowing  foreign  capital  for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  the  above- 
mentioned  establishments. 

I  have  the  honor  to  request  that  your  Excellency  will  be  good 
enough  to  give  me  a  reply  stating  whether  or  not  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment really  entertains  such  an  intention. 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  (Signed)  Hioki  Eki. 

Lou  Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Reply 

Peking,  the  25th  day  of  the  5th  month  of  the 
4th  year  of  the  Republic  of  China. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's 
note  of  this  day's  date,  which  I  have  noted. 

In  reply  I  beg  to  inform  you  that  the  Chinese  Government  hereby 
declares  that  it  has  given  no  permission  to  foreign  nations  to  con- 
struct, on  the  coast  of  Fukien  Province,  dock-yards,  coaling  stations 
for  military  use.  naval  bases,  or  to  set  up  other  military  establish- 
ments; nor  does  it  entertain  an  intention  of  borrowing  foreign  capital 
for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  the  above-mentioned  establishments. 

I  avail,  etc., 
His  Excellency,  'Signed)  Lou  Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki  Eki, 
Japanese  Minister. 


APPENDIX  C 

TEXT  OF  THE  MILITARY  AGREEMENT 
(Signed  March  19,  1918) 

Note  : — No  official  text  of  this  agreement  has  been  published.  The 
text  given  hereunder  is,  as  the  author  was  informed  by  a  Chinese 
official,  correct  except  for  the  omission  of  a  few  unimportant  para- 
graphs. 

1.  China  and  Japan,  realising  the  fact  that  the  gradual  ex- 
tension of  enemy  influence  towards  the  East  may  jeopardise  the 
peace  of  the  two  countries,  consider  it  their  mutual  duty  as  par- 
ticipants in  the  war,  to  take  concerted  action  against  the  common 
enemy. 

2.  As  regards  military  co-operation  each  country  shall  pay  due 
respect  to  the  prestige  and  interests  of  the  other  country,  and  both 
parties  shall  be  considered  to  be  on  an  equal  footing. 

3.  "When  the  time  comes  to  take  action  in  accordance  with  this 
Agreement  the  two  countries  shall  instruct  their  military  and  civil 
officials  and  people  to  adopt  a  friendly  attitude  towards  those  of  the 
other  country  in  the  military  areas.  The  Chinese  officials  shall  do 
their  best  to  aid  the  Japanese  troops  in  the  said  areas  so  that  no 
obstacles  shall  arise  to  impede  their  movements,  and  the  Japanese 
troops  shall  respect  the  sovereignty  of  China,  and  shall  not  be  al- 
lowed to  act  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  local  customs  and  cause 
inconvenience  to  the  people. 

4.  The  Japanese  troops  in  Chinese  territory  shall  be  withdrawn 
as  soon  as  military  operations  cease. 

5.  "Whenever  troops  have  to  be  despatched  outside  Chinese  ter- 
ritory, the  two  countries  shall  despatch  them  jointly  whenever 
necessary. 

6.  The  military  areas  and  other  matters  relating  to  the  military 
operations  shall  be  decided  by  the  military  authorities  of  the  two 
countries  whenever  necessary,  in  accordance  with  the  military 
strength  of  each  country. 

7.  In  order  to  facilitate  matters,  in  the  course  of  the  military 

421 


422  APPENDICES 

co-operation  the  military  authorities  of  two  countries  shall  observe 
the  arrangements: 

(a)  In  regard  to  the  making  of  all  arrangements  for  carry- 

ing on  military  operations,  both  countries  shall  appoint 
deputies  who  shall  arrange  all  matters  regarding  co-op- 
eration. 

(b)  In  order  to  secure  rapid   transportation  by  land   or  by 

water  and  rapid  communication,  both  sides  shall  co-oper- 
ate to  this  end. 

(c)  When  occasion  arises  the  two   Commanders-in-chief  shall 

arrange  all  necessary  military  constructions  such  as  mili- 
tary railway,  telegraph  and  telephone  lines.  These  shall 
all  be  removed  at  the  conclusion  of  the  military  operations. 

(d)  Regarding  the  necessary   military  supplies  and   materials 

required  for  taking  concerted  action  against  the  enemy 
the  two  countries  shall  supply  each  other  to  such  an  ex- 
tent as  not  to  affect  the  supplying  of  ordinary  demands. 

(e)  The  two  countries  shall  assist  each  other  in  carrying  out 

sanitary  measures  for  the  troops  in  the  military  areas. 

(f)  With  regard  to  the  question  of  military  experts  for  direct 

military  operations,  should  the  necessity  arise  for  mutual 
assistance,  if  one  country  requests  the  assistance  of  such 
experts  the  other  shall  supply  it. 

(g)  In  the  areas  in  which  military  operations  are  taking  place 

intelligence  agencies  may  be  established,  and  the  two 
countries  shall  exchange  important  military  maps  and 
military  reports.  The  intelligence  agencies  of  the  two 
countries  shall  exchange  information  and  render  mutual 
assistance. 

(h)  All  secret  passwords  shall  be  agreed  upon  mutually. 

The  questions  as  to  which  of  the  above  arrangements  shall  be 
considered  first,  and  which  shall  be  first  entered  upon 
shall  be  mutually  arranged  in  a  separate  agreement,  be- 
fore the  actual  commencement  of  hostilities. 

8.  When  military  transportation  necessities  the  use  of  the  Chi- 
nese Eastern  Railway,  the  provision  in  the  original  Treaty  regard- 
ing the  management  and  protection  of  the  said  railway  shall  be  re- 
spected. The  methods  of  transportation  shall  be  decided  upon  at 
the  time. 

9.  Regarding  the  enforcement  of  the  details  in  this  agreement,  it 
shall  be  decided  upon  by  delegates  appointed  by  the  military  au- 
thorities of  the  two  countries. 


APPENDICES  423 

10.  This  agreement  and  the  supplementary  articles  therein  shall 
not  be  published  by  the  two  Governments,  but  shall  be  considered 
as  military  secrets. 

11.  This  agreement  shall  be  signed  and  sealed  by  the  military 
delegates  of  the  two  countries  and  recognised  by  the  two  Govern- 
ments before  it  becomes  operative.  The  time  for  commencing  ac- 
tual military  operations  shall  be  decided  by  the  highest  military 
organs  of  the  two  countries.  This  Agreement  and  all  the  details 
arising  from  this  agreement  shall  become  null  and  void  as  soon 
as  the  military  operations  of  China  and  Japan  against  the  enemy 
countries  of  Germany  and  Austria  come  to  an  end. 

12.  Two  copies  of  this  Agreement  shall  be  written  in  the  Chinese 
language,  and  two  corresponding  copies  in  the  Japanese  Language, 
and  each  party  shall  keep  one  copy  of  the  Agreement  in  each 
language. 

(TEXT  OF  THE  NAVAL  AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  CHINA 
AND  JAPAN,  signed  19,  1918,  translated  from  the  Chinese) 

1.  (Same  as  Article  1  of  Military  Agreement.) 

2.  (Same  as  Article  2  of  Military  Agreement.) 

3.  When  the  time  comes  to  take  action  in  accordance  with  this 
Agreement  the  two  countries  shall  instruct  their  naval  officers  and 
all  officials  and  people  to  adopt  a  friendly  attitude  toward  those  of 
the  other  country  in  the  military  areas,  and  mutually  assist  each 
other  with  a  view  to  overcoming:  the  enemy. 

4.  A  separate  agreement  shall  be  drawn  up  regarding  the  field 
of  activity  and  the  duties  of  the  participants  when  the  time  comes 
for  taking  action  against  the  enemy. 

5.  When  the  time  comes  for  action  the  naval  authorities  of  China 
and  Japan  co-operate  with  a  view  to  taking  efficient  measures  as 
follows : — 

(a)  (Same  as  7(a)   of  the  Military  Agreement.) 

(b)  (Same  as  7   (b)   of  the  Military  Agreement.) 

(c)  In  all  matters  relating  to  ship-building  and   repaiis  and 

naval  equipment  and  supplies,  both  countries  shall  mu- 
tually assist  each  according  to  its  power.  This  also  ap- 
plies to  necessary  military  articles. 

(d)  (Same  as  Section  (f )  of  Article  7  of  Military  Agreement.) 

(e)  (Same  as  Section  (g)  of  Article  7  of  Military  Agreement. 

Substitute  "naval"  for  "military"  whenever  used.) 

(f )  (Same  as  Section  (h)  of  Article  7  of  Military  Agreement.) 


424  APPENDICES 

6.  (Same  as  Article  9  of  Military  Agreement,  except  that  "naval" 
should  be  substituted  for  "military"  whenever  used.) 

7.  (Same  as  Article  10,  with  "naval"  substituted  for  "military.") 

8.  (Same  as  Article  11,  with  "naval"  substituted  for  "military.") 

9.  (Same  as  Article  12.) 

7th  Year  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  5th  Month,  19th  day; 
7th  Year  of  the  Japanese  Ta  Cheng,  5th  Month,  19th  day. 
Signed  by: 

Chairman  of  Delegates  (Chung  Chiang)   Shen  Shen-k'un; 
Delegates:   (Shao  Chiang)  Wu  Chen-nan; 
Delegates:   (Shao  Chiang)   Ch'en-En-tae ; 

(Chung  Hsiao)  Wu  Kung-tsung; 
Chairman  of  Delegates: 

(Shao  Chiang)  Chi  T'ien  Tseng  Tz'u  Liang; 
Delegates  : 

(Tao  Tso)  I  Chi  Yuan  Chun; 

(Tao  Tso)  Hua  Shan  K'o  Yeh. 

EXPLANATORY  NOTES  REGARDING  THE  NAVAL 

AGREEMENT  FOR  MUTUAL  ACTION  AGAINST 

THE  ENEMY 

I 

(Signed  May  19,  1918) 

The  navies  of  the  two  countries  of  China  and  Japan,  looking  to- 
ward the  accomplishment  of  their  mutual  efforts  in  the  War,  in 
order  mutually  to  carry  out  their  purpose  as  outlined  in  Article  1, 
are  agreed  to  render  each  other  mutual  assistance  in  the  hope  that 
these  military  efforts  may  be  fully  accomplished. 

II 

Article  5  of  the  Agreement  is  explained  as  follows: 
The  term  "deputies"  used  in  Clause  (a)  of  Article  5  of  the  Naval 
Agreement  is  defined  as  naval  attaches  of  each  Legation,  and  naval 
officers   stationed   in  other   places,   and   others  to   be  mutually   ap- 
pointed in  case  of  necessity. 

In  Clause  (c)  of  Article  5  the  term  "necessary  supplies"  shall 
be  defined  as  "metallic  articles."  "Necessary  military  articles" 
shall  be  defined  as  "combustibles,  provisions,  ammunition  such  as 
are  required  in  military  operations."  They  shall  be  supplied  by 
each  country  according  to  its  power. 


APPENDICES  425 

With  reference  to  Clause  (e)  of  Article  5  charts  are  to  be  sup- 
plied upon  the  request  of  either  country. 

In  a  place  within  which  military  operations  are  taking  place, 
should  it  be  found  necessary  by  both  sides  to  make  surveys  and 
soundings  of  any  bays,  such  surveys  and  soundings  shall  be  done  by 
the  naval  authorities  of  the  country  in  which  the  bays  are  situated. 

(Signatures  same  as  on  Naval  Agreement.) 


APPENDIX  D 

MEMORIAL  OF  THE  "BLACK  DRAGON"  (JAPANESE) 
SOCIETY  CONCERNING  JAPAN'S  POLICY  IN  CHIfcA 

The  Chinese  Question  and  the  Defensive  Alliance 

It  is  a  very  important  matter  of  policy  whether  the  Japanese 
Government,  in  obedience  to  its  divine  mission  shall  solve  the  Chi- 
nese question  in  a  heroic  manner  by  making  China  voluntarily  rely 
upon  Japan  or  by  forcing  her  to  a  position  where  she  is  obliged 
to  rely  upon  Japan.  To  force  China  to  such  a  position  there  is 
nothing  else  for  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  to  do  but  to 
take  advantage  of  the  present  opportunity  to  seize  the  reins  of 
political  and  financial  power  and  to  enter  by  all  means  into  a  de- 
fensive alliance  with  her  under  secret  terms  as  enumerated  below: 

The  Secret  Terms  of  the  Defensive  Alliance 

The  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  with  due  respect  for  the 
sovereignty  and  integrity  of  China,  and  with  the  object  and  hope  of 
maintaining  the  peace  of  the  far  East,  undertakes  to  share  the  re- 
sponsibility of  cooperating  with  China  to  guard  her  against  internal 
trouble  and  foreign  invasion,  and  China  shall  accord  to  Japan 
special  facilities  in  the  matter  of  China's  national  defense,  or  the 
protection  of  Japan's  special  rights  and  privileges,  and  for  these 
objects  the  following  treaty  of  alliance  is  entered  into  between  the 
two  contracting  parties : 

1.  When  there  is  internal  trouble  in  China  or  when  she  is  at  war 
with  another  nation  or  nations,  Japan  shall  send  her  army  to  rentier 
assistance,  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  guarding  Chinese  terri- 
tory, and  to  maintain  peace  and  order  in  China. 

2.  China  agrees  to  recognize  Japan's  privileged  position  in  South 
Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia,  and  to  cede  the  sovereign  rights  of 
these  regions  to  Japan  to  enable  her  to  carry  out  a  scheme  of  local 
defense  on  a  permanent  basis. 

3.  After  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Kiaochou,  Japan  shall  acquire 
all  the  rights  and  privileges  hitherto  enjoyed  by  the  Germans  in 
regard  to  railways,  mines,  and  all  other  interests,  and  after  peace 
and  order  is  restored  in  Tsingtao,  the  place  shall  be  handed  back  to 
China  to  be  opened  as  an  international  treaty  port. 

426 


APPENDICES  427 

4.  For  the  maritime  defense  of  China  and  Japan,  China  shall 
lease  strategic  harbors  along  the  coast  of  the  Fukien  Province  to 
Japan  to  be  converted  into  naval  bases,  and  grant  to  Japan  in  the 
said  province  all  railway  and  mining  rights. 

5.  For  the  reorganization  of  the  Chinese  army,  China  shall  en- 
trust the  training  and  drilling  of  the  army  to  Japan. 

6.  For  the  unification  of  China's  firearms  and  munitions  of  war, 
China  shall  adopt  firearms  of  Japanese  pattern,  and  at  the  same  time 
establish  arsenals  (with  the  help  of  Japan)  in  different  strategic 
points. 

7.  With  the  object  of  creating  and  maintaining  a  Chinese  Navy, 
China  shall  entrust  the  training  of  her  navy  to  Japan. 

8.  With  the  object  of  reorganizing  her  finances  and  improving 
the  methods  of  taxation,  China  shall  entrust  the  work  to  Japan,  and 
the  latter  shall  elect  competent  financial  experts  who  shall  act  as  first 
class  advisors  to  the  Chinese  Government. 

9.  China  shall  engage  Japanese  educational  experts  as  educational 
advisors,  and  extensively  establish  schools  in  different  parts  of  the 
country  to  teach  Japanese,  so  as  to  raise  the  educational  standard 
of  the  country. 

10.  China  shall  first  consult  with  and  obtain  the  consent  of  Japan 
before  she  can  enter  into  an  agreement  with  another  power  for  mak- 
ing loans,  the  leasing  of  territory,  or  the  cession  of  the  same. 

From  the  date  of  the  signing  of  this  defensive  alliance,  Japan  and 
China  shall  work  together  hand-in-hand.  Japan  will  assume  the 
responsibility  of  safeguarding  Chinese  territory  and  maintaining 
the  peace  and  order  in  China.  This  will  relieve  China  of  all  future 
anxieties  and  enable  her  to  proceed  energetically  with  her  reforms, 
and,  with  a  sense  of  territorial  security,  she  may  wait  for  her  na- 
tional development  and  regeneration.  Even  after  the  present 
European  War  is  over  and  peace  is  restored  China  will  absolutely 
have  nothing  to  fear  in  the  future  of  having  pressure  brought 
against  her  by  the  foreign  powers.  It  is  only  thus  that  permanent 
peace  can  be  secured  in  the  far  East. 

But  before  concluding  this  defensive  alliance,  two  points  must  first 
be  ascertained  and  settled.  (1)  Its  bearincr  on  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. (2)  Its  bearing  on  those  Powers  having  intimate  relations 
with  and  great  interests  in  China. 

In  considering  its  effect  on  the  Chinese  Government,  Japan  must 
try  to  foresee  whether  the  position  of  China's  present  ruler  Yuan 
SJiih  K'ai,  shall  be  permanent  or  not;  whether  the  present  Govern- 
ment's policy  will  enjoy  the  confidence  of  a  large  section  of  the 
Chinese  people;  whether  Yuan  Shih  K'ai  will  readily  agree  to  the 


428  APPENDICES 

Japanese  Government's  proposal  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  alliance 
with  us.  These  are  points  to  which  we  are  bound  to  give  a  thorough 
consideration.  Judging  by  the  attitude  hitherto  adopted  by  Yuan 
Shih  K'ai,  we  know  he  has  always  resorted  to  the  policy  of  ex- 
pediency in  his  diplomatic  dealings,  and  although  he  may  outwardly 
show  a  friendliness  toward  us,  he  will  in  fact  rely  upon  the  in- 
fluence of  the  different  Powers  as  the  easiest  check  against  us,  and 
refuse  to  accede  to  our  demands.  Take  for  a  single  instance,  his 
conduct  toward  us  since  the  Imperial  Government  declared  war 
against  Germany,  and  his  action  will  then  be  clear  to  all.  Whether 
we  can  rely  upon  the  ordinary  friendly  methods  of  diplomacy  to 
gain  our  object  or  not,  it  does  not  require  much  wisdom  to  decide. 
After  the  gigantic  struggle  in  Europe  is  over,  leaving  aside  Amer- 
ica which  will  not  press  for  advantages,  China  will  not  be  able  to 
obtain  any  loans  from  the  other  Powers.  With  a  depleted  treasury, 
without  means  to  pay  the  officials  and  the  army,  with  local  bandits 
inciting  the  poverty-stricken  populace  to  trouble,  with  the  revolu- 
tionists waiting  for  opportunities  to  rise,  should  an  insurrection 
actually  occur  while  no  outside  assistance  can  be  rendered  to  quell 
it,  we  are  certain  it  will  be  impossible  for  Yuan  Shih  K'ai,  single- 
handed,  to  restore  order  and  consolidate  the  country.  The  result 
will  be  that  the  nation  will  be  cut  up  into  many  parts  beyond  all 
hope  of  remedy.  That  this  state  of  affairs  will  come  is  not  difficult 
to  foresee.  When  this  occurs,  shall  we  uphold  Yuan's  Government 
and  assist  him  to  suppress  the  internal  insurrection  with  the  cer- 
tain assurance  that  we  could  influence  him  to  agree  to  our  demands, 
or  shall  we  help  the  revolutionists  to  achieve  a  success  and  realize 
our  object  through  themf  This  question  must  be  definitely  decided 
upon  this  very  moment,  so  that  we  may  put  it  into  practical  ex- 
ecution. If  we  do  not  look  into  the  future  fate  of  China,  but  go 
blindly  to  uphold  Yuan's  Government,  to  enter  into  a  defensive  al- 
liance with  China,  hoping  thus  to  secure  a  complete  realization  of 
our  object  by  assisting  him  to  suppress  the  revolutionists,  it  is  ob- 
viously a  wrong  policy.  Why?  Because  the  majority  of  the  Chi- 
nese people  have  lost  all  faith  in  the  tottering  Yuan  Shih  K'ai,  who 
is  discredited  and  attacked  by  the  whole  nation  for  having  sold  his 
country.  If  Japan  gives  Yuan  the  support,  his  Government, 
though  in  a  very  precarious  state,  may  possibly  avoid  destruction. 
Yuan  Shih  K'ai  belongs  to  that  school  of  politicians  who  are  fond 
of  employing  craftiness  and  cunning.  He  may  be  friendly  to  us 
for  a  time,  but  he  will  certainly  abandon  us  and  again  befriend  the 
other  Powers  when  the  European  War  is  at  an  end.  Judging  by 
his  past,  we  have  no  doubt  as  to  what  he  will  do  in  the  future.    For 


APPENDICES  429 

Japan  to  ignore  the  general  sentiment  of  the  Chinese  people  and 
support  Yuan  Shih  K'ai  with  the  hope  that  we  can  settle  with  him 
the  Chinese  question,  is  a  blunder  indeed.  Therefore,  in  order  to 
secure  the  permanent  peace  of  the  far  East,  instead  of  supporting 
a  Chinese  Government  which  can  neither  be  long  continued  in  power 
nor  assist  in  the  attainment  of  our  object,  we  should  rather  sup- 
port the  400,000,000  Chinese  people  to  renovate  their  corrupt  Gov- 
ernment, to  change  its  present  form,  to  maintain  peace  and  order 
in  the  land,  and  to  usher  into  China  a  new  era  of  prosperity,  so  that 
China  and  Japan  may  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name  be  brought  into 
the  most  intimate  and  vital  relations  with  each  other.  China's  era 
of  prosperity  is  based  on  a  Chino- Japanese  alliance,  and  this 
alliance  is  the  fundamental  power  for  the  repelling  of  the  foreign 
aggression  that  is  to  be  directed  against  the  far  East  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  European  War.  This  alliance  is  also  the  foundation 
stone  of  the  peace  of  the  world.  Japan  therefore  should  take  this 
as  the  last  warning  and  immediately  solve  this  question.  Since 
the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  has  considered  it  imperative 
to  support  the  Chinese  people,  we  should  induce  the  Chinese  revolu- 
tionists, the  Imperialists,  and  other  Chinese  malcontents  to  create 
trouble  all  over  China.  The  whole  country  will  be  thrown  into  dis- 
order and  Yuan's  Government  will  consequently  be  overthrown. 
We  shall  then  select  a  man  from  amongst  the  most  influential  and 
most  noted  of  the  400,000,000  of  Chinese  and  help  him  to  organize 
a  new  form  of  government  and  to  consolidate  the  whole  country. 
In  the  meantime  our  army  must  assist  in  the  restoration  of  peace  and 
order  in  the  country,  and  in  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  proper- 
ties of  the  people,  so  that  they  may  gladly  tender  their  allegiance 
to  the  new  Government  which  will  then  naturally  confide  in  and  rely 
upon  Japan.  It  is  after  the  accomplishment  of  only  these  things 
that  we  shall  without  difficulty  gain  our  object  by  the  conclusion  of 
a  defensive  alliance  with  China. 

For  us  to  incite  the  Chinese  revolutionists  and  malcontents  to  rise 
in  China,  we  consider  the  present  to  be  the  most  opportune  moment. 
The  reason  why  these  men  cannot  now  carry  on  an  active  campaign 
is  because  they  are  insufficiently  provided  with  funds.  If  the  Im- 
perial Government  can  take  advantage  of  this  fact  to  make  them  a 
loan  and  instruct  them  to  rise  simultaneously,  great  commotion  and 
disorder  will  surely  prevail  ail  over  China.  We  can  then  intervene 
and  easily  adjust  matters. 

.The  progress  of  the  European  War  warns  Japan  with  greater 
urgency  of  the  imperative  necessity  of  solving  this  most  vital  of 
questions.     The  Imperial  Government  cannot  be  considered  as  em- 


430  APPENDICES 

barking  on  a  rash  project.  This  opportunity  will  not  repeat  itself 
for  our  benefit.  We  must  avail  ourselves  of  this  chance  and  under 
no  circumstances  to  hesitate.  Why  should  we  wait  for  the  spon- 
taneous uprising  of  the  revolutionists  and  malcontents?  Why 
should  we  not  think  out  and  lay  down  a  plan  beforehand?  When 
we  examine  into  the  form  of  government  in  China,  we  must  ask 
whether  the  existing  Republic  is  well  suited  to  the  national  tempera- 
ment and  well  adapted  to  the  thoughts  and  aspirations  of  the  Chinese 
people.  From  the  time  the  Republic  of  China  was  established  up 
to  the  present  moment,  if  what  it  has  passed  through  is  to  be  com- 
pared to  what  it  ought  to  be  in  the  matter  of  administration  and 
unification,  we  find  disappointment  everywhere.  Even  the  revolu- 
tionists themselves,  the  very  ones  who  first  advocated  the  republican 
form  of  government,  acknowledge  that  they  have  made  a  mistake. 
The  retention  of  the  republican  form  of  government  in  China  will 
be  a  great  future  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  Chino-J apanese  alliance. 
And  why  must  it  be  so?  Because,  in  a  republic  the  fundamental 
principles  of  government  as  well  as  the  social  and  moral  aims  of 
the  people  are  distinctly  different  from  that  of  a  constitutional 
monarchy.  Their  laws  and  administration  also  conflict.  If  Japan 
acts  as  a  guide  to  China  and  China  models  herself  after  Japan,  it 
will  only  then  be  possible  for  the  two  nations  to  solve  by  mutual 
effort  the  far  East  question  without  differences  and  disagreements. 
Therefore  to  start  from  the  foundation  for  the  purpose  of  recon- 
structing the  Chinese  Government,  of  establishing  a  Chino-Japanese 
alliance,  of  maintaining  the  permanent  peace  of  the  far  East,  and 
of  realizing  the  consummation  of  Japan's  Imperial  policy,  ice  must 
take  advantage  of  the  present  opportunity  to  alter  China's  repub- 
lican form  of  government  into  a  constitutional  monarchy  which 
shall  necessarily  be  identical,  in  all  its  details,  to  the  constitutional 
monarchy  of  Japan,  and  to  no  other.  This  is  really  the  key  and 
first  principle  to  be  firmly  held  for  the  actual  reconstruction  of  the 
form  of  government  in  China.  If  China  changes  her  republican 
form  of  government  to  that  of  a  constitutional  mnnarrhii,  shall  ice, 
in  the  selection  of  a  new  ruler,  restore  the  Emperor  Hsuan  T'ung 
to  his  throne,  or  choose  the  most  capable  man  from  the  monarchists, 
or  select  the  most  worthy  member  from  among  the  revolutionists? 
"We  think,  however,  that  it  is  advisable  at  present  to  leave  this 
question  to  the  exigency  of  the  future  when  the  matter  is  brought 
up  for  decision.  But  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  to  act- 
ually put  into  execution  this  policy  of  a  Chino-Japanese  alliance 
and  the  transformation  of  the  Republic  of  China  into  a  constitu- 


APPENDICES  431 

tional  monarchy  is,  in  reality,  the  fundamental  principle  to  be 
adopted  for  the  reconstruction  of  China. 

We  shall  now  consider  the  bearing  of  this  defensive  alliance  on 
the  other  Powers.  Needless  to  say,  Japan  and  China  will  in  no  way 
impair  the  rights  and  interests  already  acquired  by  the  Powers. 
At  this  moment  it  is  of  paramount  importance  for  Japan  to  come 
to  a  special  understanding  with  Russia  to  define  our  respective 
spheres  of  influence  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  so  that  the  two 
countries  may  cooperate  with  each  other  in  the  future.  This  means 
that  Japan,  after  the  acquisition  of  sovereign  rights  in  South  Man- 
churia and  Inner  Mongolia,  will  work  together  with  Russia  after 
her  acquisition  of  sovereign  rights  in  North  Manchuria  and  Outer 
Mongolia,  to  maintain  the  status  quo,  and  endeavor  by  every  effort 
to  protect  the.  peace  of  the  far  East.  Russia,  since  the  outbreak  of 
the  European  "War,  has  not  only  laid  aside  all  ill  feelings  against 
Japan,  but  has  adopted  the  same  attitude  as  her  allies  and  shown 
warm  friendship  for  us.  No  matter  how  we  regard  the  Manchurian 
and  Mongolian  questions  in  the  future,  she  is  anxious  that  we  find 
some  way  of  settlement.  Therefore  we  need  not  doubt  but  that 
Russia,  in  her  attitude  toward  this  Chinese  question,  will  be  able 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  us  for  mutual  cooperation. 

The  British  sphere  of  influence  and  interest  in  China  is  centered 
in  Tibet  and  the  Yangtze  Valley.  Therefore  if  Japan  can  come 
to  some  satisfactory  arrangement  with  China  in  regard  to  Tibet 
and  also  give  certain  privileges  to  Great  Britain  in  the  Yangtze 
Valley,  with  an  assurance  to  protect  those  privileges,  no  matter 
how  powerful  Great  Britain  might  be,  she  will  surely  not  oppose 
Japan's  policy  in  regard  to  this  Chinese  question.  While  this  pres- 
ent European  War  is  goine  on.  Great  Britain  has  even  asked  Japan 
to  render  her  assistance.  That  her  strength  will  certainly  not  enable 
her  to  oppose  us  in  the  future  need  not  be  doubted  in  the  least. 

Since  Great  Britain  and  Rnssia  will  not  oppose  Japan's  policy 
toward  China,  it  can  readily  be  seen  what  attitude  France  will  adopt 
in  regard  to  the  subject.  What  Japan  must  now  reckon  with  is 
America.  But  America  in  her  attitude  toward  us  regarding  our 
policy  toward  China  has  already  declared  the  principle  of  maintain- 
ing China's  territorial  integrity  and  equal  opportunity,  and  will  be 
satisfied  if  we  do  not  impair  America's  already  acquired  rights  and 
privileges.  We  think  America  will  also  have  no  cause  for  com- 
plaint. Nevertheless,  America  has  in  the  East  a  naval  force  which 
can  be  fairly  relied  upon,  though  not  sufficiently  strong  to  be  feared. 
Therefore  in  Japan's  attitude  toward  America  there  is  nothing  really 
for  us  to  be  afraid  of, 


APPENDIX  E 

EXTRACTS  FROM  "A  MEMORIAL  FOR  THE  ADVANCE- 
MENT OF  GERMAN  INTERESTS  IN  CHINA  ISSUED  BY 
THE  GERMAN  ASSOCIATION  OF  SHANGHAI." 

Table  of  Contents. 

I.  The  Chinese  Market. 

1 — China's  charge  of  front. 

2 — Possibilities  in  China's  economic  development. 
3 — The  importance  of  the  Chinese  Market. 
4— The  fight  for  the  Chinese  Market. 

(a)  Natural  advantages  of  our  opponents. 

(b)  Achievements  of  our  opponents. 

(c)  Aid  of  the  Schools. 

(d)  Gradual  loss  of  German  influence. 

(e)  Our  mistakes. 

(f)  Our  prospects. 

II.  Measures,  to  win  the  Chinese  Market. 

1 — Diplomatic  and  Consular  service. 

2 — Finance. 

3 — The  German  Language. 

4 — A  German  Chinese  School  System. 

(a)  Middle  schools. 

(aa)  Middle  schools  in  open  ports. 

(bb)  Mission  middle  schools. 

(cc)  Point  of  contact  with  Chinese  elementary  schools. 

(dd)  Development  (of  certain  schools  to  the  grade  of  the 
"Arbiturium"  e.  g.  graduation  from  German  Gym- 
nasium). 

(ee)  Number  of  scholars. 

(ff)   Classes  for  teachers. 

(gg)   Schools  for  girls. 

(b)  Technical  schools. 

432 


APPENDICES  433 

5 — Students  to  Germany. 

6 — Chinese  Government  schools. 

(a)  The  German  language  in  Chinese  government  schools. 

(b)  German  teachers  in  Chinese  Government  schools. 
7 — General  remarks. 

8 — A  translation  Bureau. 
9 — Museums  and  Industrial  expositions. 
10— The  Chinese  Press. 

III.  Organization  and  Cost. 

1 — Organization. 

(a)  A  head  office  in  Berlin. 

(b)  A  central  Committee  in  China. 

(c)  Promotes. 

(d)  Private  nature    (of  the  enterprise). 

(e)  Centralization  in  Leadership.    Decentralization  in  the 
work. 

2— Costs. 

(a)  Amount. 

(b)  Method  of  securing. 

IV.  Closing  remarks. 

1 — The  German  Merchant  in  China  and  his  trade. 
2 — The  last  opportunity. 

Appendix 

1 — Germany's  export  and  import  trade  with  China  1900-1911. 

2 — Development  of  German  trade  with  China  1900-1911. 

3 — China's  imports  from  Germany,  England,  America  and  Japan 
1905-1911  with  percentage  of  each. 

4 — German  exports  to  China  1908-1910  grouped  by  classes  of 
articles. 

5 — Possibilities  for  developing  German  trade. 

6 — Export  trade  of  Hankow. 

7 — Antecedents  of  the  higher  Chinese  officials  of  the  Central  Gov- 
ernment and  of  the  Provinces. 

8 — Cost  of  the  technical  schools. 

9 — Cost  of  the  Museums  and  Industrial  expositions. 
10 — Irritating  article  regarding  Germany  from  the  "Eastern  En- 
gineering News." 

Of  special  interest  and  importance  to  us  as  missionaries  are  the 


434  APPENDICES 

paragraphs  dealing  with  education.     (At  times  I  shall  translate,  at 
other  times  summarize.) 

After  speaking  of  the  national  advantages  of  Germany's  Chief 
Competitors  (England,  the  United  States  and  they  say  that  in  a 
very  special  degree  England,  the  United  States  and  even  Japan, 
have  during  the  past  ten  years  been  carrying  on  •'School  and  Cul- 
ture politics."  They  have  spent  countless  millions  (of  marks)  in 
these  endeavors.  Bands  of  Missionaries  and  of  teachers  have  in- 
vaded the  Country.  China  is  flooded  with  English  and  American 
school  books.  Educational  specialists  from  America  travel  sys- 
tematically through  China  and  acquaint  the  Chinese  with  the  won- 
ders of  Modern  science  as  seen  through  American  eyes.  The  Chi- 
nese Press  is  to  a  large  degree  under  the  influence  of  our  opponents. 
The  English  language  is  to  become  obligatory  in  Chinese  govern- 
ment schools  above  the  lower  elementary  grade.  Most  striking  is  the 
comparison  of  the  German  with  the  British  and  American  schools 
in  China.     The  figures  mentioned  are: 

For  Protestant  Missions: 

Lower  Schools  Middle  and  High  Schools. 

Schools             Scholars  Schools  Scholars 

English                1445                  32303  241  7552 

American             1992                  44354  286  23040 

German                  164                    4862  15  523 

As  if  this  were  not  enough,  England,  and  America  have  gathered 
ten  Million  Marks  more  for  Universities  in  Shantung,  Hankow  and 
Hongkong. 

For  Catholic  Missions. 

Lower  Middle  and  High 

Schools  Scholars  Schools  Scholars 

6877  1263-5  157  6545 

A  further  advantage  of  America  is  that  500  Chinese  students 
must  yearly  be  sent  to  American  Universities  on  the  Boxer  indemn- 
ity fund.  England  and  America  can  advance  their  political  ends 
by  Culture  and  Schools,  on  this  liberal  scale  because  they  have  ap- 
parently boundless  wealth  to  draw  upon,  and  because  the  idealism 
of  their  Missionaries  and  teachers  is  founded  not  less  on  patriotism 
than  on  religion. 

The  paper  goes  on  to  say  that  during  the  last  ten  years  there 
has  been  a  noticeable  loss  in  German  influence;  that  ten  years  ago 


APPENDICES  435 

there  was  still  a  chance  to  extend  the  German  language  alongside 
of  English;  but  that  Germany  had  done  nothing  to  stop  the 
triumphal  march  of  the  English  language.  There  is,  however,  still 
a  chance  of  stopping  it. 

Under  "Our  prospects"  it  is  said  the  English  language  has  not 
yet  spread  so  far  that  Germany  cannot  hope  to  catch  up  with  it. 
Our  diplomacy  ought  to  be  able  to  assure  the  German  language  of 
that  place  in  the  Chinese  Government  schools  that  is  its  due,  and 
to  increase  again  German  influence  with  the  Chinese  Government. 
By  a  better  quality  of  schools  Germany  can  make  up  for  the  quan- 
tity of  English-American  schools.  The  thoroughness  of  German 
methods  of  work  is  known  to  the  Chinese,  and  is  witnessed  to  by 
the  flocking  of  students  to  the  college  in  Tsingtau  and  to  the 
medical  and  technical  schools  in  Shanghai,  that  are  this  year  (1913) 
three  or  four  times  as  large  as  last  year.  Moreover,  China  will 
learn  to  understand  more  and  more,  that  besides  the  United  States 
Germany  is  the  only  one  of  the  great  powers  that  does  not  follow 
a  political  policy  that  looks  to  the  annexation  of  Chinese  territory. 

Measures  to  Gain  Control  of  the  Chinese  Market. 

After  speaking  of  the  need  of  reorganization  of  the  diplomatic 
and  consular  service,  and  a  more  liberal  financial  policy  on  the  part 
of  Germany  the  paper  turns  to  the  question  of  the  German  language. 
Under  this  heading  it  is  said : 

"The  important  matter  in  attaining  our  goal  of  capturing  the 
Chinese  Market  for  German  Industry,  lies  in  the  question  whether 
or  not  we  are  determined  to  take  up  the  fight  against  the  dominance 
of  the  English  language.  One  may  think  what  one  will  about  the 
general  truth  of  the  saying  that  'trade  follows  language;'  but  the 
truth  of  the  statement  regarding  China  has  already  been  sufficiently 
proved.  Germany  can,  therefore,  not  delay  in  spreading  the  Ger- 
man language  and  German  culture  in  influential  Chinese  circles. 
Only  so  can  the  caricature  of  Germany,  which  thanks  to  the  lack 
of  scrupulousness  of  our  competitors,  has  become  firmly  fixed  in 
the  minds  of  the  Chinese,  be  destroyed  and  place  be  made  for  the 
view  that  inany  needs  to  stand  behind  no  one  in  the  world,  but, 
is  called  to  play  a  leading  part  in  the  life  of  the  world. 

"The  situation  is  not  yet  one  in  which  our  endeavors  need  to  be 
looked  on  as  without  a  prospect  of  success.  It  is  true  that  the 
English  language  has  a  decided  advantage,  but  the  dominance  of 
the  English  is,  in  comparison  with  the  greatness  of  the  Chinese  na- 
tion only  in  the  elementary  schools,  and  can  still  be  overcome  by 


436  APPENDICES 

timely  opposition  measures.  The  prospects  favorable  to  the  spread 
of  the  German  language  lie  chiefly  that  Germany  is  recognized  by 
all  as  the  language  of  science,  and  therefore  seems  to  be  destined 
rather  than  other  languages  to  furnish  China  with  the  means  for 
completing  her  internal  organization.  It  is  true  that  there  is  no 
immediate  prospects  of  our  securing  a  number  of  teachers  and 
scholars,  equal  to  those  of  England  and  America,  for  organizations 
of  this  kind  are  not  procurable  on  demand ;  but  up  to  a  certain  de- 
gree we  are  in  a  position,  by  an  education  of  better  quality  to 
equalize  the  advantage  gained  by  the  larger  quantity  of  the  schools 
of  our  opponents.  The  strength  of  English  and  American  schools 
has  thus  far  consisted  more  in  the  number  than  in  the  quality  of 
the  culture  given.  Moreover,  these  schools  have  wasted  much  val- 
uable energy  by  drawing  without  distinction  from  all  classes  of 
society.  We  would  confine  ourselves  to  those  circles  which  are 
destined  to  play  a  leading  part,  namely  to  the  upper  strata  of  the 
intellectual  and  commercial  classes,  and  to  take  into  our  field  of 
endeavor  only  those  provinces,  on  which  depend  the  future  economic 
development  of  the  country,  and  which  produce  the  strongest  men 
both  in  intelligence  and  character.  In  this  we  can  overcome,  at 
least  in  part,  the  quantitative  advantages  of  our  opponents.  From 
this  point  of  view  the  following  ten  provinces  would  be  those  prob- 
ably to  be  dealt  with:  Chili,  Shantung,  Shansi,  Hunan,  Hupeh, 
Szechuen  Kiangsu,  Chekiang,  Yunnan  and  Kwangtung. 

We  should  formally  as  far  as  it  accords  with  our  aim  fall  in  line 
with  the  general  plan,  curricula,  and  regulations  of  the  Chinese 
government  schools,  so  as  to  smooth  the  way  for  recognition  by 
the  Chinese  Government. 

There  follows  an  outline  of  a  German  School  System  for  China 
and  the  cost  of  maintaining  the  same. 

Expenses 
Initial        Annual 

1.  Nine  Middle  Schools  in  Treaty  Ports.... $   380,000    $   162,000 
(Shankhai,  Hankow,  Tientsin,  Tsinanfu, 

Canton,  Nanking,   Chungking,  Changsha, 
Peking) 

2.  Thirty-five  Mission  Middle  Schools 1,050,000         420,000 

(in  case  the  Missions  will  fall  in  with  the 

general  plan) 

3.  Subsidy  to  ninety  Elementary  schools  in 

cities  (that  would  teach  German) 20,250 

4.  Subsidy  to  350  Elementarv  schools  in  the 

country    •. 35,000 


APPENDICES  437 

Expenses 
Initial        Annual 

5.  Extra  expenses  to  develop  to  college  grade 
("Arbiturium")     three     of     the     Middle 

schools    $     30,000 

6.  Extra  expenses  for  normal  education  of 

teachers  (in  three  centers)    30,000 

7.  Schools  for  girls 25,000 

8.  Five  technical  school    $  900,000          270,000 

9.  Maintaining  300  students  in  Germany  and 

10  traveling  to  and  fro  each  year 235,000 

10.  Teachers  in  Chinese  Schools  150,000 

11.  Translation  Bureau  40,000           70,000 

12.  Eight    Museums    and    Industrial    exposi- 
tions     144,000           80,000 

13.  Traveling  Lecture  Ships   40,000 

14.  Press    150,000 

15.  Organization,     Head     Office,     Office     in 

China,  Promoters    50,000 


$2,514,000    $1,769,250 

Proposed  Means  for  Securing  the  Money 

The  difficulty  of  raising  this  money  is  not  minimized,  but  it  is 
thought  to  contain  no  unsurmountable  difficulties. 

Two  plans  are  proposed. 

Either  the  formation  of  an  "Auslands  Kultur  Verein"  which 
should  seek  to  secure  small  subscriptions  from  a  very  large  number 
of  members  throughout  German,  or  failing  the  successful  launch- 
ing of  such  an  organization  the  reliance  on  Government  action.  It 
is  suggested  that  a  portion  of  the  annual  payment  of  ten  million 
marks  to  Germany  from  the  Boxer  Indemnity  could  be  devoted  to 
this  end. 

The  reason  for  desiring  to  work  through  the  Missions  in  estab- 
lishing Middle  and  Elementary  schools  is  that  this  course  is  neces- 
sitated by  the  fact  that  only  missionaries  can  reside  and  carry  on 
work  in  the  interior  away  from  the  treaty  ports.  The  paper  says: 
"Only  in  their  outward  form  should  they  be  really  Mission  Schools, 
in  their  inner  organizations  they  could  be  something  between  a 
mission  school  and  another  kind  of  school."  Professional  teachers 
will  be  necessary  and  they  will  divide  the  work  in  a  suitable  way 
with  the  missionaries.    Moreover,  these  schools  would  have  to  stand 


438  APPENDICES 

in  a  special  relation  to  the  Mission,  as  they  would  be  under  a  spe- 
cial organization  with  its  school  inspector,  and  also  because  the  re- 
ligious element  would  be  of  secondary  importance  to  the  national. 
If  participation  in  the  religious  instruction  is  made  obligatory  it  is 
to  be  feared  that  just  those  classes  of  society,  upon  which  we  lay 
special  emphasis,  will  not  send  their  children  to  these  schools. 
From  the  purely  religious  point  of  view  the  standpoint  here  put 
forward  may  seem  somewhat  questionable,  but  from  our  point  of 
view  it  does  not  make  so  much  difference,  to  gain  new  adherents  to 
the  Christian  Church,  but,  much  more  to  develop  strong  moral  per- 
sonalities. 

We  recognize  that  in  asking  the  missions  to  take  this  concep- 
tion of  their  work  we  are  requiring  them  to  make  a  sacrifice,  but  on 
the  other  hand,  the  American  and  British  Missionaries  go  con- 
siderably farther  than  this  in  placing  national  before  religious 
ends,  going  at  times  so  far  that  the  Commercial  point  of  view 
stands  in  the  foreground;  and  on  the  other  hand  our  German  mis- 
sionaries recognize  their  duties  to  propagate  German  national 
ideas.  Moreover,  the  Missionaries,  without  doing  violence  to  their 
calling,  could  take  part  in  the  system  of  schools  herein  proposed, 
inasmuch  as  an  objective  education  which  emphasizes  above  all  a 
thorough  moral  instruction,  prepares  the  way  for  Christian  teach- 
ing. 

Thus  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  admit  many  non-Christians  to  their  mem- 
bership. Fortunately  also  the  Catholic  Mission  in  Shantung  and 
several  of  the  Protestant  Missions  do  not  make  the  participation 
of  their  scholars  in  religious  instruction  a  sine  qua  non  of  admis- 
sion to  their  schools.  "We  should  give  up  our  existing  prejudices 
against  the  Missions.  It  has  been  a  serious  mistake  that  we  have 
thus  far  co-operated  so  little  with  them.  On  no  account  can  we 
dispense  with  the  Capital  of  idealism  developed  in  Missionary 
circles." 

Speaking  of  the  German  language  in  Government  schools  it  is 
said  that  one  must  start  from  the  premise  that  foreign  schools  in 
China,  as  in  Japan,  are  only  temporary  in  their  nature  and  will 
before  long  be  forced  out  by  the  Chinese  Government  or  be  taken 
over  by  it.  If  the  German  Schools  are  developed  into  Model  in- 
stitutions, as  is  planned,  could  count  on  their  being  taken  over  in 
a  reasonable  time  by  the  Chinese.  "But  we  shall  be  able  to  reap  the 
fruit  of  our  Endeavors  only  if  we  take  care  NOW  that  the  Ger- 
man language  is  accorded  the  same  place  in  Government  schools 
as  the  English  language.  Otherwise,  as  soon  as  our  direct  con- 
trol of  the  institutions  founded  by  us,  ceases,  we  shall  have  to  see 


APPENDICES  439 

England  and  America  reap  where  we  have  sowed.  The  question 
of  how  we  can  at  the  present  time  assure  to  the  German  language 
that  place  in  Chinese  government  schools,  which  belongs  to  it,  ap- 
pears to  us  to  be  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  of  at  least  equal 
significance  with  the  development  of  our  whole  German  Chinese 
school  system.  Our  diplomacy  should,  therefore,  leave  no  means 
untried,  to  put  through  our  endeavors  in  this  domain.  It  is  very 
evident,  what  all  of  this  means  for  us.  With  one  blow  would  be 
secured  to  the  German  language  a  determining  influence,  if  we 
could  in  this  way  gain  a  foothold  in  China's  widely  branching 
school  system  set  about  this  is  really  a  political  question,  that 
cannot  be  judged  from  here,  but  it  can  be  seen  with  certainty,  that 
we  could  meet  the  Chinese  in  many  other  fields,  if  we  could  only 
gain  success  here. 

In  this  matter  too  much  is  at  stake  for  us  to  be  satisfied  with 
Compromises.  Whoever  thinks  that  anything  of  value  has  really 
been  gained  with  the  recently  promulgated  school  regulations,  in  ac- 
cordance with  which  German  is  to  be  made  the  leading  language 
in  the  Medical  Schools  and  of  equal  importance  with  English  in 
the  technical  schools  and  in  Agriculture  and  Forestry,  shows  that 
he  is  not  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the  situation.  Such  conces- 
sions are  easy  to  make  on  paper,  but  are  of  no  real  significance 
in  practice.  So  long  as  English  is  made  the  only  obligatory 
language  in  the  middle  schools,  the  scholars  will  study  German  only 
in  exceptional  cases.  Of  what  value  is  it  then  to  us,  that  in  the 
universities  or  technical  schools  German  is  taught  in  certain 
branches,  when  there  is  a  lack  of  scholars,  adequately  prepared  in 
this  language.  The  heart  of  the  question  lies  in  the  fight  for  the 
Middle  schools.  What  must  be  gained  is  that  the  German  Lan- 
guage be  given  an  equal  place  with  English  as  obligatory  in  mid- 
dle and  technical  schools,  in  colleges  and  normal  schools.  We 
think  we  can  ignore  the  Elementary  schools  in  which  the  students 
remain  only  until  the  11th.  year. 

Under  the  head  of  the  Chinese  Press,  after  speaking  of  the 
Anti-German  tone  of  other  papers,  and  commending  for  its  good 
work  the  "Hsieh  Ho  Pao"  a  German  paper  published  in  Chinese, 
the  pamphlet  advocates  that  a  telegraphic  service  be  established 
to  some  twenty  places  in  the  interior  of  China  and  counteract 
the  influence  of  Renter's  service. 

Under  the  "concluding  remarks"  it  is  said:  "Once  more,  and 
probably  for  the  last  time  is  the  opportunity  afforded  us  to  take 
a  hand  in  the  course  of  events.  If  advantage  is  not  taken  now, 
England,  America  and  Japan  will  obtain  such  a  lead  that  we  may 


440  APPENDICES 

as  well  give  up  the  competition.  To  call  attention  to  the  serious- 
ness of  the  situation,  and  to  the  heavy  dangers,  which  the  situation 
offers  for  Germany  is  the  object  of  this  pamphlet.  To  work  with 
small  and  insufficient  means  is  valueless  and  means  only  waste  of 
time,  strength  and  money.  It  is  very  plain  that  we  have  the  choice 
of  only  two  alternatives,  either  to  look  at  the  Chinese  market  as  a 
lost  position,  where  Germany,  like  to  a  state  of  second  rank,  can 
carry  on  a  limited  trade  through  the  medium  of  the  English  lan- 
guage, or  else  we  must  put  forth  our  strength  to  the  utmost,  main- 
tain a  "School  and  propaganda  politic"  on  a  large  scale,  and  so 
safeguard  for  ourselves  a  part  in  China's  economic  development  in 
keeping  with  our  importance  and  the  demands  of  our  own  future." 
German  Association: 

C.  MlCHELAU  RUD.   MAHNFELD 

Chairman  Secretary. 

Shanghia,  April,  191^. 


APPENDIX  F 

COLLECTION  OF  LAWS  AND  REGULATIONS  OF  THE 

RUSSIAN  GOVERNMENT  PUBLISHED  BY  THE 

RULING  SENATE 

9  January  1915  No.  10  First  Part 

Index: 

69  Regarding  the   Agreement  of  the  treatment  of  the  British 

Subjects  dealing  in  the  Zone  of  the  Chinese-Eastern  Rail- 
way, as  per  Municipal  Orders  and  Obligations. 

His  Majesty's  Rescript  for  the  Ruling  Senate  by  the 
ministry  of  Justice. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  has  informed  the  Minister  of 
Justice,  that  regarding  His  Majesty's  Rescript  of  the  12th  Nov- 
ember 1914,  our  minister  in  Peking  has  an  exchange  of  Notes  20 
November/9  December  with  the  minister  of  Great  Britain,  regard- 
ing the  Agreement  worked  out  at  Harbin  for  the  treatment  of 
British  Subjects  dealing  in  the  Zone  of  the  Chinese-Eastern  Rail- 
way as  per  Municipal  Orders  and  Obligations. 

According  to  it  the  Minister  of  Justice  has  offered  to  the  Ruling 
Senate  for  the  publication  of  the  copies  of  the  Notes  with  the 
Text  of  the  Harbin  Agreement  (Our  Note  in  Russian  and  French 
languages  and  the  Note  of  Great  Britain  in  English  and  Russian). 

The  Note  of  the  minister  of  Great  Britain  at  Peking  to  the  Rus- 
sian minister  in  the  same  town,  dated  20  November/9  December 
1914. 

Sir  and  dear  Colleague, 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  the  British 
Majesty's  Government  have  had  under  consideration  the  draft 
Agreement  recently  negotiated  and  signed  in  English  and  Russian 
languages  on  the  17/30  April  1914  by  the  British  Consul  at  Har- 
bin and  the  local  Russian  Authorities  respecting  the  inclusion  of 
British    Subjects   and   their   property   within   the   scheme   of   the 

441 


442  APPENDICES 

Municipal  Administration  and  Taxation  established  in  the  Zone  of 
the  Chinese-Eastern  Railway. 

I  have  now  received  instructions  from  Sir  E.  Grey  stating  that 
His  Majesty's  the  Great  Britain  Government  approved  this  Agree- 
ment. I  therefore  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  as  soon 
as  I  learn  that  the  Imperial  Russian  Government  on  their  part 
have  approved  this  Agreement  I  will  undertake  the  necessary  steps 
to  enforce  its  regulations  upon  the  British  subjects  concerned  iu 
same,  beginning  from  the  1st  January  next. 

(This  Agreement  was  made  applicable  to  British  subjects  by 
"King's  Regulations"  (No.  20  of  1914)  published  by  the  British 
Minister  at  Peking,  December  5th  1914.) 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Your  Excellency 
the  assurance  of  my  highest  consideration. 

(signed)    J.  N.   Jordax. 

The  Note  of  the  Russian  minister  at  Peking  to  the  minister  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  same  town,  dated  20  November/9  Decem- 
ber 1914. 

Sir  Ambassador  and  dear  Colleague, 

I  have  the  honour  to  inform  Your  Excellency  of  the  receipt  in 
due  course  of  your  Note  of  even  date  in  which  you  have  informed 
me,  that  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  has  approved  the  pro- 
ject of  Agreement,  which  recently  was  worked  out  in  Russian  and 
English  languages  and  signed  at  Harbin  17/30  April  a.  c.  by  the 
local  Authorities  and  British  Consul  in  said  town,  respecting  the 
inclusion  of  British  Subjects  and  their  property  within  the  scheme 
of  the  Municipal  Administration  and  Taxation  established  in  the 
Zone  of  the  Chinese-Eastern  Railway.  At  the  same  time  you  have 
informed  me  that  your  Government  will  undertake  the  necessary 
measures  in  view  to  facilitate  the  enforcement  of  the  regulations 
of  the  present  Agreement  upon  the  British  Subjects  interested  in 
same,  beginning  from  January  1st  next,  as  soon  as  you  will  re- 
ceive from  me  the  information  that  the  Imperial  Russian  Govern- 
ment has  confirmed  said  Act. 

Taking  into  consideration  this  information,  I  have  the  honour 
to  inform  you,  that  I  am  entitled  by  the  Imperial  Russian  Gov- 
ernment to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  the  same  has  likewise 
confirmed  the  said  project  of  Agreement. 

Please  accept,  Sir  Ambassador  and  dear  Colleague,  my  best  con- 
sideration and  respect. 

(signed)     B.  Kroupensky. 


APPENDICES  443 


AGREEMENT 

Between   the   Russian    and   British   Governments   respecting   i. 
inclusion  of  British  subjects  within   the  scheme  of  Municipal  Ad- 
ministration and  Taxation  established  in  the  area  of  the  Chinese- 
Eastern  Railway. 

Article  1. 

The  Imperial  Russian  Government  having  declared  that  all 
taxes  and  dues  collected  in  the  Railway  Settlement  at  Harbin  and 
in  other  Settlements  situated  in  the  area  of  the  Chinese-Eastern 
Railway  shall  be  exclusively  devoted  to  municipal  and  public  pur- 
poses for  the  common  benefit  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  places, 
His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  agrees  to  the  payment,  by 
British  Subjects  residing  in  the  Railway  Settlement  at  Harbin 
and  in  other  Settlements  situated  in  the  area  of  the  Chinese  East- 
em  Railway  of  the  same  dues  and  taxes,  whether  levied  in  money 
or  in  kind,  which  are  paid  by  Russian  Subjects.  His  Britannic 
Majesty's  Government  further  agrees  that  the  payment  of  the  said 
dues  and  taxes  and  the  observance  of  the  local  Regulations  and 
Byelaws,  of  which  a  list  is  hereunto  annexed,  shall  be  made  ob- 
ligatory upon  the  aforesaid  British  Subjects  from  1  January  1915, 
and,  in  like  manner,  undertakes  to  make  binding  upon  British  Sub- 
jects from  the  day  upon  which  they  take  effect  for  Russian  Sub- 
jects any  additional  or  amended  Regulations  and  Byelaws  of  a 
similar  kind,  provided  that  due  notice  of  their  intended  introduc- 
tion is  given  and  that  nothing  is  contained  therein  which  conflicts 
with  the  extra  territorial  rights  of  British  Subjects.  It  is  agreed 
that  the  length  of  such  notice  shall  in  the  case  of  new  or  amended 
Regulations  be  two  months  and  in  that  of  new  or  amended  Bye- 
laws two  weeks. 

Article  11 

In  consideration  of  the  foregoing,  British  Subjects  residing  in 
the  Railway  Settlement  at  Harbin  and  in  other  Settlements  sit- 
uated in  the  area  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  shall  have  the 
active  and  passive  right  of  election  to  the  local  Municipal  Ad- 
ministrations, both  those  now  existing  and  those  hereafter  es- 
tablished, and  shall  exercise  this  right,  like  Russian  Subjects,  in 
accordance  with  the  stipulations  of  the  local  Municipal  Regula- 
tions.    At  Harbin,  also,  there  shall  be  introduced  into  the  Muni- 


444  APPENDICES 

cipal  Council  consisting,  in  all,  of  six  members,  the  term  of  whose 
office  is  three  years,  a  representative  of  the  foreign  (non-Russian) 
community  who  shall  be  a  foreign  (non-Russian)  resident  of 
good  standing,  the  manner  of  whose  election  shall  be  as  follows: 
The  resident  representatives,  having  full  Consular  jurisdiction,  of 
those  Foreign  Power's  exclusive  of  Russia  who  have  obliged  their 
nationals  to  pay  taxes  and  observe  the  local  Regulations  and  Bye- 
laws  in  accordance  with  the  stipulations  to  this  Agreement  shall — 
in  consultation  amongst  themselves,  the  opinion  of  the  majority 
to  prevail — prepare  and  present  in  good  time  to  the  Manager  of 
the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  for  transmission  to  the  Municipal 
Council  a  list  containing  the  names  of  not  less  than  three  and  not 
more  than  five  persons  from  amongst  whom  the  Assembly  of  Dele- 
gates shall  elect  by  an  ordinary  majority  vote — lots  to  be  cast  in 
case  of  even  ballot — the  representative  in  the  Municipal  Council 
of  the  foreign  (non-Russian)  community.  The  election  of  this 
Councillor  shall  be  simultaneous  with  that  of  other  members  of 
the  Council  and  the  term  of  his  office  shall  be  concurrent  with 
theirs.  Should  he  resign  or  be  dismissed  before  the  expiration  of 
this  period,  the  Assembly  of  Delegates  shall  at  the  ordinary  meet- 
ing occurring  next  after  the  preparation  by  the  aforesaid  Consular 
representatives  of  a  new  list,  elect  in  the  manner  before  stated, 
another  member  to  serve  for  the  remainder  of  the  current  term. 
The  dismissal  before  his  period  of  service  has  expired  of  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Council  elected  in  the  method  above  described  shall  not 
be  effected  except  with  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  the  Consular 
representatives  aforesaid. 

The  member  of  the  foreign  community  for  the  present  trienial 
period  shall  be  elected  in  the  manner  before  stated  at  a  supple- 
mentary election  which  shall  be  held  not  later  than  two  weeks 
after  the  presentation  to  the  Manager  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Rail- 
way by  the  Consular  representatives  of  the  prescribed  list  of 
names. 

Article  III 

British  Subjects  residing  in  the  Railway  Settlement  at  Harbin 
and  in  other  Settlements  situated  in  the  area  of  the  Chinese  East- 
ern Railway  shall — as  regards  all  matters  of  an  economic  char- 
acter, more  especially  such  as  relate  to  trade  and  industry  and 
leases  of  land  lots — enjoy  the  same  rights  and  privileges  as  Rus- 
sian Subjects.  This  equality  shall  also  avail  should,  in  the  future, 
the  present  restricted  rights  to  land  be  at  any  time  enlarged  or 
should  lessees  of  land  lots  or  owners  of  houses  be  the  recipients, 


APPENDICES  445 

on  the  lapse  or  termination  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  Com- 
pany's holding,  of  compensation  of  whatever  kind. 

Article  IV 

It  is  agreed  that,  should  objections  be  raised  by  British  Sub- 
jects regarding  the  amount  of  the  assessment  tax  on  commercial 
and  industrial  enterprises  exploited  by  them,  their  affidavits  made 
before  the  British  Consular  Representative  as  to  the  size  and  char- 
acter of  the  said  enterprises  shall  be  accepted  in  definite  proof. 

It  is  agreed,  also,  that  permission  shall  not  be  given  to  British 
Subjects  to  open,  establish  or  maintain  hotels,  boarding  or  eating 
houses,  houses  of  entertainment  or  shops  for  the  sale  of  liquors 
except  on  production  of  a  permit  issued  for  the  purpose  by  the 
British  Consulate. 

Article  V 

It  is  agreed  that  the  Police  Authorities  in  Harbin  and  in  other 
Settlements  situated  in  the  area  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway 
shall  give  prompt  effect  to  any  requests  preferred  by  the  British 
Consular  Representative  for  the  adoption  of  coercive  measures 
against  British  Subjects,  but  Officers  of  the  force  shall  not,  on 
their  own  initiative  and  in  the  absence  of  such  requests,  take  any 
coercive  action  against  British  Subjects  except  in  cases  involving 
a  breach  of  the  peace. 

Article  VI 

British  Subjects  shall  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  any  more 
favoured  treatment  which  may  be  accorded  by  the  Imperial  Rus- 
sian Government  to  the  Subjects  or  Citizens  of  other  Foreign 
Powers  resident  in  the  Railway  Settlement  at  Harbin  or  in  other 
Settlements  situated  in  the  area  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway. 

Article  VII 

The  Imperial  Russian  Government  undertakes  that  the  Regula- 
tions and  Byelaws,  of  which  a  list  is  hereunto  annexed,  shall  be 
brought  into  accord  with  the  stipulations  of  this  Agreement  by  the 
date  mentioned  in  Article  I. 

We,  the  undersigned,  hereby  certify  that  the  foregoing  is  the 
Draft  Agreement  concluded  between  us  regarding  the  inclusion  of 
British   Subjects  within  the   Scheme  of  Municipal  Administration 


446  APPENDICES 

and  Taxation  established  in  the  Area  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Rail- 
way. 

Harbin,  April  17/30  1914. 
(Signed): 

W.  Trautschold,  Imperial  Russian  Consul  General. 

E.  Daniel,  Delegate  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  Adminis- 
tration. 

H.  E.  Sly,  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Consul. 


OUR  NATION 
IN  THE  BUILDING 

By  Helen  Nicolay 

Author  of "  The  Book  of  American  Wars, "  etc* 

Of  the  period  of  national  shaking  together  and  development  the 
author  writes  almost  as  if  she  were  an  eye-witness.  Leaving  cheerfully 
behind  the  old,  dry,  statistical  method  of  writing  history,  Miss  Nicolay 
tells  about  what  happened,  who  did  it,  and  what  the  rest  thought  of  it — as 
informally  as  if  she  were  gossiping  over  the  teacups.  The  reader  looks 
on  at  great  movements  and  at  great  blunders,  gets  a  feeling  of  tremendous 
ideals  side  by  side  with  comical  absurdities,  catches  glimpses  of  the  new 
Capital — Washington  in  the  making;  sees  society  under  the  Adamses  and 
other  early  Presidents,  with  its  rivalries  and  jealousies;  the  beginnings  of 
invention,  the  approach  of  the  Civil  War,  etc 

Miss  Nicolay,  as  the  daughter^  of  Lincoln's  famous  secretary  and 
biographer,  has  mingled  all  her  life  in  the  political  society  of  the  Capital, 
and  has  an  instinctive  understanding  of  public  affairs.  She  describes  the 
romance  of  our  early  days,  their  men  and  women,  their  events,  develop- 
ments, causes,  movements,  with  the  sure  eye  and  hand  of  a  witty  and  pene- 
trating woman  of  the  world,  who  knows  how  to  distil  from  old  documents 
all  that  is  quintessentially  human.  She  cares  less  for  dates  than  happen- 
ings, less  for  specific  happenings  than  for  movements  and  currents  of 
feeling.  Her  reason  for  writing  this  book  is  to  emphasize  the  fact  that 
there  is  nothing  mummy-like  about  American  history,  however  much  his- 
torians may  have  made  it  seem  so,  but  that  it  is  full  of  inspiring  incident 
and  brimming  with  human  nature. 

Some  of  the  chapter-titles  are :  "An  Idol's  Successor,"  "A  Baleful 
Don  Quixote,"  "The  Opening  West,"  "A  Democratic  Despot,"  "Giants  in 
Congress,"  "As  Others  Saw  Us,"  "Roads  of  the  Promised  Land,"  "The 
Red  Menace,"  "Women  in  a  Free  Country,"  "Religion  in  a  Republic," 
"America's  War  of  Conquest,"  "The  Seers  and  the  Prophets."  The  book 
contains  sixteen  full-page  illustrations. 

Octavo,  521  pages,  illustrated 
Price  $2.50 

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PEKING    DUST 

By  Ellen  N.  La  Motte 

Author  of  "The  "Backwash  of  War,"  etc. 

This  is  a  book  of  memorable  sketches  of  modern  China,  whick 
gives  at  once  the  color  and  feel  of  the  China  of  the  Twentieth  Century 
and  lays  bare  the  incredible  bullying  and  robbing  of  a  great  but  weak 
nation  by  most  of  the  strong  nations  of  the  world.  Miss  La  Motte  has 
lived  in  China,  and  she  has  enjoyed  unusual  opportunities  of  observation. 
The  book  is  in  the  form  of  letters ;  and  the  style  is  intimate  and  easy 
and  colorful,  and  yet  marked  by  unusual  fire,  vigor  and  distinction. 

In  these  letters,  interspersed  between  descriptions  of  parties  at  the 
Legation,  camel  caravans,  temple  fairs  and  a  picture  of  "all  diplomatic 
Peking  scrambled  together  at  the  race  course,"  the  writer  describes 
several  interesting  events  which  have  not  been  dwelt  upon  by  the  Ameri- 
can press — the  French  "occupation"  of  Lao  Hsi  Kai,  the  betrayal  of 
China  by  her  vice-president  to  the  Shanghai  Opium  Combine,  and  the 
events  which  preceded  China's  declaration  of  war.  Going  to  China  from 
a  Europe  ringing  with  the  phrases  "Justice,  Liberty  and  Civilization," 
the  author  was  struck  by  certain  discrepancies  in  the  application  of 
these  principles  to  the  Far  East.  The  book  gives  an  amusing,  ironic 
picture  of  "Civilization"  as  seen  from  the  back. 

l2mot  240  pages 

Illustrated  with  photographs 

Price,  $1.50 

At  All  Bookstores  T-Tjr    fTNTITRY    Cd    353  Fourth  Avenue 
Published  by    ■  "Ei    VCill  1  UI\  i     IU.  New  York  City 


STAKES    OF    THE    WAR 

By  LOTHROP  STODDARD  ana 

Glenn  Frank 

This  book  is  a  clearly  outlined  summary  of  the  facts  involved  in 
the  problems  of  race  and  territory  that  were  the  stakes  of  the  war; 
the  problems,  for  example,  of  Belgium,  the  Ukraine,  the  Yugo-Slav 
territories,  Finland,  the  Baltic  Provinces,  Poland,  Serbia,  Mesopotamia, 
Syria,  etc.  The  facts  of  each  problem  are  so  arranged  that,  even 
though  the  reader  has  little  previous  knowledge  of  the  subject,  he  can 
get  a  complete  and  well-balanced  idea  of  the  issues  involved. 

In  the  presentation  of  each  territorial  section,  there  is  given  a  short 
historical  background,  an  economic  survey,  and  a  clear  analysis  of  the 
facts  that  one  most  desires  to  know;  such  facts  as,  the  location,  the 
different  races  comprising  the  population,  what  nation  has  controlled  or 
occupied  the  territory,  the  political,  economic,  strategic,  racial,  cultural 
and  religious  interests  that  various  nations  have  in  it,  and  a  summary  of 
the  various  solutions  that  have  been  proposed.  In  summarizing  the  solu- 
tions that  have  been  proposed,  the  authors  have  not  expressed  their  per- 
sonal opinions  but  have  simply  listed  what  the  proposers  of  and  objectors 
to  each,  solution  have  argued.  ■ 

The  book  is  well  provided  with  maps  that  visualize  the  text  matter. 
Each  chapter  is  provided  with  a  black  and  white  outline  map  of  the 
territory  discussed.  Three  large  general  maps  in  colors  show  the  whole 
field  covered  by  the  book;  and  there  are  political,  racial  and  economic 
maps. 

8vo,  377  pages 

Thirteen  political,  racial,  and  economic  maps 

Price,  $2.50 

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Z  THE  CENTURY  CO. 


Published  by    ■  »«■*    \/l«il!*V*%*     \,\J.  New  York  City 


THE    ROOTS 
OF    THE    WAR 

By,  William  Stearns  Davis 

In  Collaboration  with  William  Anderson  and  Mason  M.  Tyler 

This  book  undertakes  to  outline  the  circumstances  that  made  possible 
Germany's  inconceivably  daring  attempt  to  achieve  at  one,  or,  at  most, 
two  or  three  ruthless  and  gigantic  strokes  of  the  sword,  the  establishment 
of  a  world  empire,  an  Empire  of  Teutonia,  indescribably  vaster,  richer, 
more  universal  than  that  of   imperial   Rome. 

President  Wilson,  himself  a  historian,  has  said :  "You  can  explain 
most  wars  very  simply,  but  the  explanation  of  this  war  is  not  so  simple. 
Its  roots  run  deep  into  all  the  obscure  soils  of  history." 

It  is  to  discover  some  of  these  roots  and  their  fateful  growth  that 
this  book  was  written.  It  covers  especially  the  period  from  1870  to  1914, 
with  background  references  of  course  to  proceeding  European  history. 

The  authors  say  in  their  preface:  "By  general  consent  the  period  of 
history  which  ended  in  1914  saw  its  beginning  in  1870  when  the  Prussian 
militarists  won  their  original  triumph  over  France,  thereby  establishing 
a  precedent  for  the  use  of  armed  force  as  a  wise  supplement  to  flagging 
diplomacy,  a  precedent  that  was  to  be  applied  with  incalculable  effect  upon 
a  much  greater  field  of  action  forty-four  years  later.  During  this  interval 
a  great  many  national  and  international  forces  were  acting  simultaneous- 
ly which  all  together  helped  to  produce  the  climax  of  Armageddon," 

l2mo,  557  pages,  6  maps 
Price,  $1.50 

At  All  Bookstores    TUI7    iTMTITDV    Cf\     353  Fourth  Avenue 
Published  by    lllEi    \XlllUI\I     tU.  New  York  City 


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